Randal Anderson v. Union Pacific Railroad Company ( 2009 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 04 2009
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RANDAL ANDERSON, No. 08-16541
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:06-CV-02813-FCD-
GGH
v.
MEMORANDUM *
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, and Does 1 through 25,
inclusive,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Frank C. Damrell, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 5, 2009
San Francisco, California
Before: HAWKINS and THOMAS, Circuit Judges, and TRAGER,** District
Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable David G. Trager, Senior United States District Judge
for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
Plaintiff Randal Anderson ("plaintiff" or "Anderson") appeals the district
court's grant of summary judgment on his claims that defendant Union Pacific
Railroad Company ("defendant" or "Union Pacific") breached an implied-in-fact
contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by terminating his
employment. We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo.
Nicholson v. Hyannis Air Service, Inc., 580 F.3d 1116, 1122 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009).
Although the district court held that Anderson did not have an
implied-in-fact contract limiting his termination to good cause, it is unnecessary to
reach that issue because there is an alternative ground on which to affirm the
district court's judgment. Even if the alleged implied-in-fact contract existed,
defendant had good cause, as a matter of law, to terminate Anderson. As such,
summary judgment was also warranted on plaintiff's claim based on the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l Inc., 8 P.3d 1089,
1112 (Cal. 2000) ("insofar as the employer's acts are directly actionable as a breach
of an implied-in-fact contract term, a claim that merely realleges that breach as a
violation of the [implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing] is superfluous").
The parties are familiar with the facts and we recount them here only as
necessary.
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The record reveals three reasons for Anderson's termination. First, as
explained in his termination letter, Anderson's comments about a coworker,
Andrea Young, in the presence of other employees were found to be inappropriate,
unprofessional and in violation of Union Pacific's EEO policy ("first reason").
Second, the letter concluded that, contrary to Deputy Chief George Slaats'
instructions, Anderson's deliberate attempts to contact individuals in order to
influence Union Pacific's investigation of Young's EEO complaint were "a major
aggravating circumstance" in his termination ("second reason"). Third, although
not mentioned in the letter, his supervisors also considered Anderson's
inappropriate conduct toward Jessica Hamilton and Jill Meyer, two other
coworkers, in deciding to terminate him ("third reason").
Under California law, "good cause" is defined as:
fair and honest reasons, regulated by good faith on the
part of the employer, that are not trivial, arbitrary or
capricious, unrelated to business needs or goals, or
pretextual. A reasoned conclusion, in short, supported by
substantial evidence gathered through an adequate
investigation that includes notice of the claimed
misconduct and a chance for the employee to respond.
Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int'l, Inc., 948 P.2d 412, 422 (Cal. 1998).
Thus, Cotran requires procedural safeguards and also sets out a substantive
standard to analyze the employer's reasons for termination. Cotran also makes
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clear that where an employee is terminated for misconduct, but denies committing
the alleged misconduct, "the question critical to defendants' liability is not whether
plaintiff in fact [committed the misconduct], but whether at the time the decision to
terminate his employment was made, defendants, acting in good faith and
following an investigation that was appropriate under the circumstances, had
reasonable grounds for believing plaintiff had done so." Id. at 423. Where
appropriate, summary judgment may be granted on the issue of good cause. See
King v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 359, 370-72 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007); Silva v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 382, 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
When viewed together, the first and second reasons for Anderson's
termination satisfy Cotran's substantive standard as a matter of law. Moreover,
Cotran's procedural requirements were clearly satisfied with regard to the first
reason. The only remaining questions are: (1) whether those requirements were
met for the second reason; and (2) if they were not, whether any procedural
deficiencies prejudiced Anderson.1
1
Because we ultimately conclude that summary judgment is warranted
based on the first and second reasons, it is unnecessary to consider the third reason
for Anderson's termination.
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Although Anderson was given an opportunity at his March 22 interview
with Slaats to respond to the allegations underlying the second reason, this may not
have been sufficient to satisfy Cotran because Chief Dennis Jenson had already
decided on March 20 to terminate Anderson. See Cotran, 948 P.2d at 423 (Mosk,
J., concurring) ("[T]he requirement that an employee receive notice and an
opportunity to be heard is not fulfilled by a charade of due process by an employer
that has already made up its mind . . . . fair procedure requires that the employee
have a truly meaningful opportunity to tell his or her side of the story and to
influence the employer's decision.") (internal citation omitted).
Nonetheless, any procedural violation was ultimately harmless and did not
prejudice Anderson. Critically, at the March 22 interview, Anderson admitted that
he spoke with a coworker, Jennifer Johnson, about Young's complaint and that he
attempted to contact Hamilton and Meyer. Moreover, as explained below,
Anderson has not pointed to any mitigating circumstances or excuses for his
conduct that could lead a reasonable juror to question Union Pacific's decision to
terminate Anderson.
On appeal, Anderson points to two allegedly mitigating circumstances,
neither of which raise an issue of fact on the question of good cause. First,
Anderson claims that Slaats' directive ("I'd ask that you not discuss this with
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anyone") was ambiguous. However, Anderson's interpretations of Slaats' directive
are patently absurd in light of Anderson's law enforcement experience and
admission that such instructions were standard procedure in investigations.
Moreover, there is no evidence that Anderson ever claimed that Slaats' directive
was ambiguous when Slaats gave him an opportunity to explain his actions on
March 22.
Second, Anderson's declaration suggests that his violation of Slaats' directive
should be excused because he had no plans to coach any witnesses regarding what
they should say during the investigation and only attempted to contact Hamilton to
advise her to seek counsel. However, even if Anderson never intended to coach
any witnesses, his actions, including informing Johnson that she was named in
Young's complaint, were likely to influence the investigation. Moreover,
Anderson's declaration ignores his admission at his deposition that he attempted to
contact Hamilton and Meyer to find out who they had talked to and how his
comment about Young had gotten back to her. Any discussions with Hamilton and
Meyer on those topics undoubtedly could influence the investigation.
AFFIRMED.
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