United States v. County of Maricopa , 889 F.3d 648 ( 2018 )


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  •                      FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 15-17558
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                        2:12-cv-00981-ROS
    COUNTY OF MARICOPA, Arizona,
    Defendant-Appellant,                     OPINION
    and
    PAUL PENZONE,* in his official
    capacity as Sheriff of Maricopa
    County, Arizona,
    Defendant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Roslyn O. Silver, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted September 15, 2017
    San Francisco, California
    Filed May 7, 2018
    *
    Paul Penzone is the current Sheriff of Maricopa County and has,
    therefore, been automatically substituted for his predecessor, Joseph M.
    Arpaio. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
    2          UNITED STATES V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA
    Before: Ronald M. Gould, Richard C. Tallman,
    and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Watford
    SUMMARY**
    Civil Rights
    The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment
    in favor of the United States, which brought this action to halt
    racially discriminatory policing policies concerning traffic
    stops instituted by Joseph Arpaio, the former Sheriff of
    Maricopa County, Arizona.
    The panel held that Sheriff Arpaio acted as a final
    policymaker for the County. The panel further held that
    because the traffic-stop policies at issue fell with the scope of
    a sheriff’s law-enforcement duties, Arpaio acted as a final
    policymaker for Maricopa County when he instituted those
    policies.
    The panel held that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
    1964 and 34 U.S.C. § 12601 authorized policymaker liability.
    The panel further held that the proper standard for
    determining which employees have the power to establish an
    entity’s “official policy” under Title VI and 34 U.S.C.
    § 12601 is the standard that governs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
    The panel concluded that Maricopa County was liable for
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    UNITED STATES V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA                3
    violations of Title VI and § 12601 stemming from its own
    official policies. Finally the panel held that when Arpaio
    adopted the racially discriminatory traffic-stop policies at
    issue, he acted as a final policymaker for the County, and the
    district court correctly held the County liable for the
    violations of Title VI and § 12601 caused by those policies.
    The panel held that the district court properly applied
    issue preclusion to bar the County from relitigating the
    lawfulness of Arpaio’s traffic-stop policies because the
    County was bound by prior adverse findings. See Melendres
    v. Arpaio, 
    695 F.3d 990
    (9th Cir. 2012).
    COUNSEL
    Richard K. Walker (argued), Walker & Peskind PLLC,
    Scottsdale, Arizona, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Elizabeth Parr Hecker (argued) and Thomas E. Chandler,
    Attorneys; Gregory B. Friel, Deputy Assistant Attorney
    General; Civil Rights Division, United States Department of
    Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    4         UNITED STATES V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA
    OPINION
    WATFORD, Circuit Judge:
    The United States brought this action to halt racially
    discriminatory policing policies instituted by Joseph Arpaio,
    the former Sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona. Under
    Arpaio’s leadership, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office
    (MCSO) routinely targeted Latino drivers and passengers for
    pretextual traffic stops aimed at detecting violations of
    federal immigration law. Based on that and other unlawful
    conduct, the United States sued Arpaio, MCSO, and the
    County of Maricopa under two statutes: Title VI of the Civil
    Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and 34 U.S.C.
    § 12601 (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141).1 The
    district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
    United States on the claims relating to the unlawful traffic
    stops; the parties settled the remaining claims. Maricopa
    County is the lone appellant here. Its main contention is that
    it cannot be held liable for the unlawful traffic-stop policies
    implemented by Arpaio.
    We begin with a summary of the lengthy legal
    proceedings involving Arpaio’s unlawful policing policies.
    In an earlier class action lawsuit, Melendres v. Arpaio, a
    group of plaintiffs representing a class of Latino drivers and
    passengers sued Arpaio, MCSO, and the County of Maricopa
    1
    Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of “race, color, or
    national origin” in programs or activities that receive federal funding;
    § 12601 authorizes the United States to obtain declaratory and injunctive
    relief against any governmental authority that engages in a “pattern or
    practice of conduct by law enforcement officers” that deprives persons of
    rights protected by federal law.
    UNITED STATES V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA                   5
    under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VI. They alleged that
    execution of Arpaio’s racially discriminatory traffic-stop
    policies violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
    Amendments. Following a bench trial, the district court ruled
    in the plaintiffs’ favor and granted broad injunctive relief,
    which we largely upheld on appeal. See Melendres v. Arpaio,
    
    695 F.3d 990
    (9th Cir. 2012); Melendres v. Arpaio, 
    784 F.3d 1254
    (9th Cir. 2015) (Melendres II).
    While the Melendres action was proceeding, the United
    States filed this suit. Among other things, the United States
    challenged the legality of the same traffic-stop policies at
    issue in Melendres. The United States named as defendants
    Arpaio, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Maricopa
    County; MCSO; and Maricopa County. Early on, the district
    court dismissed MCSO from the action in light of the Arizona
    Court of Appeals’ decision in Braillard v. Maricopa County,
    
    232 P.3d 1263
    (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010), which held that MCSO
    is a non-jural entity that cannot be sued in its own name. 
    Id. at 1269.
    Throughout the proceedings below, the County argued
    that it too should be dismissed as a defendant, on two
    different grounds. First, the County argued that when a
    sheriff in Arizona adopts policies relating to law-enforcement
    matters, such as the traffic-stop policies at issue here, he does
    not act as a policymaker for the county. He instead acts as a
    policymaker for his own office, or perhaps for the State. The
    County contended that, because Arpaio’s policies were not
    policies of the County, it could not be held liable for the
    constitutional violations caused by execution of them.
    Second, the County argued that, even if Arpaio acted as a
    policymaker for the County, neither Title VI nor 34 U.S.C.
    6        UNITED STATES V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA
    § 12601 permits a local government to be held liable for the
    actions of its policymakers.
    The district court rejected both of the County’s
    arguments. The court then granted the United States’ motion
    for summary judgment with respect to claims predicated on
    the traffic-stop policies found unlawful in Melendres. The
    court held that the County was barred by the doctrine of issue
    preclusion from relitigating the issues decided in the
    Melendres action, which by that point had reached final
    judgment. The County does not contest that if the Melendres
    findings are binding here, they establish violations of Title VI
    and § 12601.
    On appeal, Maricopa County advances three arguments:
    (1) Arpaio did not act as a final policymaker for the County;
    (2) neither Title VI nor § 12601 renders the County liable for
    the actions of its policymakers; and (3) the County is not
    bound by the Melendres findings. We address each of these
    arguments in turn.
    I
    We have already rejected Maricopa County’s first
    argument—that Arpaio was not a final policymaker for the
    County. In Melendres v. Maricopa County, 
    815 F.3d 645
    (9th Cir. 2016) (Melendres III), we noted that “Arizona state
    law makes clear that Sheriff Arpaio’s law-enforcement acts
    constitute Maricopa County policy since he ‘has final
    policymaking authority.’” 
    Id. at 650
    (quoting Flanders v.
    Maricopa County, 
    54 P.3d 837
    , 847 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002)).
    Because that determination was arguably dicta, we have
    conducted our own analysis of the issue, and we reach the
    same conclusion.
    UNITED STATES V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA                   7
    To determine whether Arpaio acted as a final policymaker
    for the County, we consult Arizona’s Constitution and
    statutes, and the court decisions interpreting them. See
    McMillian v. Monroe County, 
    520 U.S. 781
    , 786 (1997);
    Weiner v. San Diego County, 
    210 F.3d 1025
    , 1029 (9th Cir.
    2000). Those sources confirm that, with respect to law-
    enforcement matters, sheriffs in Arizona act as final
    policymakers for their respective counties.
    Arizona’s Constitution and statutes designate sheriffs as
    officers of the county. The Arizona Constitution states:
    “There are hereby created in and for each organized county
    of the state the following officers who shall be elected by the
    qualified electors thereof: a sheriff, a county attorney, a
    recorder, a treasurer, an assessor, a superintendent of schools
    and at least three supervisors . . . .” Ariz. Const. Art. 12, § 3
    (emphasis added). The relevant Arizona statute explicitly
    states that sheriffs are “officers of the county.” Ariz. Rev.
    Stat. § 11-401(A)(1).
    Arizona statutes also empower counties to supervise and
    fund their respective sheriffs. The county board of
    supervisors may “[s]upervise the official conduct of all
    county officers,” including the sheriff, to ensure that “the
    officers faithfully perform their duties.” Ariz. Rev. Stat.
    § 11-251(1). The board may also “require any county officer
    to make reports under oath on any matter connected with the
    duties of his office,” and may remove an officer who neglects
    or refuses to do so. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-253(A). In addition,
    the county must pay the sheriff’s expenses. Ariz. Rev. Stat.
    § 11-444(A); 
    Braillard, 232 P.3d at 1269
    n.2. As Maricopa
    County conceded in Melendres, those expenses include the
    costs of complying with any injunctive relief ordered against
    Arpaio and MCSO. See Melendres 
    III, 815 F.3d at 650
    . A
    8        UNITED STATES V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA
    county’s financial responsibility for the sheriff’s unlawful
    actions is strong evidence that the sheriff acts on behalf of the
    county rather than the State. See 
    McMillian, 520 U.S. at 789
    ;
    Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 
    715 F.3d 750
    , 758 (9th Cir.
    2013).
    The limited guidance Arizona courts have provided on
    this topic further confirms that sheriffs act as policymakers
    for their respective counties. Most on point is Flanders v.
    Maricopa County, 
    54 P.3d 837
    (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002), which
    held that then-Sheriff Arpaio acted as a final policymaker for
    Maricopa County with respect to jail administration. 
    Id. at 847.
    Flanders relied in part on the fact that the statutory
    provision that specifies a sheriff’s powers and duties lists
    “tak[ing] charge of and keep[ing] the county jail” as one of
    them. 
    Id. (citing Ariz.
    Rev. Stat. § 11-441(A)(5)). That same
    provision also lists a wide array of law-enforcement functions
    that fall within the sheriff’s powers and duties. Ariz. Rev.
    Stat. § 11-441(A)(1)–(3). Maricopa County does not explain
    why the Sheriff would be a final policymaker for the County
    with respect to jail administration but not with respect to the
    law-enforcement functions assigned to him in the same
    provision.
    It is true that sheriffs in Arizona are independently elected
    and that a county board of supervisors does not exercise
    complete control over a sheriff’s actions. Nonetheless, “the
    weight of the evidence” strongly supports the conclusion that
    sheriffs in Arizona act as final policymakers for their
    respective counties on law-enforcement matters. See
    
    McMillian, 520 U.S. at 793
    . Because the traffic-stop policies
    at issue fall within the scope of a sheriff’s law-enforcement
    duties, we conclude that Arpaio acted as a final policymaker
    for Maricopa County when he instituted those policies.
    UNITED STATES V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA                     9
    II
    Maricopa County next argues that, even if Arpaio acted
    as the County’s final policymaker, neither Title VI nor
    34 U.S.C. § 12601 permits the County to be held liable for his
    acts. Whether either statute authorizes policymaker liability
    is an issue of first impression. We conclude, informed by
    precedent governing the liability of local governments under
    42 U.S.C. § 1983, that both statutes authorize policymaker
    liability.
    The concept of policymaker liability under § 1983 is well
    developed. Section 1983 imposes liability on any “person”
    who, while acting under color of law, deprives someone of a
    right protected by the Constitution or federal law. In Monell
    v. New York City Department of Social Services, 
    436 U.S. 658
    (1978), the Supreme Court held that the term “person”
    includes municipalities, which had the effect of creating
    liability for local governments under § 1983. See 
    id. at 690.
    But the Court also limited the scope of that liability. It
    concluded that a local government may not be held
    vicariously liable for the acts of its employees under the
    doctrine of respondeat superior. 
    Id. at 691.
    Instead, liability
    arises only if a local government’s own official policy or
    custom caused the deprivation of federal rights. 
    Id. at 694.
    As the Court later explained, this “official policy”
    requirement is intended to ensure that a municipality’s
    liability “is limited to acts that are, properly speaking, acts ‘of
    the municipality’—that is, acts which the municipality has
    officially sanctioned or ordered.” Pembaur v. City of
    Cincinnati, 
    475 U.S. 469
    , 480 (1986).
    Under policymaker liability, only certain employees of a
    local government have the power to establish official policy
    10        UNITED STATES V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA
    on the government’s behalf. The government’s legislative
    body has such power, of course, but so do officials “whose
    edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.”
    
    Monell, 436 U.S. at 694
    . Such officials are those who
    exercise “final policymaking authority for the local
    governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have
    caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at
    issue.” 
    McMillian, 520 U.S. at 784
    –85 (internal quotation
    marks omitted). In essence, policymaker liability helps
    determine when an act can properly be deemed a
    government’s own act, such that the government may be held
    liable for deprivations of federal rights stemming from it.
    We think this same concept of policymaker liability
    applies under both Title VI and § 12601. As to Title VI, the
    Supreme Court has held that an entity’s liability is limited to
    the entity’s own misconduct, as it is under § 1983. See Davis
    ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education,
    
    526 U.S. 629
    , 640 (1999); Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
    School District, 
    524 U.S. 274
    , 285 (1998).2 Thus, while an
    entity cannot be held vicariously liable on a respondeat
    superior theory, it can be held liable under Title VI if an
    official with power to take corrective measures is
    “deliberately indifferent to known acts” of discrimination.
    
    Davis, 526 U.S. at 641
    . An entity can also be held liable for
    acts of discrimination that result from its own “official
    policy.” 
    Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290
    ; see Mansourian v. Regents
    of the University of California, 
    602 F.3d 957
    , 967 (9th Cir.
    2010); Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder, 
    500 F.3d 1170
    , 1177–78 (10th Cir. 2007). Because this form of
    2
    Davis and Gebser involved Title IX of the Education Amendments
    of 1972, but “the Court has interpreted Title IX consistently with Title
    VI.” Barnes v. Gorman, 
    536 U.S. 181
    , 185 (2002).
    UNITED STATES V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA                    11
    “official policy” liability resembles § 1983 policymaker
    liability, we think the proper standard for determining which
    employees have the power to establish an entity’s “official
    policy” under Title VI is the standard that governs under
    § 1983.
    We reach the same conclusion with respect to § 12601.
    As relevant here, the statute provides: “It shall be unlawful
    for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or any
    person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to
    engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement
    officers . . . that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or
    immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws
    of the United States.” 34 U.S.C. § 12601(a).
    Section 12601 shares important similarities with § 1983.
    Section 1983 was enacted to create “a broad remedy for
    violations of federally protected civil rights.” 
    Monell, 436 U.S. at 685
    . Section 12601 was also enacted as a remedy
    for violations of federal civil rights, specifically for violations
    that are systematically perpetrated by local police
    departments. See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational
    Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 453,
    527–28 (2004). And, like § 1983, § 12601 imposes liability
    on local governments. Indeed, the language of § 12601 goes
    even further than § 1983, making it unlawful for “any
    governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or any person
    acting on behalf of a governmental authority” to engage in the
    prohibited conduct. 34 U.S.C. § 12601(a).
    We need not decide whether the language of § 12601
    imposes liability on the basis of general agency principles, as
    the United States urges here. It is enough for us to conclude,
    as we do, that § 12601 at least imposes liability on a
    12       UNITED STATES V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA
    governmental authority whose own official policy causes it to
    engage in “a pattern or practice of conduct by law
    enforcement officers” that deprives persons of federally
    protected rights. 
    Id. Because of
    the similarity between
    § 12601 and § 1983, we again see no reason to create a new
    standard for determining which officials have the power to
    establish a governmental authority’s official policy. The
    same standard that governs under § 1983 applies here as well.
    In short, Maricopa County is liable for violations of Title
    VI and § 12601 stemming from its own official policies. As
    discussed above, when Arpaio adopted the racially
    discriminatory traffic-stop policies at issue, he acted as a final
    policymaker for the County. Those policies were therefore
    the County’s own, and the district court correctly held the
    County liable for the violations of Title VI and § 12601
    caused by those policies.
    III
    Lastly, Maricopa County challenges the district court’s
    application of issue preclusion, which precluded the County
    from relitigating the lawfulness of Arpaio’s traffic-stop
    policies. Given the nature of the County’s involvement in the
    Melendres action, we conclude that the County is bound by
    the adverse findings rendered in that action.
    The County was originally named as a defendant in the
    Melendres action, along with then-Sheriff Arpaio and MCSO.
    Early in the litigation, the parties stipulated to dismissal of the
    County as a named defendant, without prejudice to the
    County’s being rejoined as a defendant later in the litigation
    if that became necessary to afford the plaintiffs full relief.
    Melendres 
    III, 815 F.3d at 648
    . In effect, the County agreed
    UNITED STATES V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA                  13
    to delegate responsibility for defense of the action to Arpaio
    and MCSO, knowing that it could be bound by the judgment
    later despite its formal absence as a party.
    The case proceeded to trial against Arpaio and MCSO and
    resulted in judgment against them. On appeal, we concluded
    that MCSO had been improperly named as a defendant
    because it could not be sued in its own name following the
    Arizona Court of Appeals’ intervening decision in Braillard.
    Melendres 
    II, 784 F.3d at 1260
    (citing 
    Braillard, 232 P.3d at 1269
    ). Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, we ordered that
    the County be rejoined as a defendant in lieu of MCSO. 
    Id. We later
    explained that we did so “[t]o assure a meaningful
    remedy for the plaintiffs despite MCSO’s dismissal.”
    Melendres 
    III, 815 F.3d at 648
    . The County challenged this
    ruling in a petition for rehearing en banc and a petition for
    writ of certiorari, both of which were denied. See 
    id. Given this
    history, the district court properly applied issue
    preclusion to bar the County from relitigating the Melendres
    findings. Each of the elements of offensive non-mutual issue
    preclusion is satisfied: There was a full and fair opportunity
    to litigate the identical issues in the prior action; the issues
    were actually litigated in the prior action; the issues were
    decided in a final judgment; and the County was a party to the
    prior action. See Syverson v. International Business
    Machines Corp., 
    472 F.3d 1072
    , 1078 (9th Cir. 2007).
    Indeed, the County contests only the last element, arguing
    that it was not in fact a party to Melendres. That is not
    accurate as a factual matter, because the County was
    originally named as a defendant in Melendres and is now one
    of the parties bound by the judgment in that action.
    Moreover, even though the County did not remain a party to
    Melendres throughout the litigation, it effectively agreed to
    14      UNITED STATES V. COUNTY OF MARICOPA
    be bound by the judgment in that action. Such an agreement
    is one of the recognized exceptions to non-party preclusion.
    See Taylor v. Sturgell, 
    553 U.S. 880
    , 893 (2008).
    AFFIRMED.