Paul Farah v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 14 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PAUL FARAH, No. 18-15986
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:13-cv-01127-MMC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE,
INC.; U.S. BANK, N.A., as trustee for Bear
Stearns Arm Trust, Mortgage Pass-through
Certificates Series 2005-10,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Maxine M. Chesney, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 11, 2019**
Before: CANBY, GRABER, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Paul Farah appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his
diversity action alleging fraud related to the foreclosure of his home. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Del. Valley Surgical
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Supply Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 523 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2008). We
affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Farah’s fraud
claim arising out of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s initial denial of his short sale
application because Farah failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether Wells Fargo concealed from him that his application was denied where the
denial had been communicated to his agent. See Santillan v. Roman Catholic
Bishop of Fresno, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 343, 348 (Ct. App. 2008) (where “agent was
under a duty to disclose certain information, the principal is bound by the agent’s
knowledge of that information whether or not the agent communicated it to the
principal”); LiMandri v. Judkins, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 539, 543 (Ct. App. 1997)
(setting forth circumstances in which nondisclosure constitutes actionable fraud).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Farah’s fraud
claim arising out of communications with Wells Fargo on May 31, 2012 because
Farah failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he suffered
any damages as a result of the misrepresentations on that date. See Patrick v.
Alacer Corp., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 642, 662 (Ct. App. 2008), as modified on denial of
reh’g (Nov. 21, 2008) (“In an action for [common law] fraud, damage is an
essential element of the cause of action.” (citation omitted)).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
2 18-15986
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 18-15986