Idaho Power Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission , 801 F.3d 1055 ( 2015 )


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  •                 FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    IDAHO POWER COMPANY; IDACORP          No. 13-72220
    ENERGY SERVICES COMPANY,
    Petitioners,      FERC Nos.
    EL01-10-096
    v.                      13-1002
    FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY
    COMMISSION,
    Respondent,
    EL PASO MARKETING COMPANY,
    LLC, FKA El Paso Marketing, LP,
    FKA El Paso Merchant Energy, LP;
    EXELON GENERATION COMPANY,
    LLC, as successor to Constellation
    Energy Commodities Group, Inc.;
    KAMALA D. HARRIS, Attorney
    General; TALEN ENERGY
    MARKETING, LLC; TALEN
    MONTANA, LLC; PEOPLE OF THE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA; PUBLIC
    UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA; SOUTHERN
    CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY,
    Respondents-Intervenors.
    2                IDAHO POWER CO. V. FERC
    IDAHO POWER COMPANY; IDACORP                 No. 14-72384
    ENERGY SERVICES COMPANY,
    Petitioners,             FERC No.
    EL01-10-129
    v.
    FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY                     OPINION
    COMMISSION,
    Respondent,
    TALEN ENERGY MARKETING, LLC;
    TALEN MONTANA, LLC,
    Respondents-Intervenors.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
    Argued and Submitted
    June 16, 2015—San Francisco, California
    Filed September 4, 2015
    Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge and M. Margaret
    McKeown and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge McKeown
    IDAHO POWER CO. V. FERC                            3
    SUMMARY*
    Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
    The panel granted two petitions for review concerning
    proposed settlements submitted to the Federal Energy
    Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) by Idaho Power
    Company, related to electricity sales in the Pacific Northwest
    in 2000 and 2001, and remanded for further proceedings.
    The panel held that FERC departed from its rules and
    precedent without explanation when it treated the first
    proposed settlement as uncontested. Because the settlements
    and petitions were inextricably intertwined, the panel granted
    both petitions. The panel directed FERC to reconsider its
    decision on the petitions and issue a decision within sixty
    days of the issuance of this court’s mandate.
    COUNSEL
    Lawrence G. Acker (argued), Howard E. Shapiro, and
    Thomas G. Hutton, Van Ness Feldman, LLP, Washington,
    D.C.; Rex Blackburn and Brian R. Buckham, Idaho Power
    Company, Boise, Idaho, for Petitioners.
    David L. Morenoff, General Counsel, Robert H. Solomon,
    Solicitor, Lona T. Perry and Susanna Y. Chu (argued),
    Deputy Solicitors, Washington, D.C., for Respondent Federal
    Energy Regulatory Commission.
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    4                      IDAHO POWER CO. V. FERC
    OPINION
    McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:
    These petitions call to mind the classic lyric: “You can
    check out any time you like, but you can never leave.”1 Idaho
    Power Company and its subsidiary, IDACORP, Inc.,
    (collectively, IDACORP), in an effort to conclude their role
    in the now-epic Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
    (“FERC”) proceeding related to electricity sales in the Pacific
    Northwest in 2000 and 2001, submitted proposed settlements
    to FERC with the expectation that the companies would be
    able to wash their hands of the proceeding for good.
    We consider whether FERC abused its discretion in
    considering these proposed settlements and conclude that the
    agency departed from its rules and precedent without
    explanation when it treated the first proposed settlement as
    uncontested. Because the settlements and petitions are
    inextricably intertwined, we grant both petitions and remand
    for further proceedings. The irony of prolonging the
    proceedings further is not lost on us, so in line with FERC’s
    representation at argument that reconsideration would not
    take long, we order FERC to issue its decision within sixty
    days of the issuance of the mandate here.
    BACKGROUND
    We recounted the now-familiar backdrop of this litigation
    in Port of Seattle v. FERC, 
    499 F.3d 1016
    (9th Cir. 2007),
    cert. denied sub nom. Puget Sound Energy, Inc. v. California,
    
    558 U.S. 1136
    (2010). We reviewed several challenges to
    1
    Eagles, Hotel California (Asylum 1976).
    IDAHO POWER CO. V. FERC                       5
    FERC’s decision to deny refunds to wholesale buyers of
    electricity that purchased energy in the short-term supply
    market in the Pacific Northwest at unusually high prices.
    That petition for review resulted in a remand for further
    proceedings.
    Few details of our remand in Port of Seattle are relevant
    to these particular petitions for review, which arise from
    settlement proceedings before FERC that followed the
    remand. Suffice it to say, we credited some of the
    petitioners’ challenges to FERC’s structuring of the refund
    proceedings and remanded, noting that FERC may in the
    future “find it necessary to call for additional fact-finding” if
    the record is insufficient to inform a reasoned decision. 
    Id. at 1035–36.
    On remand, FERC planned evidentiary hearings on
    violations that may warrant refunds. See Puget Sound
    Energy, Inc. v. All Jurisdictional Sellers of Energy,
    137 FERC ¶ 61,001 (Oct. 3, 2011). FERC held the refund
    proceedings in abeyance, however, to allow for settlement
    and appointed a settlement judge under Commission Rule
    603, 18 C.F.R. § 385.603 (2011). 137 FERC ¶ 61,001, at
    paras. 30–31. A schedule was set for refund claims to be
    presented as a part of settlement procedures.
    These petitions concern FERC’s handling of two
    proposed settlements in relation to refund claims filed against
    IDACORP by the cities of Tacoma and Seattle, Washington.
    The first settlement at issue here was between IDACORP
    and Tacoma. The proposed settlement would have resolved
    Tacoma’s claims against IDACORP, reserved Seattle’s
    claims for later disposition, and released claims between
    6                IDAHO POWER CO. V. FERC
    IDACORP and all other parties—thus ending IDACORP’s
    participation in the FERC proceedings once the Seattle claim
    was resolved.
    Powerex Corporation, PPL Montana, LLC, and PPL
    EnergyPlus, LLC (the latter two collectively referred to as the
    PPL entities)—all respondents in the FERC proceeding—
    filed comments contesting part of the proposed Tacoma
    settlement. See 18 C.F.R. § 385.602(f). They contended that
    the provisions releasing all other parties’ claims interfered
    with the preservation of potential “ripple claims,” which
    FERC defined as “sequential claims against a succession of
    sellers in a chain of purchases that are triggered if the last
    wholesale purchaser in the chain is entitled to a refund,” thus
    “rippling” through the market. 96 FERC ¶ 63,044, 65,300
    (Sept. 24, 2001).
    Despite these objections, the settlement judge certified the
    proposed Tacoma settlement to the Commission as
    uncontested. 139 FERC ¶ 63,004, at paras. 2, 34 (April 24,
    2012). FERC then approved the portions of the settlement
    regarding Tacoma and Seattle’s claims, but rejected the
    provisions that purported to release all other claims.
    139 FERC ¶ 61,209 (June 13, 2012). FERC explained that
    “[w]hile the potential for ripple claims is speculative”
    because FERC had precluded market-wide remedies in the
    proceedings, the proposed settlement could not “be used to
    extinguish potential claims of others” without conflicting
    with FERC’s policy against settlements that impair the rights
    of non-parties. 
    Id. at para.
    7. FERC directed IDACORP to
    modify the proposed settlement to remove the disputed
    language. 
    Id. IDAHO POWER
    CO. V. FERC                         7
    IDACORP filed the requested modification and requested
    rehearing. FERC accepted the modification, which excluded
    all parties other than Tacoma from the release provisions, and
    denied rehearing. 141 FERC ¶ 61,148 (Nov. 20, 2012).
    IDACORP petitioned for review.
    While that petition was pending, IDACORP submitted the
    second proposed settlement at issue here—this one with
    Powerex. Under the proposed Powerex settlement, Powerex
    would withdraw its objections to the original proposed
    Tacoma settlement and agree not to pursue any claims against
    IDACORP. This settlement would also exempt the PPL
    entities from the release provisions that they had disputed in
    the proposed Tacoma settlement. According to IDACORP,
    the proposed Powerex settlement “was structured
    procedurally and substantively to remove the objections
    FERC expressed regarding the [original proposed Tacoma
    settlement].”
    No objections were filed to the proposed Powerex
    settlement. 145 FERC ¶ 63,018, at paras. 27–29 (Dec. 20,
    2013). FERC, however, rejected its release provisions and
    required a modification similar to the one it imposed on the
    Tacoma settlement.2 146 FERC ¶ 61,123 (Feb. 21, 2014).
    IDACORP complied to FERC’s satisfaction, and FERC
    denied rehearing. 147 FERC ¶ 61,223 (June 17, 2014).
    IDACORP again petitioned for review.
    2
    IDACORP contends that had FERC instead approved the settlement,
    its petition in No. 13-72220 would have been moot.
    8               IDAHO POWER CO. V. FERC
    ANALYSIS
    We review FERC decisions to determine whether they are
    “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, unsupported by
    substantial evidence, or not in accordance with law.” Cal.
    Dep’t of Water Res. v. FERC, 
    341 F.3d 906
    , 910 (9th Cir.
    2003). While our review of FERC’s interpretation of its own
    regulations is quite deferential, see Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
    FERC, 
    746 F.2d 1383
    , 1386 (9th Cir. 1984), an agency “may
    not depart, sub silentio, from its usual rules of decision to
    reach a different, unexplained result in a single case,” Cal.
    Trout v. FERC, 
    572 F.3d 1003
    , 1023 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted).
    The decisions challenged here involve FERC’s authority
    to informally settle ratemaking proceedings. See United Mun.
    Distribs. Grp. v. FERC, 
    732 F.2d 202
    , 207 n.7 (D.C. Cir.
    1984); 18 C.F.R. § 385.602.
    Under FERC’s rules, when a proposed settlement is
    uncontested, FERC can approve it if the settlement appears to
    be “fair and reasonable and in the public interest.” 18 C.F.R.
    § 385.602(g)(3). As FERC acknowledges, this rule permits
    the agency to approve an uncontested settlement without
    determining whether it is “just and reasonable.” See Mobil
    Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 
    417 U.S. 283
    , 314 (1974).
    Contested settlements are different. FERC regulations set
    forth procedures for settlements that are “contested in whole
    or in part” and allow for severance of contested issues.
    18 C.F.R. § 385.602(h). Under the framework established in
    Trailblazer Pipeline Co., 85 FERC ¶ 61,345 (Dec. 16, 1998),
    when a proposed settlement is contested, FERC may decide
    the merits of the contested issues if substantial evidence
    IDAHO POWER CO. V. FERC                      9
    supports a reasoned decision or if FERC “determines there is
    no genuine issue of material fact.”            18 C.F.R.
    § 385.602(h)(1)(i).
    Beginning chronologically, we are perplexed why FERC
    treated the proposed Tacoma settlement as uncontested. A
    litany of references in the record underscore that it was
    contested. For example, Powerex—one of the objectors—
    headlined its argument, “The Settlement is Partially
    Contested and May Not Be Approved Without Modification
    or Severance of the Contested Issue under the Commission’s
    Trailblazer Precedent,” and explained that it “opposes certain
    portions” of the proposed settlement. The PPL entities, in
    turn, filed “comments in opposition to certain provisions” of
    the proposed settlement and concluded by stating that FERC
    “should not approve” it “unless the terms . . . affecting non-
    parties’ rights are stricken.” Reflecting that it too understood
    the settlement to be contested, IDACORP acknowledged in
    its reply comments that Trailblazer would apply.
    FERC acknowledged in its June 13, 2012 Letter Order
    that the proposed settlement contained “disputed language.”
    139 FERC ¶ 61,209, at para. 7. Despite this reference, FERC
    did not conduct the Trailblazer analysis. Nor did it refer to
    its own regulations or otherwise resolve “that the record
    contains substantial evidence from which the Commission
    may reach a reasoned decision on the merits of the contested
    issues.” 18 C.F.R. § 385.602(h)(2). FERC instead called the
    settlement uncontested but still mandated its modification to
    address the issues that Powerex and the PPL entities had
    disputed, apparently, as the agency explained later, to avoid
    “foreclos[ing] even remotely possible third party claims.”
    141 FERC ¶ 61,148, at para. 9.
    10               IDAHO POWER CO. V. FERC
    We hold that FERC abused its discretion by foregoing the
    Trailblazer analysis and merits analysis dictated by FERC’s
    regulations. The proposed settlement was at least in part
    contested. Even affording FERC substantial latitude in
    interpreting and applying its own regulations, FERC’s
    recognition of disputed issues coupled with its lack of
    explanation for proceeding how it did makes it impossible for
    us to assess FERC’s reasons for departing from its own rules
    and precedent.
    FERC’s lone, unexplained citation to San Diego Gas &
    Elec. Co. v. Sellers of Energy and Ancillary Servs., 113 FERC
    ¶ 61,171, at para. 40 (Nov. 15, 2005), in which FERC noted
    one possible way that opposition to a settlement would not
    create a genuine material issue of fact (so it could permissibly
    be considered uncontested), does not explain why FERC
    could dispose of this proposed settlement as uncontested.
    Nor does the reference point to any basis in favor of the
    settlement modification demanded by FERC. The lonely
    footnote is thus insufficient to support a departure from the
    agency’s established rules and precedent. See Cal. 
    Trout, 572 F.3d at 1023
    ; Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power
    Admin., 
    477 F.3d 668
    , 687–88 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f an
    agency glosses over or swerves from prior precedents without
    discussion it may cross the line from the tolerably terse to the
    intolerably mute.” (internal quotation mark and citation
    omitted)). We therefore grant the petition with regard to the
    proposed Tacoma settlement and remand to FERC for the
    agency to either consider the proposed Tacoma settlement
    under the proper standards or provide an explanation for why
    a different approach is appropriate in this case.
    This brings us to the second settlement at issue here.
    Given the interdependency of these petitions for review, this
    IDAHO POWER CO. V. FERC                    11
    settlement warrants just a few words. IDACORP would
    simply have had no reason to propose the settlement with
    Powerex had the parties been satisfied with FERC’s treatment
    of the contested provisions of the initial proposed Tacoma
    settlement. In light of our decision to remand with regard to
    the proposed Tacoma settlement, we also grant the petition
    with regard to the proposed Powerex settlement and remand
    for reconsideration together with the Tacoma settlement.
    CONCLUSION
    The petitions in Nos. 13-72220 and 14-72384 are
    GRANTED; we remand to FERC for consideration of the
    proposed settlements in accordance with this decision,
    including the directive for FERC to reconsider its decision on
    the petitions and issue a decision within sixty days of the
    issuance of this court’s mandate.