Lucas Lemus-Gonzales v. William Barr ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 17 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LUCAS LEMUS-GONZALES, AKA Carlos No. 17-73019
Hacon, AKA Carlos Roberto Hacon, AKA
Lucas Lemus-Gonzalez, AKA Carlos Agency No. A200-681-833
Mallen-Laines, AKA Carlos Roberto,
Petitioner, MEMORANDUM*
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 3, 2019**
Portland, Oregon
Before: MURGUIA and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and ZIPPS,*** District Judge.
After Lucas Lemus-Gonzales was placed in removal proceedings and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Jennifer G. Zipps, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
conceded removability, an immigration judge (“IJ”) denied Lemus-Gonzales’s
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
dismissed Lemus-Gonzales’s appeal. We have jurisdiction of this petition for review
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.
1. The IJ did not err in concluding that Lemus-Gonzales’s asylum application
was untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). The application describes a
continuation of the events that prompted Lemus-Gonzales to leave Guatemala in
2002, but that is merely “[n]ew evidence confirming what [he] already knew . . .
[and] does not constitute changed circumstances.” Budiono v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042,
1047 (9th Cir. 2016). And, Lemus-Gonzales also demonstrated no extraordinary
circumstances justifying the approximately ten-year delay in filing his application.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D).
2. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Lemus-Gonzales failed
to demonstrate a nexus between any alleged persecution by a gang and his family
social group. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). The IJ’s conclusion that family
membership was irrelevant to the gang’s pecuniary and personal motivations was
supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion
that Lemus-Gonzales was the victim of “harassment by criminals motivated by
theft,” which “bears no nexus to a protected ground.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d
2
1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Molina-Morales v. INS, 237 F.3d 1048, 1052
(9th Cir. 2001) (“[P]urely personal retribution is, of course, not persecution on
account of [a protected ground].”) (quoting Grava v. INS, 205 F.3d 1177, 1181 n.3
(9th Cir. 2000)).
3. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Lemus-Gonzales did
not demonstrate it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if returned to
Guatemala. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Any past mistreatment did not arise to
the level of torture and the threat of future robberies “does not provide a sufficient
basis to conclude that any harm . . . would rise to the level of torture.” Lopez v.
Sessions, 901 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2018).
PETITION DENIED
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