Stenson v. Lambert ( 2007 )


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  •                  FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DAROLD J. STENSON,                        No. 05-99011
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.                           D.C. No.
    CV-01-00252-MJP
    JOHN LAMBERT,
    OPINION
    Respondent-Appellee.
    
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Marsha J. Pechman, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    September 14, 2006—Seattle, Washington
    Filed September 24, 2007
    Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Chief Circuit Judge,
    Andrew J. Kleinfeld and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Chief Judge Schroeder
    13017
    STENSON v. LAMBERT                 13021
    COUNSEL
    Robert H. Bombiner, AFPD, Seattle, Washington, for the
    petitioner-appellant.
    Sheryl Gordon McCloud, Law Offices of Sheryl Gordon
    McCloud, Seattle, Washington, for the petitioner-appellant.
    Rob McKenna, Attorney General of the State of Washington,
    John J. Samson, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Justice
    Division, Olympia, Washington, for the respondent-appellee.
    OPINION
    SCHROEDER, Chief Circuit Judge:
    Darold Stenson was convicted and sentenced to death in
    Washington State in 1994 for the 1993 first-degree murders
    of his wife, Denise Stenson, and his business partner, Frank
    Hoerner. The trial was punctuated by disagreements between
    Stenson and his appointed counsel, Fred Leatherman. Lea-
    therman believed that the trial phase was not winnable and,
    therefore, thought he should focus on the penalty phase, to
    spare Stenson from the death penalty. Stenson believed Lea-
    therman should focus on an acquittal. The most serious spe-
    cific issue during the guilt phase was whether, during cross-
    examination of Frank Hoerner’s wife (also named Denise),
    Leatherman should attempt to suggest that she, not Stenson,
    committed the murders. Relatedly, Stenson believed Leather-
    man should introduce “other suspect” evidence to implicate
    Denise Hoerner. Leatherman refused to take this approach,
    because the evidence suggesting that Denise Hoerner had
    committed the murders was virtually non-existent. The most
    serious penalty-phase issue was whether Leatherman was
    ineffective for conceding Stenson’s guilt after the jury had
    decided the issue in the guilt phase, in order to persuade the
    13022                 STENSON v. LAMBERT
    jury not to impose the death penalty. State v. Stenson, 
    940 P.2d 1230
    , 1274-75 (Wash. 1997), cert. denied, 
    523 U.S. 1008
    (1998).
    Because of the disagreements during trial, Stenson moved
    for appointment of new counsel or, in the alternative, to repre-
    sent himself, pursuant to Faretta v. California, 
    422 U.S. 806
    (1975). The trial court held a hearing on the motion. It denied
    Stenson’s request for substitution of counsel and found that
    his request to represent himself was untimely and equivocal.
    The Washington Supreme Court agreed that Stenson’s
    Faretta request was equivocal, and did not reach the issue of
    timeliness.
    Stenson also asked the trial court to appoint independent
    counsel to represent him at the hearing on his motion to
    appoint new counsel, raising an issue as to whether the hear-
    ing constituted a critical stage of the proceedings. The Wash-
    ington Supreme Court found that while the hearing
    constituted a critical stage of the proceedings, independent
    counsel was not required because Leatherman’s second-chair
    David Neupert, adequately represented Stenson’s interests.
    In addition to challenging Leatherman’s concession of guilt
    during the penalty phase, Stenson challenged the trial court’s
    refusal to allow testimony from his father and sister regarding
    the impact his execution would have on his three young chil-
    dren, claiming the exclusion violated Lockett v. Ohio, 
    438 U.S. 586
    (1978). As to Leatherman’s concession of Stenson’s
    guilt, the Washington Supreme Court ruled the decision was
    tactical and not deficient under Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    (1984). It further held that even if the decision had
    amounted to a deficiency, under Strickland’s second prong
    Stenson could not show that he suffered any prejudice as a
    result of Leatherman’s conduct. As to the Lockett claim, the
    Washington Supreme Court reasoned that Stenson’s right to
    present mitigating evidence had not been violated because the
    trial court allowed all character and background evidence,
    STENSON v. LAMBERT                   13023
    including evidence of Stenson’s relationships with his friends
    and family. It had excluded only direct statements of how
    Stenson’s execution might impact his family members. This
    evidence, said the trial court, amounted to “nothing more than
    their opinions as to the sentence” Stenson should receive.
    
    Stenson, 940 P.2d at 1282
    .
    We have no basis to disagree with the Washington
    Supreme Court’s rulings on Stenson’s various claims. We
    accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court denying
    Stenson’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
    U.S.C. § 2254.
    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    On March 25, 1993, at 4:00 a.m. Stenson called 911 and
    told the operator “this is D.J. Stenson at Dakota Farms . . . .
    Frank has just shot my wife, and himself, I think.” Dakota
    Farms was located in Clallam County, Washington and was
    the residence of Stenson, his wife, Denise Stenson, and their
    three young children. Stenson also operated a business, rais-
    ing and selling exotic birds, from Dakota Farms.
    Within several minutes of Stenson’s 911 call, the police
    arrived at Dakota Farms. Stenson met them outside and led
    them to a guest bedroom on the ground floor, where Frank
    Hoerner lay dead on the floor with a bullet wound to the head.
    The body was face-down. A revolver lay between Hoerner’s
    left hand and his head. Stenson next led the police officers to
    an upstairs bedroom where Denise Stenson lay in the bed,
    with a severe bullet wound to the head. She was airlifted to
    a hospital, but died the next day.
    Stenson told the officers the following story: Frank Hoerner
    had arrived at his house a little after 3:30 a.m. in order to sign
    forms to insure ostriches that Stenson was going to buy for
    Hoerner on a trip to Texas. When Hoerner arrived, the two
    men went to Stenson’s office in a separate building behind the
    13024                 STENSON v. LAMBERT
    house, where Hoerner signed the insurance forms. Hoerner
    then left the office building to use the bathroom in the house.
    When Hoerner failed to return, Stenson went to look for him
    and found him dead in the guest bedroom, where Stenson had
    shown police the body. Stenson heard moaning from upstairs.
    When he went upstairs, he found his wife shot in the head.
    Stenson had not heard any gun shots. Stenson then called the
    911 operator. When the officers asked Stenson if he knew
    why someone would want to kill Frank Hoerner, Stenson
    responded that there had been sexual problems between
    Hoerner and his wife, Denise Hoerner, and that Frank
    Hoerner had complained about their marriage.
    The subsequent investigation showed that Frank Hoerner
    had not committed suicide in the bedroom, but had been hit
    in the head and dragged into the house from the gravel drive-
    way, through the laundry room, and into the guest bedroom
    where Stenson claimed to have found the body. Hoerner had
    been shot in the head in the guest bedroom at close range. The
    revolver had been placed near Hoerner’s hand after his hand
    had come to rest on the floor.
    Splatters of Hoerner’s blood were found in the driveway.
    Blood splatters were also found on Stenson’s pants that
    matched Hoerner’s blood protein profile. Gravel from the
    driveway was found in the laundry room and inside Hoerner’s
    pants. A bloody Stenson fingerprint was found on the freezer
    in the laundry room. According to Michael Grubb, a forensic
    expert, the pattern of some of the splatters indicated that they
    could not have been deposited on Stenson’s pants after Frank
    had been moved, i.e., the splatters on Stenson’s pants strongly
    suggested that Stenson had moved Frank’s body after he was
    shot.
    The police also found ammunition in Stenson’s garage that
    fit the murder weapon. They found gunshot residue inside a
    pocket of Stenson’s pants. Stenson had once been a martial
    arts instructor, and had a collection of nun-chucka sticks on
    STENSON v. LAMBERT                  13025
    the wall of his office. Dr. Brady, who performed the autopsy
    on Frank Hoerner, testified at the trial that the wounds on
    Hoerner’s head were consistent with such a weapon.
    The investigation also revealed that Stenson was in finan-
    cial difficulty. Frank Hoerner had given Stenson a $50,000
    deposit for the purchase of exotic birds, but at the time of the
    murders Stenson’s financial records showed that he had used
    less than $2,000 of Hoerner’s deposit to purchase birds. In
    addition, the bank account for Dakota Farms contained only
    about $3,400, and an audit indicated that Stenson had used
    investors’ money for personal purchases. He had attempted to
    borrow a large amount of money shortly before the murders.
    Finally, Stenson had taken out a $400,000 life insurance pol-
    icy on his wife.
    Stenson was arrested on April 8, 1993, about two weeks
    after the murders. His jury trial took place in Clallam County,
    Washington, in the summer of 1994. The prosecution’s theory
    was that Stenson had killed his wife in order to collect the
    $400,000 in life insurance money, and had killed Frank
    Hoerner in order to free himself from the $48,000 he owed
    Hoerner and to be able to blame Hoerner for the murder of
    Denise Stenson. The prosecutor argued to the jury that the
    physical evidence taken at the crime scene made Stenson’s
    initial statements to the police implausible.
    Frank Hoerner’s wife, Denise Hoerner, testified that Sten-
    son solicited Hoerner for investments in Stenson’s exotic bird
    business. Since 1992, Hoerner had given Stenson more than
    $50,000 for the purchase of birds. About a month before the
    murders, Hoerner became worried about the money he had
    entrusted to Stenson and so told Stenson either to return his
    investment or to deliver the promised birds. In response, Sten-
    son told the Hoerners that he needed to keep their money in
    his account in order to maintain the confidence of Asian
    investors from whom he was attempting to obtain a loan.
    Denise Hoerner further testified that her husband’s anxiety
    13026                 STENSON v. LAMBERT
    continued when Stenson traveled to Texas to obtain birds for
    the Hoerners, but returned empty-handed. She testified that
    Stenson assured Hoerner that he would return to Texas on
    March 25, 1993, to collect the birds. On the evening of March
    24, Stenson told Hoerner to come to his house to sign docu-
    ments necessary to insure the birds during their trip from
    Texas. Denise Hoerner offered to come sign the papers, but
    Stenson said that only Hoerner could sign them. Hoerner
    agreed to come by Stenson’s house during the early morning
    hours of March 25, on his way to the ferry that he took to
    work in Seattle.
    During the course of the trial, Stenson and his attorney,
    Fred Leatherman, developed conflicting views as to whether
    Leatherman should attempt to convince the jury that Denise
    Hoerner was the murderer. Leatherman did not want to
    attempt this defense because the forensic expert had con-
    cluded that Stenson could not have gotten the blood splatters
    on his pants after discovering Frank Hoerner’s body. In the
    context of the other evidence, this conclusion strongly sug-
    gested that Stenson had moved Hoerner’s body after Hoerner
    had been killed, which in turn strongly suggested that Stenson
    killed Hoerner. Leatherman believed that attempting to vilify
    Denise Hoerner would only turn the jury against Stenson and
    increase the likelihood that it would impose the death penalty
    during the sentencing phase.
    As a result of the conflict regarding trial strategy, Stenson
    moved the court to appoint new counsel or, in the alternative,
    to allow him to represent himself. Because Stenson’s request
    came three weeks into the voir dire process and near the end
    of jury selection, the trial court determined that Stenson’s
    request to represent himself was untimely. It also found that
    Stenson’s request was equivocal, based on the record as a
    whole. The court based this determination on the fact that
    Stenson indicated that he “really [did] not want to proceed
    without counsel[,]” and made his request to represent himself
    only as an alternative, should the trial court refuse to appoint
    STENSON v. LAMBERT                  13027
    new counsel. 
    Stenson, 940 P.2d at 1275
    . The trial court did
    not appoint independent counsel to represent Stenson at the
    hearing on the motion for new counsel.
    On August 11, 1994, the jury convicted Stenson of two
    counts of aggravated first-degree murder. With regard to the
    murder of Denise Stenson, the jury found the aggravating cir-
    cumstances that more than one person was murdered and that
    the murders were part of a common scheme or plan. With
    regard to the murder of Frank Hoerner, the jury found the
    aggravating circumstances that the murder was committed to
    conceal a crime or to protect or conceal the defendant’s iden-
    tity, and that more than one person was murdered as part of
    a common scheme or plan.
    During the penalty phase, Leatherman stated that both he
    and Stenson “accepted” the jury’s determination of guilt. Lea-
    therman also requested that the court hear testimony from
    Stenson’s family members regarding the impact Stenson’s
    execution would have on Stenson’s three young children and
    his father, who suffered from a heart condition. The court per-
    mitted extensive testimony from Stenson’s family and friends
    regarding their relationships with him, but excluded testimony
    from Stenson’s family members regarding how his execution
    would impact them, because the court found that this testi-
    mony would do no more than present their opinions as to
    what Stenson’s sentence should be. The jury sentenced Sten-
    son to death.
    PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Stenson appealed his conviction and sentence to the Wash-
    ington Supreme Court, contending, inter alia, that his self rep-
    resentation rights pursuant to Faretta, 
    422 U.S. 806
    , and his
    right to have mitigating evidence considered by the jury at the
    penalty phase under Lockett, 
    438 U.S. 586
    , had been violated.
    The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and
    sentence. See Stenson, 
    940 P.2d 1239
    .
    13028                STENSON v. LAMBERT
    In April 1999, Stenson filed the first of three personal
    restraint petitions with the Washington Supreme Court. In it,
    he raised, among other issues, his claims of ineffective assis-
    tance of counsel, the denial of counsel during a critical stage
    of the proceedings (i.e., at the hearing on his motion for sub-
    stitution of counsel), and his conflict with his trial counsel.
    The Washington Supreme Court denied that petition in 2001.
    See In re Stenson, 
    16 P.3d 1
    (Wash. 2001).
    The other two personal restraint petitions were filed during
    the pendency of Stenson’s federal habeas petition, and both
    were dismissed under state procedural bars, as untimely and
    as an abuse of the writ, respectively. These claims are not
    before us.
    This proceeding was initiated on February 20, 2001, when
    Stenson filed his petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in the
    Western District of Washington. The district court, in a
    lengthy and thoughtful decision, denied Stenson’s petition and
    later denied Stenson’s petition for reconsideration, which
    were both founded primarily on the contention that his coun-
    sel was ineffective for conceding guilt in the penalty phase in
    order to try to avoid the death penalty. The district court
    observed:
    Conceding guilt in the guilt phase is markedly differ-
    ent from conceding guilt in the penalty phase of a
    capital case after the jury has just found the defen-
    dant guilty. The reality that the defendant’s counsel
    faces in the sentencing phase of a capital case once
    the jury has found the defendant guilty changes the
    landscape of what constitutes reasonable or deficient
    performance. As the Supreme Court recognized in
    Florida v. Nixon, [
    543 U.S. 175
    (2004)] “[a]ttorneys
    representing capital defendants face daunting chal-
    lenges in developing trial strategies, not least
    because the defendant’s guilt is often clear.” [543
    U.S. at 177.]
    STENSON v. LAMBERT                   13029
    The district court granted Stenson’s motion for a certificate
    of appealability on a number of issues, including his Faretta
    and Lockett claims, his claim that his right to counsel at a crit-
    ical stage in the proceeding was violated, and his claim that
    he was denied effective assistance of counsel at sentencing.
    ANALYSIS
    I.   The Standards Governing This Appeal.
    The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
    (“AEDPA”), enacted in 1996, “placed a new restriction on the
    power of federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to state
    prisoners.” Williams v. Taylor, 
    529 U.S. 362
    , 399 (2000).
    AEDPA prohibits relief on any claim adjudicated in state
    court unless the state court decision was “contrary to, or
    involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
    federal law,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination
    of the facts[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).
    A state court decision is contrary to clearly established fed-
    eral law where the “state court arrives at a conclusion oppo-
    site to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of
    law.” 
    Williams, 529 U.S. at 405
    . A state court decision also
    is contrary to clearly established federal law “if the state court
    confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a
    relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result
    opposite” the Supreme Court’s. 
    Id. A state
    court decision constitutes an unreasonable applica-
    tion of Supreme Court precedent only if the state court deci-
    sion is objectively unreasonable. That is, the state court
    decision must be “more than incorrect or erroneous.” Cooks
    v. Newland, 
    395 F.3d 1077
    , 1080 (9th Cir. 2005). Whether a
    state court’s application of a rule is reasonable depends on the
    specificity of the rule. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 
    541 U.S. 652
    ,
    663 (2004). Where the Supreme Court has not addressed an
    issue in its holding, a state court adjudication of the issue not
    13030                STENSON v. LAMBERT
    addressed by the Supreme Court cannot be contrary to, or an
    unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.
    Kane v. Espitia, 
    546 U.S. 9
    , 9 (2006). Accordingly, Stenson
    is not entitled to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
    unless the Washington court’s decision “was contrary to or
    involved an unreasonable application of [the Supreme
    Court’s] applicable holdings.” Carey v. Musladin, 
    127 S. Ct. 649
    , 653 (2006).
    We also may grant relief if the state court adjudication
    “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
    light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
    28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). AEDPA directs us to presume that
    state court factual findings are correct. 28 U.S.C.
    § 2254(e)(1). We may not overturn them “absent clear and
    convincing evidence” that they are “objectively unreason-
    able[.]” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 
    537 U.S. 322
    , 340 (2003).
    II.   The Washington Supreme Court’s Holding That The
    Trial Court Did Not Violate Faretta v. California Was
    Not Objectively Unreasonable.
    Under the Sixth Amendment, criminal defendants have a
    right to be represented by an attorney. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
    The right to counsel has been interpreted to encompass “an
    independent constitutional right” of the accused to represent
    himself at trial, and thus waive the right to counsel. 
    Faretta, 422 U.S. at 806
    . Such waiver, however, must be “knowing,
    voluntary, and intelligent[.]” Iowa v. Tovar, 
    541 U.S. 77
    , 88
    (2004) (citing 
    Faretta, 422 U.S. at 806
    ); 
    Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835
    (“the accused must knowingly and intelligently forgo” the
    right to counsel) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 
    304 U.S. 458
    (1938)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We also have held
    that Faretta requires a defendant’s request for self-
    representation be unequivocal, timely, and not for purposes of
    delay. United States v. Erskine, 
    355 F.3d 1161
    , 1167 (9th Cir.
    2004); see also United States v. Arlt, 
    41 F.3d 516
    , 519 (9th
    Cir. 1994).
    STENSON v. LAMBERT                  13031
    Voir dire began in June. As voir dire was concluding, just
    before the jury was impaneled, Stenson requested that the trial
    court appoint new counsel. He made three such requests—one
    on July 12, one on July 13, and one on July 14, 1994. Each
    time, the court denied the request and Stenson then asked the
    court to allow him to represent himself. The trial court deter-
    mined that, because Stenson’s request to represent himself
    first came on the 20th day of voir dire and on the verge of jury
    impanelment, it was not timely. In addition, the trial court
    found that Stenson’s request was equivocal, because Stenson
    plainly did not want to represent himself. He told the court
    that he was moving to represent himself only because the
    court had denied his request for substitution of counsel. On
    July 14, when Stenson again asked the court to allow him to
    represent himself, he described it as a formal request and
    stated, “I do not want to do this but the court and the counsel
    that I currently have force me to do this.” The trial court
    denied the motion. The Washington Supreme Court upheld
    the trial court’s determination, finding that “almost all of the
    conversation between the trial judge and the Defendant con-
    cerned [Stenson’s] wish for different counsel. . . . He told the
    trial court he did not want to represent himself[.]” 
    Stenson, 940 P.2d at 1276
    .
    A.   The Washington Supreme Court’s Determination
    That Stenson’s Faretta Request Was Equivocal
    Was Not Objectively Unreasonable.
    Stenson argues on appeal that the Washington Supreme
    Court unreasonably applied Faretta in finding that his reluc-
    tance to proceed pro se did not amount to an unequivocal
    request to represent himself. The district court, relying on
    United States v. Kienenberger, 
    13 F.3d 1354
    , 1356 (9th Cir.
    1994), treated as an issue of fact the question whether Sten-
    son’s request to proceed pro se was equivocal. See also
    United States v. Mackovich, 
    209 F.3d 1227
    , 1237 (8th Cir.
    2000) (stating that the question is a question of fact); Fields
    v. Murray, 
    49 F.3d 1024
    , 1032 (4th Cir. 1995) (same).
    13032                  STENSON v. LAMBERT
    In its denial of Stenson’s federal habeas petition, the district
    court noted that we look to three factors to determine whether
    a request for self-representation is unequivocal: the timing of
    the request, the manner in which the request was made, and
    whether the defendant repeatedly made the request. In apply-
    ing these factors, federal courts must give significant defer-
    ence to the trial court’s factual findings. See 28 U.S.C.
    § 2254(e)(1) (state court factual findings “shall be presumed
    to be correct”).
    We hold that the Washington Supreme Court’s holding that
    Stenson’s request at trial was “not unequivocal,” 
    Stenson, 940 P.2d at 1275
    , was not “based on an unreasonable determina-
    tion of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A clear preference
    for receiving new counsel over representing oneself does not
    conclusively render a request equivocal under Faretta. Adams
    v. Carroll, 
    875 F.2d 1441
    , 1445 (9th Cir. 1989). It may, how-
    ever, be an indication that the request, in light of the record
    as whole, is equivocal. United States v. Kienenberger, 
    13 F.3d 1354
    , 1546 (9th Cir. 1994) (denying request for self-
    representation based on defendant’s indication that he wanted
    “advisory” counsel). Here, the trial court determined that
    Stenson’s request was not unequivocal on the basis of the
    record as a whole, which included several statements by Sten-
    son that he really did not want to represent himself but that
    he felt the court and his existing counsel were forcing him to
    do so. When the court indicated that it did not think Stenson
    wanted to proceed without counsel, Stenson replied, “[b]ut
    likewise I do not proceed [sic] with counsel that I have.”
    [1] The Washington Supreme Court relied on several indi-
    cators in determining that Stenson’s request to proceed pro se
    was not unequivocal. It cited Stenson’s statement that he
    really did not want to represent himself and noted that he did
    not refute the trial judge when the judge also came to this con-
    clusion. It cited steps Stenson took to locate another attorney.
    Finally, it pointed out that Stenson did not include a request
    to represent himself in his final written request for new coun-
    STENSON v. LAMBERT                   13033
    sel and, in fact, he requested that David Neupert, Leather-
    man’s co-counsel, be retained as counsel, supporting an
    inference that Stenson preferred working with Neupert over
    representing himself. 
    Stenson, 940 P.2d at 1275
    .
    Stenson asks us to rely on United States v. Hernandez, 
    203 F.3d 614
    (9th Cir. 2000), and Adams v. Carroll, 
    875 F.2d 1441
    (9th Cir. 1989), to find that his request was unequivocal.
    But Stenson’s burden under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) is to dem-
    onstrate that the Washington court’s finding that his request
    was equivocal “was based on an unreasonable determination
    of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
    court proceeding.” He does not do so, and the cases he cites
    are not analogous.
    In Adams, the defendant requested appointment of a new
    attorney early and often, and wound up with the same attor-
    ney against whom he had filed a malpractice 
    claim. 875 F.2d at 1442-43
    . Although the trial court denied Adams’ request
    that it appoint a new attorney, it did allow him to represent
    himself. 
    Id. at 1442.
    After representing himself for six weeks,
    Adams requested that the court appoint co-counsel to assist
    him. 
    Id. The court
    refused to do so. 
    Id. Two months
    after the
    denial of his request for co-counsel, Adams informed the
    court that he had filed a malpractice suit against his former
    attorney and again requested that the court appoint another
    attorney. 
    Id. Adams’ request
    included the condition that the
    court inform the public defender’s office not appoint the attor-
    ney against whom Adams had filed the claim, Mr. Carroll,
    who was a public defender. 
    Id. The public
    defender service “promptly reassigned Carroll
    to the case.” 
    Id. at 1443.
    Adams thus asked to represent him-
    self once again, but the court denied his motion. 
    Id. Adams was
    forced to proceed to trial with Carroll as his advocate and
    was convicted on all counts against him. 
    Id. Following the
    trial, Adams filed his federal habeas petition, and initiated his
    appeal, pro se. 
    Id. On appeal,
    he contended that the trial
    13034                 STENSON v. LAMBERT
    court’s denial of his last request to represent himself was con-
    stitutional error. 
    Id. We held
    that it was error because,
    although conditioned on the court’s refusal to appoint an
    attorney other than Carroll, Adams’ position throughout a
    several-year period was unwavering. 
    Id. at 1445
    (“Adams . . .
    took one position and stuck to it.”) The extent of the conflict
    and the persistence of the defendant in Adams are not present
    in Stenson’s case. Unlike Adams, Stenson failed consistently
    to maintain his desire to represent himself.
    In Hernandez, the defendant made his initial request to rep-
    resent himself very early—at the pretrial status 
    conference. 203 F.3d at 617
    . Stenson did not make his initial request until
    the day before voir dire ended. Hernandez’s request was con-
    ditioned on the court’s refusal to appoint new counsel. 
    Id. Although Stenson’s
    request also was presented as an alterna-
    tive to appointment of new counsel, it was not similar to Her-
    nandez’s. We described Hernandez’s request to be “an
    explicit choice between exercising the right to counsel and the
    right to self-representation,” allowing the court to be reason-
    ably certain that Hernandez wished to represent himself. 
    Id. at 621
    (citing United States v. Arlt, 
    41 F.3d 516
    , 519 (9th Cir.
    1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the
    trial judge in Hernandez engaged in “a dialogue with Her-
    nandez to determine whether [his request] was voluntary and
    intelligent,” and we held that that tended to show the trial
    court that the request was unequivocal. 
    Id. [2] By
    contrast, all of Stenson’s requests for self-
    representation were concessions that he really did not want to
    represent himself, but that he felt the court and Leatherman
    were forcing him to do so. We thus hold that the Washington
    Supreme Court’s interpretation of Stenson’s statements as
    evidencing uncertainty or equivocation regarding his desire to
    proceed pro se was not objectively unreasonable. Its finding
    that Stenson’s “conditional” request was “an indication to the
    court, in light of the record as a whole, that the request was
    not unequivocal,” 
    Stenson, 940 P.2d at 1276
    , was not based
    STENSON v. LAMBERT                   13035
    on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 
    Musladin, 127 S. Ct. at 653
    .
    B. The Trial Court’s Determination That Stenson’s
    Faretta Request Was Untimely Was Not Objectively
    Unreasonable.
    Stenson also argues that the trial court erred in finding that
    his request to represent himself was untimely. The Washing-
    ton Supreme Court did not reach the issue of timeliness. We
    thus look to the trial court’s decision as the last reasoned state
    court decision on the issue. See Hirschfield v. Payne, 
    420 F.3d 922
    , 928 (9th Cir. 2005).
    [3] We are required to determine whether the state court’s
    application of Faretta “was contrary to or involved an unrea-
    sonable application of [the Supreme Court’s] applicable hold-
    ings.” 
    Musladin, 127 S. Ct. at 653
    . Faretta does not articulate
    a specific time frame pursuant to which a claim for self-
    representation qualifies as timely. It indicates only that a
    motion for self-representation made “weeks before trial” is
    timely. 
    Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835
    . We have found that a state
    court’s denial of a motion made on the morning trial began as
    untimely was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable applica-
    tion of clearly established federal law. See Marshall v. Taylor,
    
    395 F.3d 1058
    , 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has
    never held that Faretta’s “weeks before trial” standard
    requires courts to grant requests for self-representation com-
    ing on the eve of trial. The trial court’s determination that
    Stenson’s request to proceed pro se was untimely is not objec-
    tively unreasonable under AEDPA.
    III.   The Washington Supreme Court Properly Denied
    Stenson’s Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
    During Trial.
    Stenson raises three issues with regard to Leatherman’s
    performance at trial. First, he claims that his disagreements
    13036                 STENSON v. LAMBERT
    with Leatherman amounted to a conflict of interest effectively
    denying him representation, in violation of the Sixth Amend-
    ment. Second, he claims that the trial court was required to
    appoint independent counsel during a hearing on his motion
    to substitute counsel and that the court’s failure to do so
    resulted in denial of counsel during a critical stage of the pro-
    ceedings. Third, he claims that Leatherman was ineffective
    for failing to pursue Stenson’s suggested trial strategy—to
    attempt to convince the jury that Denise Hoerner, and not
    Stenson, committed the murders.
    Stenson premises his conflict and ineffective assistance
    claims on Leatherman’s refusal to adopt his suggested strat-
    egy of attempting to pin the crimes on Denise Hoerner. Sten-
    son believed Leatherman should attempt to introduce a
    statement Denise Hoerner once made indicating that she had
    motive and opportunity to kill her husband, specifically, that
    she wished her husband were dead because she would not be
    able to get any money under the prenuptial agreement unless
    he died. Leatherman did not attempt to introduce this state-
    ment because, under Washington law, “other suspect” evi-
    dence requires a “train of facts or circumstances which tend
    clearly to point to someone other than the defendant as the
    guilty party.” In re Lord, 
    868 P.2d 835
    , 849 (Wash. 1994).
    Leatherman was convinced that Mrs. Hoerner’s statement did
    not meet Washington’s evidentiary standard for admission.
    Leatherman also believed that attempting to implicate Mrs.
    Hoerner, in the face of overwhelming evidence against Sten-
    son, would turn the jury against Stenson and drastically
    reduce his chance for a sentence of life instead of death in the
    penalty phase. Stenson claims that Leatherman’s refusal to
    attempt to pin the crimes on Mrs. Hoerner amounted to a con-
    flict of interest, an irreconcilable conflict, and a constructive
    denial of counsel because Leatherman had a different trial
    objective than Stenson, that is, he did not want to “win” the
    trial; he merely wanted to avoid the death penalty.
    STENSON v. LAMBERT                   13037
    The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the
    right to representation at all critical stages of the proceedings.
    Coleman v. Alabama, 
    399 U.S. 1
    , 3 (1970). This right encom-
    passes the right to conflict-free representation. See Wheat v.
    United States, 
    486 U.S. 153
    , 153 (1988). The Washington
    Supreme Court and the district court construed Stenson’s con-
    flict argument as both a contention that Stenson and Leather-
    man had an “actual” conflict of interest, under the Sixth
    Amendment’s guarantee of a right to conflict-free assistance
    of counsel, 
    Wheat, 486 U.S. at 153
    , and an assertion of an “ir-
    reconcilable” conflict amounting to the constructive depriva-
    tion of counsel, Brown v. Craven, 
    424 F.2d 1166
    , 1170 (9th
    Cir. 1970) cited in Schell v. Witek, 
    218 F.3d 1017
    , 1025 (9th
    Cir. 2000).
    A.   The Washington Supreme Court’s Determination
    That Stenson And Leatherman Did Not Have An
    Actual Conflict of Interest Was Not Contrary To
    Or An Unreasonable Application Of Federal Law.
    [4] Although a criminal defendant enjoys the right to
    conflict-free representation, the mere “possibility of conflict
    is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction.” Cuyler v.
    Sullivan, 
    445 U.S. 335
    , 350 (1980). In order to demonstrate
    an actual conflict of interest, the defendant must show that his
    attorney was actively representing conflicting interests and
    that the conflict adversely affected the attorney’s perfor-
    mance. 
    Id. at 348-50.
    [5] The Washington Supreme Court noted that the phrase
    “conflict of interest” is a term of art in the 
    law. 16 P.3d at 8
    .
    Ordinarily, it denotes representation of multiple conflicting
    interests, such as an attorney’s representation of more than
    one defendant in the same criminal case, or representation of
    a defendant where the attorney is being prosecuted for related
    crimes. See Mickens v. Taylor, 
    535 U.S. 162
    , 176 (2002)
    (“until . . . a defendant shows that his counsel actively repre-
    sented conflicting interests, he has not established the consti-
    13038                 STENSON v. LAMBERT
    tution predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance”)
    (quoting 
    Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 350
    ) (emphasis in original);
    United States v. Moore, 
    159 F.3d 1154
    , 1158 (9th Cir. 1998)
    (distinguishing a conflict of interest, which is “the existence
    of competing interest potentially affecting counsel’s capacity
    to give undivided loyalty to his client’s interests,” from an
    irreconcilable conflict). Stenson’s disagreement with Leather-
    man is better characterized as one over trial strategy, and the
    Washington Supreme Court so characterized it. We can find
    no clearly established Supreme Court precedent holding that
    this kind of disagreement amounts to an actual conflict of
    interest. The Washington Supreme Court correctly determined
    that no clearly established federal law supports Stenson’s con-
    struction of “conflict of interest” as describing a disagreement
    between attorney and client over trial strategy.
    B.    The Washington Supreme Court’s Determination
    Of No Irreconcilable Conflict Was Not Contrary To
    Or An Unreasonable Application Of Federal Law.
    [6] The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a “meaning-
    ful relationship” between a client and his attorney. Morris v.
    Slappy, 
    461 U.S. 1
    , 14 (1983). However, forcing a defendant
    to go to trial with an attorney with whom he has an irreconcil-
    able conflict amounts to constructive denial of the Sixth
    Amendment right to counsel. 
    Brown, 424 F.2d at 1170
    . An
    irreconcilable conflict in violation of the Sixth Amendment
    occurs only where there is a complete breakdown in commu-
    nication between the attorney and client, and the breakdown
    prevents effective assistance of counsel. 
    Schell, 281 F.3d at 1026
    . Disagreements over strategical or tactical decisions do
    not rise to level of a complete breakdown in communication.
    
    Id. To determine
    whether a conflict rises to the level of “irrec-
    oncilable,” a court looks to three factors: 1) the extent of the
    conflict; 2) the adequacy of the inquiry by the trial court; and
    3) the timeliness of the motion for substitution of counsel.
    STENSON v. LAMBERT                   13039
    
    Moore, 159 F.3d at 1158-59
    . A trial court’s inquiry regarding
    counsel’s performance on a motion to substitute counsel
    should be “such necessary inquiry as might ease the defen-
    dant’s dissatisfaction, distrust, and concern.” United States v.
    Garcia, 
    924 F.2d 925
    , 926 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted). It also should provide a “suffi-
    cient basis for reaching an informed decision[ ]” regarding
    whether to appoint new counsel. United States v. McClendon,
    
    782 F.2d 785
    , 789 (9th Cir. 1986).
    [7] Stenson now argues that the Washington Supreme
    Court’s ruling on the extent of the conflict and the adequacy
    of the trial court’s inquiry was objectively unreasonable and
    factually unsupported. He also contends that the trial court’s
    reliance on Leatherman’s competence was improper. We do
    not agree. In assessing the extent of the conflict, the trial court
    held numerous ex parte hearings with Stenson and Leather-
    man to determine whether communication had broken down
    and whether substitute counsel was warranted. In the course
    of these hearings, the trial court vetted Leatherman’s reasons
    for adopting the trial strategy he had adopted. It satisfied itself
    as to Leatherman’s competence. It also examined the flow of
    communication between Stenson and David Neupert, Leather-
    man’s second-chair and determined that communication
    between Neupert and Stenson remained open, as did the lines
    of communication between Neupert and Leatherman. Thus,
    because Neupert was in constant communication with Lea-
    therman and because Stenson could and did communicate
    with Neupert, the trial court found that there was no break-
    down of communication between Leatherman and Stenson so
    severe as to amount to constructive denial of counsel.
    The Washington Supreme Court, in rejecting Stenson’s
    final personal restraint petition, focused on Leatherman’s
    competence. It noted that Leatherman had cross-examined
    twenty-five of the state’s thirty-three witnesses, called five
    witnesses of its own, and that Stenson had “expressed general
    satisfaction with the way his attorneys conducted the trial.” In
    13040                 STENSON v. LAMBERT
    re 
    Stenson, 16 P.3d at 8
    . It thus upheld the trial court’s deter-
    mination.
    [8] Although we have held that a complete breakdown of
    communication may occur even where counsel is providing
    competent representation, we have done so only in extreme
    cases. See United States v. Nguyen, 
    262 F.3d 998
    , 1003 (9th
    Cir. 2001); United States v. Musa, 
    220 F.3d 1096
    , 1102 (9th
    Cir. 2000). In Nguyen, the trial judge, who was sitting by des-
    ignation in Guam and expressed concern regarding traveling
    “halfway around the world” to hear the case, “improperly
    emphasized his own schedule at the expense of Nguyen’s
    Sixth Amendment 
    rights.” 262 F.3d at 1003
    . Furthermore, the
    trial court’s inquiry there focused “exclusively on the attor-
    ney’s competence and refused to consider the relationship
    between Nguyen and his attorney.” 
    Id. The court
    ’s refusal to
    consider the relationship was significant in Nguyen because,
    by the time trial began, Nguyen was “left to fend for himself”;
    he could not confer with his attorney about trial strategy or
    evidence, or even get his attorney to explain the proceedings.
    
    Id. at 1004.
    No communication at all flowed between attorney
    and client.
    By contrast, the Washington Supreme Court here deter-
    mined that lines of communication between Stenson and Neu-
    pert, Leatherman’s second-chair, were still active. Thus, on
    balance, Leatherman’s competence was a more significant
    factor in the Washington Supreme Court’s analysis in this
    case. We have also determined the extent of an alleged con-
    flict by examining the attorney’s performance and compe-
    tence, lending support to the Washington Supreme Court’s
    emphasis on Leatherman’s competence in its determination
    that the trial court’s inquiry was sufficient. See 
    Moore, 159 F.3d at 1159
    (holding that attorney’s failure to keep defendant
    informed of plea negotiations and to prepare for trial because
    he felt physically threatened by defendant demonstrated irrec-
    oncilable conflict); Frazer v. United States, 
    18 F.3d 778
    , 785
    (1994) (holding that refusal to collect useful evidence for mit-
    STENSON v. LAMBERT                   13041
    igation in combination with calling defendant derogatory rac-
    ist names demonstrated irreconcilable conflict).
    [9] In light of applicable holdings of the Supreme Court
    and on the basis of the record as a whole, the Washington
    Supreme Court’s determination that there was no irreconcil-
    able conflict was not contrary to or an unreasonable applica-
    tion of federal law. 
    Musladin, 127 S. Ct. at 653
    .
    C.   The Washington Supreme Court’s Determination
    That The Trial Court Was Not Required to
    Appoint Independent Counsel to Represent Stenson
    At The Hearing On His Motion for a New Attorney
    Was Not Contrary To Or An Unreasonable
    Application Of Federal Law.
    [10] A criminal defendant is entitled to representation at
    every critical stage of the proceedings. 
    Coleman, 399 U.S. at 3
    ; Correll v. Ryan, 
    465 F.3d 1006
    , 1009 (9th Cir. 2006). A
    “critical stage” is any proceeding that implicates “substantial
    rights of the accused.” 
    Id. In the
    context of a motion to substi-
    tute counsel, this court has suggested that separate counsel
    may be warranted, for purposes of the motion, where current
    counsel fails to assist the defendant in making the motion or
    takes an adversarial and antagonistic stance regarding the
    motion. 
    Adelzo-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d at 779-80
    .
    In his first personal restraint petition, Stenson argued that
    the trial court should have appointed independent counsel to
    represent him at the July 13 hearing on his motion to substi-
    tute counsel because Leatherman’s antagonistic position left
    him effectively without representation. The Washington
    Supreme Court rejected this claim because, as we have seen,
    the lines of communication between Stenson and David Neu-
    pert remained open. Even assuming Leatherman could not be
    effective, the court found that Neupert was.
    [11] Stenson relies on United States v. Wadsworth, 
    820 F.2d 1500
    (9th Cir. 1987), to argue that the Washington
    13042                 STENSON v. LAMBERT
    Supreme Court’s holding was in error. Wadsworth is not anal-
    ogous. Critical facts distinguish Wadsworth from Stenson’s
    case. In Wadsworth, the defendant’s appointed counsel admit-
    ted that he had stopped preparing for trial and had effectively
    “quit” working on Wadsworth’s case because he was not “re-
    ceiv[ing] the cooperation” he expected from Wadsworth. 
    Id. at 1508.
    Wadsworth also presented the court with evidence
    that his attorney had neglected to respond to evidence and, as
    a result, effectively had waived any defense to the evidence.
    
    Id. Finally, during
    the court inquiry regarding the extent of the
    conflict, Wadsworth’s attorney dismissed Wadsworth’s con-
    cerns as “a bunch of hooey.” 
    Id. at 1507.
    We held that, taken
    together, these facts demonstrated that Wadsworth was denied
    the effective assistance of counsel because his attorney “had
    taken an adversary and antagonistic position on a matter con-
    cerning his client’s right to counsel and to prepare for trial.”
    
    Id. at 1510-11.
    [12] This case, however, presents no such antagonism.
    Although Stenson and Leatherman disagreed about Leather-
    man’s approach to the defense, Leatherman never stopped
    preparing for trial and never let up in his vigorous defense of
    Stenson. When Stenson requested substitute counsel, the court
    held a hearing and found that the dispute was over strategy,
    which did not warrant granting Stenson’s request. It further
    found no impediment to Neupert’s ability to advocate for
    Stenson, either to Leatherman or to the court. The Washing-
    ton Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and dismissed
    Stenson’s claim. It noted that, whatever Stenson’s claims with
    respect to Leatherman, Neupert had represented Stenson
    “continuously.”
    [13] The Washington Supreme Court also distinguished
    Wadsworth on similar grounds. Its determination that Leather-
    man did not engage in egregious conduct amounting to an
    absolute denial of representation was a reasonable application
    of Supreme Court precedent. 
    Musladin, 127 S. Ct. at 653
    .
    STENSON v. LAMBERT                  13043
    D.   The Washington Supreme Court’s Determination
    That Leatherman Did Not Provide Ineffective
    Assistance For Refusing To Implicate Denise
    Hoerner Was Not Contrary To Or An
    Unreasonable Application Of Federal Law.
    Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant is enti-
    tled to effective assistance of counsel. See 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686
    . To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel
    amounting to a constitutional violation, Stenson must show
    that Leatherman’s performance fell below an objective stan-
    dard of reasonableness and that, but for Leatherman’s defi-
    cient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been
    more favorable for Stenson. 
    Id. at 687.
    In arguing that Leatherman’s representation was ineffec-
    tive, Stenson points to Leatherman’s refusal to attempt to
    implicate Denise Hoerner by introducing “other suspect” evi-
    dence and by cross-examining her in a manner that would
    suggest she committed the murders. The Washington
    Supreme Court found that Leatherman’s decision not to
    attempt to implicate Denise Hoerner was a question of trial
    strategy. It further found that there was nothing in the record
    other than Stenson’s unsubstantiated suspicions that pointed
    to Denise Hoerner as a suspect. Thus, it concluded that Lea-
    therman had correctly determined during trial that the evi-
    dence Stenson wanted him to introduce would not have been
    admissible under Washington law, because there were no
    facts in the record to support it. See In re 
    Lord, 868 P.2d at 849
    (holding that introduction of “other suspect” evidence
    requires a “train of facts or circumstances which tend clearly
    to point to someone other than the defendant as the guilty
    party”). Because the evidence would not have been admissi-
    ble under state law, the Washington Supreme Court found that
    Leatherman’s decision not to introduce it could not have been
    defective.
    Furthermore, the Washington Supreme Court found that
    Leatherman had thoroughly investigated the possibility that
    13044                 STENSON v. LAMBERT
    Denise Hoerner had committed the murders; he had an inves-
    tigator stake out her house and look into the possibility that
    she had a boyfriend. Leatherman also subpoenaed Mrs.
    Hoerner’s bank records. He found no evidence suggesting that
    Mrs. Hoerner had killed her husband and Denise Stenson.
    [14] Strickland counsels that attorneys have a “duty to
    make reasonable investigations” regarding whether admissi-
    ble evidence 
    exists. 466 U.S. at 691
    . In evaluating attorneys’
    judgments as to whether to pursue evidence, courts must con-
    sider “whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable
    attorney to investigate further.” Wiggins v. Smith, 
    539 U.S. 510
    , 527 (2003). We apply a “heavy measure of deference to
    [an attorney’s] judgments” as to whether additional evidence
    may be adduced by further investigation. 
    Id. As the
    district
    court said, “[i]f the decision not to investigate beyond a cer-
    tain point is reasonable, then the failure to do so cannot con-
    stitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”
    [15] Here, the Washington Supreme Court determined that
    Leatherman’s decision not to attempt to introduce “other sus-
    pect” evidence against Denise Hoerner was reasonable
    because Leatherman had made a reasonable investigation that
    failed to turn up potentially admissible evidence. Because the
    reports of Leatherman’s investigation were not in the trial
    record, Leatherman would not be able to meet the burden of
    “coming up with enough evidence to clearly point to [Denise
    Hoerner] as the guilty party,” as state law required. 
    Stenson, 940 P.2d at 1272
    ; see also In re 
    Lord, 868 P.2d at 849
    . The
    state court’s finding that Leatherman investigated Stenson’s
    theory and tried to come up with some admissible evidence to
    support it is not an unreasonable determination of the facts. Its
    determination that Leatherman was not ineffective was a rea-
    sonable application of Strickland’s directive that attorneys be
    given a “heavy measure of deference” in their trial choices.
    Furthermore, Stenson cannot show that, even if Leatherman’s
    performance in refusing to introduce evidence to try to impli-
    STENSON v. LAMBERT                  13045
    cate Mrs. Hoerner was deficient, the outcome of the trial
    would have been more favorable to him.
    IV.   Leatherman’s Decision To Concede Stenson’s Guilt
    During The Sentencing Phase Of The Trial Was Not
    Objectively Unreasonable Under Federal Law.
    An attorney’s decision to concede guilt in the sentencing
    phase of a trial is not necessarily an unreasonable tactical
    decision. Florida v. Nixon, 
    543 U.S. 175
    , 176-77 (2004).
    When the evidence against a defendant in a capital case is
    overwhelming and counsel concedes guilt in an effort to avoid
    the death penalty, “counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for
    attempting to impress the jury with his candor[.]” 
    Id. at 192.
    The Washington Supreme Court did not address whether
    Leatherman’s decision to tell the jury that he and Stenson “ac-
    cepted” its verdict amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.
    As a result, we conduct an independent review of the record.
    See Pham v. Terhune, 
    400 F.3d 740
    , 742 (9th Cir. 2005).
    At sentencing, Leatherman told the jury, “I [ ] want you to
    understand that . . . we accept your verdict without reservation
    whatsoever. We don’t question it. We understand that your
    verdict is supported by the evidence[.]” He then proceeded to
    introduce mitigating evidence, including the testimony of
    Stenson’s friends and family regarding their relationships
    with Stenson. Stenson argues that Leatherman’s concession of
    guilt was error amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel
    because Leatherman should have continued to pursue a theory
    of residual doubt about Stenson’s guilt.
    [16] The Supreme Court has held that residual doubt is not
    a properly mitigating factor. Oregon v. Guzek, 
    546 U.S. 517
    ,
    
    126 S. Ct. 1226
    , 1230-32 (2006). In addition, as Leatherman
    seems to have recognized here, arguing residual doubt is
    inconsistent with a capital defendant’s conviction in the guilt
    phase, because sentencing “traditionally concerns how, not
    13046                 STENSON v. LAMBERT
    whether, a defendant committed the crime.” 
    Id. at 1230
    (emphasis in original). By the time they reach the sentencing
    phase, the parties already have litigated whether the defendant
    committed the crime.
    [17] The Supreme Court also has held that conceding guilt
    in the penalty phase is permissible. 
    Nixon, 547 U.S. at 192
    .
    The lawyer in Nixon was faced with a “disruptive and violent”
    client who remained “unresponsive” throughout the trial. 
    Id. at 182.
    Furthermore, the evidence against Nixon was substan-
    tial. He had confessed to the crime and “described [it] in
    graphic detail[.]” 
    Id. at 179.
    The State subsequently “gathered
    overwhelming evidence establishing that Nixon had commit-
    ted the murder in the manner he described.” 
    Id. at 180.
    His
    attorney concluded that, “given the strength of the evidence,
    [ ] Nixon’s guilt was not subject to any reasonable dispute.”
    
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted). The attorney therefore
    took the tack that his job was to “present extensive mitigating
    evidence [during sentencing] centering on Nixon’s mental
    instability.” 
    Id. [18] The
    Supreme Court held that the attorney’s strategy
    was not unreasonable, given the circumstances. In so holding,
    it acknowledged that “[a]n attorney undoubtedly has a duty to
    consult with the client regarding ‘important decisions,’
    including questions of overarching defense strategy.” 
    Id. at 187.
    It said, however, that an attorney is not required “to
    obtain the defendant’s consent to ‘every tactical decision.’ ”
    
    Id. In cases
    where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and
    the attorney is attempting to avoid the death penalty, an attor-
    ney does not need to obtain the defendant’s explicit consent
    before he concedes guilt in the sentencing phase. 
    Id. 188-89. [19]
    Stenson argues that Leatherman’s concession of guilt
    went beyond Nixon because Leatherman did not consult with
    him before conceding that he “accepted” the jury’s guilty ver-
    dict. But Nixon did not hold that an attorney must obtain
    defendant’s consent when conceding guilt in the sentencing
    STENSON v. LAMBERT                  13047
    phase. Indeed, even during the guilt phase, an attorney is not
    required to obtain a defendant’s “affirmative, explicit accep-
    tance” of his strategy, so long as the attorney continues to
    “function in [a] meaningful sense as the Government’s adver-
    sary.” 
    Id. at 188,
    190. The district court pointed out that the
    jury might have reacted “positively” to Leatherman’s decision
    to concede guilt in the penalty phase “because it showed that
    Leatherman and Stenson respected . . . the jury’s finding,
    thereby gaining credibility with the jury.” We agree with the
    district court’s assessment. On the record before us, there is
    no indication that Leatherman’s concession of Stenson’s guilt
    is contrary to or an unreasonable application of Nixon or Str-
    ickland.
    V.   The Washington Supreme Court’s Determination That
    The Trial Court Did Not Improperly Exclude Mitigating
    Evidence Was Not Contrary To Or An Unreasonable
    Application Of Federal Law.
    [20] Lockett v. Ohio mandates that courts engage in “indi-
    vidualized consideration of mitigating factors” to ensure that
    “each defendant in a capital case [is treated] with that degree
    of respect due the uniqueness of the 
    individual.” 438 U.S. at 605
    . Under this rule, the jury may “not be precluded from
    considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defen-
    dant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the
    offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
    less than death.” 
    Id. at 604;
    see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 
    481 U.S. 279
    , 306 (1987); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
    455 U.S. 104
    ,
    110 (1982).
    At the beginning of the penalty phase, Leatherman pro-
    posed a jury instruction outlining the factors that could be
    considered as mitigating circumstances. He requested that the
    impact of Stenson’s execution on his family, particularly on
    his three young children and his father, who suffered from a
    heart condition, be included as mitigating circumstances. He
    indicated that he would ask Stenson’s family members
    13048                STENSON v. LAMBERT
    directly what impact they believed Stenson’s execution would
    have on his father and children. The trial court refused to
    allow the testimony, concluding that it was not relevant to
    Stenson’s character or background. However, the trial court
    did permit extensive testimony from Stenson’s family mem-
    bers and friends about their relationships with Stenson and
    whether they would continue those relationships while Sten-
    son was in prison.
    Stenson argues that the trial court’s exclusion of specific
    testimony as to the impact of his execution violated Lockett’s
    requirement that all mitigating evidence be considered. The
    Washington Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting
    that, although a defendant is entitled to introduce any aspect
    of his character or record, or any aspect of the offense, as a
    mitigating circumstance, “nothing limits the traditional
    authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not
    bearing on defendant’s character, prior record, or the circum-
    stances of the offense.” 
    Stenson, 940 P.2d at 1281
    . It con-
    cluded that “execution impact” testimony is not relevant
    mitigating evidence.
    [21] The testimony the trial court excluded encompassed a
    very narrow swath of evidence, revealing only what Stenson’s
    family members’ opinions were as to the sentence Stenson
    should receive. Although mitigating evidence need not relate
    directly to the offense, the evidence Stenson argues should
    have been admitted simply does not relate to “any aspect of
    [his] character or record” that was not addressed by the testi-
    mony given. Stenson cannot point to any federal case requir-
    ing admission of “execution impact” testimony because there
    are no such cases. Lockett does not stand for that principle.
    The Washington Supreme Court’s determination that the trial
    court was not required to admit Stenson’s proposed “execu-
    tion impact” testimony is therefore not objectively unreason-
    able.
    STENSON v. LAMBERT                 13049
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons set forth above, the district court’s Denial
    of Stenson’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
    AFFIRMED.