Luis Gomez v. City of Torrance , 438 F. App'x 626 ( 2011 )


Menu:
  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             JUN 21 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LUIS GOMEZ; MARIA GILA GOMEZ,                    No. 10-55144
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,           D.C. No. 2:07-cv-00790-ODW-SH
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    CITY OF TORRANCE; TORRANCE
    POLICE DEPARTMENT; DAVID
    MAITLEN, Officer,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Otis D. Wright, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted June 6, 2011 **
    Pasadena, California
    Before: O’SCANNLAIN and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and PIERSOL, Senior
    District Judge.***
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, Senior United States District
    Judge for the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in bifurcating the trial into a
    statute of limitations phase and a liability phase because the statute of limitations
    issue was dispositive, see Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., 
    54 F.3d 570
    , 575 (9th Cir.
    1995); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b), and the issues associated with the equitable
    estoppel and liability claims were not so interwoven as render bifurcation
    inappropriate, see Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 
    103 F.3d 767
    , 782 (9th Cir. 1996).
    The district court did not improperly exclude evidence regarding the fourth
    surveillance tape or the white car. The Gomezes never offered the fourth
    surveillance video for admission into evidence. Any error in excluding evidence
    regarding Officer Maitlen’s alleged fabrication of a story about a driver of a white
    car was harmless as to the Gomezes’ equitable estoppel claim, because there was
    no evidence that the Gomezes were aware of this incident, and so they could not
    have relied on Officer Maitlen’s alleged misrepresentation. See Guerrero v. Gates,
    
    442 F.3d 697
    , 706–07 (9th Cir. 2006); Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 
    202 F.3d 1170
    ,
    1176 (9th Cir. 2000). The exclusion of the “white car” evidence was also harmless
    as to the Gomezes’ imputed concealment claim (i.e., the claim that Officer
    Maitlen’s alleged intent to defraud the Gomezes by proffering the white car story
    should be imputed to the police department), because the Gomezes offered no
    evidence of collusion between Maitlen and the police department on this issue. Cf.
    Riddell v. Riddell Wash. Corp., 
    866 F.2d 1480
    , 1493 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
    Although the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury that “the
    plaintiff’s actual and reasonable reliance on the defendant’s conduct or
    representations” is one factor in a finding of equitable estoppel, Santa Maria, 
    202 F.3d at 1176
    , the error was harmless because the Gomezes failed to offer evidence
    that they relied on the police report or that the attorneys whom they consulted
    declined to take the case because of the police report, see Snyder v. Freight,
    Constr., Gen. Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local No. 287, 
    175 F.3d 680
    ,
    688 n.12 (9th Cir. 1999).
    The district court did not err in failing to define the word “prevent,” because
    it is a “‘common term[] that [is] readily understandable to the jury,’” see United
    States v. Somsamouth, 
    352 F.3d 1271
    , 1275 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States
    v. Shryock, 
    342 F.3d 948
    , 986 (9th Cir. 2003)), and any ambiguity regarding the
    intent requirement was clarified earlier in the jury instructions, see Guebara v.
    Allstate Ins. Co., 
    237 F.3d 987
    , 992 (9th Cir. 2001). Finally, although the district
    court erred in instructing the jury that, in order to impose liability on the City, the
    Gomezes were required to prove that an individual city official or employee was
    liable for any fraudulent concealment pursuant to a “policy, custom, or
    longstanding practice,” such error was harmless because the verdict form indicates
    that the jury did not find that any of the individual defendants were liable. The
    3
    Gomezes waived their claim that including the names of police officers who were
    not defendants on the verdict form was an error because they failed to offer or
    develop any argument regarding this claim in their opening brief. United States v.
    Kama, 
    394 F.3d 1236
    , 1238 (9th Cir. 2005).
    The district judge’s questioning of witnesses and the judge’s allegedly
    improper gestures and expressions at trial did not deprive the Gomezes of a fair
    trial. The district judge’s questioning of witnesses was not improper and appears
    to have been for the purpose of clarifying each witness’s testimony, see United
    States v. Mostella, 
    802 F.2d 358
    , 361 (9th Cir. 1986), and there is no evidence in
    the record that the district judge’s expressions or gestures overstepped propriety,
    see Larson v. Palmateer, 
    515 F.3d 1057
    , 1067 (9th Cir. 2008).
    AFFIRMED.
    4