Smith v. Gardiner ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                              FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                JAN 21 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DERRICK B. SMITH, Jr.,                           No. 07-15031
    Plaintiff - Appellant,              D.C. No. CV-02-01390-RJJ
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    ED GARDINER; PAR ELECTRICAL
    CONTRACTORS, INC.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Roger L. Hunt, Chief District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted January 15, 2010 **
    San Francisco, California
    Before: WALLACE, HUG and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
    Smith appeals from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of his
    former employer, Par Electrical Contractors, Inc., and its co-defendants
    (collectively, Par) on Smith’s claims that he was terminated due to his race. The
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    district court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
    1343. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.
    I.
    We review the district court’s summary judgment de novo. Universal
    Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 
    363 F.3d 1013
    , 1019 (9th Cir. 2004). Smith
    brought claims against Par under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
    (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Nevada’s
    anti-discrimination law (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 613.330 et seq.), alleging that he was
    terminated due to his race. We analyze Smith’s disparate treatment claims under
    all three statutes using the same analytical framework. Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty
    Corp., 
    813 F.2d 1406
    , 1412 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying Title VII standards to a 42
    U.S.C. § 1981 claim); Pope v. Motel 6, 
    114 P.3d 277
    , 280 (Nev. 2005) (“[i]n light
    of the similarity between Title VII . . . and Nevada’s anti-discrimination statutes,”
    Nevada courts look to Title VII cases for guidance in analyzing state
    discrimination claims); Apeceche v. White Pine County, 
    615 P.2d 975
    , 977 (Nev.
    1980) (applying burden-shifting framework to claims under Nev. Rev. Stat.
    § 613.330 et seq.).
    Assuming, without deciding, that Smith presented a prima facie case of
    discrimination, Par had the “burden of production, but not persuasion” to
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    “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for Smith’s termination.
    E.E.O.C. v. Boeing Co., 
    577 F.3d 1044
    , 1049 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and
    citation omitted). Par met this burden by presenting evidence that Smith’s
    supervisor, Goulet, fired Smith because, after Goulet halted a verbal altercation
    between Smith and co-worker Gardiner, Goulet heard a report that led him to
    believe that Smith had threatened to shoot Gardiner. An employer’s “belief in the
    truth of the charges [of misconduct]” is a “legally sufficient” legitimate,
    nondiscriminatory reason for dismissal. Jones v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist.,
    
    702 F.2d 203
    , 205 (9th Cir. 1983) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Once Par met its burden, it then was incumbent on Smith to show that Par’s
    stated reason was pretextual. 
    E.E.O.C., 577 F.3d at 1049
    . The district court
    correctly held there was no direct evidence of discrimination. Smith alleged that
    he had heard workers “from out of town” using racial slurs, and that a foreman
    once commented on how dark Smith’s skin was, but such remarks are evidence
    that an employment action was motivated by animus only if those people were
    involved in the decision to terminate him. Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp.
    Dept., 
    424 F.3d 1027
    , 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Where... the person who exhibited
    discriminatory animus influenced or participated in the decisionmaking process, a
    reasonable factfinder could conclude that the animus affected the employment
    3
    decision”). Here, it is undisputed that Goulet was the sole decision-maker in
    Smith’s termination, and Smith admits he never heard Goulet make any racially
    charged comment.
    Smith also failed to show specific and substantial circumstantial evidence of
    pretext. First, it is irrelevant that Smith asserts he did not in fact threaten to shoot
    Gardiner, that he states the person who reported that story to Goulet was lying, or
    that Goulet did not conduct an investigation before firing Smith. The inquiry is
    whether there was evidence from which a fact-finder could infer that Goulet and
    Par did not truly believe the proffered reason for the termination. See Villiarimo v.
    Aloha Island Air, Inc., 
    281 F.3d 1054
    , 1063 (9th Cir. 2002). Smith put forth no
    evidence to suggest that Goulet and Par did not honestly believe Smith had
    threatened Gardiner.
    Smith also argues he was treated less favorably than Gardiner. An
    employer’s more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees can be
    evidence of pretext, Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 
    349 F.3d 634
    , 641 (9th Cir.
    2003), but the district court was correct that Gardiner and Smith were not
    “similarly situated.” Smith apparently does not dispute Par’s evidence that
    Gardiner, a lineman, was more skilled and more difficult to replace than Smith, a
    groundman. Moreover, there is no evidence that Gardiner engaged in further
    4
    disruptive acts after Goulet broke up the initial altercation; in contrast, Goulet
    heard a report that led him to believe that Smith had threatened Gardiner’s life.
    Finally, the district court properly gave weight to the fact that Goulet, who
    terminated Smith’s employment in 2003, also made the decision to hire Smith in
    2000 and rehire him in 2002. In this circuit, “where the same actor is responsible
    for both the hiring and the firing of a discrimination plaintiff, and both actions
    occur within a short period of time, a strong inference arises that there was no
    discriminatory action.” Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., 
    413 F.3d 1090
    , 1096 (9th
    Cir. 2005) (citing Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 
    104 F.3d 267
    , 270-71 (9th
    Cir. 1996)). Smith did not present “specific and substantial” circumstantial
    evidence sufficient to overcome that same-actor inference, and has not presented
    evidence from which a fact-finder could conclude that his employment was
    terminated due to his race.
    II.
    Because Smith’s opening brief failed to present specific arguments regarding
    his remaining claims, and we only review issues which are specifically and
    distinctly argued in the party’s opening brief, any challenge to the district court’s
    summary judgment for Par on his remaining claims is waived. See Greenwood v.
    Fed. Aviation Admin., 
    28 F.3d 971
    , 977 (9th Cir. 1994).
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    AFFIRMED.
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