United States v. Garcia ( 2007 )


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  •                  FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,             
    Plaintiff-Appellee,         No. 05-30596
    v.                            D.C. No.
    MARTIN GARCIA,                            CR-04-00087-RFC
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                  No. 06-30214
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                            D.C. No.
    CR-04-00087-RFC
    RONALD E. SMITH,
    OPINION
    Defendant-Appellant.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Montana
    Richard F. Cebull, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    April 10, 2007—Seattle, Washington
    Filed August 10, 2007
    Before: Alex Kozinski, Raymond C. Fisher and
    Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Fisher
    9681
    9684              UNITED STATES v. GARCIA
    COUNSEL
    Wendy Holton, Helena, Montana, for defendant-appellant
    Martin Garcia.
    Palmer A. Hoovestal, Hoovestal Law Firm, PLLC, Helena,
    Montana, for defendant-appellant Ronald Smith.
    William W. Mercer, United States Attorney, Jessica T. Fehr
    (argued) and James E. Seykora, Assistant United States Attor-
    neys, Billings, Montana, for plaintiff-appellee.
    UNITED STATES v. GARCIA                9685
    OPINION
    FISHER, Circuit Judge:
    Martin Garcia, Ronald Smith and Robert Green were
    among 13 defendants charged in a 25-count indictment with
    participating in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine
    obtained from various sources, both inside and outside Mon-
    tana, and with related firearm offenses. In this opinion, we
    address Garcia’s challenge to his conviction and sentence, and
    Smith’s sentencing challenge, and we affirm in part, reverse
    in part and remand in part. We affirm Green’s conviction in
    a separate memorandum disposition, filed concurrently here-
    with.
    I.   Background
    Garcia and Green were tried together before a jury in
    August 2005. Garcia was found guilty on 18 counts. The dis-
    trict court rejected Garcia’s motion under Federal Rule of
    Criminal Procedure 29 challenging the sufficiency of the evi-
    dence to support a conviction on five of those counts (Counts
    IV, V and VI; XXII and XXIII) under a Pinkerton theory of
    liability. See Pinkerton v. United States, 
    328 U.S. 640
    , 646-48
    (1946) (holding that each member of a conspiracy may be
    charged with reasonably foreseeable substantive offenses
    committed by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspir-
    acy). Later, however, the district court granted Green’s simi-
    lar Rule 29 motion with respect to two of those same counts
    (Counts XXII and XXIII). The court reversed its earlier find-
    ing when denying Garcia’s motion that the person named in
    these counts was still a member of the conspiracy when com-
    mitting the charged offenses, and found instead that he was no
    longer part of the conspiracy by then.
    Garcia was sentenced to a term of 1,284 months imprison-
    ment in November 2005. The district court calculated Gar-
    cia’s Guidelines-recommended sentence by departing upward
    9686                UNITED STATES v. GARCIA
    four levels under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) because it concluded
    Garcia was an organizer or leader of the conspiracy, and
    upward another two levels under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4 because it
    concluded he “directed, commanded, encouraged, intimi-
    dated, counseled, trained, procured, recruited, or solicited
    minors” in the commission of his crime.
    Smith pled guilty to Count I in December 2005. The district
    court sentenced him to 360 months in prison. The court con-
    cluded that the Guidelines’ prohibition on a downward depar-
    ture for drug addiction prevented it from considering Smith’s
    addiction as a mitigating factor in any respect.
    II.    Analysis
    A.     Garcia’s Convictions on Counts IV, V and VI
    Garcia challenges his convictions on Counts IV through VI
    of the indictment, which charged Edwin Santiago in combina-
    tion with various alleged co-conspirators (not Garcia) with
    possession with intent to distribute over 50 grams of a mixture
    containing methamphetamine in July 2003. Garcia timely
    moved for acquittal on these counts, arguing there was insuf-
    ficient evidence that he joined the conspiracy as early as July.
    See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c); United States v. Tisor, 
    96 F.3d 370
    , 379 (9th Cir. 1996). We review a district court’s ruling
    on a motion for acquittal de novo. See United States v. Neill,
    
    166 F.3d 943
    , 948 (9th Cir. 1999). When a defendant argues
    there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction, we
    view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecu-
    tion to determine whether “the jury reasonably could have
    found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
    United States v. Lothian, 
    976 F.2d 1257
    , 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    [1] “[A] conspirator [is] criminally liable for the substan-
    tive offenses committed by a co-conspirator when they are
    reasonably foreseeable and committed in furtherance of the
    UNITED STATES v. GARCIA               9687
    conspiracy.” United States v. Long, 
    301 F.3d 1095
    , 1103 (9th
    Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citing 
    Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 645
    -
    48). The government and Garcia agree that he cannot be held
    responsible for crimes committed before he joined the con-
    spiracy. See 
    Lothian, 976 F.2d at 1262
    (holding that “a defen-
    dant cannot be held liable for substantive offenses committed
    before joining or after withdrawing from a conspiracy”) (cit-
    ing Levine v. United States, 
    383 U.S. 265
    , 266 (1966) (per
    curiam)). We agree with Garcia that there was insufficient
    evidence that he entered the conspiracy to distribute metham-
    phetamine as of July 2003.
    [2] The government argues that circumstantial evidence,
    especially the testimony of one of Garcia’s admitted custom-
    ers for cocaine, a young woman named Gwynne Black, sup-
    ports the inference that Garcia was supplying her and Edwin
    Santiago with methamphetamine as early as April 2003.
    Black testified that in March or April 2003, she and Santiago
    were selling cocaine supplied by Garcia. But these cocaine
    sales do not establish that Garcia supplied Black, Santiago or
    anyone else with methamphetamine, the specific drug charged
    in Counts IV through VI. Nor does Black’s testimony that at
    the “very beginning of June” 2003, she was getting “drugs”
    from Garcia for her own use — and that he supplied “drugs”
    to his girlfriend, who then shared them with Black — prove
    that he was supplying them with methamphetamine. She did
    not specify the kind of drugs supplied, and the quantities
    appear to be consistent with only personal use, not amounts
    approaching 50 grams as charged.
    [3] The government contends, however, that the jury could
    have inferred that Garcia was indeed supplying methamphet-
    amine, and that he began doing so to Black as well as to San-
    tiago by May 2003. There was testimony that a different
    supplier stopped supplying Santiago at this time and yet San-
    tiago still had — and was selling — methamphetamine. The
    government links Garcia to this evidence by pointing to testi-
    mony that he negotiated to sell one pound (a “notebook”) of
    9688                    UNITED STATES v. GARCIA
    methamphetamine to Black and Santiago. However, Black’s
    testimony clearly indicates that these negotiations occurred
    sometime during or after August 2003. Thus, the govern-
    ment’s argument notwithstanding, there is no evidence
    directly or circumstantially establishing Garcia as the
    methamphetamine supplier to Black, Santiago or any of the
    other defendants before August 2003. Without any such evi-
    dence, we conclude that no reasonable jury “could have found
    the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” of conspiring
    to distribute over 50 grams of methamphetamine in July 2003.
    
    Lothian, 976 F.2d at 1261
    (internal quotation marks omitted).1
    1
    We are troubled that it appears the prosecutor brought charges against
    Garcia on Counts IV through VI — and the district court allowed those
    charges to go to the jury — based on the prosecutor’s misstatement at trial
    about the extent of conspirator liability. On appeal, the government con-
    ceded that the prosecutor “persuaded the judge of an incorrect proposition
    of law,” specifically that “under the general law of conspiracy, if you join
    an ongoing conspiracy, you’re responsible for everything that went on
    before it.” This proposition is correct only in the context of establishing
    vicarious liability for acts establishing the crime of conspiracy itself rather
    than vicarious liability for other substantive offenses committed in the
    course of a conspiracy. Compare United States v. Saavedra, 
    684 F.2d 1293
    , 1301 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Further[,] a conspirator who joins a pre-
    existing conspiracy is bound by all that has gone on before in the conspira-
    cy.”), with 
    Levine, 383 U.S. at 266
    (reversing convictions in light of gov-
    ernment’s concession that “an individual cannot be held criminally liable
    for substantive offenses committed by members of the conspiracy before
    that individual had joined or after he had withdrawn from the conspiracy”)
    (emphasis added); see also Robert R. Arreola et al., Federal Criminal
    Conspiracy, 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 617, 628-29 (1997) (“In establishing
    liability for the conspiracy charge, the circuit courts generally find con-
    spirator liability for acts committed by co-conspirators both prior to, as
    well as during the defendant’s participation. However, a defendant cannot
    be held criminally liable for substantive offenses committed by others
    involved in the conspiracy before joining it or after ending participation
    in the conspiracy.”) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
    It is thus unclear whether Garcia would have been charged with Counts
    IV through VI if the prosecutor had not misunderstood conspiracy liabil-
    ity, but in any event, we conclude that the government did not present suf-
    ficient evidence that Garcia had joined the conspiracy in July 2003, and
    we reverse Garcia’s conviction on that basis.
    UNITED STATES v. GARCIA                  9689
    B.   Garcia’s Convictions on Counts XXII and XXIII
    Counts XXII and XXIII charged that a co-conspirator
    named Isaac Kimber on December 9, 2003 possessed 4.2
    grams of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it.
    Garcia timely moved for acquittal with respect to these
    counts, so again we review the district court’s denial of his
    motion de novo. See 
    Neill, 166 F.3d at 948
    ; 
    Tisor, 96 F.3d at 379
    . Garcia argues that there was insufficient evidence that
    Kimber, the only defendant named in these counts, was still
    part of the conspiracy on December 9, 2003.
    [4] The district court denied Garcia’s motion after the close
    of evidence. However, after Garcia had already been sen-
    tenced, the district court in addressing Garcia’s co-defendant
    Green’s identical Rule 29 motion then reversed Green’s con-
    viction for Counts XXII and XXIII, finding that:
    the jury had no evidence suggesting Kimber’s
    December 9, 2003 crimes (Counts XXII & XXIII)
    were undertaken in furtherance of the conspiracy.
    . . . Santiago and Black were arrested over two
    months before Kimber was caught in the act [in
    December 2003]. There was no evidence linking the
    methamphetamine that Kimber possessed on Decem-
    ber 9, 2003 to the conspiracy, and his conviction on
    Count XXII must be reversed. . . . [I]t was unreason-
    able for the jury to find that Kimber committed the
    crime charged in Count XXIII in furtherance of the
    conspiracy.
    The district court specifically disclaimed its earlier reliance —
    when denying Garcia’s motion — on “Exhibit 233, a letter
    Santiago sent from jail . . . which listed Isaac Kimber as a per-
    son who owed Santiago money.” “In hindsight, the fact that
    Kimber owed Santiago money proves only that” and “does
    not prove that Kimber was [a] member after Santiago was
    arrested in October and certainly does not prove he was still
    9690                UNITED STATES v. GARCIA
    selling methamphetamine in furtherance of the conspiracy
    two months later.” The government has not appealed the dis-
    trict court’s reversal of Green’s convictions on these grounds,
    so any objection to the court’s finding as to him has been
    waived.
    [5] In light of the district court’s ruling on Green’s motion,
    we remand Garcia’s Rule 29 motion to the district court for
    reconsideration. “It is ‘the most basic principle of jurispru-
    dence that we must act alike in all cases of like nature.’ ”
    Myers v. Ylst, 
    897 F.2d 417
    , 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting
    Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 Emory
    L.J. 747, 758 (1982) (internal quotations omitted)). We
    express no opinion on the merits of either of the district
    court’s rulings regarding the sufficiency of the evidence of
    Kimber’s continued involvement in the conspiracy.
    C.     Enhancements to Garcia’s Guidelines-Recommended
    Sentence
    In calculating Garcia’s Guidelines-recommended sentence,
    the district court enhanced Garcia’s offense four levels for his
    role as an organizer or leader and two levels for involving a
    minor in the crime. We review the district court’s interpreta-
    tion of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. See United States
    v. Hernandez, 
    476 F.3d 791
    , 802 (9th Cir. 2007). The district
    court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. See
    United States v. Kimbrew, 
    406 F.3d 1149
    , 1151 (9th Cir.
    2005). There is an intracircuit conflict regarding how we
    review application of the Guidelines to the facts. Compare 
    id. (“This court
    reviews . . . the district court’s application of the
    Sentencing Guidelines to the facts of this case for abuse of
    discretion.”), with United States v. Williamson, 
    439 F.3d 1125
    , 1137 n.12 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We review the interpreta-
    tion and application of the Guidelines de novo.”); see also
    United States v. Staten, 
    466 F.3d 708
    , 713 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006)
    (discussing the conflict). However, because our decision
    would be the same under either standard of review, we do not
    UNITED STATES v. GARCIA                    9691
    need to call this case en banc to resolve the conflict. We
    affirm the imposition of both enhancements.
    1.     Organizer/leader (§ 3B1.1(a))
    The district court enhanced Garcia’s offense level four
    levels under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). Garcia contends that he
    acted solely as a supplier, not as an organizer or leader, and
    thus that he does not qualify for an enhancement under
    § 3B1.1(a); he further contends that because no evidence was
    presented that he qualifies for an enhancement under
    § 3B1.1(b), we should remand for resentencing without any
    enhancement encompassed by § 3B1.1. That section provides
    for varying levels of enhancement depending upon a defen-
    dant’s control over criminal activity and the number of people
    involved:
    (a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a
    criminal activity that involved five or more partici-
    pants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4
    levels.
    (b) If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but
    not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity
    involved five or more participants or was otherwise
    extensive, increase by 3 levels.
    (c) If the defendant was an organizer, leader, man-
    ager, or supervisor in any criminal activity other than
    described in (a) or (b), increase by 2 levels.
    U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. The application notes provide:
    Factors the court should consider include the exer-
    cise of decision making authority, the nature of par-
    ticipation in the commission of the offense, the
    recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a
    larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of
    9692               UNITED STATES v. GARCIA
    participation in planning or organizing the offense,
    the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the
    degree of control and authority exercised over oth-
    ers. There can, of course, be more than one person
    who qualifies as a leader or organizer of a criminal
    association or conspiracy. This adjustment does not
    apply to a defendant who merely suggests commit-
    ting the offense.
    U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. 4.
    [6] We have upheld upward adjustments under § 3B1.1(a)
    in “cases involv[ing] defendants who, the evidence showed,
    exercised some degree of control or organizational authority
    over others.” United States v. Avila, 
    95 F.3d 887
    , 890 (9th
    Cir. 1996) (citing cases). Such control or authority over others
    is required to impose the four-level enhancement under
    § 3B1.1(a), for it is “precisely what distinguishes a leader or
    an organizer [under § 3B1.1(a)] from a manager or supervi-
    sor” under § 3B1.1(b). 
    Id. at 890
    n.6. A § 3B1.1(a) enhance-
    ment is not justified if there is “no evidence that [the
    defendant] coordinated or oversaw the procurement or distri-
    bution of drugs” or “exercised any control or organizational
    authority over others.” 
    Id. at 890
    -91 (noting that the defendant
    there “merely relayed the price of the cocaine, as set by his
    supplier, to the buyer”); see also United States v. Lopez-
    Sandoval, 
    146 F.3d 712
    , 717-18 (9th Cir. 1998) (reversing a
    § 3B1.1(a) enhancement where the defendant only relayed
    information about drug transactions). An enhancement under
    §§ 3B1.1(a) or (b) does not require control over all of the five
    or more participants. See United States v. Barnes, 
    993 F.2d 680
    , 685 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that “[t]he fact that [the
    defendant] did not supervise more than one participant does
    not preclude the enhancement [under § 3B1.1(b)] as a matter
    of law”). The Eleventh Circuit has noted that “fronting” drugs
    may be indicative that a defendant “exercised a managerial
    role,” although it further held that mere “evidence of fronting,
    without more, is insufficient to satisfy the management
    UNITED STATES v. GARCIA                 9693
    requirement.” See United States v. Alred, 
    144 F.3d 1405
    , 1422
    & n.18 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original) (drawing a dis-
    tinction between cases in which the fronting was accompanied
    by direct control by the creditor and those in which the credi-
    tor was paid several weeks later after merely transporting the
    drugs).
    [7] Here, there is evidence that Garcia did more than relay
    prices, but rather set the price and quantity for the metham-
    phetamine he supplied to Black and Santiago. There is also
    evidence that Garcia exercised control over at least Black by
    fronting her methamphetamine while threatening to harm her
    if she did not repay him for the drugs within three days. Black
    testified that she “had like signed my life off” to Garcia
    because “[i]f it wasn’t paid, then that was my ass,” and that
    Garcia had told her as much. Black also testified that Garcia
    “said that [she] was to keep track of the money and make sure
    that Eddie didn’t . . . try to rip [her] off.” This evidence sup-
    ports the district court’s findings that Garcia “had a high
    degree of participation in the planning of the offenses” and
    “provid[ed] instruction to others,” and its conclusion that Gar-
    cia organized and exercised control over at least Black and
    her participation in the methamphetamine distribution.
    Whether applying a de novo or an abuse of discretion stan-
    dard of review, we affirm the district court’s decision to
    impose the four-level organizer/leader enhancement under
    § 3B1.1(a).
    2.   Involvement of a minor (§ 3B1.4)
    [8] Based on Garcia’s interactions with Black — who was
    then only 17 years old — the district court imposed a two-
    level enhancement to Garcia’s offense level under U.S.S.G.
    § 3B1.4, which applies when “the defendant used or
    attempted to use a person less than eighteen years of age to
    commit the offense or assist in avoiding detection of, or
    apprehension for, the offense.” “The evidence must show that
    ‘the defendant acted affirmatively to involve the minor’ in the
    9694                  UNITED STATES v. GARCIA
    crime.” United States v. Jimenez, 
    300 F.3d 1166
    , 1169 (9th
    Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Parker, 
    241 F.3d 1114
    ,
    1120 (9th Cir. 2001)). Section 3B1.4’s application notes spec-
    ify that “ ‘[u]sed or attempted to use’ includes directing, com-
    manding, encouraging, intimidating, counseling, training,
    procuring, recruiting, or soliciting.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4 cmt.1.
    In Parker, we held that simply “acting as [a minor’s] part-
    ner” in a crime or as a minor’s co-conspirator does not suffice
    as a basis for a § 3B1.4 enhancement. 
    Parker, 241 F.3d at 1120-21
    . We noted that the district court there found that the
    defendant and the minor “were merely co-conspirators.” 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    Our holding that the defendant did not
    “ ‘use[ ] or attempt[ ] to use’ [his minor co-conspirator] under
    the meaning of § 3B1.4” was specifically predicated on our
    conclusion the “[d]efendant did not command, encourage,
    intimidate, counsel, train, procure, recruit, solicit, or other-
    wise actively involve” the minor. 
    Id. [9] Here,
    the district court stated its “belie[f] that [Garcia]
    directed, commanded, encouraged, intimidated, counseled,
    trained, procured, recruited, or solicited minors in the com-
    mission of this crime.” There is sufficient evidence that Gar-
    cia engaged in conduct involving Black that at least qualifies
    as “training,” “intimidating” or “encouraging.” Black testified
    that Garcia advised her to “keep track” of the proceeds of the
    methamphetamine he fronted her and indicated that if she did
    not repay him, “then that was [her] ass.” Black also testified
    that although she initially asked Garcia to front her just an
    ounce of methamphetamine to sell, Garcia would only agree
    to sell her a pound and then, as discussed above, instructed
    her regarding aspects of selling the pound. Unlike Parker,
    there was much more than evidence of mere partnership or
    co-conspirator status. We therefore affirm Garcia’s sentence
    enhancement under § 3B1.4.2
    2
    Because we affirm the enhancement on the basis of Garcia’s interac-
    tions with Black, we do not address whether evidence that Garcia’s minor
    daughter accompanied him on a trip during which he transported metham-
    phetamine could support an enhancement under § 3B1.4.
    UNITED STATES v. GARCIA                 9695
    D.   Smith’s Sentencing Challenge
    [10] Smith challenges his sentence, arguing that the district
    court erred by not considering drug addiction as a mitigating
    factor under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), which requires the sen-
    tencing court to consider “the nature and circumstances of the
    offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.”
    The district court concluded that it did not have the discretion
    to consider Smith’s alleged diminished mental capacity due to
    drug addiction, because voluntary drug addiction is precluded
    as a basis for a downward departure under the Guidelines. See
    U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.13, 5H1.4.
    [11] The district court, without the benefit of our more
    recent case law, adopted too narrow a view of its discretion-
    ary authority post-Booker. See United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    (2005). The system of downward departures that still
    guides the sentencing court’s determination of the Guidelines-
    recommended range as required under § 3553(a)(4) does not
    preclude the court’s discretion to consider other § 3553(a)
    factors. As we stated in United States v. Mohamed, 
    459 F.3d 979
    (9th Cir. 2006), “if a district court were to employ a post-
    Booker ‘departure’ improperly, the sentencing judge still
    would be free on remand to impose exactly the same sentence
    by exercising his discretion under the now-advisory guide-
    lines.” 
    Id. at 987.
    Just because a consideration was improper
    under the mandatory Guidelines regime does not mean that it
    is necessarily improper under the advisory Guidelines regime.
    Other circuits have refused to foreclose sentencing courts’
    consideration of drug addiction entirely, although at least one
    circuit has expressed skepticism that addiction is a proper rea-
    son for sentencing below the Guidelines “absent extraordinary
    circumstances.” United States v. Hodge, 
    469 F.3d 749
    , 757
    (8th Cir. 2006) (noting the continuing relevance of § 5H1.4);
    see also United States v. Matheny, 
    450 F.3d 633
    , 641 (6th Cir.
    2006) (tacitly approving the sentencing court’s statement
    “that it considered, pursuant to § 3553(a)(1), the fact that
    Matheny had his drug addiction since childhood”).
    9696                UNITED STATES v. GARCIA
    [12] We agree with our sister circuits and hold that district
    courts are not prohibited in all circumstances from consider-
    ing a defendant’s drug addiction in choosing a reasonable sen-
    tence. We express no opinion as to whether Smith’s alleged
    drug addiction and diminished mental capacity would be an
    appropriate consideration in this case. Rather, because we are
    not certain that the district court would impose the same sen-
    tence if it had full knowledge of its discretionary authority to
    consider drug addiction during sentencing, we remand for the
    district court to consider this question in the first instance. Cf.
    United States v. Ameline, 
    409 F.3d 1073
    , 1084-85 (9th Cir.
    2005) (en banc).
    Accordingly, with respect to Garcia, we REVERSE and
    VACATE his convictions on Counts IV, V and VI of the
    indictment, we REMAND for resentencing in light of this
    reversal and we REMAND for reconsideration of his convic-
    tions on Counts XXII and XXIII. With respect to Smith, we
    VACATE and REMAND for resentencing in light of our
    holding that sentencing courts are not precluded from consid-
    ering a defendant’s drug addiction under all circumstances.
    United States v. Garcia, No. 05-30596 is REVERSED,
    VACATED AND REMANDED.
    United States v. Smith, No. 06-30214 is VACATED AND
    REMANDED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-30596

Filed Date: 8/10/2007

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/14/2015

Authorities (20)

United States v. Rodney Robert Kimbrew, A.K.A. Carlton ... , 406 F.3d 1149 ( 2005 )

Pinkerton v. United States , 66 S. Ct. 1180 ( 1946 )

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David ... , 166 F.3d 943 ( 1999 )

United States v. Alred , 144 F.3d 1405 ( 1998 )

United States v. Jerry Wayne Matheny, Jr. , 450 F.3d 633 ( 2006 )

Levine v. United States , 86 S. Ct. 925 ( 1966 )

United States v. Alfred Arnold Ameline , 409 F.3d 1073 ( 2005 )

United States v. Matthew Edward Lothian , 976 F.2d 1257 ( 1992 )

98-cal-daily-op-serv-4578-98-daily-journal-dar-6269-united-states-of , 146 F.3d 712 ( 1998 )

United States v. Loren Samuel Williamson , 439 F.3d 1125 ( 2006 )

United States v. Marcos Alonzo Hernandez , 476 F.3d 791 ( 2007 )

United States v. William T. Barnes , 993 F.2d 680 ( 1993 )

United States v. Way Quoe Long , 301 F.3d 1095 ( 2002 )

United States v. Evelyn Jimenez , 300 F.3d 1166 ( 2002 )

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry John ... , 96 F.3d 370 ( 1996 )

United States v. Carlotta Santana Saavedra , 684 F.2d 1293 ( 1982 )

United States of America, Appellee/cross-Appellant v. ... , 469 F.3d 749 ( 2006 )

United States v. Chris Parker , 241 F.3d 1114 ( 2001 )

United States v. Zameer Nooralla Mohamed, AKA Al, AKA ... , 459 F.3d 979 ( 2006 )

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rafael ... , 95 F.3d 887 ( 1996 )

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