Sherman v. U.S. Parole Commission ( 2007 )


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  •                  FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    BRENT SHERMAN,                       
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.                         No. 05-35364
    UNITED STATES PAROLE                        D.C. No.
    CV-05-00008-JAR
    COMMISSION; ROBERT A. HOOD,
    Warden; CHARLES A. DANIELS,                 OPINION
    Warden,
    Respondents-Appellees.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    James A. Redden, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    March 9, 2006—Portland, Oregon,
    Filed September 4, 2007
    Before: Melvin Brunetti, Thomas G. Nelson, and
    Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Brunetti
    11253
    11256        SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION
    COUNSEL
    Christine Stebbins Dahl, Assistant Federal Defender, Port-
    land, Oregon, for the petitioner-appellant.
    Kenneth C. Bauman (brief), Assistant United States Attorney,
    Portland, Oregon; and Kelly A. Zusman (argued), Assistant
    United States Attorney, Portland, Oregon, for the
    respondents-appellees.
    OPINION
    BRUNETTI, Circuit Judge:
    We consider whether an administrative warrant issued pur-
    suant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 4213
    (a) for the retaking of an alleged
    parole violator is subject to the oath or affirmation require-
    ment of the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause. We hold it
    is not and therefore affirm the denial of petitioner’s habeas
    challenge to his detention on an unsworn parole violator war-
    rant.
    I
    Petitioner Brent Sherman is a federal inmate currently
    being held by the Bureau of Prisons at the Federal Detention
    Center in Sheridan, Oregon. In 1982, he was sentenced to
    twenty-years imprisonment for two counts of bank robbery
    and one year for failure to appear. In 1985, he escaped and
    committed armed robbery of another bank, crimes for which
    he received five years and twenty years, respectively. Because
    his offenses were committed prior to November 1, 1987, the
    effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 which
    replaced most forms of “parole” with “supervised release,”
    Sherman received “old law” sentences under the former statu-
    tory regime, which remains in effect as to such offenders. See
    SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION           11257
    United States v. Kincade, 
    379 F.3d 813
    , 817 n.2 (9th Cir.
    2004) (en banc); Benny v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 
    295 F.3d 977
    ,
    981 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002).
    Paroled for the first time in 1993, Sherman’s parole was
    revoked two years later for possession of a controlled sub-
    stance, extortion, and unlawful use of a weapon. He was
    paroled again in August 1999 and five years later requested
    a hearing for early termination under 
    18 U.S.C. § 4211
    (c)(1).
    See Benny, 
    295 F.3d at 982-83
    . Instead of granting his
    request, the United States Parole Commission once again ini-
    tiated revocation proceedings.
    In November 2004, the Commission issued a parole viola-
    tor warrant for Sherman’s retaking pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 4213
    (a)(2) on the basis of two alleged parole violations:
    sexual assault (rape) in 2000, and fraud in 2000 and 2002. It
    is undisputed that the warrant application containing the alle-
    gations was unsworn. In December 2004, the U.S. Marshals
    Service took Sherman into custody on the warrant, and the
    following month he filed the underlying habeas petition under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
     challenging his detention on the ground that
    the warrant was invalid under the Fourth Amendment because
    it was not supported by oath or affirmation.
    While his habeas petition was pending, Sherman’s parole
    revocation proceedings continued before the Commission.
    After a preliminary interview, the interviewing officer recom-
    mended a finding of probable cause on the fraud charge, but
    not on the sexual assault charge. The Commission apparently
    took a somewhat different view. It found probable cause that
    Sherman had violated his parole, citing both charges, and con-
    tinued to hold him pending a final hearing on revocation.
    Meanwhile, in April 2005 the district court denied Sher-
    man’s habeas petition. In a published opinion, Sherman v.
    Reilly, 
    364 F. Supp. 2d 1216
     (D. Or. 2005), the court held that
    Sherman was lawfully detained on an unsworn warrant
    11258         SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION
    because, unlike judicial warrants, parole violator warrants
    issued under 
    18 U.S.C. § 4213
    (a) are administrative and not
    subject to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. The
    court accordingly declined to extend our decision in United
    States v. Vargas-Amaya, 
    389 F.3d 901
     (9th Cir. 2004), in
    which we held that a supervised release “warrant” within the
    meaning of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 3583
    (i) and 3606 must comply with
    the Warrant Clause. Sherman timely appealed.
    Before the parties filed their briefs on appeal, however, the
    Commission revoked Sherman’s parole based on the fraud
    charge while making no findings concerning the sexual
    assault charge. He remains incarcerated with a presumptive
    re-parole date of October 13, 2007. The projected full-term
    date on his aggregate sentence is November 25, 2015.
    II
    The Government asserted below that Sherman’s habeas
    petition challenging his detention on the unsworn parole vio-
    lator warrant became moot when the Commission conducted
    a preliminary hearing and found probable cause that Sherman
    violated his parole. It also asserted mootness in its brief on
    appeal, by then predicating the argument on the Commis-
    sion’s intervening revocation of Sherman’s parole. At oral
    argument, however, the Government conceded that this case
    is within the “capable of repetition, yet evading review”
    exception to the mootness doctrine. Undertaking our indepen-
    dent obligation to determine our subject-matter jurisdiction in
    the face of possible mootness, see Dittman v. California, 
    191 F.3d 1020
    , 1025 (9th Cir. 1999), we find the Government’s
    concession to be well taken.
    The capable of repetition, yet evading review exception has
    been applied to permit appellate review of constitutional or
    statutory challenges to pretrial and other initial proceedings
    despite the regular progression of further proceedings making
    it “no longer possible to remedy the particular grievance giv-
    SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION           11259
    ing rise to the litigation.” United States v. Howard, 
    480 F.3d 1005
    , 1009 (9th Cir. 2007). For instance, in Gerstein v. Pugh,
    
    420 U.S. 103
    , 110 n.11 (1975), the Court determined that the
    respondents’ convictions did not preclude review of their
    challenge to their pretrial detentions, which lacked a judicial
    determination of probable cause. In Howard, 
    480 F.3d at 1009-10
    , we applied Gerstein and held that the conclusion of
    pretrial proceedings did not preclude us from reviewing a
    courtroom security policy of shackling pretrial detainees dur-
    ing initial appearances. And in United States v. Woods, 
    995 F.2d 894
    , 896 (9th Cir. 1993), we applied the exception to an
    inmate’s challenge to the revocation of his conditional release
    under 
    18 U.S.C. § 4246
    (f), despite the fact his confinement at
    the time of appeal was “not due to the revocation order being
    challenged.” By the time we heard his appeal, Woods had
    been again granted conditional release and then re-confined
    under another revocation order.
    As in those contexts, a parolee’s initial detention solely on
    the authority of a parole violator warrant is by nature tempo-
    rary and is “not likely to persist long enough to allow for the
    completion of appellate review” before the Commission either
    releases the parolee or takes further action providing super-
    ceding authority for the detention. Woods, 
    995 F.2d at 896
    ;
    accord Gerstein, 
    420 U.S. at
    110 n.11. Indeed, a parole viola-
    tor summoned or retaken under 
    18 U.S.C. § 4213
     is entitled
    to a preliminary hearing on probable cause “without unneces-
    sary delay” and a revocation hearing “within sixty days of
    such determination of probable cause.” 
    Id.
     § 4214(a)(1)(A),
    (B). As this case exemplifies, these statutory requirements vir-
    tually guarantee the revocation process will be concluded
    before appellate review of the initial retaking is feasible.
    This case is also capable of repetition. The Parole Commis-
    sion has not retreated from its policy of issuing warrants
    based on unsworn allegations, and Sherman is scheduled for
    presumptive re-parole in October 2007 with over eight years
    remaining on his sentence. During that period of release, his
    11260         SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION
    liberty will continue to be conditioned on the Commission’s
    ability to issue a parole violator warrant and retake him based
    on unsworn allegations. Cf. Woods, 
    995 F.2d at 896
     (applying
    the exception where the defendant remained subject to a con-
    ditional release order, the violation of which led to the revoca-
    tion order on appeal); Spencer v. Kemna, 
    523 U.S. 1
    , 18
    (1998) (holding that the exception did not apply because the
    expiration of petitioner’s sentence negated any reasonable
    expectation of another round of parole and revocation). More-
    over, because the Commission’s policy is ongoing and gener-
    ally applicable to all federal parolees subject to retaking, the
    proper construction of 
    18 U.S.C. § 4213
    (a) in relation to the
    Fourth Amendment is “an issue of continuing and public
    importance.” Woods, 
    995 F.2d at 896
    .
    [1] For these reasons we agree with the parties that Sher-
    man’s appeal from the denial of his habeas petition should not
    be dismissed as moot. We hold that despite the Parole Com-
    mission’s issuance of a revocation order providing superced-
    ing authority for Sherman’s present confinement, we have
    jurisdiction to review his initial retaking and detention on a
    parole violator warrant under the exception for cases that are
    “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
    III
    [2] The Fourth Amendment rights of parolees are hardly
    uncharted waters. By now it is clear that parolees are pro-
    tected against unreasonable searches and seizures. Samson v.
    California, 
    126 S. Ct. 2193
    , 2197, 2198 n.2 (2006); Latta v.
    Fitzharris, 
    521 F.2d 246
    , 248-49 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
    But their rights also are not coextensive with those of ordinary
    citizens. We have held that “probable cause is not required to
    arrest a parolee for a violation of parole. Warrantless arrests
    of parole violators are also valid.” United States v. Butcher,
    
    926 F.2d 811
    , 814 (9th Cir. 1991).
    Sherman’s habeas petition raises a closely related yet dis-
    tinct question: When the United States Parole Commission
    SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION             11261
    issues a parole violator warrant pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 4213
    (a) for the retaking of a federal parolee, must that war-
    rant comply with the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amend-
    ment and therefore be “supported by Oath or affirmation”?
    Because the question has both statutory and constitutional
    dimensions, we consider first whether Congress incorporated
    the Fourth Amendment definition of a “warrant” into § 4213
    before addressing whether compliance with the Warrant
    Clause is otherwise constitutionally required.
    A
    [3] Although we have interpreted 
    18 U.S.C. § 4213
    (a) in
    other contexts, e.g., Benny v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 
    295 F.3d 977
    , 985 (9th Cir. 2002) (addressing the Commission’s dis-
    cretionary power to issue a warrant instead of a summons),
    we have yet to address whether § 4213 requires a parole vio-
    lator warrant to be supported by sworn facts. “In construing
    a statute as a matter of first impression, we first look to the
    statutory language: ‘The starting point in interpreting a statute
    is its language, for if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
    end of the matter.’ ” United States v. Morales-Alejo, 
    193 F.3d 1102
    , 1105 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Good Samaritan Hosp.
    v. Shalala, 
    508 U.S. 402
    , 409 (1993)). Section 4213 provides:
    (a) If any parolee is alleged to have violated his
    parole, the Commission may—
    (1) summon such parolee to appear at a
    hearing conducted pursuant to section
    4214; or
    (2) issue a warrant and retake the parolee
    as provided in this section.
    (b) Any summons or warrant issued under this sec-
    tion shall be issued by the Commission as soon as
    11262        SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION
    practicable after discovery of the alleged violation,
    except when delay is deemed necessary . . . .
    (c) Any summons or warrant issued pursuant to this
    section shall provide the parolee with written notice
    of—
    (1) the conditions of parole he is alleged to
    have violated as provided under section
    4209;
    (2) his rights under this chapter; and
    (3) the possible action which may be taken
    by the Commission.
    (d) Any officer of any Federal penal or correctional
    institution, or any Federal officer authorized to serve
    criminal process within the United States, to whom
    a warrant issued under this section is delivered, shall
    execute such warrant by taking such parolee and
    returning him to the custody of the regional commis-
    sioner, or to the custody of the Attorney General, if
    the Commission shall so direct.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 4213
     (italics added).
    On its face, despite setting forth several requirements for
    the issuance of a parole violator warrant, § 4213 makes no
    mention of an oath or affirmation requirement. Instead, sub-
    section (a) expressly authorizes the Commission to issue a
    warrant upon a mere allegation of a parole violation. The stat-
    ute’s only other express requirements regard the issuer (“the
    Commission”), the timing (“as soon as practicable after dis-
    covery of the alleged violation”), and the contents of the war-
    rant (“written notice” of the alleged violation, the parolee’s
    rights, and possible consequences). Id. § 4213(a)-(c). The
    implementing regulation is in accord, adding only that “satis-
    SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION           11263
    factory evidence” of the alleged violation is required. 
    28 C.F.R. § 2.44
    (a).
    Nevertheless, Sherman contends that we should read the
    lone term “warrant” as implicitly incorporating the Fourth
    Amendment definition. For this argument he relies on United
    States v. Vargas-Amaya, 
    389 F.3d 901
     (9th Cir. 2004), a
    supervised release case in which we interpreted the term
    “warrant” in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (i) as manifesting Congress’
    intent to incorporate the requirements of the Warrant Clause.
    He also invokes the general principle of statutory construction
    that the same language should be given a consistent interpre-
    tation across different statutes, citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 
    543 U.S. 1
    , 11 (2004).
    While we do not necessarily disagree with either premise,
    the issue is not so simple. Considering isolated terms without
    regard to the complete statutory language can be misleading,
    as can narrowly focusing on the holding of our opinions with-
    out due regard to the intricacies of our reasoning. Certainly
    Vargas-Amaya is a highly relevant precedent here given obvi-
    ous similarities between the issues presented. But closer
    examination of that opinion reveals a textual analysis of the
    supervised release statutes that, when applied to the distinct
    language of the parole statutes, leads to precisely the opposite
    result.
    1
    In Vargas-Amaya we addressed whether the district court
    lacked jurisdiction under § 3583(i) to revoke supervised
    release after the release term had expired because the warrant
    on which the defendant was arrested was not supported by
    oath or affirmation. That statute provides:
    The power of the court to revoke a term of super-
    vised release for violation of a condition of super-
    vised release, and to order the defendant to serve a
    11264        SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION
    term of imprisonment and . . . a further term of
    supervised release, extends beyond the expiration of
    the term of supervised release . . . if, before its expi-
    ration, a warrant or summons has been issued on the
    basis of an allegation of such a violation.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (i) (italics added). Focusing narrowly on the
    word “warrant,” we invoked two canons of statutory construc-
    tion: “in the absence of a statutory definition, a term should
    be accorded its ordinary meaning”; and “when Congress uses
    a term of art, such as ‘warrant,’ unless Congress affirmatively
    indicates otherwise, we presume Congress intended to incor-
    porate the common definition of that term.” Vargas-Amaya,
    
    389 F.3d at 904
    . Accordingly, at the outset we presumed that
    Congress “incorporated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
    against the issuance of warrants based on something less than
    probable cause supported by sworn facts,” and agreed with
    petitioner that “the plain meaning of the term ‘warrant’ means
    a document that is based upon probable cause and supported
    by sworn facts.” Id.; see also U.S. Const. amend. IV (“no
    Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
    Oath or affirmation”).
    But that is only the tip of the iceberg. As we also noted,
    these canons of statutory construction may be overcome if
    “Congress affirmatively indicates otherwise” or gives “ ‘con-
    trary direction.’ ” Vargas-Amaya, 
    389 F.3d at 904
     (quoting
    Carter v. United States, 
    530 U.S. 255
    , 264 (2000)). In other
    words, the presumption is rebuttable and therefore requires
    consideration of the statutory context and the surrounding
    terms. After all, terms do not appear in isolation and a stat-
    ute’s remaining language may place its terms of art in a dif-
    ferent light and alter the plain meaning of the statue as a
    whole. See Leocal, 
    543 U.S. at 9
    . Of course, after accordingly
    expanding our analysis of the supervised release statutes in
    Vargas-Amaya, we happened to find confirmation of the pre-
    sumption rather than contrary direction. But because our opin-
    ion in that case is fundamentally one of statutory construction
    SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION           11265
    and we dealt with an entirely separate statutory scheme, our
    methodology rather than our conclusion is more pertinent to
    our analysis here.
    Perhaps most remarkable about our analysis is that, despite
    initially applying the aforementioned presumptions regarding
    the implied meaning of the term “warrant,” we went on to
    determine that § 3583(i) “does not relate to the requirements
    for issuing a warrant at all.” Vargas-Amaya, 
    389 F.3d at 906
    .
    In considering the operative phrase “if, before its expiration,
    a warrant or summons has been issued on the basis of an alle-
    gation of such a violation,” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (i), we rejected
    the Government’s contention that the “allegation” clause had
    the effect of narrowly defining the term “warrant” as “some-
    thing less than that required by the Fourth Amendment.”
    Vargas-Amaya, 
    389 F.3d at 905-06
    . We reasoned that Con-
    gress’ use of the past tense in § 3583(i) (“has been issued”)
    rather than the present tense (“[may be] issued”) indicates that
    § 3583(i) merely enumerates the prior issuance of a valid
    supervised release warrant as a jurisdictional prerequisite
    without prescribing the requirements for issuing such a war-
    rant. Id. For those requirements we looked instead to § 3606,
    in which Congress did use the present tense in discussing the
    issuance of such warrants.
    Congress’ use of the past tense [in § 3583(i)]
    stands in contrast to the Fourth Amendment, and
    Rules 4, 9, and 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
    Procedure all of which discuss the requirements for
    issuing an arrest warrant in the present tense. See
    U.S. Const. amend. IV (“no Warrants shall issue”);
    Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(a) (“the judge must issue an arrest
    warrant”); Fed. R. Crim. P. 9(a) (“The court must
    issue a warrant”); Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d) (“a magis-
    trate judge or a judge . . . must issue the warrant if
    there is probable cause”). The use of the past tense
    in § 3583(i) implies that the statute does not relate to
    the requirements for issuing a warrant at all, but
    11266         SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION
    rather solely pertains to the court’s jurisdiction if an
    arrest warrant has already been validly issued.
    Another statute describes in the present tense when
    an arrest warrant may be issued for a violation of
    supervised release and provides that “If there is
    probable cause to believe that a . . . person on super-
    vised release has violated a condition of his . . .
    release, . . . the court . . . may issue a warrant for the
    arrest of a . . . releasee for violation of a condition
    of release.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3606
    .
    
    Id. at 906
    ; accord United States v. Garcia-Avalino, 
    444 F.3d 444
    , 446 n.3 (5th Cir. 2006) (stating that § 3583 is a jurisdic-
    tional provision while “section 3606 actually governs the issu-
    ance of warrants for the arrest of probationers or supervised
    releasees”)
    Of course, despite our determination that § 3583(i) itself is
    not controlling regarding the meaning of the term “warrant,”
    § 3606 confirmed the presumption that Congress intended to
    incorporate the Fourth Amendment definition. Reasoning that
    §§ 3583(i) and 3606 must be read consistently regarding the
    definition of a supervised release “warrant” and noting that
    § 3606 includes an express “probable cause” requirement, we
    concluded:
    The only reasonable inference is that Congress was
    aware of the Fourth Amendment and incorporated its
    requirement that a warrant be based “upon probable
    cause” in both statutes. By extension, if Congress
    intended to incorporate the “probable cause” portion
    of the Warrant Clause in each statute, it must have
    also intended to incorporate the “Oath or affirma-
    tion” portion of the Clause.
    Vargas-Amaya, 
    389 F.3d at
    905 n.2.
    SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION            11267
    2
    The plain language of § 4213 may seem superficially simi-
    lar to the supervised release statutes we considered in Vargas-
    Amaya, but on closer inspection it is structurally and substan-
    tively distinct and not amenable to the same inferences. We
    therefore cannot reach the same conclusion that Congress
    intended to incorporate the requirements of the Warrant
    Clause of the Fourth Amendment.
    To begin, by our reasoning in Vargas-Amaya, § 4213’s
    plain language makes it comparable not with § 3583(i) but
    with § 3606 insofar as the statute itself prescribes the require-
    ments for issuing a valid warrant. Congress’ use of the present
    tense throughout § 4213(a)-(c) (“the Commission may . . .
    issue a warrant,” “Any . . . warrant . . . shall be issued,” and
    “Any . . . warrant . . . shall provide”) stands in stark contrast
    to the past tense construction of § 3583(i) and instead paral-
    lels the present tense construction of § 3606 and Federal
    Rules of Criminal Procedure 4(a), 9(a), and 41(d).
    But that is also where any parallels end. Read in context,
    Congress did not use the term “warrant” in the same sense in
    both regimes. Section 4213 expressly authorizes only “the
    Commission” to issue a parole violator “warrant” and thereby
    provides for an administrative warrant. 
    18 U.S.C. § 4213
    (a).
    Only in replacing parole with supervised release did Congress
    shift issuing authority to “the court” and thereby use the term
    “warrant” in the ordinary sense of a judicial warrant. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3606
    ; see Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 
    498 U.S. 395
    , 400-01 (1991); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(a) (“the
    judge”); Fed. R. Crim. P. 9(a) (“The court”); Fed. R. Crim. P.
    41(d)(1) (“a magistrate judge”). In certain circumstances the
    distinction can be significant. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 
    483 U.S. 868
    , 877-78 (1987) (distinguishing between “administra-
    tive search warrants” and “constitutionally mandated judicial
    warrants”); Abel v. United States, 
    362 U.S. 217
    , 232 (1960)
    (characterizing a deportation arrest warrant under the Immi-
    11268         SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION
    gration and Nationality Act of 1952 as “an administrative
    warrant, not a judicial warrant within the scope of the Fourth
    Amendment”); United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette, 
    418 F.2d 1319
    , 1322 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that a parole violator
    warrant designated as “administrative” under New York law
    was not subject to ordinary Fourth Amendment safeguards).
    Thus, we question the present applicability of the “term of
    art” presumption we applied in Vargas-Amaya where “war-
    rant” was used in the judicial sense.
    Moreover, in § 4213 Congress omitted any express refer-
    ence to the Warrant Clause’s requirements in describing the
    issuance of a parole violator warrant. By contrast, § 3606 and
    Rules 4, 9, and 41 all expressly require “probable cause” for
    the issuance of an arrest warrant. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3606
    (“probable cause to believe that a probationer or a person on
    supervised release has violated a condition of his probation or
    release”); Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(a) (“probable cause to believe
    that an offense has been committed”); Fed. R. Crim. P. 9(a)
    (“probable cause that an offense has been committed”); Fed.
    R. Crim. P. 41(d)(1) (“probable cause to search for and seize
    a person or property”). Additionally, Rules 4, 9, and 41 also
    contain clear references to a sworn facts requirement. See
    Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(a) (referencing “the complaint or one or
    more affidavits filed with the complaint”); Fed. R. Crim. P.
    9(a) (“one or more affidavits accompanying the informa-
    tion”); Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d) (“an affidavit or other informa-
    tion,” which may consist of “sworn testimony”).
    The unique omission of any such references to the Warrant
    Clause in § 4213 is significant. In Vargas-Amaya we inter-
    preted the express “probable cause” requirement within
    § 3606 as an implicit incorporation of the full Warrant Clause,
    which we then imputed to § 3583(i). 
    389 F.3d at
    904-05 &
    n.2. The same premise is simply not available to us in the case
    of § 4213. Congress’ use of the term “warrant” is accompa-
    nied by several express requirements for its valid issuance, yet
    none reference the Warrant Clause. While § 3606 and the
    SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION            11269
    Federal Rules exemplify Congress’ ability to reference and
    incorporate the Warrant Clause’s requirements when
    intended, the omission of such requirements and inclusion of
    others in § 4213 indicates a contrary intent.
    [4] The natural reading of § 4213 is that the Commission
    is authorized to issue a parole violator warrant “[i]f any paro-
    lee is alleged to have violated his parole”—period. 
    18 U.S.C. § 4213
    (a). Although in Vargas-Amaya we determined that
    § 3583(i)’s “allegation” clause was largely irrelevant because
    of the statute’s past-tense construction, the converse is true
    here. Indeed, we expressly noted in Vargas-Amaya that if
    Congress were to use the present tense in conjunction with an
    allegation clause, that would indicate its intent to require only
    an allegation of a parole violation rather than full satisfaction
    of the Fourth Amendment:
    The government argues that Congress specifically
    defined warrant as something less than that required
    by the Fourth Amendment—and, thus, that a warrant
    based on unsworn facts is acceptable—because of
    the phrase “on the basis of an allegation of” a viola-
    tion of supervised release. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (i) . . . .
    To effect its reading of the statute, the government
    asks us to rewrite § 3583(i) to mean that “a warrant
    or summons [may be] issued on the basis of an alle-
    gation of such a violation.” However, we are not at
    liberty to rewrite the words chosen by Congress.
    Vargas-Amaya, 
    389 F.3d at 905-06
     (brackets in original). Of
    course, neither are we at liberty to rewrite the words chosen
    by Congress as to § 4213(a), which actually contains a “may
    issue” construction. Thus, by Vargas-Amaya’s reasoning, we
    must adopt as to § 4213(a) the very reading we rejected as to
    § 3583(i).
    3
    Contrary to our suggestion in Vargas-Amaya, 
    389 F.3d at 904
    , congressional authorization for the issuance of warrants
    11270        SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION
    outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause
    is not unprecedented. For instance, as noted above, in 1960
    the Supreme Court interpreted former INA § 242(a), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a), as “giving authority to the Attorney General or his
    delegate to arrest aliens pending deportation proceedings
    under an administrative warrant, not a judicial warrant within
    the scope of the Fourth Amendment.” Abel, 
    362 U.S. at 232
    .
    Much like § 4213, the immigration statute as it then existed
    authorized an executive official to issue an arrest warrant
    without reference to any Warrant Clause requirements.
    Pending a determination of deportability in the case
    of any alien . . . , such alien may, upon warrant of
    the Attorney General, be arrested and taken into
    custody. Any such alien taken into custody may, in
    the discretion of the Attorney General and pending
    such final determination of deportability, (1) be con-
    tinued in custody; or (2) be released under bond in
    the amount of not less than $500 with security
    approved by the Attorney General, containing such
    conditions as the Attorney General may prescribe; or
    (3) be released on conditional parole. But such bond
    or parole . . . may be revoked at any time by the
    Attorney General, in his discretion, and the alien
    may be returned to custody under the warrant which
    initiated the proceedings against him and detained
    until final determination of his deportability . . . .
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a) (1976) (emphasis added); Immigration and
    Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 242(a), 
    66 Stat. 163
    , 208-09 (1952). Indeed, deportation statutes going
    back to 1798 “have ordinarily authorized the arrest of deport-
    able aliens by order of an executive official,” evidencing an
    “overwhelming historical legislative recognition of the propri-
    ety of administrative arrest for deportable aliens.” Abel, 
    362 U.S. at 233
    .
    The same can be said of administrative arrests of parole
    violators, which Congress has authorized on the warrant of an
    SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION            11271
    executive official without requiring compliance with the
    Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause since the inception of
    federal parole in 1910. Parolees are legislatively “assigned to
    a unique status in our legal system.” United States v. Polito,
    
    583 F.2d 48
    , 54 (2d Cir. 1978). “A parolee is a convicted
    criminal who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment
    and who has been allowed to serve a portion of that term out-
    side prison walls” while subject to various conditions of
    release. 
    Id.
     Under the original 1910 Act, though not in physi-
    cal custody, a parolee was “to remain, while on parole, in the
    legal custody and under the control of the warden of such
    prison from which paroled . . . until the expiration of the term
    or terms specified in his sentence.” Act of June 25, 1910, ch.
    387, § 3, 
    36 Stat. 820
     (codified at 
    18 U.S.C. § 716
    ). Thus, a
    parole violator was viewed by Congress not as an ordinary
    citizen subject to arrest under a judicial warrant but as a “pris-
    oner” subject to administrative “retaking” by the warden
    already having legal custody over him. As amended in 1930
    with only technical changes, 
    18 U.S.C. § 717
    , the original
    predecessor to today’s § 4213, provided:
    If the warden of the prison or penitentiary from
    which said prisoner was paroled or the Board of
    Parole or any member thereof shall have reliable
    information that the prisoner has violated his parole,
    then said warden, at any time within the term or
    terms of the prisoner’s sentence, may issue his war-
    rant to any officer hereinafter authorized to execute
    the same for the retaking of such prisoner.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 717
     (1946); Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, § 4,
    
    36 Stat. 820
     (original enactment); Act of May 13, 1930, ch.
    255, § 1, 
    46 Stat. 272
     (amendment).
    Courts interpreting this legislation soundly rejected
    attempts by parole violators to claim certain rights enjoyed by
    ordinary citizens. In 1923, the Supreme Court characterized
    the nature of parole by stating that “[w]hile this is an amelio-
    11272         SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION
    ration of punishment, it is in legal effect imprisonment” and
    that a parole violator’s “status and rights were analogous to
    those of an escaped convict.” Anderson v. Corall, 
    263 U.S. 193
    , 196 (1923). Accordingly, in the 1930s the Fourth and
    D.C. Circuits relying on Anderson denied the habeas petitions
    of two parolees who, like Sherman, challenged their deten-
    tions on unsworn warrants. Both circuits squarely held that a
    parole violator warrant issued under § 717 need not be sup-
    ported by oath or affirmation. Jarman v. United States, 
    92 F.2d 309
    , 311 (4th Cir. 1937); Story v. Rives, 
    97 F.2d 182
    ,
    188 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (also rejecting the claim that probable
    cause was required); see also United States ex rel. Nicholson
    v. Dillard, 
    102 F.2d 94
    , 96 (4th Cir. 1939) (“Nothing in any
    statute requires anything more; and in the reason of the case
    nothing more was required.”). Despite Congress’ use of the
    term “warrant” in § 717, the Fourth Circuit clearly stated that
    “the warrant in question was not a warrant . . . as contem-
    plated in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.” Jarman,
    
    92 F.2d at 311
    .
    If, contrary to this interpretation, Congress had actually
    intended to incorporate the Warrant Clause’s requirements, it
    could have expressed that intent in subsequent legislation. But
    despite recodifying the parole statutes in 1948, Congress
    made no such changes. Like the 1910 Act, the 1948 Act con-
    tinued to provide that a “parolee shall . . . remain, while on
    parole, in the legal custody and under the control of the Attor-
    ney General,” and that “[a] warrant for the retaking of any
    United States prisoner who has violated his parole, may be
    issued only by the Board of Parole or a member thereof” and
    shall be executed “by taking such prisoner and returning him
    to the custody of the Attorney General.” Act of June 25, 1948,
    ch. 645, 
    62 Stat. 854
    -55 (codified at 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 4203
    , 4205
    and 4206, respectively). Even such a conspicuous change as
    the omission of the “reliable information” clause from former
    § 717 was later dismissed by at least one court as “probably
    a drafting oversight” given the lack of any “express reference
    of congressional intent that would indicate that the change
    SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION             11273
    was intentional.” Hyser v. Reed, 
    318 F.2d 225
    , 241 n.11 (D.C.
    Cir. 1963) (en banc).
    Given this legislative consistency, courts applying the 1948
    Act maintained the view that Congress did not intend parole
    violator warrants to be within the scope of the Fourth Amend-
    ment, even despite growing recognition that parolees had
    some procedural due process rights in revocation proceedings.
    For instance, in an apparent departure from the Supreme
    Court’s “escaped convict” analogy in Anderson, the D.C. Cir-
    cuit observed in Hyser that “in providing for a warrant type
    of procedure for retaking parolees thought to have violated
    parole conditions, Congress has recognized the need for some
    minimal procedural safeguards,” and that “something more
    than casual processes or varying improvisations was intend-
    ed.” 
    Id. at 242, 244
    . Yet the court still stopped short of requir-
    ing compliance with the Fourth Amendment. Characterizing
    a parole violator warrant as an “administrative arrest war-
    rant,” the court observed that “Congress evinced no intent to
    require precisely the same formalities and safeguards as to
    those contained in the Constitution for criminal arrests,” and
    it reaffirmed the view that “Congress meant to provide . . .
    [that] the retaking [of a parole violator] is not ‘an arrest within
    the meaning of the constitutional provisions.’ ” 
    Id. at 241, 244
    (quoting Story, 
    97 F.2d at 188
    ). Accordingly, while the court
    proceeded to prescribe in detail various requirements for the
    issuance of a parole violator warrant, including “a written
    application . . . reciting the facts believed to constitute a viola-
    tion” and that “the facts recited . . . , if true, amount to satis-
    factory evidence that parole conditions have been violated,”
    neither probable cause nor oath or affirmation were ever men-
    tioned. 
    Id. at 245
    ; see also 
    id.
     at 241 & n.12 (discussing the
    meaning of “satisfactory evidence”).
    Even when Congress finally did respond to court decisions
    by codifying certain judicially-recognized due process rights
    of parolees, it again made no changes to bring parole violator
    warrants within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. The
    11274         SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION
    Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 94-
    233, 
    90 Stat. 219
     (1976), was Congress’ final recodification
    and comprehensive amendment to the parole statutes before
    the 1984 repeal, and it produced the provisions we construe
    today. It was intended in part to legislatively address the
    Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in Morrissey v. Brewer,
    
    408 U.S. 471
     (1972), which declared that a parolee’s interest
    in his conditional liberty is protected by the Fourteenth
    Amendment and prescribed certain minimum procedural safe-
    guards for the revocation process. 
    Id. at 482-83, 484-85
    ; S.
    Rep. No. 94-369, at 15 (1975), as reprinted in 1976
    U.S.C.C.A.N. 335, 337. The Court’s prescriptions included,
    among other things, notice of the alleged parole violations and
    the parolee’s rights; an opportunity for a prompt informal pre-
    liminary hearing near the place of arrest, at which an indepen-
    dent administrative officer must determine whether probable
    cause exists for the parolee’s continued detention pending a
    final decision on revocation; and an opportunity for a final
    hearing — not rising to the level of a criminal trial — to
    determine whether revocation is warranted. Morrissey, 
    408 U.S. at 485-89
    . Congress accordingly codified these safe-
    guards at 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 4213
    (c) (notice) and 4214 (preliminary
    and final hearings). Parole Commission & Reorganization Act
    § 2, 90 Stat. at 228-30.
    Notably, however, neither the Supreme Court nor Congress
    suggested that stricter procedures were required for the issu-
    ance of a parole violator warrant for a parolee’s initial arrest.
    In Morrissey, despite tempering Anderson’s strong-form ver-
    sion of the “custody” theory, the Court nonetheless reaffirmed
    that “parole is an established variation on imprisonment of
    convicted criminals” and continued to give due recognition of
    that special status as limiting the rights of parolees as com-
    pared to ordinary citizens. 
    408 U.S. at 477, 480, 483
    ; see also
    Samson v. California, 
    126 S.Ct. 2193
    , 2198-99 & n.2 (2006).
    And nearly all of the new safeguards prescribed by the Court
    and codified by Congress regard only the process due a paro-
    lee in revocation proceedings after he is retaken. See D’Amato
    SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION           11275
    v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 
    837 F.2d 72
    , 75-76 (2d Cir. 1988);
    S. Rep. No. 94-369, at 18, 25-26, as reprinted in 1976
    U.S.C.C.A.N. at 339, 347-48; H.R. Rep. No. 94-838, at 33-34
    (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 351, 365-66. Even
    the notice requirement, which does relate to the warrant pro-
    cedures, merely relates to the content of the warrant rather
    than the justification for its issuance.
    For our purposes, the 1976 Act is practically indistinguish-
    able from the 1910 and 1948 Acts in authorizing the retaking
    of a parole violator on an administrative warrant outside the
    scope of the Fourth Amendment. Much like former 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 716
     and 717 (1910-1948) and former 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 4203
    ,
    4205 and 4206 (1948-1976), the latest parole statutes continue
    to provide that “[a] parolee shall remain in the legal custody
    and under the control of the Attorney General,” and that “[i]f
    any parolee is alleged to have violated his parole, the Com-
    mission may . . . issue a warrant and retake the parolee” “by
    taking such parolee and returning him to the custody of the
    regional commissioner, or to the custody of the Attorney Gen-
    eral.” 
    18 U.S.C.A. §§ 4210
    (a), 4213(a), (d) (West Supp.
    2007); Parole Commission & Reorganization Act § 2, 90 Stat.
    at 226-28.
    [5] Although the 1976 Act did incorporate for the first time
    an express “probable cause” requirement for revocation pro-
    ceedings, it has no bearing on the issuance and execution of
    a parole violator warrant. The term appears not in § 4213 but
    in § 4214, which expressly applies only after a parolee has
    already been “summoned or retaken under section 4213.” 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 4214
    (a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2007); see also H.R.
    Rep. No. 94-838, at 34, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
    366 (“following the issuance of a summons or warrant”).
    While § 4214 entitles a retaken parolee to “a preliminary
    hearing . . . to determine if there is probable cause to believe
    that he has violated a condition of his parole,” that inquiry is
    intended not as a post-hoc examination of the warrant’s valid-
    ity but to determine whether the circumstances justify “incar-
    11276         SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION
    ceration of the parolee pending further revocation
    proceedings,” among other options. 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 4214
    (a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2007); see also S. Rep. No. 94-
    369, at 18, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 339. Thus,
    the 1976 Act requires probable cause as a prerequisite only
    for continuing revocation proceedings beyond the preliminary
    hearing and extending a retaken parolee’s detention, not to
    compel an alleged parole violator’s appearance at such a hear-
    ing. Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 
    420 U.S. 103
    , 113-14 (1975) (hold-
    ing with respect to an ordinary criminal defendant that “the
    Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of prob-
    able cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty fol-
    lowing arrest”). Congress certainly could have included
    “probable cause” in both §§ 4213 and 4214, but it opted not
    to.
    [6] Instead, for the first time Congress expressly referenced
    a mere allegation as the necessary predicate for issuing a
    parole violator warrant. Compare 
    18 U.S.C. § 4213
    (a) (West
    Supp. 2007) (“is alleged to have violated his parole”) with 
    18 U.S.C. § 4205
     (1970) (“has violated his parole”) and 
    id.
     § 717
    (1946) (“reliable information that the prisoner has violated his
    parole”). The legislative history also repeatedly mentions an
    allegation as a sufficient predicate. See S. Rep. No. 94-369,
    at 18, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 339 (“In the case
    of allegations”); H.R. Rep. No. 94-838, at 33, as reprinted in
    1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 365-66 (describing § 4213 as “giving
    the Commission discretion to use either a summons or war-
    rant when a condition of parole has alleged to have been vio-
    lated”). Given the lack of any explanation of congressional
    intent regarding the allegation clause specifically, Congress
    might not have intended any substantive change from the
    prior Acts. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-838, at 33, as reprinted in
    1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 365-66; Hyser, 
    318 F.2d at
    241 n.11;
    see also 
    28 C.F.R. § 2.44
     (continuing to require “satisfactory
    evidence” of the alleged violation). But at the very least the
    allegation clause clarifies that, in marked contrast to the impo-
    sition of heightened safeguards for post-arrest revocation pro-
    SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION            11277
    ceedings, Congress expressly kept to a minimum the
    requirements for issuing a summons or warrant to ensure a
    parolee’s appearance and intended to codify only those rights
    prescribed by Morrissey and guaranteed under the Fourteenth
    Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment.
    4
    Finally, we are unpersuaded by Sherman’s argument that
    we should construe § 4213 as incorporating the requirements
    of the Warrant Clause in order to avoid raising serious doubts
    as to its constitutionality. Although in Vargas-Amaya we so
    applied the constitutional-doubt canon of statutory construc-
    tion as to § 3583(i), we did so only as an alternative rationale
    confirming our reading of the statute’s plain language.
    Because our textual analysis mooted any potential constitu-
    tional problems, we assumed arguendo that § 3583(i) was
    fairly susceptible of two constructions and then employed the
    canon of constitutional doubt to doubly reject the Govern-
    ment’s reading. 
    389 F.3d at 906
    . The situation here is much
    different, for our reading of § 4213’s plain text actually raises
    constitutional issues. We therefore lack the luxury of engag-
    ing in a hypothetical exercise in alternative rationales and
    must determine whether the constitutional-doubt canon
    applies at all. We conclude it does not.
    The canon of constitutional avoidance has no application
    when a statute’s language is unambiguous and Congress’
    intent is clear. As our preceding textual analysis reveals,
    § 4213 is susceptible of only one construction, which we
    therefore must adopt despite its potential for raising a signifi-
    cant constitutional question regarding the statute’s validity.
    Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 239
    (1998). Although “one of the canon’s chief justifications is
    that it allows the courts to avoid the decision of constitutional
    questions,” avoidance cannot be an end in itself lest the canon
    become something it is not — a method of resolving constitu-
    tional questions by other means. Clark v. Martinez, 
    543 U.S. 11278
             SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION
    371, 381 (2005). The canon is merely a tool of statutory inter-
    pretation, “not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language
    enacted by the legislature” for “we cannot press statutory con-
    struction to the point of disingenuous evasion even to avoid
    a constitutional question.” Salinas v. United States, 
    522 U.S. 52
    , 59-60 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omit-
    ted). “The canon of constitutional avoidance comes into play
    only when, after the application of ordinary textual analysis,
    the statute is found to be susceptible of more than one con-
    struction; and the canon functions as a means of choosing
    between them.” Clark, 
    543 U.S. at 385
    . It “rest[s] on the rea-
    sonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alterna-
    tive which raises serious constitutional doubts” and “is thus a
    means of giving effect to congressional intent, not of subvert-
    ing it.” Id. at 381-82.
    [7] Moreover, our interpretation of § 4213 as excepting
    administrative parole violator warrants from the Warrant
    Clause of the Fourth Amendment is entirely consistent with
    the presumption that Congress legislates in the light of consti-
    tutional limitations. See Harris v. United States, 
    536 U.S. 545
    ,
    556 (2002). As already discussed, the 1976 Act was passed
    after the Anderson Court had analogized the rights of parole
    violators with those of escaped prisoners, the Fourth and D.C.
    Circuits had repeatedly rejected application of the Warrant
    Clause to parole violator warrants, and the Morrissey Court
    left such warrants alone in addressing the due process rights
    of parole violators. Thus, “Congress would have had no rea-
    son to believe that it was approaching the constitutional line
    by following that instruction” and continuing to authorize the
    issuance of parole violator warrants under substantially the
    same procedures as the 1910 Act had originally allowed. Har-
    ris, 
    536 U.S. at 556
    .
    [8] For all of the above reasons, we hold as a statutory mat-
    ter that an administrative warrant issued by the Parole Com-
    mission under 
    18 U.S.C. § 4213
     for the retaking of an alleged
    parole violator need not be supported by oath or affirmation.
    SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION           11279
    Thus, Sherman has failed to establish any deprivation of his
    statutory rights in support of his habeas petition.
    B
    We now turn to the constitutional question implicated by
    our statutory analysis. Pointing to the Fourth Amendment’s
    prohibition that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
    cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,” Sherman contends
    that sworn facts establishing probable cause are constitution-
    ally required to support all warrants, even those issued by
    administrative agencies pursuant to statute. Consequently, he
    contends that his arrest and temporary detention on an
    unsworn parole violator warrant issued by the Parole Com-
    mission pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 4213
     is inconsistent with the
    Warrant Clause and therefore unconstitutional. Cf. Payton v.
    New York, 
    445 U.S. 573
    , 574-75 (1980) (holding that New
    York statutes authorizing warrantless entry into a private resi-
    dence to make a routine felony arrest are inconsistent with the
    Fourth Amendment). We disagree.
    No doubt, the once prevailing view that searches and sei-
    zures of parolees present no Fourth Amendment issues has
    been rejected in our modern jurisprudence. Latta v. Fitzharris,
    
    521 F.2d 246
    , 248 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc). But “[t]o hold
    that the Fourth Amendment is applicable . . . is only to begin
    the inquiry into the standards governing such intrusions.”
    Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 
    489 U.S. 602
    , 618-19
    (1989).
    By now it is clear that parole searches and seizures must
    “pass muster under the Fourth Amendment test of reasonable-
    ness.” Latta, 
    521 F.2d at 248-49
    . Under the general Fourth
    Amendment approach, we assess reasonableness by examin-
    ing the totality of the circumstances and balancing the intru-
    sion on the individual’s privacy against the promotion of
    legitimate governmental interests. Samson, 
    126 S.Ct. at 2197
    .
    “In most criminal cases, we strike this balance in favor of the
    11280         SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION
    procedures described by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth
    Amendment” and therefore ordinarily require a search or sei-
    zure to be “accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued
    upon probable cause.” Skinner, 
    489 U.S. at 619
     (emphasis
    added).
    Parole is different, however. “[R]evocation of parole is not
    part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of
    rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to
    parole revocations.” Morrissey, 
    408 U.S. at 480
    . “Quite to the
    contrary, the Court has recognized that those who have suf-
    fered a lawful conviction are properly subject to a broad range
    of restrictions that might infringe constitutional rights in free
    society . . . .” United States v. Kincade, 
    379 F.3d 813
    , 833
    (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and brack-
    ets omitted).
    Accordingly, in the parole context we have struck the
    proper balance between the individual and public interests by
    generally exempting parole searches and seizures from the
    requirements of the Warrant Clause. In Latta we held that the
    Fourth Amendment requires neither a warrant nor probable
    cause before a parole officer may search a California parolee.
    
    521 F.2d at 250
     (en banc plurality); 
    id. at 253
     (Wright, J.,
    concurring); 
    id.
     (Choy, J., concurring). Moreover, we thought
    it “indisputable, in view of the nature of parole and of the
    parole agent’s responsibilities,” that even if a warrant were
    constitutionally required “the showing necessary to obtain it
    would have to be substantially different from probable cause
    to avoid frustrating the purposes of parole.” 
    Id. at 251
    . And
    in United States v. Rabb, 
    752 F.2d 1320
    , 1324 (9th Cir. 1984),
    we extended Latta to parole arrests. “Under the Latta analy-
    sis, once a violation is established, the public interest in
    apprehending parole violators outweighs the parolee’s privacy
    interest,” such that “if a parole officer reasonably believes a
    parolee is in violation of his parole, the officer may arrest the
    parolee.” 
    Id.
     Thus, as we later summarized: “Under California
    and federal law, probable cause is not required to arrest a
    SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION           11281
    parolee for a violation of parole. Warrantless arrests of parole
    violators are also valid.” United States v. Butcher, 
    926 F.2d 811
    , 814 (9th Cir. 1991).
    These principles apply equally to federal parolees like
    Sherman. It is immaterial here that Latta, Rabb and Butcher
    all involved California state parolees or that California law
    may in some ways be stricter than federal law in terms of the
    conditions placed on parolees. Compare Cal. Penal Code
    Ann. § 3067(a) (West 2007) (requiring that state parolees
    agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure at any time
    “with or without a search warrant and with or without cause”)
    with 
    28 C.F.R. § 2.44
     (West 2007) (requiring “satisfactory
    evidence” of a parole violation for the issuance of an adminis-
    trative parole violator warrant). In Latta we considered the
    Fourth Amendment rights of parolees without reference to
    such jurisdiction-specific provisions and instead relied on
    those characteristics of parole that are more universal — e.g.,
    the nature, goals and purposes of parole, parolees’ unique
    legal status and diminished expectation of privacy, and the
    presence of long-standing statutory or judicial authority for
    warrantless searches and seizures of parolees. 
    521 F.2d at 249-51
    . And Rabb’s extension of Latta to parole arrests was
    based on the “same analytical framework” and an observation
    that echoes the congressional intent underlying 
    18 U.S.C. § 4213
    : Given that a parolee “remains under legal custody,”
    “a parole arrest [is] more like a mere transfer of the subject
    from constructive custody into actual or physical custody,
    rather than like an arrest of a private individual who is the
    suspect of a crime.” Rabb, 
    752 F.2d at 1324
     (internal quota-
    tion marks omitted). Thus, while the jurisdiction-specific
    aspects of California law may be a material factor in some cir-
    cumstances, see, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 
    474 F.3d 1208
    ,
    1214 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding a warrantless, suspicionless
    search of a California parolee’s residence as reasonable in
    light of the California parole-search statute and the parolee’s
    conditions of release), nothing in the reasoning of Latta and
    11282         SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION
    its progeny would limit the precedential effect of those deci-
    sions in the context of federal parole.
    [9] Because searches and seizures of parolees are generally
    not subject to the requirements of the Warrant Clause, we
    conclude that the Fourth Amendment does not require an
    administrative parole violator warrant to be supported by oath
    or affirmation. We therefore hold that petitioner’s arrest on a
    unsworn parole violator warrant issued by the U.S. Parole
    Commission pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 4213
     was not unconsti-
    tutional under the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.
    Lest there be any confusion, our holding today is in keep-
    ing with the fact that “[o]ur cases have not distinguished
    between parolees, probationers, and supervised releasees for
    Fourth Amendment purposes.” Kincade, 
    379 F.3d at
    817 n.2.
    The distinctions we have recognized between parole and
    supervised release warrants are fundamentally statutory, not
    constitutional. Vargas-Amaya stands for the relatively narrow
    proposition that an ordinary judicial warrant that is statutorily
    required for the arrest of a person on supervised release must
    comply with the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment in
    order to extend the court’s jurisdiction under § 3583(i). See
    Vargas-Amaya, 
    389 F.3d at
    907 & n.5 (addressing “whether
    a warrant for violation of the terms of release must comply
    with the Warrant Clause,” given the fact that “by statute, a
    [judicial] warrant was required to extend the court’s jurisdic-
    tion”); cf. United States v. Murguia-Oliveros, 
    421 F.3d 951
    ,
    955 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the court had jurisdiction to
    revoke supervised release under § 3583(e)(3) despite the
    releasee’s arrest on “an unsworn warrant”). We never consid-
    ered the notion of an administrative warrant like that provided
    in § 4213. See Vargas-Amaya, 
    389 F.3d at 904
    ; see also 
    id. at 906
     (discussing “all warrants” in terms of only “search”
    and “arrest” warrants). And we expressly avoided the ques-
    tion of whether a supervised releasee’s arrest must comply
    with the Warrant Clause in the absence of a statute requiring
    a judicial warrant. 
    Id.
     at 907 n.5 (“we do not address whether
    SHERMAN v. U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION            11283
    Vargas’ arrest was otherwise a valid warrantless arrest”); cf.
    Latta, 
    521 F.2d at 250-51
    . That is the question we answer
    today, albeit in the context of parole and given a statute that
    requires “an administrative warrant, not a judicial warrant
    within the scope of the Fourth Amendment.” Abel, 
    362 U.S. at 232
    .
    IV
    [10] We hold that neither 
    18 U.S.C. § 4213
     nor the Fourth
    Amendment require an oath or affirmation for the issuance of
    a valid administrative warrant for the retaking of an alleged
    parole violator. As petitioner alleges no other statutory or con-
    stitutional defect in the warrant on which he was retaken and
    held pending a preliminary hearing on revocation, we con-
    clude his detention was not unlawful. The judgement of the
    district court denying Sherman’s habeas petition challenging
    his detention on an unsworn parole violator warrant is
    AFFIRMED.