Norman Diamond v. United States ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 19 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    NORMAN DOUGLAS DIAMOND,                         No. 15-56100
    Plaintiff-Appellant,           D.C. No. 2:14-cv-09196-GHK-
    AGR
    v.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       MEMORANDUM*
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    George H. King, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted April 11, 2017**
    Before:       GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    Norman Douglas Diamond appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
    dismissing his damages action under 26 U.S.C. § 7433 arising from various
    interactions with defendant involving his federal income taxes. We have
    jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for lack of
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    subject matter jurisdiction. Harger v. Dep’t of Labor, 
    569 F.3d 898
    , 903 (9th Cir.
    2009). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Diamond’s action without prejudice for
    lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Diamond failed to show his claims fell
    within a waiver of sovereign immunity. See Holloman v. Watt, 
    708 F.2d 1399
    ,
    1401 (9th Cir. 1983) (waiver of sovereign immunity “must be unequivocally
    expressed,” and “[t]he party who sues the United States bears the burden of
    pointing to such an unequivocal waiver of immunity” (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted)); Miller v. United States, 
    66 F.3d 220
    , 222-23 (9th Cir.
    1995) (waiver of sovereign immunity under § 7433 permitting taxpayers to sue for
    misconduct in collection of taxes does not extend to improper determination or
    assessment of taxpayer’s liabilities); see also Shwarz v. United States, 
    234 F.3d 428
    , 433 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Section 7433 creates a private right of action only for
    tax collection activity that violates some provision of the Revenue Code or the
    regulations promulgated thereunder.”).
    We reject as meritless Diamond’s contentions that he was improperly denied
    discovery and injunctive relief.
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    2                                   15-56100
    in the opening brief, or arguments, allegations, or evidence raised for the first time
    on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); Kirshner
    v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 
    842 F.2d 1074
    , 1077 (9th Cir. 1988).
    Diamond’s motions for leave to file supplemental briefs (Docket Entry Nos.
    39, 41) are granted. The Clerk shall file the supplemental briefs (Docket Entry
    Nos. 40, 42).
    All other pending motions and requests (Docket Entry Nos. 2, 6) are denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                     15-56100