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FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 11 2010 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ROSS MASSBAUM, No. 08-55406 Plaintiff-counter-defendant - D.C. No. 8:07-cv-00096-DOC- Appellant, RNB v. MEMORANDUM * WNC MANAGEMENT; et al., Defendants-counter-claimants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding Submitted December 15, 2009 ** Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges. Ross Massbaum appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for defendants in his action alleging housing discrimination on the basis of race * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). LSS/Research and disability. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Gamble v. City of Escondido,
104 F.3d 300, 304 (9th Cir. 1997), and we affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment on the Fair Housing Act claim because Massbaum failed to raise a triable issue as to whether the defendants acted with any discriminatory intent during the events at issue, or whether their practices disproportionately impacted any particular racial group. See McDonald v. Coldwell Banker,
543 F.3d 498, 505 n.7 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a disparate treatment claim under the Fair Housing Act requires some showing of discriminatory intent, while a disparate impact claim requires, inter alia, showing “a significantly . . . disproportionate impact on persons of a particular type produced by the defendant’s facially neutral acts or practices”). For the same reasons, summary judgment was proper on the claims brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1981and Title VI. See Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit,
335 F.3d 932, 944 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Title VI itself directly reach[es] only instances of intentional discrimination.”); De Horney v. Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n,
879 F.2d 459, 467 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]o establish a § 1981 claim, the plaintiff must prove intentional or purposeful discrimination.”). LSS/Research 2 08-55406 Summary judgment was proper on the
42 U.S.C. § 1982claim because Massbaum did not show he is a member of a racial minority. See Phiffer v. Proud Parrot Motor Hotel, Inc.,
648 F.2d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1980). Summary judgment was proper on the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act claims, because Massbaum failed to raise a triable issue as to whether defendants discriminated against him on the basis of a disability. See Weinreich v. Los Angeles County Metro. Transp. Auth.,
114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act require proof of discrimination by reason of a disability). Massbaum’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive. AFFIRMED. LSS/Research 3 08-55406
Document Info
Docket Number: 08-55406
Judges: Goodwin, Wallace, Clifton
Filed Date: 1/11/2010
Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024