Chaj-Chavez v. Garland ( 2023 )


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  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                             MAR 8 2023
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    FRANCISCO CHAJ-CHAVEZ,                          No. 21-7
    Petitioner,                       Agency No.       A200-157-965
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted March 7, 2023**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: CALLAHAN, FORREST, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
    Francisco Chaj-Chavez petitions for review of an order issued by the
    Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). We lack jurisdiction to review the issues
    presented in Chaj-Chavez’s opening brief. We therefore dismiss the petition for
    review.
    On August 24, 2017, an immigration judge (IJ) denied Chaj-Chavez’s
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
    precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    applications for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention
    Against Torture (CAT). In an order issued on May 22, 2018, the BIA summarily
    dismissed Chaj-Chavez’s appeal of the IJ’s denial of relief. But in the same
    order, the BIA remanded for the IJ to give Chaj-Chavez the advisals required
    for a grant of voluntary departure.
    Chaj-Chavez did not petition for review of the BIA’s May 2018 order.
    Instead, Chaj-Chavez returned to the IJ, who denied his request for voluntary
    departure and further denied his motion to terminate the removal proceedings.
    Chaj-Chavez appealed. The BIA upheld the IJ’s rulings on voluntary departure
    and the motion to terminate in an order issued on April 16, 2021.
    Chaj-Chavez petitioned for review of the BIA’s April 2021 order. But his
    opening brief does not address the issues that were the subject of that order: the
    denial of voluntary departure and the motion to terminate. Instead, he argues
    that he was entitled to withholding of removal and protection under the CAT—
    i.e., the issues that were resolved in the BIA’s earlier May 2018 order. Under
    our precedent, we lack jurisdiction to consider these issues because Chaj-
    Chavez did not timely petition for review of that order.
    We have jurisdiction to review “a final order of removal.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(1). To seek review, a party must file a petition for review “not later
    than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.” 
    Id.
     § 1252(b)(1). We
    have held that a decision of the BIA “denying . . . withholding of removal . . .
    and CAT protection but remanding to the IJ for voluntary departure proceedings
    2                                        21-7
    is a final order of removal . . . and, effectively, the only order that we can
    review.” Singh v. Lynch, 
    835 F.3d 880
    , 883 (9th Cir. 2016) (per curiam)
    (quoting Pinto v. Holder, 
    648 F.3d 976
    , 980 (9th Cir. 2011)). Despite the fact
    that such an order will result in further voluntary departure proceedings before
    the IJ, a party who wishes to seek review of the aspect of the order denying
    withholding of removal and CAT protection must therefore file a petition for
    review within 30 days. 
    Id.
     Once this 30-day period has expired, we lack
    jurisdiction to consider a challenge to the denial of relief that is presented
    through a petition for review of the remanded voluntary departure proceedings.
    
    Id.
    Here, the BIA’s May 2018 order denying withholding of removal and
    CAT protection but remanding for further voluntary departure proceedings was
    a “final order of removal.” See 
    id.
     To seek review of this order, Chaj-Chavez
    was required to file a petition for review within 30 days. He did not do so.
    Instead, Chaj-Chavez waited until after the proceedings on remand, by which
    point the 30-day period for seeking review of the May 2018 order had long
    expired. Under our precedent, we lack jurisdiction to consider Chaj-Chavez’s
    untimely challenges to the May 2018 order, which are the only arguments he
    asserts in his brief. See 
    id.
     Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for review for
    lack of jurisdiction.
    DISMISSED.
    3                                      21-7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-7

Filed Date: 3/8/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/8/2023