Edmond Ovasapyan v. City of Glendale , 405 F. App'x 256 ( 2010 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DEC 13 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
EDMOND OVASAPYAN, No. 09-55798
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-00194-CAS-JWJ
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ARTHUR FRANK; IAN GRIMES,
Defendants - Appellants,
CITY OF GLENDALE; MATTHEW
IRVINE,
Defendants.
EDMOND OVASAPYAN, No. 09-55990
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-00194-CAS-JWJ
v.
ARTHUR FRANK; IAN GRIMES,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
CITY OF GLENDALE, MATTHEW
IRVINE,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 6, 2010
Pasadena, California
Before: TROTT and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and BREWSTER, Senior
District Judge.**
A jury found that two Glendale, California, police officers, Detective Arthur
Frank and Lieutenant Ian Grimes (the “Officers”), unlawfully arrested and caused
the malicious prosecution of Edmond Ovasapyan. The district court denied the
Officers’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding that sufficient evidence
supported the jury’s verdict. The district court also denied the Officers qualified
immunity on both claims, ruling that a reasonable officer would know that the
conduct in which they engaged was unlawful. During the punitive damages phase
of the trial, the district court quashed subpoenas issued to members of the Glendale
**
The Honorable Rudi M. Brewster, Senior United States District Judge
for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
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City Council. The subpoenas were presumably issued for the purposes of eliciting
testimony regarding potential indemnification of the Officers by the City of
Glendale. The Officers appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for
judgment as a matter of law, and Mr. Ovasapyan appeals the district court’s
quashal of the subpoenas. We affirm.
A. The District Court Properly Denied the Officers’ Motion for Judgment
as a Matter of Law
Denial of a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is reviewed de
novo. Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 864 (9th Cir. 1999). “A
jury’s verdict must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence, which is
evidence adequate to support the jury’s conclusion, even if it is also possible to
draw a contrary conclusion.” Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2002).
The evidence presented at trial sufficiently supported the jury’s finding that
the Officers lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Ovasapyan. The evidence
presented at trial also supported the jury’s finding that the Officers misled the
prosecutor and withheld exculpatory information from her.
“When a police officer asserts qualified immunity, we apply a two-part
analysis.” Torres v. City of Los Angeles, 548 F.3d 1197, 1210 (9th Cir. 2008).
The first question is whether “the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.”
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Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The second question is whether the
right was “clearly established.” Id. at 202. In determining whether a right was
“clearly established,” the court considers whether it would be clear to a reasonable
officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. The first
question is one of fact, while the second is a question of law. Tortu v. Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police Dept., 556 F.3d 1075, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009).
It is clear to a reasonable officer that omitting material, exculpatory
information from reports submitted to a district attorney, as the jury found the
Officers did in this case, constitutes unlawful conduct. Awabdy v. City of
Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2004).
Qualified immunity is appropriate when a reasonable officer could have
believed that probable cause existed to arrest a plaintiff. Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d
423, 437 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). Mrs. Shahnazari
unequivocally stated that Mr. Ovasapyan was not one of the perpetrators, though
she said that he bore a strong resemblance thereto. The totality of the remaining
evidence did not compensate for Mrs. Shahnazari’s non-identification. It was not
reasonable for the Officers to believe they had probable cause to arrest Mr.
Ovasapyan.
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B. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion By Quashing
Subpoenas Issued to Members of the Glendale City Council
A decision to quash a civil subpoena is reviewed for abuse of discretion,
Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 813 (9th Cir. 2003), as are
evidentiary rulings, Tritchler v. County of Lake, 358 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir.
2004). The district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that purely
speculative testimony regarding the possibility that the City of Glendale might
choose to indemnify the Officers against punitive damages pursuant to California
Government Code § 825(b) was irrelevant, even after the Officers’ testified about
their personal financial status. Both Bell v. Clackamas County, 341 F.3d 858 (9th
Cir. 2003), and Lawson v. Trowbridge, 153 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 1998) are
distinguishable because those cases considered mandatory indemnification statutes.
Allegations of shadowy sources inside the Glendale City Council, with no further
offer of proof, did not support the plaintiff’s request.
AFFIRMED.
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