Shellie Halper v. Twin Palms Lending Group ( 2019 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NOV 12 2019
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: SHELLIE MELISSA HALPER, No. 18-60019
Debtor, BAP No. 17-1171
______________________________
SHELLIE MELISSA HALPER, MEMORANDUM*
Appellant,
v.
TWIN PALMS LENDING GROUP, LLC,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Taylor, Faris, and Spraker, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
Submitted November 6, 2019**
Pasadena, California
Before: SCHROEDER, FRIEDLAND, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Defendant-Appellant Shellie Halper appeals a decision of the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel (“BAP”) affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s entry of default
judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Twin Palms Lending Group. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) and we affirm. We review the grant of
terminating sanctions and the entry of default judgment for abuse of discretion.
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 482 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th
Cir. 2007); Alan Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1391 (9th
Cir.1989).
Halper contends the Bankruptcy Court erred in issuing terminating sanctions
without considering the appropriate factors. See Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d
at 1096. She is not correct. After months of warnings from the Bankruptcy Court
regarding Halper’s failure to comply with court orders regarding her discovery
abuses and considering all other relevant circumstances, the Bankruptcy Court first
issued a lesser sanction, requiring Halper to pay some of Twin Palms’s fees
incurred as a result of her delay. The Bankruptcy Court explained that if she failed
to pay this initial sanction, it would grant terminating sanctions. Halper
acknowledged this. It was only after Halper did not comply with this initial
sanction that the Bankruptcy Court granted terminating sanctions. Given the
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lengths the Bankruptcy Court went to before granting terminating sanctions, we
hold that there was no abuse of discretion. Id.Nor did the Bankruptcy Court abuse its discretion in awarding default
judgment. In reviewing a default judgment, we must take the well-pleaded factual
allegations of the complaint as true. Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d
1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, the well-pleaded factual allegations of Twin
Palms’s complaint show that each of the elements of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) was
met, and, indeed, Halper did not attempt to challenge the allegations or the
evidence. The Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion by granting default
judgment. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986).
We also reject Halper’s contention that the Bankruptcy Court’s damages
award was excessive. Twin Palms’s complaint sought a base amount of damages,
as well as interest, penalties, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. At the default
judgment hearing, which Halper attended, Twin Palms submitted declarations
carefully calculating the amount of damages, which Halper had the opportunity to
oppose, but did not. We hold that there was no error in the Bankruptcy Court’s
award of damages.
AFFIRMED.
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