Trinh v. Mohammed Moghaddam , 369 F. App'x 865 ( 2010 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 08 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD TRIHN; AMPHOUVANHNA No. 09-15039
CHANTHALAMGSY,
D.C. No. 2:07-cv-00488-GEB-
Plaintiffs - Appellants, EFB
v.
MEMORANDUM *
MOHAMMED JACK MOGHADDAM; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Garland E. Burrell, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
**
Submitted February 16, 2010
Before: FERNANDEZ, GOULD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
GT/Research
Richard Trihn and Amphouvanhna Chanthalamgsy appeal pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment for the City of Marysville and City officials in
their action alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause,
and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), and 1986. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1278 (9th
Cir. 1996), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the Equal
Protection Clause claims and other racial discrimination claims arising under
federal statutes, because plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue as to whether
defendants were motivated by racial animus when they temporarily shut-down
plaintiffs’ night-club and subsequently revoked their conditional use permit. See
id. (providing that affidavit in opposition to summary judgment must be based on
personal knowledge); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536-38 (9th
Cir. 1992) (affirming summary judgment for defendant on 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
claim, and explaining that racial animus is an element of a section 1985(3) claim).
Even if plaintiffs had a cognizable property interest in the continued
existence of the conditional use permit, the district court properly granted summary
judgment on the Due Process Clause claims because there was no triable issue as to
whether plaintiffs were afforded adequate due process at the revocation hearing.
GT/Research 2 09-15039
See Ebel v. City of Corona, 698 F.2d 390, 392-93 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming
summary judgment for City Planning Commission on claim that it violated Due
Process Clause by making a decision “without making adequate findings of fact to
justify” the decision, and explaining that “great latitude is given to legislative
bodies in the procedures they may use in factfinding”); see also Town of Castle
Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756, 760 (2005) (explaining that cognizable
property interests arise only when the relevant state law provisions “truly ma[k]e
[the conferral of the benefit] mandatory.”).
Plaintiff’ remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
GT/Research 3 09-15039