Fmc Corporation v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes ( 2019 )


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  •                        FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    FMC CORPORATION,                              Nos. 17-35840
    Plaintiff-Appellant/                       17-35865
    Cross-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                        4:14-cv-00489-BLW
    SHOSHONE-BANNOCK
    TRIBES,                                           OPINION
    Defendant-Appellee/
    Cross-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Idaho
    B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted May 17, 2019
    Seattle, Washington
    Filed November 15, 2019
    Before: Michael Daly Hawkins and William A. Fletcher,
    Circuit Judges, and David C. Bury,* District Judge.
    Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher
    *
    The Honorable David C. Bury, United States District Judge for the
    District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
    2        FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    SUMMARY**
    Tribal Court Jurisdiction
    The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment enforcing
    a judgment of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Court of
    Appeals, which ruled that FMC Corporation must pay an
    annual use permit fee for storage of hazardous waste on fee
    lands within the Shoshone-Bannock Fort Hall Reservation, as
    required under a consent decree settling a prior suit brought
    against FMC by the Environmental Protection Agency under
    the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
    The panel held that the tribal court had regulatory and
    adjudicatory jurisdiction over the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes’
    suit against FMC under two “Montana exceptions.” Under
    the first exception, a tribe may regulate the activities of
    nonmembers who enter into consensual relationships with the
    tribe or its members. Under the second Montana exception,
    a tribe retains inherent power to exercise civil authority over
    the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation
    when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the
    political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
    welfare of the tribe. The panel held that, under the first
    Montana exception, the Tribes had regulatory jurisdiction to
    impose the permit fees because FMC entered into a
    consensual relationship when it signed a permit agreement
    with the Tribes. The panel held that FMC’s conduct of
    storing hazardous waste on its fee lands within the reservation
    fell within the second Montana exception. The panel held
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                   3
    that the district court erred in refusing, as a matter of comity,
    to enforce the judgment of the Tribal Court of Appeals under
    the second exception. The panel held that, in addition to
    regulatory jurisdiction, the Tribes had adjudicatory
    jurisdiction.
    The panel also held that the Tribal Court of Appeals did
    not deny FMC due process through a lack of impartiality.
    COUNSEL
    Gregory G. Garre (argued), Elana Nightingale Dawson, and
    Genevieve P. Hoffman, Latham & Watkins LLP,
    Washington, D.C.; Ralph H. Palumbo, Yarmuth Wilsdon
    PLLC, Seattle, Washington; Lee Radford, Parsons Behle &
    Latimer, Idaho Falls, Idaho; Maureen L. Mitchell, Fox
    Rothschild LLP, Seattle, Washington; for Plaintiff-
    Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
    Douglas B. L. Endreson (argued) and Frank S. Holleman,
    Sonosky Chambers Sachse Endreson & Perry LLP,
    Washington, D.C.; William F. Bacon, Shoshone-Bannock
    Tribes, Fort Hall, Idaho; Paul C. Echo Hawk, Echo Hawk
    Law Office, Pocatello, Idaho; for Defendant-Appellee/Cross-
    Appellant.
    4      FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    OPINION
    W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:
    For over 50 years, FMC Corporation (“FMC”) operated
    an elemental phosphorus plant on fee land within the
    Shoshone-Bannock Fort Hall Reservation (“Reservation”) in
    Idaho. FMC’s operations produced approximately 22 million
    tons of hazardous waste that is currently stored on the
    Reservation. The waste is radioactive, carcinogenic, and
    poisonous.
    In 1990, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
    (“EPA”) declared FMC’s plant and storage area, together
    with an adjoining off-reservation plant owned by J.R.
    Simplot, a Superfund Site under the Comprehensive
    Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
    (“CERCLA”). In 1997, the EPA further charged FMC with
    violating the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
    (“RCRA”). A Consent Decree settling the RCRA suit
    required FMC to obtain permits from the Shoshone-Bannock
    Tribes (“the Tribes”). FMC and the Tribes negotiated an
    agreement under which FMC agreed to pay $1.5 million per
    year for a tribal use permit allowing storage of hazardous
    waste. FMC paid the annual use permit fee from 1998 to
    2001 but refused to pay the fee in 2002 after ceasing active
    plant operations. FMC has continued to store the hazardous
    waste on the Reservation despite its failure to pay the use
    permit fee.
    The Tribes sued FMC in Tribal Court, seeking inter alia
    payment of the annual $1.5 million use permit fee for waste
    storage. Under Montana v. United States, 
    450 U.S. 544
    (1981), there are two potentially relevant bases for tribal
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                 5
    jurisdiction in this case—two of the three so-called “Montana
    exceptions.” First, “[a] tribe may regulate, through taxation,
    licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who
    enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members,
    through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
    arrangements.” 
    Id. at 565.
    Second, “[a] tribe may also retain
    inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of
    non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that
    conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
    integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of
    the tribe.” 
    Id. at 566.
    After years of litigation, the Tribal
    Court of Appeals held in 2014 that the Tribes have regulatory
    and adjudicatory jurisdiction over FMC under both Montana
    exceptions. The court held that FMC owed $19.5 million in
    unpaid use permit fees for hazardous waste storage from 2002
    to 2014, and $1.5 million in annual fees going forward.
    After the decision of the Tribal Court of Appeals, FMC
    sued the Tribes in federal district court. FMC argued that the
    Tribes did not have jurisdiction under either of the Montana
    exceptions; that the Tribal Court of Appeals denied FMC due
    process because two judges on the Tribal Court of Appeals
    were biased against FMC; and that the judgment by the Tribal
    Court of Appeals was unenforceable.              The Tribes
    counterclaimed, seeking an order recognizing and enforcing
    the judgment of the Tribal Court of Appeals. The district
    court held that the Tribes had regulatory and adjudicatory
    jurisdiction under both Montana exceptions, that the Tribal
    Court of Appeals had not denied FMC due process, and that
    the Tribal Court of Appeals’ judgment was entitled to comity,
    and was therefore enforceable, under the first but not the
    second Montana exception.
    6       FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    FMC appeals the district court’s judgment in favor of the
    Tribes. The Tribes cross-appeal the district court’s decision
    that the Tribal Court of Appeals’ judgment is not enforceable
    under the second Montana exception.
    We affirm the judgment of the district court. We hold
    that the judgment of the Tribal Court of Appeals is
    enforceable under both Montana exceptions.
    I. Factual and Procedural Background
    The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes are a federally recognized
    Indian tribe comprising the eastern and western bands of the
    Northern Shoshone and the Bannock, or Northern Paiute,
    bands.     The Tribes are organized under the Indian
    Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 5101 et seq., and
    are governed by the Fort Hall Business Council, a legislative
    body consisting of seven elected members.
    Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, Tribal Government,
    http://www2.sbtribes.com/government (last visited Sept. 19,
    2019). The ancestral lands of the Tribes included land in
    present-day Idaho, Oregon, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming,
    Montana, and parts of Canada. See Shoshone-Bannock
    Tribes, http://www2.sbtribes.com/about (last visited Sept. 19,
    2019). Pursuant to the Fort Bridger Treaty of 1868, 15 Stat.
    673, and related executive orders, the Tribes today have
    sovereign authority over the Fort Hall Reservation. The Fort
    Hall Reservation originally encompassed approximately
    1.8 million acres, or 2,800 square miles. See 
    id. The Reservation
    now encompasses approximately 544,000 acres,
    or 840 square miles, in what is now southeastern Idaho.
    Ninety-seven percent of the Reservation is tribal land or land
    held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the Tribes
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                 7
    and their members. Approximately three percent of the
    Reservation is fee land owned by non-members.
    A. FMC’s Phosphorus Plant, Consent Decree, and Permit
    Fees
    From 1949 to 2001, FMC Corporation and its
    predecessors owned and operated an elemental phosphorus
    production plant occupying 1,450 acres. Virtually all of the
    property is fee land on the Fort Hall Reservation. FMC’s
    plant was the largest elemental phosphorus plant in the world.
    FMC Idaho, Plant History, http://fmcidaho.com/plant-history
    (last visited Sept. 19, 2019). For most of its operation, FMC
    obtained or mined raw materials for its plant from tribal and
    allottee lands on the Reservation. See, e.g., 
    id. Hazardous waste
    from the plant’s 52 years of operation
    contaminates FMC’s land on the Reservation. Approximately
    22 million tons of hazardous waste are stored in waste storage
    ponds on the site. Some storage ponds are capped. Some are
    not. Some ponds are lined. Some are not. Phosphorus,
    arsenic, and other hazardous materials contaminate an
    additional 1 million tons of loose soil and groundwater
    throughout the site. Millions of tons of slag containing
    radioactive materials contaminate the site. Somewhere
    between twenty one and thirty railroad tanker cars containing
    toxic phosphorous sludge are buried on the property. There
    is no lining underneath the tanker cars and no cap above
    them. As will be described in greater detail below, the
    hazardous waste in the storage ponds, tanker cars, soil,
    groundwater, and air at the site is radioactive, carcinogenic,
    and poisonous.
    8      FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    In 1990, EPA declared the FMC plant, as well as an
    adjoining off-reservation plant owned by a different
    company, J.R. Simplot, as a National Priority List
    Superfund Site—the “Eastern Michaud Flats” site—under
    CERCLA. See 55 Fed. Reg. 35502, 35507. The National
    Priorities List is a list of the nation’s “worst hazardous
    waste sites.”        EPA, Superfund Cleanup Process,
    https://www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-cleanup-process
    (last visited Sept. 19, 2019).
    In 1997, EPA charged FMC with violating RCRA.
    RCRA regulates the disposal of solid and hazardous waste.
    To avoid litigation, FMC began negotiations with the EPA
    over the terms of a possible Consent Decree that would settle
    the RCRA suit. Though not a formal party, the Tribes
    participated in the negotiations. Among other measures, the
    proposed RCRA Consent Decree required construction of a
    treatment facility and additional waste storage ponds on
    FMC’s fee land on the Reservation. As a condition to
    obtaining the Consent Decree, the EPA required FMC to
    obtain relevant permits from the Tribes. See Consent Decree,
    Case No. 4:98-cv-00406-BLW (D. Idaho, July 13, 1998).
    Pursuant to the Tribes’ Land Use Policy Ordinance
    (“LUPO” or “Ordinance”) and associated Guidelines, the
    relevant tribal permits included a building permit for
    construction of the treatment facility and waste storage ponds,
    and a use permit for storage of the hazardous waste. FMC
    and the Tribes met in July 1997 to discuss the permits.
    During negotiations, FMC consented to tribal jurisdiction.
    See, e.g., Letter from the Land Use Policy Commission to
    FMC (Aug. 6, 1997) (stating that following the July meeting,
    “We understood that FMC would recognize tribal jurisdiction
    within the exterior boundaries of the Fort Hall Indian
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                9
    Reservation.”); Letter from J. Paul McGrath, Senior Vice
    President and General Counsel and Secretary of FMC, to the
    Fort Hall Business Council, Shoshone-Bannock Tribes
    (Oct. 30, 1997) (stating “[i]n connection with the land use
    permit, we did agree that we would consent to tribal
    jurisdiction in that area”). FMC applied for the building and
    use permits in August 1997.
    While negotiations were proceeding, the Tribes
    considered and then adopted amended LUPO Guidelines for
    storage of hazardous waste on the Reservation. The Tribes
    finalized the amended Guidelines in April 1998. The
    amended Guidelines required an annual use permit for storage
    of hazardous waste on the Reservation, with an annual fee of
    $5.00 per ton. Money from use permit fees was to be
    “deposited in the Shoshone-Bannock Hazardous Waste
    Management Program Fund,” and to be used “to pay the
    reasonable and necessary costs of administrating the
    Hazardous Waste Management Program.” Amendments to
    Chapter V: Fort Hall Land Use Operative Policy Guidelines,
    § V-9-2(B) (1998).
    The Land Use Policy Commission (“LUPC” or
    “Commission”), the Tribes’ administrative and enforcement
    body for the Ordinance, notified FMC of the amended
    Guidelines. FMC estimated that the $5 per ton storage fee
    would cost over $110 million per year. FMC sought to
    negotiate a compromise with the Tribes. FMC Corp. v.
    Tribes, No. 4:14-CV-489-BLW, 
    2017 WL 4322393
    , at *2
    (D. Idaho Sept. 28, 2017).
    In May and June 1998, the Tribes and FMC negotiated an
    agreement under which FMC agreed to a one-time fee of
    $1 million and an annual use permit fee of $1.5 million to
    10     FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    cover FMC’s storage of its hazardous waste on the
    Reservation. See Letter from LUPC to FMC (May 19, 1998).
    The parties agreed that FMC was required to obtain a use
    permit and to pay the $1.5 million fee even if FMC capped
    and closed the eleven hazardous waste ponds that were
    subject to the RCRA Consent Decree (the “RCRA ponds”).
    See 
    id. (stating that
    FMC agreed to pay the annual use permit
    fee “beginning on June 1, 1999, and for every year
    thereafter”); Letter from J. Paul McGrath, Senior Vice
    President and General Counsel and Secretary of FMC, to
    LUPC (June 2, 1998) (“[I]t is our understanding that the
    permit covers the plant and that the $1.5 million annual fee
    would continue to be paid for the future even if the use of
    ponds 17–19 was terminated in the next several years.”);
    Affidavit of Robert J. Fields, Division Manager of FMC
    (Oct. 20, 2000) (stating that he participated in the
    negotiations with the Tribes and that the June 2, 1998 letter
    from FMC was intended to confirm FMC’s shared
    understanding that the use permit covered the entire facility
    and that FMC’s agreement to pay $1.5 million per year would
    not end when Ponds 17, 18 and 19 were closed pursuant to
    the Consent Decree). FMC paid its first fee on June 1, 1998.
    A few months later, FMC and the EPA agreed to a
    Consent Decree to settle the RCRA suit. FMC Corp. v.
    Tribes, 
    2017 WL 4322393
    at *3. Paragraph 8 of the Consent
    Decree memorialized the Decree’s requirement that FMC
    obtain permits from the Tribes: “Where any portion of the
    Work requires a . . . tribal permit or approval, [FMC] shall
    submit timely and complete applications and take all other
    actions necessary to obtain all such permits or approvals.”
    See Consent Decree, No. 4:98-CV-00406-BLW, ¶ 8 (D. Idaho
    July 13, 1998).
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                  11
    Pursuant to the Consent Decree, FMC agreed to pay a fine
    to the U.S. government of $11.9 million, to install a range of
    upgrades in its handling of waste, and to cap nine of the
    eleven RCRA ponds covered by the Consent Decree. FMC
    Corp. v. Tribes, 
    2017 WL 4322393
    at *3. Between 1999 and
    2005, FMC capped and/or closed the RCRA ponds. 
    Id. at *4.
    In 2005, FMC certified that the last of the RCRA ponds had
    been capped and/or closed.
    B. Prior Federal Court Proceedings
    From 1998 to 2001, FMC paid the Tribes the annual use
    permit fee of $1.5 million pursuant to its 1998 agreement
    with the Tribes. In December 2001, FMC stopped all active
    phosphorus processing operations at the site. When the
    $1.5 million use permit fee came due in 2002, FMC refused
    to pay it.
    After negotiations failed, the Tribes filed a motion in the
    RCRA Consent Decree action in federal district court,
    seeking a declaration that FMC was required by the Consent
    Decree to obtain tribal permits for waste storage on the
    Reservation. 
    Id. The district
    court held that “(1) the Tribes
    had jurisdiction over FMC under the first Montana exception
    . . . , (2) FMC was required to apply for Tribal permits based
    on FMC’s agreement to submit to tribal jurisdiction in ¶ 8 of
    the RCRA Consent Decree, (3) the Tribes were intended
    third-party beneficiaries of the Consent Decree and therefore
    had a right to enforce its terms, and (4) FMC was required to
    exhaust tribal remedies over any challenges to the Tribal
    permit decisions.” FMC Corp. v. Tribes, 
    2017 WL 4322393
    at *4; see United States v. FMC, No. CV-98-0406-E-BLW,
    
    2006 WL 544505
    (D. Idaho 2006).
    12     FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    On appeal from the district court, we addressed only the
    third of the district court’s holdings. We held that the Tribes
    were incidental rather than intended beneficiaries of the
    Consent Decree and therefore had no right to judicial
    enforcement of the Decree. United States v. FMC, 
    531 F.3d 813
    , 815 (9th Cir. 2008). We remanded to the district court
    with instructions to dismiss the Tribes’ suit. 
    Id. at 824.
    However, we noted that during the pendency of the appeal to
    our court “FMC began the process of applying for tribal
    permits, which is the main relief that the Tribes have sought
    in this action.” 
    Id. at 823.
    We explicitly noted and relied on
    a representation by FMC. We wrote:
    At oral argument, the Tribes expressed their
    concern that, if we were to hold that the
    Tribes lack standing to enforce the Consent
    Decree, FMC would withdraw its permit
    applications and undo the progress made to
    date on the proper resolution of this dispute.
    In response to questioning from the panel,
    FMC’s lawyer represented to the court that
    FMC understands that it has the obligation to
    continue, and will continue, with the current
    tribal proceedings to their conclusion. We
    accept that statement from counsel as binding
    on FMC.
    
    Id. at 823–24.
    C. Tribal Proceedings
    In 2006, after entry of the district court’s order but while
    FMC’s aforementioned appeal to our court was still pending,
    FMC applied to the Tribes’ Land Use Policy Commission for
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                 13
    a building permit for demolition activities and a use permit
    for continued storage of the waste. Following notice and a
    public hearing, the Commission granted FMC’s applications
    for the two permits. See Findings of Fact and Decision on
    FMC Application for Building Permit for Activities at the
    FMC Pocatello Plant (Land Use Policy Commission, Apr. 25,
    2006); Findings of Fact and Decision on FMC Application
    for Special Use Permit for Activities at the FMC Pocatello
    Plant (Land Use Policy Commission, Apr. 25, 2006). The
    Commission concluded that it had regulatory jurisdiction
    under both Montana exceptions to require FMC to obtain the
    permits. The Commission assessed a one-time building
    permit fee at $3,000 for demolition activities during that year.
    The Commission also assessed FMC’s use permit fee for
    storage of hazardous waste at the previously agreed
    $1.5 million annual rate. The Commission provided, as an
    alternative, that FMC could choose to pay the higher $5 per
    ton fee based on the weight of the waste stored on FMC’s
    property on the Reservation, pursuant to the Tribes’ amended
    Guidelines. 
    Id. FMC appealed
    the Commission’s decision to the
    governing body of the Tribes, the Fort Hall Business Council
    (“Council”). On July 21, 2006, the Council affirmed the
    Commission’s decision. Fort Hall Business Council Decision
    Regarding FMC’s Appeals of the April 25, 2006 Land Use
    Permit Decisions (July 21, 2006). On February 8, 2007, the
    Commission issued a “letter resolution” setting the use permit
    fee at the agreed-upon $1.5 million. FMC again appealed the
    Commission’s decision to the Council. On June 14, 2007, the
    Council affirmed the Commission’s decision.
    FMC appealed the Council’s and the Commission’s
    decisions to the Tribal Court. (The Shoshone-Bannock tribal
    14     FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    court system consists of a trial court and an appellate
    court—the “Tribal Court”and the “Tribal Court of Appeals.”)
    The Tribal Court held inter alia that, pursuant to the Tribes’
    laws, the Tribes were required to submit their Land Use
    Policy Guidelines and the Hazardous Waste Management Act
    of 2001, upon which the tribal use permit requirement was
    premised, to the Secretary of the Interior for approval. FMC
    Corp. v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes’ Fort Hall Business
    Council and Land Use Policy Commission, Case Nos. C-06-
    0069, C-07-0017, C-07-0035 (Shoshone-Bannock Tribal
    Court, Civil Division, May 21, 2008). The Tribal Court
    found that the Guidelines and the Act had not been approved
    by the Secretary of the Interior, and therefore, were
    unenforceable as a matter of tribal law.
    In June 2008, the Tribes and FMC cross-appealed to the
    Tribal Court of Appeals. The members of that court were
    Judges Fred Gabourie, Mary Pearson, and Cathy Silak. None
    of them is a member of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes. Judge
    Gabourie is a former California state court judge, former
    Chief Judge for the Kootenai Tribe of Idaho, and a former
    prosecutor and city attorney. Judge Pearson is a former Chief
    Judge for the Spokane Tribe and the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.
    Judge Silak is a former Justice of the Idaho Supreme Court.
    1. Conference Remarks by Judges Gabourie and Pearson
    While the case was pending before the Tribal Court of
    Appeals, Judges Gabourie and Pearson spoke at a conference
    entitled “Tribal Courts: Jurisdiction and Best Practices”
    convened by the University of Idaho College of Law on
    March 23, 2012. In the audience were law students, tribal
    court practitioners, other lawyers, and members of the public.
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                 15
    The conference was videotaped. FMC’s counsel attended the
    judges’ presentation.
    Judge Gabourie described the manner in which tribal
    appellate court decisions come before federal courts, and he
    noted that very few federal court judges have experience with
    tribes. He stated that “every court has—should be impartial”
    and “a good opinion comes [from] both sides, both parties.
    Because both parties rely on a good opinion, strong opinion.”
    He stated that a tribal appellate court decision should discuss
    the tribe’s tradition and culture so that judges in the federal
    system have some context when they read the decision. He
    stated that an appellate judge has a responsibility to remand
    the case for testimony from expert witnesses if there is a
    weakness in the record. He discussed limitations on tribes’
    sovereign powers under current law, and how, in light of
    Supreme Court decisions like Montana, “which has just been
    murderous to Indian tribes,” it is important for tribes to
    support good appellate courts that can issue strong opinions
    in the event issues are heard in a federal court. He discussed
    Nevada v. Hicks, 
    533 U.S. 353
    (2001), and Strate v. A-1
    Contractors, 
    520 U.S. 438
    (1997), noting that the tribal
    appellate court decisions had not been good, and that, as a
    result, the U.S. Supreme Court did not have vital information
    about the tribes’ cultures and traditions.
    Judge Pearson discussed the importance of tribal
    attorneys creating a record at the tribal trial court level. She
    stated tribal attorneys should involve the tribe in the “big
    cases.” She noted that they had a big case at that moment that
    they knew was “going to go up,” so they were saying prayers,
    reading cases, and “trying to do . . . the history.” She
    described Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 
    266 F.3d 1201
    (9th
    Cir. 2001), as a case where the tribal lawyers had effectively
    16     FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    laid out the history for the tribal trial and appellate courts.
    She discussed the importance of this responsibility—how
    “[you] just need to make sure that you do the job
    right”—since non-Indian federal judges were reviewing the
    decisions.
    In response to questions, Judge Gabourie discussed the
    value of anthropologists and scientists testifying in tribal
    court cases. He stated that the use of experts in Bugenig was
    a model for tribes seeking to protect their sovereignty,
    traditions, and cultures. Expanding on his earlier discussion
    of experts, Judge Gabourie stated:
    You know, there’s one area, too, there are
    tribes that have had mining and other
    operations going on, on the reservation, you
    know, and then the mining company or
    whatever, manufacturing company,
    disappears. They leave, you know. They’ve
    . . . either dug everything they could, and then
    the ground is disturbed, sometimes polluted
    beyond repair. And you sit as . . . an appellate
    court justice, and you’re starting to read the
    cases that come down from the tribal court.
    And you’re saying to yourself, you know, we
    know that . . . there’s pollution, that the food
    that they’re eating is polluted, the water’s
    polluted, but nobody proved it. And while
    John Jones said that it is polluted, you know,
    John Jones don’t count. But the tribal courts
    have got to realize that you need expert
    witnesses. You need chemists and whatever
    to get out of testifying. It may cost a little, but
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES              17
    so the appellate court is in a position of
    remanding that case back and say “do it.”
    You know, you made—and you’re really
    being fair to both sides. . . . That’s why you
    need the expert witnesses to cover those loose
    ends, you know, so when it finally goes to
    the—whatever circuit it may go to, they can
    see that there’s been some experts testifying
    on behalf. Maybe experts that testify on
    behalf of the mining company, but experts
    nonetheless. Well, you can be damn sure that
    the mining company’s going to spend the
    money to protect their interest, you know.
    So the appellate courts have got to step in and
    in their own way, make a good, balanced
    decision, a hundred-percenter for both sides,
    but be sure to protect the tribe. And that’s my
    own opinion, that last sentence.
    Judge Pearson clarified, “We’re not guaranteeing anybody
    anything.” Judge Pearson advised the audience:
    Well, I encourage you to get the Bugenig
    handouts, because it’s really important. If
    you’re a law student and you’re going to
    practice law, as well as if you’re a judge and
    you’re going to be hearing cases, you know
    where—companies come on the reservations
    and do business for X number of years and
    they dirty up your groundwater and your other
    things, and they go out of business. And they
    leave you just sitting. And you need to know
    18      FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    what you can do as you’re sitting as a judge
    with those cases coming toward you.
    2. Decisions of the Tribal Court of Appeals
    Just over a month later, on May 8, 2012, the Tribal Court
    of Appeals issued an opinion holding inter alia that (1) the
    Tribes have regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction over
    FMC under the first Montana exception to require FMC to
    obtain a building permit for demolition and construction, and
    a use permit for hazardous waste storage, and to require FMC
    to pay the agreed-upon annual use permit fee of $1.5 million;
    (2) the use permit fee was authorized by and enforceable
    under tribal law, because, inter alia, the Land Use Policy
    Ordinance and the Hazardous Waste Management Act were
    both approved by the Secretary of the Interior consistent with
    tribal law; and (3) the Tribal Court erred in failing to consider
    whether the Tribes have jurisdiction under the second
    Montana exception. The court issued an amended order on
    June 26, 2012. FMC Corp. v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes
    Land Use Dep’t and Fort Hall Bus. Council, Amended, Nunc
    Pro Tunc Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Opinion and
    Order, Case Nos. C-06-0069, C-07-0017, C-07-0035
    (Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Court of Appeals, June 26, 2012)
    (“Tribal Court of Appeals, June 2012 Opinion”).
    On January 10, 2013, pursuant to a state-court order under
    the Idaho Public Records Act, FMC obtained a videotape of
    Judges Gabourie and Pearson’s remarks at the law school
    conference. In April 2013, Judges Peter McDermott and
    Vern Herzog Jr. replaced Judges Gabourie and Pearson on the
    Tribal Court of Appeals. Judge McDermott is a retired Idaho
    state district court judge. Judge Herzog is a practicing
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES               19
    attorney. Neither is a member of the Shoshone-Bannock
    Tribes. Judge Silak remained on the court.
    On May 6, 2013, FMC filed briefs asking the
    reconstituted Tribal Court of Appeals to reconsider its prior
    rulings on the ground that the statements by Judges Gabourie
    and Pearson showed bias against FMC. In an order dated
    May 28, 2013, the Tribal Court of Appeals revised its earlier
    ruling on an issue unrelated to the questions now before us.
    It upheld its earlier rulings on all other issues. The court
    ordered an evidentiary hearing to resolve the question
    previously left open—whether the Tribes had regulatory and
    adjudicatory jurisdiction over FMC under the second
    Montana exception.
    From April 1 to April 15, 2014, the Tribal Court of
    Appeals held an evidentiary hearing on the second Montana
    exception. Judge Silak was not available for the hearing.
    Judge John Traylor replaced Judge Silak. Judge Traylor is a
    practicing attorney. He is not a member of the Shoshone-
    Bannock Tribes. Judges McDermott and Herzog remained on
    the court. Following the hearing, the Tribal Court of Appeals
    made factual findings and held that the Tribes had regulatory
    and adjudicatory jurisdiction under the second Montana
    exception. See Shoshone-Bannock Tribes Land Use Dep’t
    and Fort Hall Bus. Council v. FMC Corp., Opinion, Order,
    Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law (Shoshone-
    Bannock Tribal Court of Appeals, May 16, 2014) (“Tribal
    Court of Appeals, May 2014 Opinion”); see also Shoshone-
    Bannock Tribes Land Use Dep’t and Fort Hall Bus. Council
    v. FMC Corp., Statement of Decision (Shoshone-Bannock
    Tribal Court of Appeals, Apr. 15, 2014) (“Tribal Court of
    Appeals, Statement of Decision”).
    20     FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    In 2012, prior to the decision of the Tribal Court of
    Appeals, the EPA had issued an Interim Amendment to the
    Record of Decision (“IRODA”) under CERCLA addressing
    the FMC Operable Unit (“OU”) of the Eastern Michaud Flats
    Superfund Site. See EPA, Interim Amendment to the Record
    of Decision for the EMF Superfund Site, FMC Operable Unit,
    Pocatello, Idaho (Sept. 2012) (“IRODA”). The IRODA
    replaced an earlier 1998 Record of Decision (“ROD”). EPA
    concluded that it needed to issue the IRODA because the
    human health and environmental threats at the FMC site were
    greater than anticipated, there were “immediate” threats to
    human health and the environment, and EPA “no longer
    considered” the 1998 ROD “protective of human health and
    the environment.” IRODA at v, 14, 52; see also 
    id. at ii,
    16,
    20.
    The IRODA noted the particular dangers of the elemental
    phosphorus present at the FMC site: Elemental phosphorus
    is an “ignitable and reactive waste” that has “physical
    properties unlike most contaminants of concern . . .
    encountered in environmental response actions.” 
    Id. at iii.
    Due to these characteristics, elemental phosphorus “requires
    special handling techniques not only for routine handling but
    also for emergency response.” 
    Id. The IRODA
    noted that the
    remedial work completed under the RCRA Consent Decree
    was independent of the remedial work that remained to be
    done under CERCLA. 
    Id. at v.
    The IRODA outlined an extensive, multi-part “interim
    amended remedy” to be implemented on the FMC site. The
    IRODA included the following remedial measures: (1) place
    evapotranspiration caps over eight “remediation areas” on the
    Reservation containing “non-slag fill (such as elemental
    phosphorous, phossy solids, precipitator solids, . . . ),” id.;
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES              21
    (2) place “approximately 12 inches of soil cover over areas
    containing slag fill, ore stockpiles, and the former Bannock
    Paving areas to prevent [] exposure to gamma radiation and
    fugitive dust,” 
    id. at iii–iv;
    (3) “[c]lean underground
    reinforced concrete pipes that contain elemental phosphorous
    and radionuclides,” 
    id. at iv;
    (4) “[i]nstall an interim
    groundwater extraction/treatment system to contain
    contaminated groundwater, thereby preventing contaminated
    groundwater from migrating beyond the FMC OU and into
    the Simplot OU and/or adjoining springs or the Portneuf
    River,” id.; (5) “[i]mplement a long-term groundwater
    monitoring program to evaluate the performance of the soil
    and groundwater remedial actions,” id.; and (6) “[i]mplement
    a gas monitoring program at the FMC OU capped ponds (also
    referred to as the CERCLA Ponds to distinguish them from
    the RCRA-regulated ponds) and subsurface areas where
    elemental phosphorous is present to identify potential
    phosphine and other potential gas generation at
    concentrations that could pose a risk to human health,” 
    id. (emphasis in
    original).
    In its brief to us, FMC wrote, “The IRODA—which
    remains in effect today—requires an additional set of
    remedial actions that EPA has concluded are appropriate and
    fully ‘protective of human health and the environment.’”
    (emphasis added.) FMC’s brief misrepresents what the EPA
    wrote. The EPA did not write that the interim remedial
    measures described in the IRODA would be “fully”
    protective. Here is what the EPA wrote in the IRODA,
    specifying that the remedial measures are “interim” (which
    FMC’s brief failed to mention), and not using the word
    “fully” (which FMC’s brief supplied):
    22       FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    The measures in this selected interim
    amended remedy will be protective of human
    health and the environment, comply with
    federal and state/tribal requirements that are
    applicable or relevant and appropriate within
    the scope of the selected interim amended
    remedy, and result in cost-effective action and
    utilize permanent solutions and alternative
    treatment (or resource recovery) technologies
    to the maximum extent practicable.
    IRODA at v (emphasis added to indicate words quoted in
    FMC’s brief).
    The IRODA went on to specify:
    Because the selected interim amended remedy
    will result in hazardous substances, pollutants,
    or contaminants remaining on the FMC OU
    above levels that allow for unrestricted use
    and unlimited exposure, a statutory review
    will be conducted within 5 years after
    initiation of the remedial action, and every 5
    years thereafter to ensure that the interim
    amended remedy is or will [sic] protect
    human health and the environment.
    
    Id. at vi.
    The Tribal Court of Appeals’ factual findings were based
    in substantial part on the IRODA, and on earlier orders by the
    EPA, whose factual findings were not contested by FMC.
    See e.g., Tribal Court of Appeals, May 2014 Opinion, at 6
    n.2. The Tribal Court of Appeals found that “FMC created
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                 23
    and continues to store millions of tons of toxic waste on its
    fee land within Reservation boundaries.” 
    Id. at 5.
    This
    hazardous waste includes (1) as much as 16,000 tons of
    elemental phosphorus that leaked into the soil during
    production and now contaminates approximately 780,000
    cubic yards of soil weighing approximately 1 million tons;
    (2) elemental phosphorus that is “suspended in contaminated
    water” and contained in 23 waste storage ponds on the site;
    (3) “phosphine gas,” which is produced when elemental
    phosphorus is exposed to water; (4) approximately 21 tanker
    rail cars that were used to ship hazardous elemental
    phosphorous sludge and are now buried in unlined soil on the
    site; and (5) groundwater contaminated with arsenic and
    phosphorus that flows into important ground and surface
    water resources on the Reservation. 
    Id. at 5–7
    (citing IRODA
    at 7–9). “The site was also filled and graded using millions
    of tons of slag that contains radioactive materials which emit
    gamma radiation in excess of EPA’s human health safety
    standards.” 
    Id. at 6
    (citing IRODA at 7–9).
    The Tribal Court of Appeals found that FMC’s creation
    and storage of this hazardous waste on the Reservation
    creates “an ongoing and extensive threat to human health”
    and threatens the “welfare and cultural practices of the Tribes
    and their members.” 
    Id. at 5.
    “The elemental phosphorus in
    the soil and in containment ponds [on] FMC’s land is
    reactive, meaning that it will burst into flames when exposed
    to oxygen.” 
    Id. at 6
    (citing IRODA at 77). “The phosphorus
    itself is toxic when ingested, inhaled or absorbed.” 
    Id. (citing IRODA
    at 78). Phosphine gas, which “is harmful and even
    deadly to humans at certain levels,” has been released from
    the site at dangerous levels. 
    Id. at 7
    (citing IRODA at 77).
    The tanker rail cars buried at the site contained “from 200 to
    2,000 tons of elemental phosphorus sludge, 10–25% of which
    24      FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    remained in each of the tankers at the time they were buried”
    because FMC concluded cleaning them was “dangerous” to
    employees. 
    Id. at 7
    –8. These tankers remain in the ground
    today, and “it is possible that they either have or will corrode
    to the point of leakage.” 
    Id. “Arsenic and
    phosphorus from
    the site are continuously flowing in the groundwater from
    FMC’s land through seeps and springs directly into the
    Portneuf River and Fort Hall Bottoms.” 
    Id. at 8.
    This
    groundwater contamination “negatively affects the ecosystem
    and subsistence fishing, hunting and gathering by tribal
    members at the River, as well as the Tribes’ ability to use this
    important resource as it has been historically used for cultural
    practices, including the Sundance.” 
    Id. The Tribal
    Court of Appeals stated that “FMC does not
    challenge” that the hazardous materials present at the FMC
    site “do pose a threat” to the Tribes. 
    Id. at 9.
    “Rather, [FMC]
    contends that if certain methods suggested by the EPA are
    undertaken and properly implemented by FMC in the future,
    the risk will be contained.” 
    Id. But the
    court found that EPA
    itself continues to view FMC’s site as dangerous to public
    health and welfare. For example, in 2013, a year after the
    issuance of the IRODA, the EPA wrote that hazardous waste
    at the FMC site “may constitute an imminent and substantial
    endangerment to public health or welfare or the
    environment.” 
    Id. (quoting EPA,
    Unilateral Admin. Order
    for Remedial Design and Remedial Action, No. CERCLA-10-
    2013-0116, at 9–10 (June 10, 2013)). Further, the court
    wrote, “Although the EPA has been involved at this site since
    1990, remedial actions chosen by the EPA have not been
    implemented” and many “proposed remedial actions are still
    in design phase only.” 
    Id. “EPA’s IRODA
    is itself only an
    interim measure.” 
    Id. “[A] final
    Record of Decision will not
    be available for five to ten years.” 
    Id. (citing IRODA
    at 19).
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                 25
    “EPA’s plans remain just that: Plans.” 
    Id. In addition,
    “EPA’s plans are containment plans,” which would keep the
    hazardous wastes on the Reservation “for the indefinite
    future.” 
    Id. The Tribal
    Court of Appeals held that the Tribes had
    regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction over FMC under the
    second Montana exception. It concluded that FMC’s storage
    of millions of tons of toxic waste on the Reservation poses a
    serious threat, and has a direct effect on, “the political
    integrity, the economic security or the health or welfare of the
    [Tribes].” See Tribal Court of Appeals, May 2014 Opinion
    at 14–15; Tribal Court of Appeals, Statement of Decision
    at 29–32. The Court concluded that this threat “is real; it is
    not a mere potential,” and is a threat of catastrophic
    consequences to the Tribes. Tribal Court of Appeals,
    May 2014 Opinion, at 11.
    On May 16, 2014, the Tribal Court of Appeals issued a
    final judgment, holding FMC liable for an annual use permit
    fee of $1.5 million. See Shoshone-Bannock Tribes Land Use
    Dep’t and Fort Hall Bus. Council v. FMC Corp., Judgment
    and Order for Attorney Fees and Costs, May 16, 2014. The
    court assessed FMC $19,500,000 for unpaid permit fees for
    2002–2014; $928,220.50 in attorneys’ fees; and $91,097.91
    in costs, for a total judgment of $20,519,318.41. 
    Id. D. Federal
    District Court Proceedings
    In November 2014, FMC filed a complaint in the United
    States District Court for the District of Idaho, requesting that
    the district court deny enforcement of the judgment of the
    Tribal Court of Appeals. The Tribes counterclaimed, seeking
    an order enforcing the judgment.
    26      FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    The district court granted the Tribes’ motion to enforce
    the judgment. The court concluded that the Tribes had
    jurisdiction over FMC under both Montana exceptions. The
    district court rejected FMC’s due process challenge based on
    the alleged bias of Judges Gabourie and Pearson on the first
    panel of the Tribal Court of Appeals. The court noted that the
    reconstituted panel reconsidered the rulings of the first panel
    and, in relevant part, independently reached the same
    conclusions.
    The district court enforced the judgment in its entirety
    under the first Montana exception. However, the court
    denied comity under the second Montana exception on the
    ground that there was insufficient nexus between the
    $1.5 million annual permit fee and the costs of tribal
    programs required to mitigate the threat from the storage of
    FMC’s hazardous waste on the Reservation. The court
    concluded that the second Montana exception was therefore
    not a ground on which the judgment could be enforced.
    The present appeal followed. FMC argues that the Tribes
    lacked jurisdiction over FMC under both Montana
    exceptions, and that FMC was denied due process. The
    Tribes cross-appeal, arguing that the district court erred in
    finding that the judgment was not enforceable under the
    second Montana exception.
    II. Appellate Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
    We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
    “We have . . . recognized that because tribal courts are
    competent law-applying bodies, the tribal court’s
    determination of its own jurisdiction is entitled to ‘some
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                 27
    deference.’” Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v.
    LaRance, 
    642 F.3d 802
    , 808 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting FMC v.
    Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 
    905 F.2d 1311
    , 1313 (9th Cir.
    1990)). “As we consider questions of tribal jurisdiction, we
    are mindful of ‘the federal policy of deference to tribal
    courts’ and that ‘[t]he federal policy of promoting tribal self-
    government encompasses the development of the entire tribal
    court system, including appellate courts.’” 
    Id. at 808
    (quoting
    Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 
    480 U.S. 9
    , 16–17 (1987));
    see also United States v. Wheeler, 
    435 U.S. 313
    , 332 (1978)
    (recognizing that “tribal courts are important mechanisms for
    protecting significant tribal interests”).
    We review de novo tribal courts’ legal rulings on tribal
    jurisdiction, and we review for clear error tribal courts’
    factual findings underlying their jurisdictional rulings. Big
    Horn Cty. Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Adams, 
    219 F.3d 944
    , 949 (9th
    Cir. 2000); AT&T Corp. v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 
    295 F.3d 899
    , 904 (9th Cir. 2002).
    We review de novo the district court’s summary judgment
    decision on the due process claim. Big Horn 
    Cty., 219 F.3d at 949
    .
    III. Discussion
    The core question in this appeal is whether we should
    recognize and enforce the Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Court of
    Appeals’ final judgment holding FMC liable for an annual
    use permit fee of $1.5 million.
    “As a general rule, federal courts must recognize and
    enforce tribal court judgments under principles of comity.”
    AT&T Corp. v. Coeur d’Alene 
    Tribe, 295 F.3d at 903
    (citing
    28      FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    Wilson v. Marchington, 
    127 F.3d 805
    , 810 (9th Cir. 1997)).
    In some circumstances, however, we will not recognize and
    enforce a judgment. 
    Id. First, we
    will not recognize and
    enforce a judgment if the tribal court did not have both
    personal and subject matter jurisdiction. 
    Id. Second, we
    will
    not enforce a judgment if the tribal court denied due process
    to the losing party.       
    Id. Further, “[u]nder
    limited
    circumstances, . . . [we] may refuse to recognize or enforce a
    tribal judgment on equitable grounds as an exercise of
    discretion.” 
    Id. FMC argues
    we should not enforce the judgment of the
    Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Court of Appeals for two reasons.
    First, FMC argues the Tribes lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction over FMC. Second, FMC argues it was denied
    due process of law because two judges of the Tribal Court of
    Appeals were biased against it.
    Unless we hold that the Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Court
    of Appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction or denied FMC
    due process, we “must enforce the tribal court judgment
    without reconsidering issues decided by the tribal court.” 
    Id. at 903–04
    (citing Iowa Mut. Ins. 
    Co., 480 U.S. at 19
    (“Unless
    a federal court determines that the Tribal Court lacked
    jurisdiction . . . proper deference to the tribal court system
    precludes relitigation of issues . . . resolved in the Tribal
    Courts.”)). We “may not readjudicate questions—whether of
    federal, state or tribal law—already resolved in tribal court
    absent a finding that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction or that
    its judgment be denied comity for some other valid reason.”
    
    Id. at 904.
    We address each of FMC’s arguments in turn. We hold
    that the Tribes had regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                  29
    under both Montana exceptions to impose and enforce the
    permit fees. We further hold that there was no due process
    violation. Finally, we hold that the final judgment of the
    Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Court of Appeals is entitled to
    recognition and enforcement under principles of comity under
    both Montana exceptions.
    A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
    We first determine whether the Shoshone-Bannock Tribal
    Court of Appeals had subject matter jurisdiction over the
    Tribes’ claims against FMC. To make that determination, we
    must answer two related questions. First, did the Tribes have
    regulatory jurisdiction to impose the permit fees? Second,
    did the Tribes have adjudicatory jurisdiction to enforce those
    fees in tribal court? See, e.g., Water 
    Wheel, 642 F.3d at 809
    (“To exercise its inherent civil authority over a defendant, a
    tribal court must have [] subject matter jurisdiction—
    consisting of regulatory and adjudicative jurisdiction . . . .”);
    see also Knighton v. Cedarville Rancheria of N. Paiute
    Indians, 
    922 F.3d 892
    , 899 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting the
    same). For the reasons that follow, we hold that the Tribes
    had both regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction.
    1. Regulatory Jurisdiction
    The case before us concerns nonmember conduct on non-
    Indian-owned fee land within the boundaries of the
    Reservation. We therefore apply the Supreme Court’s
    framework set forth in Montana v. United States, 
    450 U.S. 544
    (1981), to determine whether the Tribes had regulatory
    jurisdiction to impose permit fees on FMC. See Window
    Rock Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reeves, 
    861 F.3d 894
    , 898 (9th Cir.
    2017), as amended (Aug. 3, 2017) (explaining that “[o]ur
    30     FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    caselaw has long recognized two distinct frameworks for
    determining whether a tribe has jurisdiction over a case
    involving a non-tribal-member defendant: (1) the right to
    exclude, which generally applies to nonmember conduct on
    tribal land; and (2) the exceptions articulated in Montana v.
    United States, 
    450 U.S. 544
    (1981), which generally apply to
    nonmember conduct on non-tribal land.” (emphasis added)).
    In Montana, the Supreme Court held that there are three
    bases for tribal regulatory jurisdiction over nonmember
    activities on non-Indian fee land within the boundaries of a
    reservation—the so-called Montana 
    exceptions. 450 U.S. at 565
    –66 (“Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to
    exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on
    their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands.”); Bugenig
    v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 
    266 F.3d 1201
    , 1209–10 (9th Cir.
    2001) (en banc) (discussing the same); see also Iowa Mut.
    Ins. 
    Co., 480 U.S. at 18
    (“Tribal authority over the activities
    of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of
    tribal sovereignty.”); Attorney’s Process & Investigation
    Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of Miss. in Iowa, 
    609 F.3d 927
    , 934–35 (8th Cir. 2010) (briefly discussing some of the
    historical scope of tribal sovereignty and changes over time).
    Cf. Worcester v. Georgia, 
    31 U.S. 515
    , 557 (1832) (Tribes are
    “distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries,
    within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right
    to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only
    acknowledged, but guarantied by the United States.”).
    First, a tribe retains the inherent sovereign authority to
    “regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the
    activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships
    with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
    contracts, leases or other 
    arrangements.” 450 U.S. at 565
    .
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                 31
    Second, a tribe “retain[s] inherent power to exercise civil
    authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within
    its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct
    effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
    health or welfare of the tribe.” 
    Id. at 566.
    Third, a Tribe may
    regulate the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian fee land
    when that regulation is expressly authorized by federal statute
    or treaty. See 
    Strate, 520 U.S. at 445
    ; Montana v. U.S. EPA,
    
    137 F.3d 1135
    , 1140 (9th Cir. 1998). There is a presumption
    against tribal jurisdiction over nonmember activity on non-
    Indian fee land. 
    Bugenig, 266 F.3d at 1209
    –10; see Plains
    Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 
    554 U.S. 316
    , 330 (2008). The Tribes bear the burden of rebutting that
    presumption. Plains Commerce 
    Bank, 554 U.S. at 330
    .
    Only the first two jurisdictional bases are relevant here.
    We examine them in turn.
    a. First Montana Exception
    The first Montana exception provides that tribes have
    jurisdiction to “regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other
    means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
    relationships with the tribe or its members,” including
    consensual relationships “through commercial dealing,
    contracts, leases or other arrangements.” 
    Montana, 450 U.S. at 565
    –66; see also 
    Strate, 520 U.S. at 446
    . The Supreme
    Court has recognized that permit requirements and permit
    fees constitute a form of regulation. See Morris v. Hitchcock,
    
    194 U.S. 384
    (1904) (recognizing tribal jurisdiction to require
    non-members to obtain permits and pay a permit fee in order
    to graze livestock on reservation).
    32      FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    For purposes of determining whether a consensual
    relationship exists, “consent may be established ‘expressly or
    by [the nonmember’s] actions.’” Water 
    Wheel, 642 F.3d at 818
    (quoting Plains Commerce 
    Bank, 554 U.S. at 338
    ).
    The test is not subjective. Rather, it is “whether under th[e]
    circumstances the non-Indian defendant should have
    reasonably anticipated that [its] interactions might ‘trigger’
    tribal authority.” 
    Id. at 817–18
    (quoting Plains Commerce
    
    Bank, 554 U.S. at 337
    ) (stating also “[t]he Supreme Court has
    indicated that tribal jurisdiction depends on what non-Indians
    ‘reasonably’ should ‘anticipate’ from their dealings with a
    tribe or tribal members on a reservation.”).
    FMC entered a consensual relationship with the Tribes,
    both expressly and through its actions, when it negotiated and
    entered into an permit agreement with the Tribes, requiring
    annual use permits and an annual $1.5 million permit fee to
    store 22 million tons of hazardous waste on the Reservation.
    As the district court noted, FMC then “affirmed its
    consensual relationship with the Tribes by signing the
    Consent Decree, which required FMC to obtain Tribal
    permits.” FMC Corp. v. Tribes, 
    2017 WL 4322393
    at *9.
    “FMC then cited its consensual relationship with the Tribes”
    to the district court and our court “as part of its argument that
    the Decree should be approved.” 
    Id. The conduct
    that the
    Tribes seek to regulate through the permit fees at issue—the
    storage of hazardous waste on the Reservation—arises
    directly out of this consensual relationship. See 
    Knighton, 922 F.3d at 904
    (“Montana’s consensual relationship
    exception requires that ‘the regulation imposed by the Indian
    tribe have a nexus to the consensual relationship itself.’”
    (quoting Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 
    532 U.S. 645
    , 656
    (2001))).
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                 33
    FMC argues this consensual relationship was “coerced”
    because EPA required FMC to obtain relevant permits from
    the Tribes in order to obtain a Consent Decree to settle EPA’s
    RCRA-based claims against FMC. FMC may indeed have
    been “coerced” in the sense that the EPA required it to obtain
    tribal permits as a condition for obtaining a Consent Decree.
    However, the “coercion,” if it can be called that, came from
    FMC’s strong interest in obtaining a Consent Decree that
    would allow it to settle the RCRA suit on favorable terms.
    FMC was highly motivated to obtain the Consent Decree
    proffered by the EPA. In the words of the district court,
    “[T]he Consent Decree allowed FMC to dump the toxic mess
    it had created in the EPA’s lap by paying a small fine of
    $11.9 million along with a few million dollars in construction
    commitments. That was a sweetheart deal and FMC was
    desperate to grab it.” FMC Corp. v. Tribes, 
    2017 WL 4322393
    at *13. Faced with a choice between years of
    litigation, on the one hand, and a “sweetheart deal” that
    required FMC to pay a small fine and obtain tribal permits
    whose terms were already known, on the other, FMC chose
    to consent to tribal jurisdiction. The district court wrote,
    “This was a simple business deal . . . .” 
    Id. at *10.
    It was
    “not the product of illegal duress or coercion.” 
    Id. We fail
    to see why a strong interest in obtaining a
    particular result is “coercion” that invalidates an agreement
    designed to achieve that desired result. Further, to the extent
    that there was some kind of “coercion,” it was “coercion” by
    the EPA. It was the EPA that insisted on tribal permits as a
    condition to agreeing to enter into the Consent Decree. As
    the district court observed, the Tribes simply “took advantage
    of their bargaining leverage, a long-standing practice in the
    34     FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    sharp-elbowed corporate world in which FMC does business
    every day.” 
    Id. Moreover, FMC
    should have reasonably anticipated that
    its interactions might “trigger” tribal regulatory authority.
    Water 
    Wheel, 642 F.3d at 818
    (quoting Plains Commerce
    
    Bank, 554 U.S. at 338
    ). FMC “is no stranger” to the Tribes’
    governance and laws or to the Tribes’ regulatory and
    adjudicatory jurisdiction. 
    Knighton, 922 F.3d at 904
    . FMC
    has operated on the Reservation for over 50 years and has had
    an extensive relationship with the Tribes for 70 years. That
    relationship includes a long history of “commercial
    dealing[s], contracts, leases, and other arrangements” with the
    Tribes, including mining leases, contracts for the supply of
    phosphate shale, agreements recognizing the Tribes’ taxing
    power, royalty payments, and employment and permit
    agreements. 
    Montana, 450 U.S. at 565
    –66; see also FMC v.
    Shoshone-Bannock 
    Tribes, 905 F.2d at 1312
    (9th Cir. 1990)
    (discussing FMC’s extensive mining operations on the
    Reservation to supply the phosphate shale needed to produce
    phosphorus at FMC’s facility).
    Based on FMC’s history on the Fort Hall Reservation, we
    have previously held that FMC had entered into a consensual
    relationship with the Tribes. In 1990, in FMC v. Shoshone-
    Bannock Tribes, we held that the Tribes had regulatory
    jurisdiction over FMC’s activities on its fee land within the
    Reservation such that the Tribes could require FMC to
    comply with the Tribes’ Tribal Employment Rights
    Ordinance. 
    905 F.2d 1311
    . Enacted by the Tribes in 1980,
    the Ordinance required employers on the Reservation,
    including non-Indian employers operating on fee land, to give
    mandatory preferences in hiring, contracting, and
    subcontracting to Indians. 
    Id. at 1312.
    FMC initially
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                35
    objected to application of the Ordinance to its phosphorus
    production plant, the same plant at issue here. 
    Id. But the
    re,
    as here, “[a]fter negotiations with the Tribes, FMC entered
    into an employment agreement based on the TERO in 1981
    that resulted in a large increase in the number of Indian
    employees at FMC.” 
    Id. at 1312–13.
    In 1986, “the Tribes became dissatisfied with FMC’s
    compliance with the employment agreement,” and after
    attempts to negotiate failed, the Tribes filed suit in Tribal
    Court. 
    Id. at 1313.
    There, as here, FMC argued the Tribes
    lacked regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction over FMC.
    
    Id. The Tribal
    Court held the Tribes had jurisdiction over
    FMC and concluded that FMC had violated the Ordinance.
    
    Id. The Tribal
    Court of Appeals affirmed. 
    Id. When the
    parties could not agree on a compliance plan, the Tribal Court
    of Appeals entered its own compliance plan and levied an
    annual fee of approximately $100,000 against FMC. 
    Id. We held
    that the Tribes had jurisdiction over FMC under
    Montana’s first exception. We wrote:
    FMC has certainly entered into consensual
    relationships with the Tribes in several
    instances. Most notable are the wide[-
    ]ranging mining leases and contracts FMC has
    for the supply of phosphate shale to its plant.
    FMC also explicitly recognized the Tribes’
    taxing power in one of its mining agreements.
    FMC agreed to royalty payments and had
    entered into an agreement with the Tribes
    relating specifically to the TERO’s goal of
    increased Indian employment and training.
    There is also the underlying fact that its plant
    36      FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    is within reservation boundaries, although,
    significantly, on fee and not on tribal land. In
    sum, FMC’s presence on the reservation is
    substantial, both physically and in terms of
    the money involved.
    
    Id. at 1314.
    We therefore conclude that the Tribes had regulatory
    jurisdiction under Montana’s first jurisdictional basis to
    impose the permit fees based on FMC’s consensual
    relationship with the Tribes.
    b. Second Montana Exception
    Under Montana’s second exception, the Tribes must
    demonstrate that FMC’s conduct on its fee lands within the
    Reservation “threatens or has some direct effect on the
    political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
    welfare of the tribe.” 
    Montana, 450 U.S. at 566
    . Under the
    second exception, a tribe “may quite legitimately seek to
    protect its members from noxious uses that threaten tribal
    welfare or security, or from nonmember conduct on the land
    that does the same.” Plains Commerce 
    Bank, 554 U.S. at 336
    . Threats to tribal natural resources, including those
    that affect tribal cultural and religious interests, constitute
    threats to tribal self-governance, health and welfare. See,
    e.g., 
    id. at 333;
    Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
    Yakima Indian Nation, 
    492 U.S. 408
    , 441 (1989); Montana v.
    U.S. 
    EPA, 137 F.3d at 1139
    , 1141 (“We have previously
    recognized that threats to water rights may invoke inherent
    tribal authority over non-Indians. A tribe retains the inherent
    power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-
    Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                 37
    threatens or has some direct effect on the health and welfare
    of the tribe. This includes conduct that involves the tribe’s
    water rights. . . . [D]ue to the mobile nature of pollutants in
    surface water it would in practice be very difficult to separate
    the effects of water quality impairment on non-Indian fee
    land from impairment on the tribal portions of the
    reservation: A water system is a unitary resource. The
    actions of one user have an immediate and direct effect on
    other users.”) (internal quotation marks and citations
    omitted).
    To establish jurisdiction under Montana’s second
    exception, the nonmember’s activities “must do more than
    injure the [Tribes].” Plains Commerce 
    Bank, 554 U.S. at 341
    .
    The activities must “imperil the subsistence or welfare” of the
    tribal community. 
    Montana, 450 U.S. at 566
    ; accord Plains
    Commerce 
    Bank, 554 U.S. at 341
    ; Evans v. Shoshone-
    Bannock Land Use Policy Comm’n, 
    736 F.3d 1298
    , 1306 (9th
    Cir. 2013).
    Tribal jurisdiction under the second Montana exception
    may exist concurrently with federal regulatory jurisdiction.
    See Tribal Court of Appeals, May 2014 Opinion, at 5
    (discussing the same). As we have explained previously,
    there is “no suggestion” in the Montana case law that
    “inherent [tribal] authority exists only when no other
    government can act.” Montana v. U.S. 
    EPA, 137 F.3d at 1141
    .
    We conclude that FMC’s storage of millions of tons of
    hazardous waste on the Reservation “threatens or has some
    direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security,
    or the health or welfare” of the Tribes to the extent that it
    “imperil[s] the subsistence or welfare” of the Tribes.
    38     FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    
    Montana, 450 U.S. at 566
    . We base our conclusion on the
    factual findings of the Tribal Court of Appeals, the factual
    findings and conclusions of the EPA, expert testimony
    presented in the Tribal Court of Appeals, and the record as a
    whole. The record contains extensive evidence of toxic,
    carcinogenic, and radioactive substances at the FMC site. We
    highlight here only two sources of contamination and the
    threats they pose to the Tribes: elemental phosphorus in the
    ground, and phosphine gas in the air.
    i. Elemental Phosphorus in the Ground
    Millions of tons of “ignitable-reactive elemental
    phosphorus,” “high concentrations of arsenic,” and gamma
    radiation contaminate the soil at the FMC site. EPA, 2013
    Unilateral Admin. Order for Remedial Design and Remedial
    Action, CERCLA No. 10-2013-0116, at 7 (June 10, 2013)
    (“2013 UAO”). “The elemental phosphorus contamination
    within the FMC OU alone is at a scale unprecedented
    anywhere in the United States . . . .” IRODA at 83. As much
    as 16,000 tons of elemental phosphorus saturate the ground,
    extend in a plume at least 85 feet below ground, and
    contaminate approximately 780,000 cubic yards of soil
    weighing 1 million tons. IRODA at 21, 78, 83. This
    calculated amount of phosphorus does not include elemental
    phosphorus-contaminated wastes that currently sit in ponds
    on the FMC site, the elemental phosphorus waste that has
    migrated or been blown off-site, and the unknown amount of
    waste that is contained in buried rail tanker cars that may
    corrode and leak. IRODA at 9, 14, 83. The elemental
    phosphorus contamination at the FMC site poses a serious
    threat to human health, the environment, and the welfare of
    the Tribes. In the EPA’s words, elemental phosphorus at the
    FMC site exists “in concentrations exceeding 1,000 parts per
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                 39
    million (ppm)” in the soil and “will present a significant risk
    to human health and the environment should exposure occur.”
    IRODA at ii; see also 
    id. at 34
    (“[R]isks from exposure to
    ignitable elemental phosphorus are severe and highly certain
    should direct exposure occur.”).
    The EPA concluded that the elemental phosphorus at the
    FMC site constitutes a “principal threat waste.” IRODA at ii,
    77–78. “Principal threat wastes are those source materials
    considered to be highly toxic or highly mobile that generally
    cannot be reliably contained or would present a significant
    risk to human health or the environment should exposure
    occur.” 
    Id. at ii–iii.
    Elemental phosphorus “is highly toxic
    by ingestion, inhalation, and skin absorption”; “may be fatal
    at high concentrations; is corrosive to skin and other living
    tissue”; “is likely to cause skin burns upon contact”; and is
    pyrophoric, meaning it will spontaneously burst into flames
    when exposed to the air, producing phosphine and other toxic
    gases. 
    Id. at 7
    7–78. Exacerbating the threat, elemental
    phosphorus “has physical properties that are unlike most
    [contaminants of concern] encountered in environmental
    response actions,” requiring “special handling techniques not
    only for routine handling but also for emergency response.”
    
    Id. at iii,
    77–78; see also 
    id. at 28
    (concluding that elemental
    phosphorus at the FMC site “could ignite, causing burns and
    inhalation hazards from intensely irritating phosphoric acid
    aerosols with potential to drift beyond the immediate area.”).
    “The threat of elemental phosphorus was vividly described by
    Claudeo Bronco, [a witness before the Tribal Court of
    Appeals,] who testified that he [saw] ducks spontaneously
    ignite as they took off from FMC’s phosphorus containment
    ponds.” Tribal Court of Appeals, May 2014 Opinion, at 6–7.
    40     FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    The EPA’s CERCLA plan calls for FMC to place
    evapotranspiration caps over areas contaminated with
    elemental phosphorus. IRODA at 68. However, despite the
    EPA’s involvement at the site since 1990 when the EPA first
    declared the plant a Superfund Site, many areas of the site,
    including the area where the tanker railroad cars are buried,
    still had not been capped at the time of the 2014 hearing
    before the Tribal Court of Appeals. Further, as the EPA
    wrote, capping “does not reduce [the] toxicity, mobility, or
    volume of contaminants.” 
    Id. at 6
    0. Even if capped,
    phosphorus-contaminated soil will remain on the Reservation
    indefinitely and continue to present a threat to Tribal health
    and welfare.
    ii. Phosphine Gas in the Air
    Phosphine gas produced from elemental phosphorus
    stored in ponds on FMC’s site poses a constant threat to the
    Tribes. Phosphine gas is “very flammable,” “highly
    reactive,” and “extremely toxic” to humans. Letter from Kai
    Elgethun, Idaho Dep’t of Health and Welfare to Greg Weigel,
    EPA Idaho Operations Office, at 2–3 (June 1, 2010) (“Letter
    from Idaho Dep’t of Health and Welfare”); EPA, Unilateral
    Admin. Order for Removal Action, FMC Idaho LLC,
    CERCLA No. 10-2010-0170, at 9 (June 14, 2010) (“2010
    UAO”); see also Expert Witness Testimony from Dr. Jerrold
    Leikin and Dr. Peter Orris, members of EPA’s Supplemental
    Environmental Project 14 for the FMC Site (discussing the
    dangers of phosphine gas and the FMC site in particular).
    Phosphine gas is “immediately dangerous to life and health”
    at concentrations of 50 parts per million (“ppm”). 2010 UAO
    at 9. It burns spontaneously upon contact with air and
    explodes at concentrations at or near 20,000 ppm. Id.; see
    also Expert Witness Testimony of Dr. Jerrold Leikin
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                41
    (describing phosphine as a “knockdown gas,” meaning a few
    breaths can render a person unable to walk or talk, and can
    result in extreme harm or eventual death). The short-term
    upper limit for human exposure is 1 ppm for 15 minutes of
    exposure. 2010 UAO at 9.
    There are eleven RCRA waste ponds on FMC’s property
    that are supervised under the Consent Decree. Nine of those
    ponds were capped between 1999 and 2005. See 2010 UAO
    at 8; FMC Corp. v. Tribes at *4. The other two were left
    uncapped. 
    Id. at 9–10.
    Dangerous levels of phosphine gas
    build up beneath the evapotranspiration caps on the capped
    ponds and are released from the uncapped ponds. 
    Id. Although the
    EPA has ordered FMC to implement measures
    to contain the gas, releases continue to occur.
    In 2006 and 2010, for example, the EPA entered
    Unilateral Administrative Orders (“UAO”) responding to
    phosphine gas releases from capped and uncapped RCRA
    ponds. See EPA, Unilateral Admin. Order for Removal
    Actions, FMC Idaho LLC, CERCLA No. 10-2007-0051 (Dec.
    14, 2006) (“2006 UAO”); 2010 UAO at 10–11 (noting that in
    2005, 2006, 2007, and 2009, levels of phosphine gas in the air
    around the RCRA ponds were high enough that workers in
    the area either had to delay work or leave the area for their
    safety).
    The EPA reported in its 2006 UAO that phosphine gas
    releases had been detected at RCRA Pond 16S. In June 2006,
    “intermittent emissions of smoke” from two temperature
    monitoring points (“TMP”) had been observed at the pond.
    2006 UAO at 10. Subsequently, “[v]isible air emissions from
    Pond 16S [were] observed on a number of occasions [after]
    June 2006, including by Shoshone-Bannock Tribal staff on
    42      FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    September 6, 2006 and September 18, 2006.” 
    Id. FMC had
    reported to the EPA that phosphine gas was collecting in
    TMP well casings at Pond 16S, and was “likely accumulating
    to the phosphine auto-ignition concentration (20,000 parts per
    million) inside the temperature well casings or vents.” 
    Id. The EPA
    concluded that “[t]he conditions at the Site
    constitute[d] an imminent and substantial endangerment to
    public health or welfare or the environment within the
    meaning of Section 106(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
    § 9606(a).” 
    Id. at 13–14
    (stating also that the conditions
    “constitute a threat to public health or welfare or the
    environment”). The EPA issued a “time critical Action
    Memorandum on December 13, 2006 for Pond 16S to remove
    and treat phosphine and other gases at levels of concern . . . .”
    
    Id. at 12–13.
    Dr. Peter Orris testified before the Tribal Court of
    Appeals that he “absolutely” agreed with the EPA’s findings
    and conclusions in the 2006 UAO. He testified that the
    phosphine gas was “both acutely and chronically dangerous
    to people in the area or downstream, if you will, or
    downwind.” “Phosphine gas [is a] close cousin to the
    phosgene gas used in World War I . . . that gassed all the
    soldiers, so that a high dose short-term exposure can kill
    people. . . . This is pretty catastrophic stuff.”
    The EPA reported in its 2010 UAO that “[p]hosphine gas
    ha[d] been detected in and around TMPs and in ambient air
    at a number of the RCRA Ponds.” 2010 UAO at 9. In late
    2009, FMC detected phosphine levels above 1 ppm near Pond
    15S, triggering alarms downwind and requiring evacuations
    on November 2, 23, and 27, and on December 22. 
    Id. at 11.
    In December 2009 to April 2010, FMC detected
    concentrations of phosphine gas as high as 23,000 ppm inside
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                43
    a lift station associated with Pond 15S. 
    Id. Daily monitoring
    from February to April 2010 measured phosphine gas in
    “ambient air,” at breathing zone height, ranging from 0 to at
    least 20 ppm. 
    Id. at 12.
    The actual concentrations may have
    been much higher. The EPA reported, “[O]n numerous
    occasions the monitors [] ‘pegged out’ at 20 ppm,” the upper
    detection limit for FMC’s monitors, “indicating some
    unknown concentration higher than 20 ppm.” 
    Id. Another phosphine
    survey on April 30, 2010, “provided phosphine
    readings that averaged 300 ppm” in another area of the pond.
    
    Id. FMC first
    reported the issues with Pond 15S to the EPA
    in a letter dated April 14, 2010. 
    Id. at 11.
    In response to an
    EPA request for information, FMC sent the EPA monitoring
    data from all the RCRA ponds on April 26, 2010. 
    Id. at 12.
    The data indicated that phosphine concentrations in the
    ambient air around two more ponds—one capped and one
    uncapped—were at or near the upper detection limit for
    FMC’s monitors. 
    Id. (Ponds 8E
    and 17); see 
    id. at 8
    for a list
    of capped and uncapped RCRA ponds.
    On June 1, 2010, shortly before the EPA’s release of its
    2010 UAO, Dr. Kai Elgethun of the Idaho Department of
    Health and Welfare wrote: “We conclude that the phosphine
    gas being released from Pond 15S is an urgent public health
    hazard to the health of people breathing the air in the
    proximity of Pond 15S . . . .” Letter from Idaho Dep’t of
    Health and Welfare at 1. Pond 15S is approximately
    400 meters south of a road and 600 meters south of an
    interstate highway that crosses the Reservation. 
    Id. at 3.
    The EPA wrote in the 2010 UAO: “Action is necessary to
    protect receptors from inhalation of phosphine at RCRA
    44      FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    Ponds, and to minimize the risk of fire and explosion from
    high concentrations of phosphine gas at the RCRA Ponds.”
    2010 UAO at 14. “Receptors,” in the jargon of the EPA, are
    individuals who may be exposed to phosphine gas. The EPA
    wrote that “receptors” included individuals “at or near the
    facility boundaries,” such as railroad and power company
    workers, bicyclists and pedestrians on “old Highway 30,” and
    “members of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes.” 
    Id. at 13.
    The
    EPA concluded in 2010, as it had in 2006, that the “[h]igh
    concentrations of phosphine accumulating within the [FMC]
    RCRA Ponds and being released” “constitute an imminent
    and substantial endangerment to public health or welfare or
    the environment within the meaning of Section 106(a) of
    CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).” 
    Id. at 13–15.
    The EPA
    issued a “time critical removal Action Memorandum on June
    11, 2010, for Ponds 8E, 15S and 17 and the other RCRA
    Ponds, requiring air monitoring and action to remove and
    treat phosphine gas . . . .” 
    Id. at 13.
    David Reisman, a former EPA official who worked at the
    EPA for thirty-six years, including several years at the FMC
    site, testified before the Tribal Court of Appeals that the
    threat of phosphine gas being released from the FMC
    site—both onsite and offsite—is “always there.” Reisman
    testified that when he visited the FMC site and walked on the
    caps on the RCRA ponds he observed visually that “they
    were not well maintained.” He testified further, “I think the
    data bears out that there is moisture and air getting under the
    cap, and mixing with the waste stream in one fashion or
    another.” Reisman noted that some phosphine gas is already
    escaping because of the nature of the evapotranspiration cap.
    He testified that at a landfill site near Las Vegas, repeated
    downpours of rain had caused part of an evapotranspiration
    cap to slide off the landfill, exposing the waste. If the caps at
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                 45
    the FMC site were to similarly crack or slide off, Reisman
    testified, massive clouds of phosphine gas at lethal exposure
    levels would be released.
    Reisman testified that proper monitoring to detect releases
    of phosphine gas was not being done at the FMC site.
    According to Reisman, monitoring remained “a big question
    mark” under the 2012 IRODA. See also Testimony of Rob
    Hartman, Vice President of FMC Idaho (discussing how a
    monitoring plan for phosphine gas “has not been developed”).
    Reisman testified that FMC does not have an early warning
    system in place, stating that he “hope[d] that all parties would
    look into some early warning system in case some of the
    catastrophic events would occur.” Another expert witness
    described the monitoring at the FMC site as “completely
    inadequate.”
    The record establishes that FMC’s RCRA ponds on the
    Reservation continue to generate lethal amounts of phosphine
    gas that accumulate beneath the pond covers. As the district
    court wrote, this phosphine gas “pose[s] a constant and
    deadly threat to the Tribes” and “a real risk of catastrophic
    consequences should containment fail.” FMC Corp. v.
    Tribes, 
    2017 WL 4322393
    at *11.
    iii. FMC’s Arguments
    FMC makes two arguments in its brief against jurisdiction
    under the second Montana exception. Both arguments fail.
    First, FMC argues that the hazardous waste on its site is
    contained, is “actively monitored by FMC and EPA,” and
    poses little danger to the Tribes. FMC writes, “The record
    does not remotely support jurisdiction under the second
    46     FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    Montana exception.” FMC’s argument fails to take into
    account what is actually in the record.
    The hazardous waste at the FMC site constitutes a serious
    and continuous threat. The district court summarized:
    [T]he EPA has taken substantial steps to
    contain the toxic waste and prevent harm. But
    the threat remains. . . . Because the EPA
    intends to leave the waste on the site
    indefinitely, and because the waste’s toxicity
    has such a long life—decades if not
    longer—there is a real risk that no matter how
    well its containment system is designed, the
    system may fail. . . . EPA reports demonstrate
    that the waste sites are not reservoirs of
    passive liquid that can be contained with a
    simple dam.         Instead, these sites are
    generating lethal gases that accumulate under
    pressure beneath the pond covers. In other
    words, they pose a constant and deadly threat
    to the Tribes, a real risk of catastrophic
    consequences should containment fail. And
    despite the best efforts of the EPA, there have
    releases of these toxic gases. . . . This
    dangerous threat can only be contained, not
    removed or treated. . . . It is so toxic that there
    is no safe way to remove it, ensuring that it
    will remain on the Reservation for decades.
    FMC Corp. v. Tribes, 
    2017 WL 4322393
    at *10–11.
    Second, FMC argues that our decision in Evans v.
    Shoshone-Bannock Land Use Policy Comm’n, 
    736 F.3d 1298
            FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                 47
    (9th Cir. 2013), compels the conclusion that the Tribes lack
    jurisdiction. Evans is light years away from the case before
    us. In Evans, we held that the Tribes’ Land Use Policy
    Commission did not have jurisdiction under the second
    Montana exception to require a nonmember to obtain tribal
    permits for the construction of a single-family home. We
    held that the Tribes had not established that the construction
    of one single-family home on fee land in an area of the
    Reservation that already “contain[ed] many residential
    properties owned and inhabited by nonmembers”—unlike the
    area in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima
    Indian Nation, 
    492 U.S. 408
    (1989), which was closed to the
    general public—threatened or had some direct effect on the
    political integrity, economic security, or the health or welfare
    of the Tribes. 
    Id. at 1303–06.
    In stark contrast to Evans, the
    threats from the FMC site, as Dr. Orris testified, “are not
    minimal annoyances. They are the threat of catastrophic
    health reactions, including death.”
    iv. Nexus
    The district court held that due to the extensive
    contamination at the FMC site, the Tribes had established
    jurisdiction under the second Montana exception. However,
    as a matter of comity, the court refused to enforce the
    judgment of the Tribal Court of Appeals under the second
    exception. In the view of the court, the Tribes had failed to
    sufficiently explain the connection between the $1.5 million
    annual permit fee and the threat posed by the hazardous
    waste. Citing Wilson v. Marchington, 
    127 F.3d 805
    (9th Cir.
    1997), the court wrote:
    Having jurisdiction under the second Montana
    exception, the Tribes are authorized to assess
    48     FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    a permit fee that has some nexus to the costs
    of supplementing the EPA’s program to fully
    protect the health and safety of Tribal
    members.      Yet the Tribes have never
    explained why an annual fee of $1.5 million is
    necessary to provide that supplemental
    protection.
    FMC Corp. v. Tribes, 
    2017 WL 4322393
    at *12.
    The district court was mistaken in holding that the Tribes
    had jurisdiction under the second Montana exception and, at
    the same time, holding that the Tribal Court of Appeals’
    judgment was not entitled to comity. The nexus question is
    part of the jurisdictional question. Once jurisdiction is
    established, lack of nexus is not a ground for denying comity
    under Marchington.
    We take it as a given that there must be some nexus
    between a basis for jurisdiction under Montana and a tribal
    action taken in the exercise of that jurisdiction. For example,
    if the Tribes had insisted under the second Montana
    exception that FMC disinvest from its businesses in China,
    such insistence would have been an unreasonable exercise of
    jurisdiction. However, there is nothing in Montana requiring
    that nexus be narrowly defined. There is nothing, for
    example, requiring the Tribes to show that the $1.5 million
    annual use permit fee be spent on supplemental measures,
    beyond those now being taken by the EPA, to protect against
    hazards posed by FMC’s hazardous waste. There is evidence
    in the record suggesting that the Tribes have spent
    approximately $1.5 million annually on measures to monitor
    and mitigate the dangers posed by FMC’s hazardous waste,
    and indeed that the Tribes might spend more if funds were
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                49
    available. But we need not rely on that evidence alone to find
    nexus.
    A more-than-sufficient nexus may be shown by
    comparing fees charged on the open market for hazardous
    waste storage, on the one hand, to the $1.5 million annual fee
    charged by the Tribes, on the other. FMC’s own evidence in
    the Tribal Court of Appeals showed that as of 1995,
    commercial hazardous waste disposal facilities charged
    between $50 and $250 per ton for bulk disposal (the type of
    materials typically disposed of at FMC’s facility). Given the
    extreme danger posed by FMC’s hazardous waste, it is an
    open question whether anyone could be persuaded to accept
    its waste at any price. But assuming that someone would be
    willing to accept FMC’s hazardous waste, and using a
    midrange fee of $150 per ton, the one-time fee for disposing
    of FMC’s 22 million tons of hazardous waste would be
    $3.3 billion. Compared to $3.3 billion, an annual fee of
    $1.5 million is an extraordinary bargain.
    Although we conclude that the Tribes can establish nexus
    in this case by showing that they charge less than the open
    market fee for comparable activity, we do not mean thereby
    to suggest that a tribe in some circumstances might not be
    able to charge substantially more than an open market fee, or
    might not be able to forbid waste storage or other activities
    entirely. We need not hypothesize cases not before us. It is
    enough for current purposes to show that there is a more-
    than-sufficient nexus between the storage of FMC’s highly
    dangerous—potentially catastrophically dangerous—waste
    and the $1.5 million annual use permit fee to warrant the
    assessment of that fee under Montana’s second exception.
    50      FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    2. Adjudicatory Jurisdiction
    A tribe’s adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmembers may
    not exceed its regulatory jurisdiction. 
    Strate, 520 U.S. at 453
    ;
    Water 
    Wheel, 642 F.3d at 814
    (noting that the Supreme Court
    has “articulated the general rule that a tribe’s adjudicative
    jurisdiction may not exceed its regulatory jurisdiction”).
    However, the Supreme Court has never decided whether a
    Tribe’s adjudicatory jurisdiction is necessarily as extensive as
    its regulatory jurisdiction. See Water 
    Wheel, 642 F.3d at 816
    .
    Where as here, we hold that the Tribes had regulatory
    jurisdiction, we are thus presented with the question of
    whether they also had adjudicatory jurisdiction.
    The Court has held that “where tribes possess authority to
    regulate the activities of nonmembers, ‘civil jurisdiction over
    disputes arising out of such activities presumptively lies in
    the tribal courts.’” 
    Strate, 520 U.S. at 453
    (citation omitted);
    see also Iowa Mut. Ins. 
    Co., 480 U.S. at 18
    (“Tribal authority
    over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an
    important part of tribal sovereignty. Civil jurisdiction over
    such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless
    affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal
    statute.” (internal citations omitted)); 
    Knighton, 922 F.3d at 906
    (discussing the same); Water 
    Wheel, 642 F.3d at 814
    (discussing the same). In two recent cases—both involving
    nonmember conduct on tribal land—we have held that tribes
    had adjudicatory jurisdiction. See 
    Knighton, 922 F.3d at 906
    –07; Water 
    Wheel, 642 F.3d at 814
    –16. In both cases, we
    based our holding on the existence of regulatory jurisdiction,
    the nature of the tribal sovereign interests, long-standing
    principles of Indian law, and congressional interest in tribal
    self-government. Based on those same factors, we conclude
    that the Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Court of Appeals had
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                 51
    adjudicatory jurisdiction over the Tribes’ claims in this case.
    See 
    Knighton, 922 F.3d at 907
    (concluding the same); Water
    
    Wheel, 642 F.3d at 816
    (concluding the same). As we stated
    in Water Wheel, “Any other conclusion would impermissibly
    interfere with the tribe’s inherent sovereignty, contradict
    long-standing principles the Supreme Court has repeatedly
    recognized, and conflict with Congress’s interest in
    promoting tribal 
    self-government.” 642 F.3d at 816
    .
    B. Due Process
    We held in Wilson v. Marchington that a federal court
    must “reject a tribal judgment if the defendant was not
    afforded due process of 
    law.” 127 F.3d at 811
    . “Due
    process, as that term is employed in comity, . . . [requires]
    that there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial before
    an impartial tribunal that conducts the trial upon regular
    proceedings after proper service or voluntary appearance of
    the defendant, and that there is no showing of prejudice in the
    tribal court or in the system of governing laws.” 
    Id. Comity, however,
    “does not require that a tribe utilize judicial
    procedures identical to those used in the United States
    Courts.” 
    Id. We must
    “be careful to respect tribal
    jurisprudence” as well as tribes’ customs and traditions. 
    Id. “Extending comity
    to tribal judgments is not an invitation for
    [us] to exercise unnecessary judicial paternalism in
    derogation of tribal self-governance.” 
    Id. “However, the
    tribal court proceedings must afford the defendant the basic
    tenets of due process or the judgment will not be recognized
    by the United States.” 
    Id. FMC argues
    it was denied due
    process. We disagree.
    FMC’s primary argument is that two judges on the Tribal
    Court of Appeals—Judges Gabourie and Pearson—were not
    52     FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    impartial. In support of its argument, FMC cites the judges’
    remarks at the conference sponsored by the University of
    Idaho College of Law. FMC’s argument fails for two
    reasons.
    First, Judges Gabourie and Pearson did not make any
    statements at the conference indicating bias against FMC. At
    several points in their remarks, both judges emphasized the
    importance of impartiality. Transcript of Tribal Courts:
    Jurisdiction and Best Practices (“Transcript”) at 9 and 19
    (stating “every court has—should be impartial”; “a good
    opinion comes [from] both sides, both parties. Because both
    parties rely on a good opinion, strong opinion.”; you “need to
    make sure that you do the job right”). Although Judges
    Gabourie and Pearson criticized various Supreme Court
    opinions, including Montana, disagreement with an opinion
    of the Supreme Court does not indicate that judges cannot
    faithfully apply that opinion to the case before them. If such
    were the case, federal and state judges would need to recuse
    themselves with some frequency. See, e.g., Republican Party
    of Minn. v. White, 
    536 U.S. 765
    , 779 (2002) (“[J]udges often
    state their views on disputed legal issues outside the context
    of adjudication—in classes that they conduct, and in books
    and speeches.”); In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct,
    
    632 F.3d 1289
    , 1289 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The Code of Conduct
    encourages judges to ‘speak, write, lecture, teach, and
    participate in other activities concerning the law, the legal
    system, and the administration of justice.’ Engaging in such
    law-related activities—including speeches that comment on
    current events and legal developments—is permitted not only
    because judges are citizens, but because they are particularly
    knowledgeable on such topics.” (internal citations omitted));
    In re Charges of Judicial Misconduct, 
    769 F.3d 762
    , 785
    (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[C]riticizing the [Supreme] Court does not
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                 53
    constitute judicial misconduct. . . . It would be all but
    impossible for a judge to urge changes in the course of the
    law, or even to comment on substantive legal issues, without
    being able to reference and criticize decisions of the Supreme
    Court. Not surprisingly, then, there is a long tradition of
    lower court judges criticizing the Court on issues of
    constitutional law [and other areas].”).
    Judge Pearson did mention at one point that she had a
    “big case” that she believed was “going to go up,” and that
    she was saying prayers, reading cases, and trying to do the
    history. However, she said nothing about the merits of the
    case. Cf. In re Charges of Judicial 
    Misconduct, 769 F.3d at 787
    –88 (“[N]otwithstanding the general prohibition on
    commenting on the merits of pending or impending matters,
    the Code contains an exception for offering such comments
    in the context of ‘scholarly presentations made for purposes
    of legal education.’” (citing Canon 3A(6) of the Judicial-
    Conduct Rules)).
    Second, to the degree Judges Gabourie and Pearson’s
    remarks may be thought to have indicated bias against FMC,
    a reconstituted panel of judges considered the prior rulings of
    the Tribal Court of Appeals. The reconstituted panel revised
    one aspect of the court’s prior decision and affirmed the
    others. A differently reconstituted panel then handled all
    proceedings going forward, including the hearing on
    jurisdiction under Montana’s second exception. The actions
    of the reconstituted panels eliminated any possible due
    process concerns arising from the remarks of Judges
    Gabourie and Pearson, and from their participation in earlier
    decisions of the Tribal Court of Appeals.
    54      FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    FMC makes other due process arguments, including that
    the Fort Hall Business Council improperly closed the record;
    that the Tribal Court of Appeals improperly rejected evidence
    from FMC as untimely; that the Tribal Court of Appeals,
    rather than the trial court, held an evidentiary hearing; and
    that the tribal courts are not independent from the Fort Hall
    Business Council. FMC has either waived these arguments
    or they are self-evidently meritless.
    FMC’s due process arguments are based in part on an
    underlying argument that, in FMC’s words, tribal courts
    present “inherent risks . . . for denying nonmembers” due
    process protections. The Supreme Court, our circuit, and our
    sister circuits have repeatedly rejected that and other similar
    arguments. See, e.g., Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow
    Tribe of Indians, 
    471 U.S. 845
    , 855–57 (1985) (requiring
    nonmembers to exhaust tribal court remedies and stating that
    exhaustion will “provide other courts with the benefit of
    [tribal court] expertise”); Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe of the
    Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 
    862 F.3d 1236
    , 1249–50 (10th
    Cir. 2017) (“We also reject the officers’ arguments that they
    will suffer undue bias and a lack of due process if subjected
    to tribal jurisdiction. The officers offer little support for their
    allegations, which boil down to baseless ‘attacks’ on the
    competence and fairness of the Ute Tribal Court. The
    Supreme Court has already explained that such arguments are
    contrary to federal policy . . . . The Court has also
    ‘repeatedly’ recognized tribal courts ‘as appropriate forums
    for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important
    personal and property interests of both Indians and non-
    Indians.’” (citing Iowa Mut. Ins. 
    Co., 480 U.S. at 19
    ; Santa
    Clara 
    Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 65
    ; 
    Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 332
    (“[T]ribal courts are important mechanisms for protecting
    significant tribal interests.”))).
    FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES                 55
    The Tenth Circuit recently wrote, “Although it is true that
    the Bill of Rights does not itself constrain tribal court
    proceedings, see Talton v. Mayes, 
    163 U.S. 376
    , 382–85
    (1896), this does not leave the rights of nonmembers
    unprotected in tribal courts.” 
    Norton, 862 F.3d at 1249
    . “The
    Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–04,
    expressly provides that no tribe may ‘deny to any person
    within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or
    deprive any person of liberty or property without due process
    of law.’” 
    Id. at 1249–50
    (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8)); see
    also Iowa Mut. Ins. 
    Co., 480 U.S. at 19
    (noting that ICRA
    “provides non-Indians with various protections against unfair
    treatment in the tribal courts”). “Making good on these due
    process guarantees, nearly five decades of tribal cases
    applying ICRA show that tribal courts protect the rights of
    both member and nonmember litigants in much the same way
    as do federal and state courts.” 
    Norton, 862 F.3d at 1250
    .
    “[T]ribal courts often provide litigants with due process that
    ‘exceed[s] the protections offered by state and federal
    courts.’” 
    Id. (second alteration
    in original) (citing Matthew
    L.M. Fletcher, American Indian Tribal Law 325 (2011)).
    “[E]mpirical studies demonstrate that tribal courts are
    even-handed in dispensing justice to nonmembers.” Id.; see,
    e.g., Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider:
    Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers in Tribal Justice Systems,
    37 Ariz. St. L.J. 1047, 1047, 1051 (2005) (“Navajo appellate
    courts are remarkably balanced in hearing cases involving
    outsiders. . . . The court is both numerically balanced in its
    decisions regarding nonmembers . . . and qualitatively
    balanced, even in areas . . . that might seem particularly prone
    to bias. A less comprehensive review of decisions from other
    tribal court systems reveals a similar effort to decide issues
    fairly, even where it requires ruling against tribal members or
    56     FMC CORP. V. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES
    the tribe itself.”); Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative
    Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: Of Tribal
    Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 Fordham L. Rev.
    479, 578 (2000) (concluding from a study of twelve years of
    decisions from approximately twenty-five tribal courts that
    “tribal courts have [not] succumbed to the temptation to favor
    the insider at the expense of outsiders”).
    Our own experience in reviewing tribal court decisions is
    consistent with the findings of these studies. Tribal courts,
    like all courts (including our own), make mistakes. But,
    contrary to the contention of FMC, tribal courts do not treat
    nonmembers unfairly.
    C. Comity
    Because we hold that the Tribes had regulatory and
    adjudicatory jurisdiction under both Montana bases, and that
    FMC was not denied due process, we recognize and enforce
    the Tribal Court of Appeals’ judgments under principles of
    comity. See AT&T Corp. v. Coeur d’Alene 
    Tribe, 295 F.3d at 903
    . The judgment of the Tribal Court of Appeals is
    enforceable under both the first and second Montana
    exceptions. See Wilson v. 
    Marchington, 127 F.3d at 810
    .
    Conclusion
    We hold that the Tribes had regulatory and adjudicatory
    jurisdiction under both Montana exceptions, and that the
    Tribal Court of Appeals did not violate FMC’s right to due
    process. We hold that the judgment of the Tribal Court of
    Appeals is enforceable under principles of comity.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-35840

Filed Date: 11/15/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/15/2019

Authorities (21)

Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley , 121 S. Ct. 1825 ( 2001 )

Worcester v. Georgia , 8 L. Ed. 483 ( 1832 )

United States v. Wheeler , 98 S. Ct. 1079 ( 1978 )

National Farmers Union Insurance v. Crow Tribe of Indians , 105 S. Ct. 2447 ( 1985 )

Republican Party of Minnesota v. White , 122 S. Ct. 2528 ( 2002 )

Mary Jane WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas David ... , 127 F.3d 805 ( 1997 )

United States v. FMC Corp. , 531 F.3d 813 ( 2008 )

Nevada v. Hicks , 121 S. Ct. 2304 ( 2001 )

roberta-bugenig-v-hoopa-valley-tribe-the-hoopa-valley-tribal-council-the , 266 F.3d 1201 ( 2001 )

At & T Corporation v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe , 295 F.3d 899 ( 2002 )

Strate v. A-1 Contractors , 117 S. Ct. 1404 ( 1997 )

Morris v. Hitchcock , 24 S. Ct. 712 ( 1904 )

big-horn-county-electric-cooperative-inc-v-denis-adams-tax-commissioner , 219 F.3d 944 ( 2000 )

state-of-montana-lake-county-montana-a-political-subdivision-of-the-state , 137 F.3d 1135 ( 1998 )

fmc-v-shoshone-bannock-tribes-acting-by-and-through-its-tero-commission , 905 F.2d 1311 ( 1990 )

In Re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct , 632 F.3d 1289 ( 2011 )

Talton v. Mayes , 16 S. Ct. 986 ( 1896 )

BRENDALE v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES AND BANDS OF THE YAKIMA ... , 109 S. Ct. 2994 ( 1989 )

Attorney's Process & Investigation Services, Inc. v. Sac & ... , 609 F.3d 927 ( 2010 )

Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. Larance , 642 F.3d 802 ( 2011 )

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