Robert James v. Eric Jackson ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 7 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT E. JAMES, No. 22-35041
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:16-cv-06063-RJB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ERIC JACKSON,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 16, 2023
Seattle, Washington
Before: PAEZ and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and BENITEZ,** District Judge.
Robert James appeals the district court’s order denying his petition for writ of
habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253(a). Because
his petition fails to show that the underlying state court decisions unreasonably
applied clearly established federal law as required under the Antiterrorism and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Roger T. Benitez, United States District Judge for the Southern
District of California, sitting by designation.
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), we affirm. 1
In 2013, James was charged in the State of Washington with raping an
inebriated woman (S.C.). Before and at trial, James’s counsel misinterpreted the
forensic data as demonstrating that some of the DNA recovered from S.C. must have
come from an unknown third party other than James. In fact, all of the male DNA
found on S.C. was consistent with James. The jury found James guilty of second
degree rape and sentenced him to “102 months to Life” in prison.
James appealed his conviction to the Washington Court of Appeals. As
relevant here, James argued that because his counsel failed to investigate the DNA
test, he “did not provide [James] the correct information which would have enabled
[him] to accurately [gauge] the strengthes [sic] and weakness[es] of [his] case.” The
court affirmed. James then filed a personal restraint petition, arguing that his
counsel’s error “affected [his] decision to refuse [a] plea deal offered by the state.”
The court rejected James’s petition for, inter alia, not “establish[ing] a prima facie
case of actual prejudice.”
Washington’s Supreme Court remanded to the appeals court to reconsider
“James’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective in misinterpreting the DNA
1
James’s Unopposed Motion to Supplement Record on Appeal (Docket Entry No.
11) is granted. James’s implied “motion to expand the COA” to include uncertified
issues is denied. Ninth Cir. R. 22-1(e).
2
report.” On remand, the appeals court held that “[a]lthough James has made a prima
facie showing that defense counsel performed deficiently … he has failed to make a
prima facie showing that he suffered prejudice as a result.” “[F]atal to James’s
ineffective assistance claim” was that he did not “assert that he would have accepted
the State’s plea offer absent defense counsel’s deficient performance.”
Washington’s Supreme Court denied review, noting that the lower court’s decision
was consistent with clearly established federal law.
James then filed this federal habeas petition. The district court denied relief,
adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation finding “that [James] has not
demonstrated that the state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable.” See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The court concluded that although
James “suggested that defense counsel’s misrepresentation of the DNA report may
have influenced ‘his decision to accept or reject a plea offer.…’ the court cannot say
that it was unreasonable for the state court to have determined that [James] could not
establish that but for counsel’s misstatement regarding the strength of the DNA
evidence, there was a reasonable probability that [he] would have accepted a plea
deal.”
A federal court may grant habeas relief for claimed constitutional violations
under AEDPA only if the underlying state court adjudication “resulted in a decision
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
3
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States….” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1).
At issue here is Strickland’s two-part test for making an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim: “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient.… Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To demonstrate prejudice
when ineffective assistance results in a rejection of a plea offer, a defendant must
show that “but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability
that the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant
would have accepted the plea….)” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 164 (2012).
The state courts and the district court are correct: James failed to argue and
support the required showing of prejudice under Strickland. They reviewed the
record for any statement that James’s decisions were not only “affected” or
“impacted” in some general sense, but were in fact changed or determined by his
counsel’s error. Absent a showing of such prejudice, it was reasonable for the state
courts to conclude that James failed to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice requirement.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
AFFIRMED.2
2
James’s request for an evidentiary hearing to further develop the record is denied
as moot.
4