Charles Easley v. Oscar Flores ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 18 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES JEROME EASLEY, No. 18-55323
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:15-cv-04359-GW-E
v.
MEMORANDUM*
OSCAR FLORES, individual, Santa Monica
Police Detective; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 12, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, HAWKINS, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Charles Jerome Easley appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims in
connection with the impoundment and inventory search of his vehicle. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Guatay Christian
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir. 2011) (cross-
motions for summary judgment); May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 560-61 (9th Cir.
1997) (qualified immunity). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Easley’s Fourth
Amendment claim on the basis of qualified immunity because it would not have
been clear to every reasonable officer that the impoundment of Easley’s vehicle
under California Vehicle Code § 22651(o)(1)(A) and inventory search under Santa
Monica Police Department Policy § 510.4 were unlawful under the circumstances.
See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (explaining two-part test for
qualified immunity).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Easley’s
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim because Easley failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether he was entitled to pre-impoundment notice
and an opportunity to be heard, or whether he lacked an adequate post-deprivation
remedy under California law. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th
Cir. 1994) (California law provides an adequate post-deprivation for property loss);
Scofiled v. City of Hillsborough, 862 F.2d 759, 762-64 (9th Cir. 1988) (towing a
vehicle with an expired registration, without prior notice, does not violate due
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process).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Easley’s motion to
appoint counsel because Easley failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances.
See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth standard of
review and exceptional circumstances requirement for appointment of counsel).
We reject as without merit Easley’s contention that summary judgment on
his Fourth Amendment claim was precluded based on the district court’s order
denying defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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