Samuel Ili v. American Seafoods Company LLC ( 2009 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 25 2009
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SAMSON ILI, No. 09-35000
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:07-CV-01275-MJP
v.
MEMORANDUM *
AMERICAN SEAFOODS CO., LLC,
AMERICAN TRIUMPH, LCC,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Marsha J. Pechman, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 6, 2009
Seattle, Washington
Before: ALARCÓN, KLEINFELD and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Samson Ili has two causes of action at issue on appeal: negligence under the
Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, and unseaworthiness under maritime common law,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 547-50 (1960). There are triable
issues of material facts as to whether requiring a 16-hour work day, seven days a
week, for months at a time, is negligent or creates an unseaworthy condition; and
whether such negligence or unseaworthiness caused Ili to fall when the ship rolled
during the last hour of his 16-hour shift. The district court granted American
Seafoods’ motion for summary judgment on these claims. We reverse and remand.
Ili’s Jones Act claim has four elements: (1) the employer’s duty to provide a
safe work environment to its seaman employee; (2) breach of that duty; (3) the
employer’s awareness of the unsafe condition; and (4) a causal link, however
slight, between the breach and the seaman’s injury. Ribitzki v. Canmar Reading &
Bates, Ltd., 111 F.3d 658, 662-64 (9th Cir. 1997). There is no dispute that Ili is a
seaman and that American Seafoods owes him a duty to provide a safe work
environment. It is also undisputed that American Seafoods was aware that it
required 16-hour shifts, with no days off, for months at a time, on Ili’s boat, the
F/T American Triumph. The disputed issues are whether the shift length created
an unsafe work environment and whether the long shift was a cause, however
slight, of Ili’s injury.
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In his opposition to summary judgment, Ili pointed to the deposition of
American Seafoods employee Alan Davis. Davis stated that other boats use 12-
hour and 14-hour shifts and that the company was experimenting with shorter
shifts to see if those shifts are better for the seamen. Davis also stated that the 16-
hour shifts were shocking to him when he first entered the industry but that he
grew to accept them as industry standard. Even if 16-hour shift is industry
standard, that does not establish a lack of negligence as a matter of law. See The
T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (L. Hand, J.). A reasonable jury
could conclude that requiring Ili to work a 16-hour shift was a breach of American
Seafoods’ duty to provide a safe work environment. Pointing to Davis’s deposition
testimony is sufficient to survive summary judgment.
Ili established sufficient causation to survive summary judgment on the
Jones Act claim as well. The standard for causation in Jones Act claims is very
low, and requires only that the negligence be a cause, however slight, of the injury.
Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957). Ili fell during
the final hour of his 16-hour shift. He had previously complained to American
Seafoods that his shift was too long and caused him to be exhausted. His job
involved lifting and flipping 70-pound trays of frozen fish. At the time of his
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injury, the boat rolled and Ili tried to shift his weight when his legs gave out under
him. This is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact whether the
length of his shift played any role, however slight, in causing his fall and his
subsequent injury. This district court erred in granting summary judgment on the
Jones Act claim.
Ili’s unseaworthiness claim has four elements: (1) seaman status triggering
the warranty of seaworthiness; (2) an injury arising from the condition of the ship
or its crew; (3) the unseaworthiness of that condition; and (4) proximate causation
between the unseaworthy condition and the injury. Ribitzki, 111 F.3d at 664.
Again, it is undisputed that Ili is a seaman and thus entitled to a warranty of
seaworthiness. The disputed issues are whether the length of Ili’s shift is an
unseaworthy condition and whether the shift length proximately caused Ili’s injury.
Lack of adequate crew is a basis for unseaworthiness. Id.; American
President Lines, Ltd. v. Welch, 377 F.2d 501, 504 (9th Cir. 1967). Requiring a
ship’s crew to work 16 hours a day, every day, for months on end can indicate that
the ship is not adequately manned with crew to perform its duties in a seaworthy
manner. Whether the length of shift and size of the crew are unseaworthy is
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decided by the trier of fact. E.g., Pashby v. Universal Dredging Corp., 608 F.2d
1312, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). The trier of fact in this case is a jury
because Ili invoked his right to a jury trial under the Jones Act. See Fitzgerald v.
U.S. Lines, Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20-21 (1963).
Unseaworthiness requires a higher degree of causation than does a Jones Act
negligence claim. See Ribitzki, 111 F.3d at 664. Whether the alleged
unseaworthiness of requiring the crew to work 16-hour shifts every day was a
substantial factor in causing Ili’s fall is a question for the jury. The same evidence
that supports Ili’s Jones Act claim also supports his unseaworthiness claim. The
district court erred in granting summary judgment on the unseaworthiness claim.
Because the Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims could be based on a
combination of ingredients, and further analysis and factual development by
counsel may put the facts in a different light, we reverse the summary judgment in
full, rather than parsing it and affirming in parts.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected Ili’s request to
extend the time to file expert reports. The motion to extend time was filed in
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September 2008, but the deadline for filing expert reports was in June 2008.
However, given that we remand for further proceedings, the district court may find
it appropriate to allow Ili to file his expert reports and for the parties to perform
any additional discovery necessary to respond to those reports.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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