Felix Colindres-Trujillo v. Merrick Garland ( 2023 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 10 2023
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    FELIX ARMANDO COLINDRES-                        No.    18-73098
    TRUJILLO,
    Agency No. A098-402-897
    Petitioner,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted March 10, 2023**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: FRIEDLAND, BADE, and KOH, Circuit Judges.
    Felix Armando Colindres-Trujillo (“Petitioner”), a native and citizen of El
    Salvador, petitions this court for review of the denial by the Board of Immigration
    Appeals (“BIA”) of his motion to reopen seeking to challenge the underlying
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under
    the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    , and
    we deny the petition in part and vacate and remand in part.
    We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.
    Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 
    958 F.3d 887
    , 892 (9th Cir. 2020). “A decision is an
    abuse of discretion if it is ‘arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting
    Bonilla v. Lynch, 
    840 F.3d 575
    , 581 (9th Cir. 2016)).
    1.     A motion to reopen based on changed country conditions requires the
    movant to:
    (1) produce evidence that conditions have changed in the
    country of removal, (2) demonstrate that the evidence is
    material, (3) show that the evidence was not available
    and would not have been discovered or presented at the
    previous hearing, and (4) demonstrate that the new
    evidence, when considered together with the evidence
    presented at the original hearing, would establish prima
    facie eligibility for the relief sought.
    Silva v. Garland, 
    993 F.3d 705
    , 718 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2
    (c)(1)). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s
    motion to reopen because he failed to demonstrate that he is prima facie eligible
    for relief. “To establish a prima facie case, the movant must adduce evidence that,
    along with the facts already in the record, ‘will support the desired finding if
    evidence to the contrary is disregarded.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Maroufi v. I.N.S., 
    772 F.2d 597
    , 599 (9th Cir. 1985)). Petitioner supports his motion to reopen with evidence
    2
    of gang violence in El Salvador. However, this evidence, along with Petitioner’s
    testimony about being kidnapped for ransom, establishes only a fear of generalized
    violence and crime, which is insufficient to support a finding that Petitioner has a
    likelihood of persecution or a clear probability of persecution on account of a
    protected ground. See Zetino v. Holder, 
    622 F.3d 1007
    , 1016 (9th Cir. 2010).
    Similarly, such generalized evidence does not adequately support a finding that,
    more likely than not, Petitioner would be tortured if returned to El Salvador. See
    Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 
    600 F.3d 1148
    , 1152 (9th Cir. 2010).
    2.     The BIA also denied sua sponte reopening. We may review a denial
    of sua sponte reopening “for the limited purpose of reviewing the reasoning behind
    the decisions for legal or constitutional error.” Bonilla, 
    840 F.3d at 588
    . In
    denying sua sponte reopening, the BIA relied on Matter of S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 
    27 I. & N. Dec. 462
     (A.G. 2018), for the conclusion that “immigration judges have no
    inherent authority to terminate or dismiss removal proceedings” and may only
    terminate or dismiss proceedings for reasons “expressly set out in the relevant
    regulations or where DHS has failed to sustain the charges of removability.” 
    Id. at 463
    . After the date of the BIA’s decision, the Attorney General overruled Matter
    of S-O-G- & F-D-B- in its entirety. See Matter of Coronado Acevedo, 
    28 I. & N. Dec. 648
    , 651 (A.G. 2022). Because the BIA’s denial of sua sponte reopening in
    this case “relied on an incorrect legal premise,” we remand to the BIA “so it may
    3
    exercise its authority against the correct ‘legal background.’” Bonilla, 
    840 F.3d at 588
    .
    DENIED in part; VACATED and REMANDED in part.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-73098

Filed Date: 3/10/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/10/2023