United States v. Selby ( 2009 )


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  •                    FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                     No. 07-30183
    Plaintiff-Appellee,              D.C. No.
    v.                             CR 05-234-BR
    JANE G. SELBY,                                 ORDER AND
    Defendant-Appellant.
            OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Anna J. Brown, United States District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    May 6, 2008—Portland, Oregon
    Filed February 9, 2009
    Before: Richard C. Tallman and Richard R. Clifton,
    Circuit Judges, and Edward R. Korman,* District Judge.
    Per Curiam Opinion
    *The Honorable Edward R. Korman, Senior United States District
    Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    1409
    1412               UNITED STATES v. SELBY
    COUNSEL
    Per Olson, Hoevet, Boise & Olson, P.C., Portland, Oregon,
    for the appellant.
    Karin J. Immergut, United States Attorney, and Kelly A. Zus-
    man, Assistant United States Attorney, Portland, Oregon, for
    the appellee.
    ORDER
    The Opinion previously filed on January 15, 2009 is with-
    drawn, and the Opinion filed with this Order is filed in its
    stead.
    UNITED STATES v. SELBY                1413
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Jane Selby, a former official of the Bonneville Power
    Administration (“BPA”) appeals her jury conviction for hon-
    est services wire fraud, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1343
    ; mak-
    ing false claims and statements, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1001
    ; and felony conflict of interest, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 208
    . Selby contends the district court erred by deny-
    ing her motions for judgment of acquittal because the evi-
    dence was insufficient to convict. We affirm the district
    court’s decision.
    I
    Jane Selby held a significant administrative position at the
    BPA, a federal agency which produces and transmits power
    throughout the Pacific Northwest. She was one of three “Tier
    3 managers” in the Transmission and Marketing Division and
    appears to have been the most trusted of the three by her
    supervisor, Charles Meyer, BPA’s Vice President of Trans-
    mission and Sales. At the time of the events at issue here,
    Meyer had assigned Selby to a special detail to determine why
    various information technology projects were behind schedule
    and over budget, and to work alongside other Tier 3 managers
    in the department to help complete the projects. Selby’s
    assignment was to help manage the transition to the new com-
    puter system, along with Mark Reynolds, the Tier 3 manager
    in charge of BPA’s information technology staff, and Lorie
    Hoffman, the Tier 3 manager in charge of the transmission
    scheduling staff. Selby also served as acting Vice President
    when Charles Meyer was away.
    Jane Selby is married to Scott Selby. In March 2002, Scott
    Selby was hired as a salesman by a software company called
    Knowmadic, Inc., during the time it was seeking to expand
    the scope of an existing agreement to sell software (“ASCI”
    1414                UNITED STATES v. SELBY
    or “ASCI/CWI”) to BPA. Jane Selby had approached Know-
    madic’s Vice President about hiring her husband, telling him
    that Scott was “very computer literate and savvy. And that he
    had been unemployed for quite a long time, and was looking
    for a job.” Knowmadic then hired Scott and assigned him to
    the BPA account to work on-site at BPA’s Vancouver, Wash-
    ington, office. Scott earned a base salary plus commissions.
    His duties included the sale of Knowmadic products to BPA
    and persuading other public power customers to sign up to use
    the ASCI system.
    BPA and Knowmadic entered into an initial agreement on
    May 11, 2001, for the purchase of ASCI software. Jane Selby
    was not involved in the negotiations for this initial procure-
    ment agreement. However, she subsequently promoted exten-
    sive additional use of Knowmadic’s software and participated
    in the decision-making process to implement further use of
    Knowmadic’s products. This activity led to her indictment for
    violating 
    18 U.S.C. § 208
    , which prohibits covered federal
    employees from certain kinds of participation in the decision-
    making process on federal contracts or matters in which the
    employee or her spouse as a financial interest, and related
    counts of wire fraud in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1343
    , making
    a false statement during the course of an inspector general
    investigation of her conduct in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1001
    ,
    and witness tampering in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1512
    .
    A jury in the United States District Court for the District of
    Oregon returned a guilty verdict on the conflict of interest,
    wire fraud, and false statement counts, and a not guilty verdict
    on the witness tampering count. Selby was sentenced to five
    years probation on each count of conviction. On appeal, she
    challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on each of the three
    counts.
    II
    The district court had jurisdiction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3231
    .
    We have appellate jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We
    UNITED STATES v. SELBY                 1415
    review de novo whether sufficient evidence exists to support
    a conviction where the defendant moves for acquittal at the
    close of the government’s evidence. See United States v.
    Stewart, 
    420 F.3d 1007
    , 1014 (9th Cir. 2005). Sufficient evi-
    dence exists when, “viewing the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the prosecution, [a] rational trier of fact could
    have found the elements of [each of] the crime[s] proved
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Bailon-Santana,
    
    429 F.3d 1258
    , 1262 (9th Cir. 2005).
    III
    [1] We first address Selby’s claim that the evidence was
    insufficient to support her conviction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 208
    .
    Under 
    18 U.S.C. § 208
    (a), it is unlawful for an executive
    branch employee to participate “personally and substantially
    . . . through decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation,
    the rendering of advice, investigation, or otherwise” in a
    “contract, claim, controversy . . . or other particular matter,”
    with the knowledge that she or her spouse has a financial
    interest in the matter. At issue here is the scope of conduct
    proscribed by the statute. Selby contends her conduct related
    to the ASCI project did not fall within the scope of conduct
    contemplated by the statute. Specifically, she contends that
    the evidence was insufficient to establish that she participated
    substantially in the ASCI project, or that she knowingly or
    willfully violated the law. We consider the scope of each of
    these elements of the offense in light of the evidence adduced
    at trial supporting the verdict.
    A.   Substantial Participation
    Selby argues that § 208 does not apply because her partici-
    pation with the ASCI project occurred “post-procurement,
    i.e., after BPA had signed a contract with Knowmadic and
    after BPA had committed itself financially to the endeavor.”
    Because her conduct “occurred during the implementation of
    1416                    UNITED STATES v. SELBY
    the ASCI project, and had nothing to do with contracting,
    invoicing, or the taking of delivery of goods and services,”
    she argues that the type of activity in which she engaged was
    “not proscribed by the statute.” The statute is broader than the
    narrow interpretation Selby urges upon us.
    [2] We have not previously considered the precise scope of
    § 208’s “participation” requirement. In United States v. Irons,
    
    640 F.2d 872
     (7th Cir. 1981), the Seventh Circuit undertook
    an extensive analysis of the legislative history of 
    18 U.S.C. § 208
    , and concluded that it “demonstrates an intention to
    proscribe rather broadly employee participation in business
    transactions involving conflicts of interest and to reach activi-
    ties at various stages of these transactions . . . [The scope of
    
    18 U.S.C. § 208
     includes] acts which [lead] up to the forma-
    tion of the contract as well as those . . . which might be per-
    formed in the execution of the contract.” 
    Id. at 877
    . We
    adopted much of this analysis in United States v. Jewell, 
    827 F.2d 586
     (9th Cir. 1987),1 where we explained:
    the import of the Seventh Circuit’s statement is
    clear: liability for conflict of interest may be founded
    on a variety of acts leading up to the formation of a
    contract even if those acts are not specifically men-
    tioned in the text of section 208(a). The section’s
    “catch all” language (“participates . . . through deci-
    sion, approval, recommendation, the rendering of
    advice, investigation, or otherwise. . . .”) was
    designed to allow prosecution on the basis of any
    type of action taken to execute or carry to comple-
    tion a contract.
    
    Id. at 587
     (emphasis in original).
    1
    In Jewell, we held that separate acts of participation did not support
    separate counts of liability, but did not consider which acts fell within the
    statute. 
    827 F.2d at 588
    .
    UNITED STATES v. SELBY                  1417
    [3] We reiterate our agreement with the Seventh Circuit.
    The wording Congress chose is broader than the narrow inter-
    pretation Selby urges. We hold that where, as here, an
    employee suffers from a conflict of interest, liability may lie
    for actions taken after the initial procurement is authorized.
    Where Selby continued to actively participate in BPA’s inter-
    nal agency deliberations leading up to its decisions to expand
    the scope of the work to be done by Knowmadic, and where
    Selby continued to recommend or urge co-workers to recom-
    mend expansion of the contract, and the result was additional
    procurement resulting in additional sales commissions to be
    paid to her husband, Selby violated § 208.
    This broad reading of § 208 comports with our sister cir-
    cuits’ approach to this statute. The Fifth Circuit, in United
    States v. Nevers, 
    7 F.3d 59
    , 61-62 (5th Cir. 1993), examined
    the legislative history of § 208 and concluded Congress had
    intended to correct the “fundamentally defective” predecessor
    statute, which “allow[ed] public officials to engage in a large
    number of activities which were wholly incompatible with the
    duties of public office” by broadening the provision to
    embrace “any participation on behalf of the Government in a
    matter in which the employee has an outside financial inter-
    est.” Id. at 62 (emphasis in original). The Seventh Circuit in
    Irons confirms this reading of the statutory history, conclud-
    ing the revised § 208 “was enacted with the purpose of broad-
    ening rather than narrowing the scope of covered business
    activity.” Id. at 876. It rejected the contention that the statu-
    tory language limited its applicability to “matters generally
    preliminary to the formation of the contract.” Id.
    Selby claims the Sixth Circuit’s approach in United States
    v. Ponnapula, 
    246 F.3d 576
     (6th Cir. 2001), would preclude
    liability here because that circuit interpreted the phrase “per-
    sonally and substantially” to exclude employees “performing
    purely ministerial or procedural duties.” Specifically, the
    Sixth Circuit held that an attorney hired by the government to
    act as the trustee in a foreclosure sale did not participate “sub-
    1418                UNITED STATES v. SELBY
    stantially” in the formation of a contract for sale, where her
    conduct was limited to publishing legal notices of the sale and
    performing administrative tasks at the closing. 
    Id. at 583
    . The
    court concluded that “[a] statute aimed at preserving the
    integrity of the decisionmaking process does not need to
    extend to employees who have no discretion to affect that pro-
    cess.” 
    Id.
     Selby also points to the language of the holding in
    Irons—“acts which comprise execution of the contract”—to
    argue that, because her involvement with ASCI occurred only
    after the original contract was signed, the statute does not
    apply here.
    Neither Ponnapula nor Irons support Selby’s claims
    because the record reveals that she did have a significant dis-
    cretionary role in the ASCI contract, and that she was
    involved in the deal while there was still opportunity to
    change the financial outcome. Selby’s involvement was not,
    as she characterizes it, merely ministerial or purely “post-
    contractual.” Notwithstanding her lack of official decision-
    making authority over the ASCI project, the evidence at trial
    was sufficient for a jury to find that Selby could and did influ-
    ence the decision process in favor of Knowmadic.
    BPA and Knowmadic entered into the initial contract on
    May 11, 2001. It provided for the purchase of one copy of the
    Knowmadic software, associated maintenance, and related
    technical support. Selby was not involved in negotiations for
    this contract. In the spring of 2002, BPA was approaching an
    important deadline for the implementation of a major auto-
    mated ordering function for its electricity customers. The soft-
    ware BPA had planned to use, ETMS, would apparently not
    be ready on time. Knowmadic’s ASCI software was an alter-
    native to ETMS, and Knowmadic met with BPA staff to dis-
    cuss the possibility of expanding ASCI use.
    The evidence shows that Selby actively sought to counter
    internal opposition to the expanded use of ASCI. Lorie Hoff-
    man, the Tier 3 manager in Transmission and Marketing Divi-
    UNITED STATES v. SELBY                1419
    sion, whose department the ASCI program was designed to
    support, was outspoken in her opposition to expanded use of
    ASCI. She was opposed to the ASCI program because BPA
    “had a number of resources being used, a number of people
    being used to develop the ETMS system” and because a lot
    of money had been expended and it was “going to be moving
    into our new scheduling system.” She and others in the sched-
    uling group expressed concern that “we had multiple kind[s]
    of tasks and multiple applications . . . being developed at the
    same time, and it seemed to be diverting us from what we
    thought we were trying to accomplish with the ETMS sys-
    tem.” Selby attempted to counter this argument in internal
    communications with BPA staff. When the project manager,
    Exe, drafted an announcement about the proposed change,
    Selby added language indicating BPA had been doing busi-
    ness with Knowmadic since 2001 in direct response to the
    objections to diverting resources away from the existing plan.
    On March 29, 2002, BPA and Knowmadic entered into a
    second “contract” for the provision of ASCI software and
    hardware, amending the May 11, 2001, agreement. The
    March 29, 2002, agreement provided for additional services
    to be procured on a time-and-materials basis, not to exceed
    $2,401,250.00, and a performance period of March 29, 2002,
    to July 1, 2002. Significantly, unless BPA chose to sign spe-
    cific work orders for materials and new services, Knowmadic
    would not derive any benefit from the March 29, 2002, agree-
    ment.
    BPA proceeded to implement Knowmadic’s ASCI software
    on a broader basis than originally contemplated. BPA manag-
    ers discussed even further expansion of ASCI capabilities,
    and Reynolds testified he consulted with Selby “at least week-
    ly” about how BPA’s resources should be allocated among
    various projects, including ASCI and ETMS. Reynolds
    believed Selby favored expanding ASCI rather than ETMS.
    When Exe gave an internal presentation describing ASCI and
    explaining why BPA was supporting ASCI over ETMS, Selby
    1420                UNITED STATES v. SELBY
    arranged for other staff members to ask questions to convey
    the impression that ASCI enjoyed support among the staff.
    Reynolds testified that Selby was “instrumental” in arranging
    for cash awards for BPA staff members who were involved in
    the ASCI project. Selby acknowledges in her opening brief
    that “[t]he evidence showed that [she] advocated for ASCI/
    CWI at a time when there was internal resistance, and that she
    discussed with [the project manager] ways to address those
    concerns.”
    By August 2002 it was apparent that ETMS would not be
    functional anytime soon, and BPA began considering expand-
    ing ASCI as a permanent replacement for ETMS. As we dis-
    cuss below, Selby improperly forwarded an internal e-mail
    about the agency’s deliberations to her husband Scott at
    Knowmadic. Selby was aware that the other Tier 3 managers
    “still had outstanding issues on whether to actually implement
    [ASCI].” She suggested to Charles Meyer, the BPA Vice
    President in charge of Transmission Marketing and Sales, that
    he “intervene and bring it to a closure.” She then scheduled
    a meeting with the various players on August 26, 2002, for
    the purpose of deciding whether to proceed with hourly
    scheduling. At the meeting Selby advocated going forward.
    The managers finally agreed to recommended that BPA pro-
    ceed to expand ASCI, and set September 10 as the deadline
    for implementing the new functions.
    Later the same week, Reynolds discussed additional pur-
    chases by BPA in connection with adding new functions to
    ASCI with Scott Selby and Knowmadic sales representatives.
    On August 30, 2002, Reynolds signed two work authoriza-
    tions for the purchase of additional software licenses, servers,
    and consulting services for the ASCI program. These pur-
    chase orders added up to $2,750,000, from which Scott Selby
    would receive commissions.
    In October 2002, Selby was promoted to internal operations
    manager, which gave her supervisory authority over Reyn-
    UNITED STATES v. SELBY                  1421
    olds, the information technology manager. That month,
    BPA’s procurement officer investigated invoices from Know-
    madic and noted the authorizing documents had not gone
    through the regular procurement process. He met with Know-
    madic representatives, including Scott Selby, and learned
    Scott was Jane Selby’s husband. He informed Knowmadic
    that the situation was inappropriate and “could not continue.”
    He also testified that Reynolds told Knowmadic representa-
    tives that Selby “was still trying to find a way to keep the deal
    together for the 2 million 750.” Following an internal investi-
    gation of the Knowmadic relationship and disputed invoices,
    BPA and Knowmadic settled on a payment of approximately
    $1,300,000, for which Scott Selby received a commission of
    $10,493.52.
    [4] This evidence provided ample basis from which the jury
    could reasonably find that what Jane Selby refers to as her
    “post-contractual” activities actually constituted significant
    participation in an ongoing procurement process. While her
    activities may have post-dated the May 11, 2001, basic con-
    tract, Selby exercised substantial influence over the decision-
    making process at the time when BPA was most aggressively
    expanding its contractual relationship with Knowmadic by
    expanding the scope of the vendor’s work. Based on this evi-
    dence, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a
    reasonable doubt that Selby participated substantially in the
    ASCI matter.
    B.   Knowledge
    [5] Selby next argues the evidence was insufficient for the
    jury to find that she acted knowingly. The text of § 208 pro-
    hibits participation by a government employee in matters
    which, “to his knowledge,” he or his spouse has a financial
    interest. The district court instructed the jury that the govern-
    ment must prove that Selby “knew about the financial interest
    and knew her participation would have a direct and predict-
    able effect . . . [i]n other words, that there was a close causal
    1422                UNITED STATES v. SELBY
    link between her alleged participation in the matter and the
    expected effect of the matter on [the] financial interest.” The
    question is whether the jury had sufficient evidence to over-
    come Selby’s testimony regarding her own state of mind.
    Selby testified at trial and now argues on appeal that she
    did not know her actions would affect her husband’s compen-
    sation. We have held that “[a] trier of fact is not compelled
    to accept and believe the self serving stories of vitally inter-
    ested defendants.” United States v. Cisneros, 
    448 F.2d 298
    ,
    305 (9th Cir. 1971). Moreover, “[d]isbelief of a defendant’s
    own testimony may provide at least a partial basis for a jury’s
    conclusion that the opposite of the testimony is the truth.”
    United States v. Martinez, 
    514 F.2d 334
    , 341 (9th Cir. 1975);
    see also United States v. Price, 
    623 F.2d 587
    , 591 (9th Cir.
    1980). Instead, we look to whether the evidence of her action
    provided a sufficient basis for the jury to conclude that Selby
    acted with knowledge of the likely financial outcome.
    Selby contends the evidence was insufficient to show that
    she knew her participation would have a direct and predict-
    able effect because it was unclear what effect the decision to
    proceed with expanding ASCI capabilities would have on the
    Knowmadic contract. In particular, she contends that the func-
    tion added in August and September 2002 “was built into the
    ASCI tool from the beginning” and “was not an enhance-
    ment.”
    However, the jury heard testimony from several witnesses
    that the decision to proceed with the hourly function would
    involve substantial additional work by Knowmadic. An
    employee of a Knowmadic subcontractor who worked on the
    ASCI project testified that adding the hourly function “would
    mean revamping the entire application.” This dovetailed with
    the testimony of Mark Reynolds, who agreed that this addi-
    tion of the hourly scheduling function “involve[d] additional
    software development work by technology specialists.”
    UNITED STATES v. SELBY                    1423
    Additionally, on August 22, Selby forwarded to her hus-
    band an internal draft e-mail, which had also been sent to her
    for her input. After summarizing “a few points to make sure
    that [he] had captured what we had discussed,” the draft e-
    mail concluded with a statement by Reynolds that he
    “[would] be giving the ‘green light’ to include hourly prod-
    ucts as part of the production roll out of ASCI/CWI. Reynolds
    testified that the e-mail, which provided the basis for the wire
    fraud count, contained “inside information.” Significantly,
    Selby acknowledged that “[i]n retrospect [she] should have
    asked Mark [Reynolds]” before she sent it to her husband.
    Given their intimate relationship, forwarding an internal
    office e-mail could rationally be explained by her knowledge
    of Scott’s financial interest in the matter.
    Moreover, the jury heard evidence that Selby had com-
    pleted two conflict of interest memoranda during the period
    at issue. When Reynolds learned Scott Selby had been hired
    at Knowmadic, he told Selby it was necessary to follow the
    agency’s conflict of interest disclosure procedures. BPA’s
    ethics officer confirmed it was necessary for Selby to recuse
    herself from Knowmadic matters. On June 11, 2002, Selby
    circulated her first recusal memorandum within BPA. In rele-
    vant part, the memorandum reads as follows:
    I am seeking to disqualify myself from decisions
    related to the use of the Knowmadic software prod-
    uct because of a Conflict of Financial interest. I have
    a personal financial interest in Knowmadic because
    my spouse is an employee of the company.
    The jury also received evidence that Selby’s second recusal
    memorandum contained false information. Selby filed the sec-
    ond memorandum on January 13, 2003, just after BPA com-
    pleted its internal investigation of the disputed Knowmadic
    invoices. The memorandum incorrectly states that Scott Selby
    became a Knowmadic employee in June 2002, rather than
    April 2002. Selby testified that she put down the wrong date
    1424                 UNITED STATES v. SELBY
    by mistake. However, the jury was entitled to draw an adverse
    inference that she acted with wrongful intent by deliberately
    misstating the dates of her husband’s employment with
    Knowmadic.
    [6] Ultimately, the jury was entitled to conclude Selby
    knew that promoting additional ASCI functionality would
    lead directly to a broader contractual relationship with Know-
    madic, and in turn, financial gain for her husband, who earned
    commissions on sales to BPA. In light of Selby’s recusal
    memoranda, the jury could also conclude Selby specifically
    knew of her husband’s financial interest during the period
    covered by her “mistake” in dates, the very sort of ethical
    dilemma proscribed by § 208.
    C.     Willfulness
    Selby also argues the evidence was insufficient to prove
    she “did not act in willful violation of the law.” The willful-
    ness requirement arises under 
    18 U.S.C. § 216
    (a)(2), the pen-
    alty provision relating to § 208. The district court instructed
    the jury that the government was required to prove that Selby
    acted “with the purpose of violating a known legal duty.”
    Selby contends there is insufficient evidence that she acted
    willfully because the BPA ethics advisor told her that “she
    could participate in implementation, as long as she stayed
    away from contract negotiations and other financial matters.”
    [7] Upon meeting with BPA’s ethics advisor, Selby pre-
    pared and signed her first recusal memorandum. This memo-
    randum, circulated on June 11, 2002, declared Selby’s
    disqualification from “decisions related to the use of the
    Knowmadic software product.” Both Selby and the ethics
    officer signed the document. The record therefore supports
    the conclusion that during the spring of 2002, Selby knew and
    acknowledged that BPA’s ethics rules required her complete
    disqualification from the decisionmaking process.
    UNITED STATES v. SELBY                1425
    [8] As discussed above, Selby did not in fact stay away
    from contract and financial matters. She actively participated
    in deliberations at a time when BPA was expanding its busi-
    ness relationship with Knowmadic. Though Selby testified
    that she was merely participating in “implementation,” in
    accordance with the ethics officer’s advice, the jury was not
    required to credit her testimony. The evidence was sufficient
    for a rational juror to conclude that Selby had willfully vio-
    lated § 208.
    IV
    Selby also challenges her conviction for making false state-
    ments under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1001
    , which prohibits giving false
    information in any matter within the jurisdiction of a depart-
    ment or agency of the United States. A conviction under
    § 1001 requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable
    doubt that the defendant: 1) made a statement, 2) that was
    false, and 3) material, 4) with specific intent, 5) in a matter
    within the agency’s jurisdiction. United States v. Camper, 
    384 F.3d 1073
    , 1075 (9th Cir. 2004). Selby challenges the suffi-
    ciency of the evidence of materiality and intent.
    A.   Materiality
    The false statement at issue appears in Selby’s second
    recusal memorandum. As discussed above, Selby indicated in
    the memorandum that Scott began working for Knowmadic
    on June 1, 2002, when in fact he started on April 1, 2002.
    Selby contends the updated memorandum was written to
    clarify the scope of her recusal following Scott’s resignation
    from Knowmadic, and the statement had no connection to
    BPA’s decisions about Selby’s recusal. However, as the dis-
    trict court noted, the relevant agency decisions for purposes
    of the statement’s materiality are BPA’s decisions about the
    disputed Knowmadic invoices, worth over $2,750,000. The
    false statement as to Scott’s employment dates—and therefore
    1426                UNITED STATES v. SELBY
    his entitlement to commissions from sales she influenced
    within the agency—was relevant for the BPA’s analysis
    regarding the scope and length of the conflict of interest.
    [9] A rational juror could have found that Selby’s false
    statement regarding her husband’s start date was material to
    the agency’s decisionmaking.
    B.     Intent
    Selby also contends the evidence was insufficient to prove
    she intended to make the false statement to the BPA. She
    maintains the misstatement was merely an inadvertent mis-
    take.
    The jury was entitled to conclude otherwise. As we have
    noted in other criminal fraud contexts, “[i]t is settled law that
    intent to defraud may be established by circumstantial evi-
    dence.” United States v. Milwitt, 
    475 F.3d 1150
    , 1162 (9th
    Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Rogers, 
    321 F.3d 1226
    ,
    1230 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also United States v. Bucher, 
    375 F.3d 929
    , 934 (9th Cir. 2004) ( “Culpable intent can be
    inferred from the defendant’s conduct and from the surround-
    ing circumstances”).
    [10] Selby made the false statement under circumstances
    that support a reasonable inference that she knew it was false.
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prose-
    cution, any rational juror could have found that Selby acted
    with the required intent.
    V
    Finally, Selby contends the evidence at trial was insuffi-
    cient to support her conviction of wire fraud under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1343
    . The charge at trial alleged Selby sent the August 22
    e-mail to her husband in furtherance of a scheme to deprive
    BPA of its right to honest services. A conviction under § 1343
    UNITED STATES v. SELBY                  1427
    requires the government to prove: 1) a scheme to defraud, 2)
    use of the wires in furtherance of the scheme, and 3) specific
    intent to defraud. 
    18 U.S.C. § 1343
    ; United States v. Sullivan,
    
    522 F.3d 967
    , 974 (9th Cir. 2008). Selby challenges the suffi-
    ciency of the evidence on all three elements.
    A.   Scheme to Defraud
    First, she claims that because the evidence was insufficient
    to support the conflict of interest conviction, it was necessar-
    ily insufficient to support the conviction for wire fraud under
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1343
    . In particular, she claims that she “did not
    fail to disclose her husband’s financial interest in Know-
    madic; nor did she secretly influence decision-making with
    regard to the ASCI project.”
    [11] However, as discussed above, we find the evidence
    was sufficient for a rational juror to conclude that Selby had
    a conflict of interest in violation of § 208, and that she had not
    been entirely candid in disclosing that conflict to her
    employer. The jury was not required to credit her testimony
    that she had made the sort of complete and honest disclosure
    that would defeat a wire fraud charge. Therefore, the evidence
    was sufficient for a rational juror to conclude she had engaged
    in a scheme to defraud BPA. 
    18 U.S.C. § 1346
     (amending
    fraud statutes to include schemes to deprive another of the
    “intangible right of honest services”); see United States v.
    Bohonus, 
    628 F.2d 1167
    , 1171 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The requisite
    ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ is found in the deprivation of
    the public’s right to honest and faithful government.”).
    B.   Use of the Wires
    [12] Second, Selby claims her use of the wires was not in
    furtherance of the scheme. However, the use of the wires need
    not be an essential element of the scheme in order to further
    the scheme. See United States v. Shipsey, 
    363 F.3d 962
    , 971
    (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Lo, 
    231 F.3d 471
    , 478 (9th
    1428                UNITED STATES v. SELBY
    Cir. 2000). The internal e-mail Selby forwarded to her hus-
    band, which documented BPA’s debate on whether to expand
    ASCI, is sufficient to establish the element of the use of the
    wires in furtherance of the scheme.
    C.     Intent
    Finally, Selby claims the government failed to prove that
    she intended to deceive the BPA. She argues that although she
    should not have forwarded the e-mail, it does not show intent
    “to deceive her employer or to secretly pass on information to
    Knowmadic.”
    [13] As we discussed above, the jury was entitled to reject
    Selby’s testimony regarding her intent. Extensive evidence
    showed that Selby was actively involved in promoting addi-
    tional business between BPA and Knowmadic, in which her
    husband had a financial interest, in violation of the fraud stat-
    ute. She forwarded to her husband an e-mail discussing
    BPA’s internal deliberations just before BPA informed
    Knowmadic that it planned to expand the use of ASCI. Given
    these circumstances, a rational juror could have found that
    Selby forwarded the internal email to her husband with “cul-
    pable intent.” See Bucher, 
    375 F.3d at 934
    .
    VI
    Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the
    prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the
    essential elements of all three crimes beyond a reasonable
    doubt. Because the evidence established that the defendant
    knowingly violated § 208 and the related provisions of Title
    18 with which she was charged, her judgment of conviction
    is AFFIRMED.