United States v. Charles Chaney ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                          FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        DEC 24 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                      U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No. 11-30349
    Plaintiff - Appellee,             D.C. No. 3:11-cr-00010-HRH-1
    District of Alaska,
    v.                                            Anchorage
    CHARLES CHANEY,
    ORDER
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
    The memorandum disposition filed on September 10, 2012 is withdrawn and
    replaced with the accompanying amended memorandum disposition.
    With these amendments, the panel has voted to deny the petition for panel
    rehearing.
    The petition for panel rehearing is DENIED. No further petitions shall be
    permitted.
    FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              DEC 24 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 11-30349
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 3:11-cr-00010-HRH-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    CHARLES CHANEY,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Alaska
    H. Russel Holland, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted August 30, 2012 **
    Anchorage, Alaska
    Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
    Charles Chaney (“Chaney”) appeals the district court’s denial of his motion
    to suppress two recorded interviews with police officers in their car. Chaney
    argues that his statements, though voluntary, should have been suppressed under
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, as the statements were the product of an
    illegal police entry into his home. We review de novo the district court’s denial of
    a motion to suppress evidence, and review for clear error underlying factual
    findings. United States v. Bynum, 
    362 F.3d 574
    , 578 (9th Cir. 2004).
    Voluntary statements should be suppressed where officers confront the
    suspect with illegally obtained evidence, or where the defendant’s answers during
    questioning may have been “induced or influenced by the illegal search.” United
    States v. Shetler, 
    665 F.3d 1150
    , 1158 (9th Cir. 2011). Chaney’s statements were
    not a “product of the initial illegal search.” 
    Id. at 1159
    . The police discovered
    sufficient evidence prior to the illegal search that rendered the evidence discovered
    in Chaney’s home de minimis. See United States v. Green, 
    523 F.2d 968
    , 972 (9th
    Cir. 1975). Officer Arthur Dull testified that he recognized Chaney on sight in an
    all terrain vehicle with a stolen police radar gun strapped to the front of it. The
    still-warm all terrain vehicle with the radar gun was later parked outside Chaney’s
    home. Chaney was aware that the police had this information when he voluntarily
    decided to speak to the police and to deny involvement in the theft. Chaney did
    not change his story when confronted with additional physical evidence obtained in
    the home. Finally, in the first interview, no mention was made of the evidence
    from the illegal search, and in the second interview, a single reference to the
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    evidence did not change Chaney’s story and was redacted before the recording was
    played for the jury. Thus, the circumstances surrounding Chaney’s statements
    indicate that they were not induced by the search. The district court properly
    denied the suppression motion.
    Chaney also appeals the district court’s denial of his request for a mistrial.
    He argues that the agent’s inadmissible opinion testimony that Chaney appeared
    “nervous and untruthful” was prejudicial and willful. We review for abuse of
    discretion a district court’s denial of a mistrial request. United States v.
    Washington, 
    462 F.3d 1124
    , 1135 (9th Cir. 2006). Reversal is warranted when the
    defendant shows that “the misconduct materially affected the verdict.” United
    States v. Tucker, 
    641 F.3d 1110
    , 1120 (9th Cir. 2011).
    The agent’s statement was not prejudicial and did not affect the verdict.
    Chaney admitted that he was involved in the vehicle theft. The jury heard credible
    testimony regarding Chaney’s use of the police officer’s firearm. The jury also
    heard several phone calls during which Chaney discussed the theft. Finally, the
    judge properly admonished the jury regarding the agent’s testimony. A jury is
    presumed to follow the district court’s curative instructions. Doe ex. rel.
    Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 
    232 F.3d 1258
    , 1270 (9th Cir. 2000). Taking the context
    of the trial as a whole, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
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    discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial because the agent’s testimony did
    not materially impact the verdict.
    AFFIRMED.
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