Douglas Brown v. City of Caldwell , 570 F. App'x 679 ( 2014 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT APR 18 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
DOUGLAS A. BROWN, No. 12-35881
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:10-cv-00536-BLW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CITY OF CALDWELL, a subdivision of
the State of Idaho,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 10, 2014
Seattle, Washington
Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, and RAWLINSON and BEA, Circuit Judges.
We review the district court’s rejection of Plaintiff-Appellant Douglas
Brown’s proposed jury instruction de novo because the rejection was based on a
question of Idaho law. See Snake River Valley Elec. Ass’n v. PacifiCorp, 357 F.3d
1042, 1052 n.11 (9th Cir. 2004). The Idaho Supreme Court has not held that the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Circuit Rule 36-3.
causation standard for retaliatory discharge claims under the Idaho Protection of
Public Employees Act, Idaho Code § 6-2101 et seq., is less stringent than the
standard of “but for” causation. See Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue, 224
P.3d 458 (Idaho 2008). Moreover, while Jury Instruction 18 did require “but for”
causation, it also stated that the protected activity “need not be the only cause” of
the employment action. Because the district court’s jury instruction did not
conflict with Idaho law, we AFFIRM.
We do not review Brown’s claim regarding the burden-shifting framework
articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), because
Brown has not proved he challenged this aspect of the jury instructions at the
district court. See Bird v. Lewis & Clark College, 303 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir.
2002).
AFFIRMED.
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