Kevin Allen v. v. Bentacourt ( 2023 )


Menu:
  •                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           MAR 3 2023
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    KEVIN ALLEN,                                       No. 20-17479
    Plaintiff-Appellant,              D.C. No. 1:18-cv-01187-DAD-
    GSA
    v.
    V. BENTACOURT; et al.,                             MEMORANDUM*
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 1, 2023**
    Before HAWKINS, S.R. THOMAS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges:
    California state prisoner Kevin Allen appeals pro se the judgment dismissing
    his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-
    confinement claim. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We construe
    Allen’s post-decision filings as notification to the district court of his intent to stand
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
    oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    on his first amended complaint (“FAC”), Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 
    356 F.3d 1058
    , 1063‒65 (9th Cir. 2004), and review the dismissal of the FAC for failure to
    state a claim de novo, Resnick v. Hayes, 
    213 F.3d 443
    , 447 (9th Cir. 2000).1 We
    affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
    Allen’s conditions-of-confinement claim against defendants John Does
    Numbers 1 through 4 were properly dismissed because Allen failed to allege facts
    sufficient to show that these defendants were deliberately indifferent to his health
    and safety. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 
    627 F.3d 338
    , 341‒42 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining
    that although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present
    factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); Johnson v. Lewis,
    
    217 F.3d 726
    , 731, 734 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth the elements of an Eighth
    Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim).
    Nor was there an abuse of discretion in denying Allen’s motions for
    appointment of counsel because Allen failed to demonstrate exceptional
    circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 
    560 F.3d 965
    , 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
    forth the standard of review and “exceptional circumstances” requirement). As the
    1
    The district court dismissed the FAC for failure to state a claim and instructed Allen
    to file an amended complaint within thirty days. It failed to notify Allen that he
    could elect to stand on his FAC. Nonetheless, Allen pro se filed a motion following
    the decision that indicated a desire to stand on the complaint and requesting the
    ability to appeal immediately because he believed the FAC had stated a claim.
    Plaintiff’s “decision to forego amending [his] complaint was perfectly proper,”
    Edwards, 
    356 F.3d at 1063
    , and should have been construed as such.
    2                                    20-17479
    district court noted, Allen’s conditions-of-confinement claim was not complex, and
    he appeared able to adequately articulate his claims.
    The district court did, however, err by dismissing Allen’s conditions-of-
    confinement claim against defendants Bentacourt, Ochoa, Sandaval, and
    Valdovinos. Allen alleged that the toilet in his cell clogged and overflowed feces
    and urine in his cell for a period of seven days, and that these defendants failed to
    adequately address the sanitation issue, thereby exhibiting deliberate indifference.
    As alleged in the complaint, the toilet became clogged on January 23 and Allen made
    numerous complaints about the smell and lack of a working toilet for the next several
    days. The prison grievance and appeal records indicate a work order was not filed
    until January 29, and that a plumber resolved the problem the same day.2
    As the district court noted, “the odor, unsanitary conditions, and risk posed by
    raw sewage is obvious” and “the more basic the need, the shorter the time it can be
    withheld.” However, the court concluded that the defendants were not deliberately
    indifferent to the situation because they “submitted a work order, made follow-up
    phone calls, provided the inmates with a mop, attempted to find an empty cell
    available for Plaintiff and his cell mate, and offered showers to the inmates.” This
    2
    The grievance appeals also mention a toilet work order on January 18, but this was
    prior to and apparently unrelated to the event alleged by Allen in the complaint on
    January 23.
    3                                   20-17479
    conclusion appears to come from statements in the complaint in which Allen relates
    that the defendants told him they were filing a work order or going to make a follow-
    up call; however, the prison grievance records attached to the complaint clearly
    reflect that no work order or other action was taken until January 29, which is
    consistent with Allen’s allegations that he lived in squalor for a week until something
    was done.
    Allen’s allegations are “sufficient to warrant ordering [defendants] to file an
    answer.” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 
    680 F.3d 1113
    , 1116 (9th Cir. 2012); see Johnson,
    
    217 F.3d at 731, 734
    ; Anderson v. County of Kern, 
    45 F.3d 1310
    , 1314‒15 (9th Cir.
    1995) (subjecting a prisoner to a lack of sanitation can constitute an Eighth
    Amendment violation). We therefore reverse the district court’s dismissal of Allen’s
    conditions-of-confinement claim against defendants Bentacourt, Ochoa, Sandaval,
    and Valdovinos, and remand for further proceedings as to these defendants only.
    Allen’s motion to notify the court of new authority (Docket Entry No. 7) is
    granted. Allen’s motion to appoint counsel (Docket Entry No. 7) is denied.
    AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED. Appellees
    shall bear the costs on appeal.
    4                                    20-17479