Brice Peeler v. Kevin Reali ( 2019 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JAN 23 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    BRICE ANTHONY PEELER,                           No.    18-16870
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00582-TLN-CKD
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    KEVIN REALI; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Troy L. Nunley, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted January 15, 2019**
    Before:      TROTT, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
    California state prisoner Brice Anthony Peeler appeals pro se from the
    district court’s judgment dismissing his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging false
    arrest and malicious prosecution claims. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Wilhelm v.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Rotman, 
    680 F.3d 1113
    , 1118 (9th Cir. 2012). We may affirm on any basis
    supported by the record. See Thompson v. Paul, 
    547 F.3d 1055
    , 1058-59 (9th
    Cir. 2008). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Peeler’s malicious prosecution claim
    because Peeler failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants acted with
    malice and without probable cause. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 
    693 F.3d 896
    ,
    919 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (elements of malicious prosecution claim under
    § 1983); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 
    627 F.3d 338
    , 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although
    pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to
    state a plausible claim).
    Dismissal of Peeler’s false arrest claim was proper because Peeler failed to
    allege facts sufficient to show that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him.
    See Dubner v. City & County of San Francisco, 
    266 F.3d 959
    , 964 (9th Cir. 2001)
    (requirements for a false arrest claim). To the extent Peeler’s claims rest on an
    implied invalidity of his conviction, they are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 
    512 U.S. 477
    , 486-87 (1994).
    To the extent that Peeler’s claims against defendants are based on a theory of
    respondeat superior, Peeler failed to state a claim because neither government
    2                                     18-16870
    entities nor individuals can be held vicariously liable under § 1983. See Monell v.
    Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
    436 U.S. 658
    , 690-94 (1978) (explaining that a municipality
    cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory); Starr v. Baca,
    
    652 F.3d 1202
    , 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he
    or she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or there is a
    “sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the
    constitutional violation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                    18-16870