Ricardo Angel v. Loretta E. Lynch ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    FEB 23 2016
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RICARDO ANTONIO ANGEL,                           No. 13-70878
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A094-245-823
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted February 9, 2016
    Pasadena, California
    Before: BERZON, DAVIS**, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
    Ricardo Antonio Angel challenges the IJ and BIA’s determination that he is
    a persecutor and therefore not entitled to special rule cancellation of removal under
    the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (“NACARA”). See 
    8 C.F.R. § 1240.60
     et seq.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Andre M. Davis, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S.
    Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    An applicant seeking NACARA relief “must not . . . be an alien described in
    [
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (b)(3)(B)(i)].” 
    8 C.F.R. § 1240.66
    (a). Section 1231(b)(3)(B)(i)
    precludes relief to those aliens who “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise
    participated in the persecution of an individual because of the individual’s race,
    religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
    Because the record “indicated” that the persecutor bar may apply to Angel, he bore
    the burden of proving that it did not apply. 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.8
    (d), 1240.64(a); see
    Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 
    449 F.3d 915
    , 930, 932–33 (9th Cir. 2006).
    Angel urges that he did not “assist” in the persecution because his actions
    were not sufficiently integral to the persecution to render him a persecutor. We
    conclude, however, that although Angel was not “present and active” during the
    persecution, his conduct was sufficiently material to the persecution that he failed
    to overcome his burden to show he was not a persecutor. Miranda Alvarado, 
    449 F.3d at 918
    , 928–29. He arrested guerrillas and conducted initial interviews with
    them; he then turned the guerrillas over to his superiors, knowing his superiors
    would torture them. Although Angel maintains that the record does not
    definitively establish that he learned of the torture while still engaged in the
    arresting and turning over of guerrillas to the torturers, the inference from his
    testimony that he did is a strong one, and the agency was entitled to make it.
    2
    Angel also maintains that the persecutor bar does not apply because he did
    not provide assistance on account of political opinion; rather, he participated as a
    member of the military and therefore his actions were “on account of” the general
    civil discord occurring within the context of El Salvador’s civil war. See 
    id.
     at
    930–31; Matter of Rodriguez-Majano, 
    19 I. & N. Dec. 811
    , 816 (BIA 1988).
    Angel’s argument misses the mark. What matters is not his motivation, but instead
    the motivation of those effecting the persecution—his superiors. See Miranda
    Alvarado, 
    449 F.3d at
    930–32. Angel has not shown (or even argued) that his
    superiors were motivated by something other than political opinion. He has,
    therefore, not met his burden to show that the persecutor bar does not apply. See
    
    id. at 930
    .
    PETITION DENIED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-70878

Judges: Berzon, Davis, Owens

Filed Date: 2/23/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024