Juan Gomez-Rangel v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 18 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUAN PABLO GOMEZ-RANGEL, AKA No. 17-70926
Juan Pedro Gomez,
Agency No. A201-242-649
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 11, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: W. FLETCHER and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and KANE,*** District
Judge.
Juan Pablo Gomez-Rangel (“Gomez-Rangel”), a native and citizen of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Yvette Kane, United States District Judge for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
Mexico, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) dismissing his appeal from an order of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
denying his applications for withholding of removal, protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and cancellation of removal. We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny in part and dismiss in part the petition.
“Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ decision and also adds its own
reasoning, we review the decision of the BIA and those parts of the IJ’s decision
upon which it relies.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1027–28 (9th Cir.
2019). We review de novo constitutional and legal claims, including whether a
group constitutes a cognizable particular social group, and review factual findings
for substantial evidence. Cordoba v. Barr, 962 F.3d 479, 481–82 (9th Cir. 2020).
1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Gomez-
Rangel failed to establish that he is more likely than not to face a threat to life or
freedom on account of a cognizable particular social group or any other protected
ground. Gomez-Rangel failed to identify a particular social group for the IJ’s
consideration, and the BIA and IJ adequately addressed his claim that, upon
returning to Mexico after several years, he will be targeted as “Americanized” and
perceived as wealthy.1 The agency properly invoked this court’s precedent to find
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We discern no error in the BIA’s failure to expressly reference Gomez-Rangel’s
assertion, not raised to the IJ, that he belongs to the particular social group of
“Americanized Nationals.” The BIA considered the underlying attributes of that
2
Gomez-Rangel did not establish the requisite nexus to a protected ground.
Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting
“returning Mexicans from the United States” as too broad to qualify as a
cognizable social group); Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010)
(holding that “[a]n alien’s desire to be free from harassment by criminals
motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a
protected ground”); see also Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1228–29
(9th Cir. 2016) (rejecting “imputed wealthy Americans,” or “those who have the
physical appearance and mannerisms of Americans,” as cognizable social group).2
2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief for
Gomez-Rangel’s failure to establish the requisite likelihood that he would face
future torture. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). He did not claim past torture and can
potentially relocate to another part of Mexico. Edu v. Holder, 624 F.3d 1137, 1145
(9th Cir. 2010) (noting past torture is a principal factor); Tamang v. Holder, 598
F.3d 1083, 1095 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting ability to safely relocate is extremely
important). The generalized evidence of violence in Mexico does not compel the
group as presented by Gomez-Rangel and was not required to consider a newly
proposed group. Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 192–93 (BIA
2018) (refusing to consider proposed group “in the first instance on appeal”).
2
The court lacks jurisdiction to consider Gomez-Rangel’s claim that he belongs to
the particular social group of “Americanized Mexicans” because he did not
propose that specific social group to the agency. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).
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conclusion that Gomez-Rangel is entitled to protection under CAT. Alphonsus v.
Holder, 705 F.3d 1031, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds as
recognized in Guerrero v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 2018).
3. We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s determination that
Gomez-Rangel failed to establish exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a
qualifying relative for purposes of cancellation of removal. Martinez-Rosas v.
Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 2005). We retain jurisdiction to consider
colorable constitutional claims, id. at 930, but Gomez-Rangel alleges none. His
contentions that the IJ failed to distinguish case law and misapplied the facts of his
case to the hardship standard do not give rise to colorable constitutional claims.
De Mercado v. Mukasey, 566 F.3d 810, 815–16 (9th Cir. 2009); cf. Arteaga-De
Alvarez v. Holder, 704 F.3d 730, 742 (9th Cir. 2012). Finally, Gomez-Rangel’s
argument that the BIA acted arbitrarily, irrationally, and contrary to law is at
bottom an abuse of discretion challenge beyond this court’s review. Bazua-Cota v.
Gonzales, 466 F.3d 747, 748–49 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.
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