Mark McDonald v. Molina Healthcare of Wash. ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 7 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARK MCDONALD, No. 22-35108
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:20-cv-01189-JCC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MOLINA HEALTHCARE OF
WASHINGTON, INC., a domestic profit
corporation,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
MOLINA HEALTH CARE, INC., a foreign
profit corporation,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 15, 2023**
Seattle, Washington
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: W. FLETCHER and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and LIBURDI,***
District Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant Mark McDonald appeals from the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Molina Healthcare of
Washington, Inc. (“MHW”) on his Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)
claims. McDonald suffers from a hearing impairment and argues that MHW failed
to accommodate his disability and engaged in disability discrimination and
retaliation. The parties are familiar with the other facts, so we do not repeat them
here.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Humphrey
v. Mem’l Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001), and may affirm on any
basis supported by the record, even one not relied upon by the district court, Curley
v. City of North Las Vegas, 772 F.3d 629, 631 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.
The district court correctly analyzed McDonald’s ADA discrimination and
retaliation claims under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework because
McDonald could not show direct proof of discrimination or retaliation. See
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973). Without direct
proof, a plaintiff has the initial burden of showing a prima facie case of
***
The Honorable Michael T. Liburdi, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
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discrimination or retaliation. Curley, 772 F.3d at 632. To establish a prima facie case
of discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a disabled person within the
meaning of the ADA; (2) he is a qualified individual with a disability; and (3) he
suffered adverse employment action because of his disability. Hutton v. Elf Atochem
N. Am., Inc., 273 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 2001). Similarly, to establish a prima facie
retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he engaged in a protected
activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal
link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Villiarimo
v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2002). If the employee
satisfies this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the employer to establish a
legitimate, non-discriminatory (or non-retaliatory) reason for the challenged actions.
Id. at 1062. If the employer can establish as much, the burden returns to the
employee, who must then show that the proffered reason is pretextual. Id.Even if McDonald could satisfy the prima facie showing of discrimination or
retaliation based on his hearing disability, MHW articulated a legitimate, non-
discriminatory, non-retaliatory reason for terminating McDonald’s employment
grounded in his inappropriate workplace behavior. MHW provided uncontroverted
evidence that McDonald threatened to break employees’ arms if they entered his
workspace without knocking, identified himself as the “ladies leg wrestling coach,”
repeatedly referred to his female supervisor as “Mr. Man,” called his female
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coworker “fireball” and “tigress,” discussed his celibacy with his coworkers, and
sent unprofessional emails to his superiors.
While McDonald takes issue with how his conduct was characterized, he does
not deny making the remarks or engaging in the conduct. And McDonald did not
proffer any factual basis for his claims that other employees were treated differently
beyond his own conclusory testimony and pleadings. See Hernandez v. Spacelabs
Med. Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that, to survive summary
judgment, a party needs to offer facts beyond conclusory pleadings and self-serving
testimony).
McDonald further failed to establish that MHW’s reasons for the challenged
actions were pretextual. Where, as here, the record establishes that the “same actor
is responsible for both the hiring and the firing of a discrimination plaintiff, and both
actions occur within a short period of time, a strong inference arises that there was
no discriminatory motive.” Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270–
71 (9th Cir. 1996). It is uncontested that Olson hired McDonald, that she was aware
of his hearing disability at the time of his hiring, and that Olson ultimately made the
decision to terminate him. To show pretext, McDonald needed to have mustered “the
extraordinarily strong showing of discrimination necessary to defeat the same-actor
inference.” Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co. LLC, 413 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2005).
He failed to do so.
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McDonald finally argues that his workplace behavior cannot be viewed as a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for his termination because his comments
relating to entering his workspace without knocking were directly related to his
hearing disability. But it is unclear how this disability necessitates threats about
breaking his coworkers’ arms. In any event, MHW provided ample evidence of
multiple instances of inappropriate conduct beyond the “broken arm” comment.
The district court also properly dismissed McDonald’s failure to
accommodate claim. McDonald requested a TTY/TDD machine and a private office
to accommodate his hearing impairment.1 The ADA treats the failure to provide a
reasonable accommodation as an act of discrimination if (1) the employee is a
qualified individual, (2) the employer receives adequate notice, and (3) a reasonable
accommodation is available that would not place an undue hardship on the operation
of the employer’s business. Snapp v. United Transp. Union, 889 F.3d 1088, 1095
(9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Importantly, an “employer is not
obligated to provide an employee the accommodation he requests or prefers, the
employer need only provide some reasonable accommodation.” Zivkovic v. S. Cal.
1
McDonald filed a Motion for this Court to Take Judicial Notice of Supplemental
Authorities and/or Supplement the Record (ECF No. 27). Having considered the
Motion and materials filed in connection, the Court grants the Motion to the extent
that we take judicial notice of the information describing the various hearing
assistance technologies. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).
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Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
MHW demonstrated meaningful efforts to reasonably accommodate
McDonald’s disability. See Snapp, 889 F.3d at 1095 (stating that notifying an
employer of a need for an accommodation “triggers a duty to engage in an interactive
process . . . for accommodating the employee”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The MHW office does not have any available private workspaces available for
employees below the title of director. To minimize background noise, MHW placed
McDonald in a cubicle against a wall in the quietest area of the office floor. MHW
also provided McDonald with a special amplifying headset to assist him while it
worked to acquire a TTY/TDD machine.
McDonald failed to show that the accommodations furnished by MHW were
insufficient for him to perform the essential functions of his job. McDonald admitted
that he was doing more work than his peers and that MHW was giving him additional
responsibilities. If anything, the record demonstrates that McDonald was more
productive than his peers and clearly capable of performing the essential functions
of his job with the accommodations MHW provided. It was McDonald’s own
workplace conduct and his poor interaction with other MHW employees that
prompted his separation.
AFFIRMED.
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