Genesis Insurance Co. v. Magma Design Automation, Inc. , 705 F. App'x 505 ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    JUL 7 2017
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    GENESIS INSURANCE COMPANY,                       No.   15-16999
    Plaintiff-counter-claim-           D.C. No. 5:06-cv-05526-EJD
    defendant-Appellee,
    v.                                              MEMORANDUM*
    MAGMA DESIGN AUTOMATION,
    INC.,
    Defendant-counter-claim-
    3rd-party-plaintiff-
    Appellee,
    v.
    NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE
    COMPANY, of Pittsburgh, PA,
    Third-party-defendant-
    Appellant,
    and
    EXECUTIVE RISK INDEMNITY, INC.,
    Third-party-defendant.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Edward J. Davila, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted June 16, 2017
    San Francisco, California
    Before: SCHROEDER, FISHER,** and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    National Union Fire Insurance Company (“National Union”) appeals the
    district court’s order granting partial summary judgment in favor of Genesis
    Insurance Company (“Genesis”) and Magma Design Automation, Inc. (“Magma”).
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    1.1 Under the law of the case doctrine, “a court is generally precluded from
    reconsidering an issue previously decided by the same court, or a higher court in
    the identical case.” United States v. Lummi Nation, 
    763 F.3d 1180
    , 1185 (9th Cir.
    2014) (citation omitted). “For the doctrine to apply, the issue in question must have
    been decided explicitly or by necessary implication in the previous disposition.”
    
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    **
    The Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit Judge for the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
    1
    Judge Fisher would resolve this first issue on summary judgment, rather
    than law of the case, grounds.
    2
    The issue presented in this case is whether the information Magma provided
    to Executive Risk Indemnity, Inc. (“ERII”) is sufficient to constitute a “notice of
    circumstances” under ERII’s 2003-04 Policy (“2003-04 Policy”). In Genesis I, this
    court held that the information Magma provided to Genesis was not sufficient to
    constitute a “notice of circumstances.” Genesis Ins. Co. v. Magma Design
    Automation, Inc. (“Genesis I”), 386 F. App’x 728, 730 (9th Cir. 2010) (mem.).
    Because Magma provided the same material information to ERII as it provided to
    Genesis, the law of the case doctrine applies and our prior holding that the
    information was not sufficient to constitute a “notice of circumstances” is
    applicable here.
    Even if the law of the case doctrine did not apply, the district court properly
    entered partial summary judgment against National Union when it held that the
    2003-04 Policy was not triggered, because no reasonable jury could find that the
    information Magma provided to ERII was sufficient to constitute a “notice of
    circumstances” under the terms of the insurance policy. The parties agree that the
    only information Magma provided to ERII that it did not provide to Genesis was a
    phone call whereby Magma explained how the patent litigation could morph into a
    directors and officers lawsuit. However, this “additional information” is not
    relevant under the “notice of circumstances” provision, because it is not “a
    3
    description of the Claim [or] circumstances,” it does not involve “the nature of the
    alleged or potential damage,” it does not include “the names of all actual or
    potential claimants,” and it does not include “the manner in which [the] Insured
    first became aware of the Claim [or] circumstances.” And even if the information
    provided during the phone call were relevant, no reasonable jury could find this
    information constitutes a “notice of circumstances” or corrects the deficiencies of
    the earlier written information, because the policy requires that a “notice of
    circumstances” be in writing.
    Because we now hold that ERII was not provided a “notice of
    circumstances” under the 2003-04 Policy, ERII can properly “adjust its records” to
    reflect exhaustion of its 2004-06 Policy. Since ERII’s 2004-06 Policy is deemed
    exhausted, National Union is now liable for providing first-layer excess insurance
    coverage pursuant to the National Union 2004-06 Policy. Therefore, Genesis is
    entitled to recover its $5 million settlement payment from National Union.
    2. The district court used the correct date of accrual in calculating the
    prejudgment interest award. California courts have “uniformly . . . interpreted the
    ‘vesting’ requirement as being satisfied at the time that the amount of damages
    become certain or capable of being made certain, not the time liability to pay those
    amounts is determined.” Evanston Ins. Co. v. OEA, Inc., 
    566 F.3d 915
    , 921 (9th
    4
    Cir. 2009) (listing cases). It is the “amount [that] must be vested, not . . . the legal
    entitlement to that amount.” 
    Id.
    The amount of damages became certain on July 21, 2008, when Genesis
    made the $5 million payment to the settlement of the securities litigation. Thus, the
    district court properly held that July 21, 2008, was the date of accrual.
    3. The district court applied the correct interest rate in calculating the
    prejudgment interest award. “In the insurance context, [equitable subrogation]
    permits the paying insurer to be placed in the shoes of the insured and to pursue
    recovery from third parties responsible to the insured for the loss for which the
    insurer was liable and paid.” Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 
    26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762
    , 767-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). Equitable subrogation rights are “purely
    derivative.” State Bar of Cal. v. Statile, 
    86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72
    , 81 (Cal. Ct. App.
    2008).
    Because the right to which Genesis has become subrogated is the right to
    coverage defined by the insurance policy between Magma and National Union, it is
    a contractual right to which Genesis has succeeded and which defines the
    obligation in question. In contract cases, the applicable rate of prejudgment interest
    is “10 percent per annum” after the breach. 
    Cal. Civ. Code § 3289
    (b). Therefore,
    the district court applied the correct interest rate.
    5
    AFFIRMED.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-16999

Citation Numbers: 705 F. App'x 505

Judges: Schroeder, Fisher, Smith

Filed Date: 7/7/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024