Curtis Jackson v. J. Mendez ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 1 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CURTIS RENEE JACKSON, No. 15-17448
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:11-cv-00080-BAM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
J. MENDEZ; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Barbara McAuliffe, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 15, 2018
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and BATTS,** District
Judge.
Curtis Renee Jackson, who is incarcerated at the Pleasant Valley State
Prison in Coalinga, California, appeals from a judgment following a jury verdict in
favor of various prison officials (collectively, “Defendants”) on his 42 U.S.C. §
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Deborah A. Batts, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
1983 claim. He challenges various evidentiary rulings as well as the district court’s
rulings denying his motion for appointment of counsel and its alleged failure to sua
sponte hold a competency hearing. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s refusal to grant a writ of habeas
corpus ad testificandum, Wiggins v. Alameda County, 717 F.2d 466, 468 & n.1
(9th Cir. 1983), its evidentiary rulings, Duran v. City of Maywood, 221 F.3d 1127,
1130 (9th Cir. 2000), its refusal to appoint counsel, Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d
965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009), and its decision whether to hold a competency hearing or
otherwise consider a claim of incompetence. Allen v. Calderon, 408 F.3d 1150,
1153–54 (9th Cir. 2005).
1. Attendance of O’Neal. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Jackson’s motion to have Michael O’Neal, another inmate, testify at trial.
Jackson’s argument lacks merit because the district court could reasonably
conclude that O’Neal’s testimony would not “substantially further the resolution of
the case,” see Wiggins, 717 F.2d at 468 n.1, as O’Neal would have testified to
actions by Defendant Mendez that were no longer at issue in Jackson’s trial.
2. Evidence of other assaults allegedly committed by Mendez. Nor did the
district court abuse its discretion in excluding testimony by three inmate witnesses
regarding other assaults allegedly committed by Defendant Mendez. On the record
before it, the district court could reasonably conclude the excluded evidence did
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not satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), as Jackson failed to articulate how the
testimony would show Mendez’s intent or plan. In addition, the district court could
reasonably conclude that the probative value of the excluded testimony was
substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues
and misleading the jury under Rule 403 given the danger that disputes over the
inmate witnesses’ credibility and recollection would detract from the main issue.
See Tennison v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 244 F.3d 684, 690 (9th Cir. 2001).
3. Doctor’s notes. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
the notes taken by the doctor who examined Jackson nearly one month after the
alleged assault occurred. Jackson did not present testimony by a document
custodian, or otherwise provide certification, to authenticate the doctor’s notes. See
Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)(D).
4. Appointment of counsel. Absent exceptional circumstances, “a person has
no right to counsel in civil actions.” Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970. The district court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that Jackson was able to represent himself after
he ably survived summary judgment, particularly given that his case did not
involve particularly complex legal issues. See id. Although Jackson has
documented mental health issues, his doctor stated that he was “stable and able to
participate in” the proceedings before the district court.
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5. Competency hearing. The district court also did not abuse its discretion in
failing to conduct sua sponte a competency hearing. “[W]hen a substantial
question exists regarding the mental competence of a party proceeding pro se, the
proper procedure is for the district court to conduct a hearing to determine
competence.” Allen, 408 F.3d at 1153 (citing Krain v. Smallwood, 880 F.2d 1119,
1121 (9th Cir. 1989)). For the same reasons that the district court’s decision not to
appoint counsel for Jackson was not an abuse of discretion, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in failing to hold a competency hearing. This is particularly
true where Jackson did not make a motion for a competency hearing and where
there was already evidence in the record regarding his competence. See Roberts v.
Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010) (“District courts have limited
resources (especially time), and to require them to conduct further evidentiary
hearings when there is already sufficient evidence in the record to make the
relevant determination is needlessly wasteful.”).
AFFIRMED.
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