Courthouse News Service v. Michael Planet ( 2014 )


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  •                 FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE,                  No. 11-57187
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    D.C. No.
    v.                       2:11-cv-08083-
    R-MAN
    MICHAEL D. PLANET, in his official
    capacity as Court Executive
    Officer/Clerk of the Ventura County         OPINION
    Superior Court,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued May 8, 2013
    Submitted April 7, 2014
    Pasadena, California
    Filed April 7, 2014
    Before: John T. Noonan, Kim McLane Wardlaw,
    and Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Wardlaw
    2          COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET
    SUMMARY*
    Civil Rights
    The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of a
    complaint and remanded in an action brought pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     by a news organization alleging that the
    Ventura County Superior Court’s failure to provide same-day
    access to newly filed unlimited civil complaints violated the
    news organization’s right of access to public judicial
    proceedings under the First Amendment.
    The panel held that the district court erred by abstaining
    from hearing the case under Railroad Commission of Texas
    v. Pullman Co., 
    312 U.S. 496
     (1941), and O’Shea v. Littleton,
    
    414 U.S. 488
     (1974). The panel held that this case presented
    an important First Amendment question involving the right of
    access to public records and proceedings that should be
    decided by the federal courts and that plaintiff’s requested
    relief would not excessively intrude on sensitive state
    functions. The panel noted that there may be limitations on
    the public’s right of access to judicial proceedings, and
    mandating same-day viewing of unlimited civil complaints
    may be one of them, but the panel declined to take a position
    on the ultimate merits of plaintiff’s claims, which the district
    court had yet to address in the first instance.
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET                           3
    COUNSEL
    Rachel Matteo-Boehm (argued), Roger Myers, David Greene,
    and Leila Knox, Bryan Cave LLP, San Francisco, California,
    for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Robert A. Naeve (argued), Erica L. Reilley, and Nathaniel P.
    Garrett, Jones Day, Irvine, California, for Defendant-
    Appellee.
    Lucy A. Dalglish, Gregg P. Leslie, and Kristen Rasmussen,
    Arlington, Virginia, for Amicus Curiae The Reporters
    Committee for Freedom of the Press.
    OPINION
    WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:
    Courthouse News Service (“CNS”) is a national news
    organization that publishes daily reports for its subscribers
    about civil litigation, including the filing of new lawsuits. In
    courthouses around the country—large and small, state and
    federal—CNS reporters review civil complaints on the day
    they are filed. For many years, the Superior Court for the
    State of California for the County of Ventura (“Ventura
    County Superior Court”) provided CNS with prompt access
    to newly filed “unlimited”1 civil complaints. Now, in contrast
    with this prior practice, the Ventura County Superior Court
    1
    Virtually all matters of public interest and importance are “unlimited”
    cases under California law. Actions seeking permanent injunctive relief,
    
    Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 580
    (b)(2), or with an amount in controversy
    exceeding $25,000, 
    id.
     §§ 85(a), 88, are classified as “unlimited.”
    4           COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET
    withholds newly filed unlimited complaints from the public
    until they have been fully processed, which sometimes may
    take days or weeks.
    CNS appeals the district court’s order dismissing its
    complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against
    Michael Planet (“Planet”), the Executive Officer/Clerk of the
    Ventura County Superior Court. It alleges that the Ventura
    County Superior Court’s failure to provide same-day access
    to newly filed unlimited civil complaints violates its right of
    access to public judicial proceedings under the First
    Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district
    court granted Planet’s motion to abstain from hearing the case
    under Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.,
    
    312 U.S. 496
     (1941), and O’Shea v. Littleton, 
    414 U.S. 488
    (1974), which permit the federal courts to decline to decide
    matters over which they have jurisdiction but which implicate
    sensitive state interests. This case presents an important First
    Amendment question, U.S. CONST. amend. I, that should be
    decided by the federal courts, and CNS’s requested relief
    would not excessively intrude on sensitive state functions.
    We conclude that the district court erred by abstaining and
    dismissing this action and, accordingly, reverse and remand.
    I.
    We treat the factual allegations in CNS’s complaint as
    true for the purpose of reviewing the district court’s decision
    to abstain.2 In his motion to dismiss, Planet explicitly
    2
    The “Motion to Dismiss and Abstain” that Planet filed in the district
    court was not expressly styled as a motion under either Federal Rule of
    Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
    Planet now argues that it should be construed it as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion,
    COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET                                5
    represented to the district court that it was “obligated to
    assume the truth of the complaint’s allegations,” citing
    Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
     (2002). This representation
    suggests that Planet’s motion was a motion to dismiss for
    failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and that we should
    take the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true. Iqbal,
    556 U.S. at 678; Alvarez v. Chevron Corp., 
    656 F.3d 925
    ,
    930–31 (9th Cir. 2011).
    Even if we were to view Planet’s motion as a motion to
    dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule
    12(b)(1), it is a “facial” challenge to the federal court’s
    exercise of jurisdiction, not a “factual” one. Safe Air for
    Everyone v. Meyer, 
    373 F.3d 1035
    , 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).3 A
    factual challenge “rel[ies] on affidavits or any other evidence
    while CNS contends that it is more properly viewed as a Rule 12(b)(6)
    motion. We have not squarely held whether abstention is properly raised
    under Rule 12(b)(6), Rule 12(b)(1), both, or neither. Compare, e.g.,
    Porter v. Jones, 
    319 F.3d 483
    , 489 (9th Cir. 2003) (reviewing the district
    court’s decision to abstain pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and noting
    that, “[i]n debating the propriety of abstention, the parties . . . rely on the
    facts alleged in the complaint”), with Scotts Co. LLC v. Seeds, Inc.,
    
    688 F.3d 1154
    , 1159–60 (holding, on appeal from a dismissal under Rule
    12(b)(1), that the district court abused its discretion in applying Colorado
    River abstention), and Potrero Hills Landfill, Inc. v. Cnty. of Solano,
    
    657 F.3d 876
    , 881 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that “petitioners intervened . .
    . and moved to dismiss under [Rules] 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1), or in the
    alternative to abstain from deciding the case” (emphasis added)). This
    case does not require us to decide which Rule, if either, provides the
    correct vehicle for a motion to abstain.
    3
    A “facial” attack asserts that a complaint’s allegations are themselves
    insufficient to invoke jurisdiction, while a “factual” attack asserts that the
    complaint’s allegations, though adequate on their face to invoke
    jurisdiction, are untrue. 
    Id.
    6           COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET
    properly before the court” to contest the truth of the
    complaint’s allegations. St. Clair v. City of Chico, 
    880 F.2d 199
    , 201 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Savage v. Glendale Union
    High Sch., 
    343 F.3d 1036
    , 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). Planet’s
    motion did not do so. It expressly treated the complaint’s
    allegations as true. Nor did the district court make any
    findings of fact. Though Planet submitted evidence before
    the district court suggesting that it would be difficult for the
    Ventura County Superior Court to provide same-day access
    to newly filed complaints, he did so only in response to
    CNS’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Planet’s motion
    to dismiss is therefore a facial Rule 12(b)(1) motion, if it is a
    Rule 12(b)(1) motion at all. When reviewing the district
    court’s grant of such a motion, we treat the factual allegations
    in the complaint as true. See Safe Air for Everyone, 
    373 F.3d at 1039
    .4
    II.
    CNS alleges that it is a news wire service that specializes
    in reporting on civil lawsuits. It has about three thousand
    individual and institutional subscribers nationwide, including
    law firms, university and law school libraries, and major
    media outlets such as the Los Angeles Times and Boston
    Globe. It publishes sixteen reports on new litigation in
    federal and state courts in California and enables subscribers
    to receive email alerts about new filings involving matters of
    4
    We also consider and treat as true CNS’s factual allegations in the
    exhibits attached to its complaint. See United States v. Ritchie, 
    342 F.3d 903
    , 907–08 (9th Cir. 2003); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington,
    
    51 F.3d 1480
    , 1484 (9th Cir. 1995) (“When a plaintiff has attached various
    exhibits to the complaint, those exhibits may be considered in determining
    whether dismissal was proper . . . .”).
    COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET                  7
    interest to them. CNS maintains a website with news stories
    and commentary freely available to the general public.
    To provide this extensive news coverage, CNS employs
    more than one hundred reporters who daily visit courthouses
    around the country to review recently filed civil complaints.
    In state and federal courthouses throughout California and
    across the United States, CNS is generally able to access civil
    complaints on the day they are filed. For instance, at the Los
    Angeles Division of the U.S. District Court for the Central
    District of California, reporters have a key to a room where
    complaints are placed in boxes for their review at the end of
    each day, before the complaints have been processed. At the
    San Jose Division of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
    District of California, a clerk prints out a list of all new
    complaints filed each day, and reporters go behind the
    counter to view and scan any complaints they deem
    noteworthy. At the San Francisco Division of the Northern
    District, reporters go behind the counter to review complaints
    filed each day even if the complaints have not yet been fully
    docketed. The U.S. District Courts for the Southern and
    Eastern Districts of California also provide same-day access
    to new civil complaints.
    In many California counties, the state Superior Court
    provides same-day access to newly filed unlimited
    complaints. At the Superior Court for Contra Costa County,
    located in Martinez, California, unlimited civil complaints are
    placed in a media bin at 4:00 p.m. daily, and reporters are
    permitted to review the complaints until 4:45 p.m. even
    though the court closes to the general public at 3:00 p.m. At
    the Santa Monica branch of the Superior Court for Los
    Angeles County, reporters can view the cover page of all
    newly filed complaints each afternoon and then request and
    8         COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET
    receive the full text of any complaint of interest. At the
    Superior Court for Santa Clara County in San Jose, reporters
    may view all unlimited civil complaints filed by 3:30 pm
    each day before they have been fully processed. In Riverside
    County, the Clerk of the Superior Court enabled same-day
    access to unlimited civil complaints by shifting employees’
    schedules to begin and end work later in the day.
    Busy courts in other states do the same. At the New York
    County Supreme Court, the court of general jurisdiction for
    Manhattan, court officials place paper copies of new
    complaints in a secure area behind the counter where
    reporters can view the complaints on the day of filing. At the
    state trial court in Albuquerque, New Mexico, a CNS reporter
    is given a “review pile” of new complaints on the day they
    are filed, before they have been fully processed or made
    available on the internet.
    CNS began regular coverage of new civil case filings at
    the Ventura County Superior Court in 2001, and the same
    reporter has been responsible for its coverage since then. The
    reporter initially visited the Ventura County Superior Court
    once or twice a week, and was able to review the large
    majority of the unlimited civil complaints that had been filed
    since her last visit. Beginning in early 2008, however, the
    clerk’s office implemented “a series of small and large
    changes that made . . . review of new civil complaints less
    timely and more difficult,” including, ultimately, a rule that
    limited the reporter to viewing twenty-five complaints each
    day. CNS and court staff worked out an informal
    arrangement that would allow CNS’s reporter to access newly
    filed unlimited complaints before they were fully processed.
    The Ventura County Superior Court did not adhere to this
    arrangement, however, and court staff soon began
    COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET                          9
    withholding complaints until after they had been fully
    processed.
    In November 2010, CNS began covering the Ventura
    County Superior Court on a daily basis. It again sought to
    work out an informal procedure to enable same-day access
    for its reporter, but it could not reach agreement with court
    staff. In June 2011, CNS’s counsel wrote to Planet,
    explaining that the delays in access were “effectively denials
    of access” and requesting that complaints be made available
    on the day of filing before being fully processed. CNS’s
    counsel noted that many other courts, in California and
    elsewhere, allowed reporters to access complaints before full
    processing was complete. Three weeks later, Planet denied
    this request. Citing “serious resource shortages as a result of
    budget reductions,” Planet explained that the Ventura County
    Superior Court could not “prioritize [same-day] access over
    other priorities and mandates.” He refused to make
    complaints available before they had been fully processed,
    noting that “the Court must ensure the integrity of all filings.”
    In the summer of 2011, CNS’s reporter experienced delays in
    accessing unlimited civil complaints of up to thirty-four
    calendar days.
    On September 29, 2011, CNS filed this action under
    
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     in the U.S. District Court for the Central
    District of California. It claimed that the Ventura County
    Superior Court’s withholding of newly filed unlimited civil
    complaints violated its right of access to public proceedings
    under the First Amendment and federal common law.5 CNS
    5
    It also alleged a violation of the California Rules of Court, but CNS
    conceded below that this claim was barred by the Eleventh Amendment
    and does not appeal its dismissal.
    10        COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET
    sought declaratory relief and preliminary and permanent
    injunctive relief. It requested an injunction “prohibiting”
    Planet from “continuing his policies resulting in delayed
    access to new unlimited jurisdiction civil complaints and
    denying Courthouse News timely access to new civil
    unlimited jurisdiction complaints on the same day they are
    filed, except as deemed permissible following the appropriate
    case-by-case adjudication.”
    Planet moved the district court to abstain and dismiss
    CNS’s complaint. As Planet pointed out in his motion, an
    existing California statute requires that trial court records of
    all kinds “shall be made reasonably accessible to all members
    of the public.” Cal Gov’t Code § 68150(l). The statute does
    not define the phrase “reasonably accessible,” and the parties
    dispute what that phrase actually requires. Planet argued that
    litigation in state court to clarify the meaning of § 68150(l)
    could obviate any federal constitutional issue, and that CNS’s
    suit presented significant federalism concerns because, if
    CNS prevailed, federal district courts would, in effect, dictate
    how the state courts should allocate scarce resources.
    The district court granted the motion to abstain and
    dismiss on November 30, 2011. It “abstain[ed] and
    dismisse[d]” CNS’s federal claims “under the equitable
    abstention doctrine enunciated in O’Shea v. Littleton,
    
    414 U.S. 488
     (1974), and its progeny,” reasoning that CNS’s
    requested relief would interfere with the day-to-day
    administration of the Ventura County Superior Court and
    might require the federal courts to dictate the spending
    priorities of the California judiciary. The district court
    “further abstain[ed] and dismisse[d]” CNS’s claims under the
    Pullman doctrine, noting that the federal constitutional
    question would be avoided if the California courts construed
    COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET                 11
    Cal. Gov’t Code § 68150(l) to require same-day access to
    newly filed unlimited civil complaints.
    III.
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We
    review the district court’s decision to invoke Pullman
    abstention under a modified abuse of discretion standard.
    Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 
    447 F.3d 673
    , 678 (9th Cir. 2006).
    We first review de novo whether the requirements for
    Pullman abstention are satisfied. Id.; Fireman’s Fund Ins.
    Co. v. City of Lodi, 
    302 F.3d 928
    , 939 (9th Cir. 2002). If they
    are not, the district court has “little or no discretion” to
    abstain; if they are, we review the decision to abstain for an
    abuse of discretion. Almodovar v. Reiner, 
    832 F.2d 1138
    ,
    1140 (9th Cir. 1987).
    The proper standard of review for the district court’s
    decision to abstain under O’Shea is unsettled. See E.T. v.
    Cantil-Sakauye, 
    682 F.3d 1121
    , 1123 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011) (per
    curiam), cert. denied, 
    133 S. Ct. 476
     (2012). CNS argues that
    O’Shea abstention is a particular species of abstention under
    Younger v. Harris, 
    401 U.S. 37
     (1971), and that we therefore
    review the district court’s decision de novo. See Potrero
    Hills Landfill, Inc. v. Cnty. of Solano, 
    657 F.3d 876
    , 881 (9th
    Cir. 2011). Planet contends that O’Shea abstention is its own
    distinct form of abstention, and that we should review the
    district court’s decision under a modified abuse of discretion
    standard, as we review its decision to abstain under the
    Pullman doctrine. See World Famous Drinking Emporium,
    Inc. v. City of Tempe, 
    820 F.2d 1079
    , 1081–82 (9th Cir.
    1987). Even under the modified abuse of discretion standard,
    however, we first review de novo whether the legal
    requirements for abstention are satisfied. See Fireman’s
    12        COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET
    Fund Ins. Co., 
    302 F.3d at 939
    . Because we ultimately
    determine that they are not, we would reverse the district
    court’s decision under either standard of review, and we need
    not decide which one applies. See E.T., 682 F.3d at 1123 n.3.
    IV.
    In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.,
    
    312 U.S. 496
     (1941), the Supreme Court declined to
    adjudicate a “substantial constitutional issue” that would be
    avoided by first giving the Texas courts the opportunity to
    decide whether the challenged regulation was valid under
    Texas law. 
    Id.
     at 498–99. The Court reasoned that abstaining
    from hearing the case would prevent it from “touch[ing] a
    sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal courts
    ought not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is
    open.” 
    Id. at 498
    . The “sensitive” issue avoided was whether
    Texas’s Jim Crow requirement that a white “conductor”
    rather than a black “porter” supervise every railroad sleeper
    car violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 
    Id. at 497
    .
    Notwithstanding its ignominious origins, the doctrine of
    “Pullman abstention” remains in force. See generally Lauren
    Robel, Riding the Color Line: The Story of Railroad
    Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., in FEDERAL COURTS
    STORIES 163 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010).
    Pullman abstention is rarely appropriately invoked in cases
    implicating the First Amendment, however, and we conclude
    that the district court erred by dismissing this case under the
    Pullman doctrine.
    A.
    Pullman abstention “is an extraordinary and narrow
    exception to the duty of a district court to adjudicate a
    COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET                 13
    controversy.” Wolfson v. Brammer, 
    616 F.3d 1045
    , 1066 (9th
    Cir. 2010) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted).
    The doctrine does not “exist for the benefit of either of the
    parties but rather for ‘the rightful independence of the state
    governments and for the smooth working of the federal
    judiciary.’” San Remo Hotel v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 
    145 F.3d 1095
    , 1105 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Pullman, 
    312 U.S. at 501
    ). Over time, we have developed three independently
    mandated requirements to permit the district court to exercise
    discretion to abstain under Pullman:
    (1) the case touches on a sensitive area of
    social policy upon which the federal courts
    ought not enter unless no alternative to its
    adjudication is open, (2) constitutional
    adjudication plainly can be avoided if a
    definite ruling on the state issue would
    terminate the controversy, and (3) the proper
    resolution of the possible determinative issue
    of state law is uncertain.
    Porter v. Jones, 
    319 F.3d 483
    , 492 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal
    alteration and quotation marks omitted).
    Pullman abstention “is generally inappropriate when First
    Amendment rights are at stake.” Wolfson, 
    616 F.3d at 1066
    (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted). We have
    held that the first requirement for Pullman abstention is
    “almost never” satisfied in First Amendment cases “because
    the guarantee of free expression is always an area of
    particular federal concern.” Ripplinger v. Collins, 
    868 F.2d 1043
    , 1048 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Wolfson, 
    616 F.3d at 1066
    (rejecting Pullman abstention in challenge to limits on speech
    by candidates for elected judicial office); Porter, 
    319 F.3d at
    14          COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET
    492–93 (rejecting Pullman abstention in challenge to
    threatened prosecution of operators of “vote swapping”
    website); Sable Commc’ns of Cal. Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel.
    Co., 
    890 F.2d 184
    , 190–91 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting Pullman
    abstention in challenge to policy authorizing disconnection of
    telephone service for the transmission of explicit messages);
    Playtime Theaters, Inc. v. City of Renton, 
    748 F.2d 527
    , 532
    (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting Pullman abstention in challenge to
    zoning ordinance regulating adult movie theaters), rev’d on
    other grounds, 
    475 U.S. 41
     (1986).6
    The only First Amendment case in which we have ever
    found the first requirement for Pullman abstention to be
    satisfied, Almodovar v. Reiner, 
    832 F.2d 1138
     (9th Cir.
    1987), was procedurally aberrational. There, the plaintiffs
    had already reached the California Supreme Court in a
    pending case that presented the same issues as their federal
    suit, so they would not need to “undergo the expense or delay
    of a full state court litigation” while their federal case was
    stayed. 
    Id. at 1140
    ; see Porter, 
    319 F.3d at
    493–94
    (distinguishing Almodovar on the ground that it involved “an
    6
    The second and third requirements are plainly satisfied in this case.
    California law provides that court records shall be “reasonably accessible”
    to the public. Cal. Gov’t Code § 68150(l). A construction of that term
    that would require same-day access to filed unlimited civil complaints
    would provide CNS the relief it seeks. Therefore, “constitutional
    adjudication could be avoided by a state ruling.” Wolfson, 
    616 F.3d at 1066
    . Moreover, the meaning of “reasonably accessible” is unclear. No
    published decision of a California court has interpreted that term, so
    “resolution of the state law issue is uncertain.” Id.; see also L.A. Times v.
    Cnty. of L.A., 
    956 F. Supp. 1530
    , 1531 (C. D. Cal. 1996) (observing that
    claims under Cal. Gov’t Code § 68150 “are novel” and “raise issues of
    first impression”).
    COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET                   15
    unusual procedural setting”). These exceptional factors are
    not present here.
    Planet claims that this line of cases is inapposite, arguing
    that “this is not a ‘free expression’ case,” but simply a case in
    which the government has declined to make information it
    possesses available to the public. Under some circumstances,
    the mere “governmental denial of access to information in its
    possession” does not raise any free speech issues. L.A. Police
    Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 
    528 U.S. 32
    , 40
    (1999). For instance, a state law placing conditions on public
    access to arrestees’ home addresses is not subject to a facial
    challenge on free speech grounds because the government is
    under no obligation to make those addresses public at all. 
    Id.
    Here, however, CNS asserts its First Amendment right of
    access to judicial and other public proceedings. See Press-
    Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II),
    
    478 U.S. 1
     (1986). It is highly doubtful that “California could
    decide not to give out [the complaints] at all without violating
    the First Amendment.” 
    Id.
     (emphasis added); cf. Rushford v.
    New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 
    846 F.2d 249
    , 253 (4th Cir.
    1988) (holding that the First Amendment right of access
    applies to a summary judgment motion in a civil case).
    Though the government may sometimes withhold information
    without violating the expressive rights protected by the First
    Amendment, the First Amendment right of access to public
    proceedings—where it applies—is inextricably intertwined
    with the First Amendment right of free speech. See Globe
    Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 
    457 U.S. 596
    , 604 (1982).
    This difference in the precise First Amendment right asserted
    by CNS does not in any way diminish the principles
    underlying our rule that federal courts should not invoke
    Pullman abstention in cases implicating First Amendment
    16        COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET
    rights. CNS’s claims, like other First Amendment claims,
    raise issues of particular federal concern.
    B.
    The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that access to
    public proceedings and records is an indispensable predicate
    to free expression about the workings of government. In the
    foundational case, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
    
    448 U.S. 555
     (1980), the Court reasoned that “[f]ree speech
    carries with it some freedom to listen.” 
    Id. at 576
     (plurality
    opinion). It held that the First Amendment guarantees of
    freedom of speech and freedom of the press, “standing
    alone,” enabled access to criminal trials. 
    Id.
     Otherwise,
    those rights “would lose much meaning if access to . . . the
    trial could . . . be foreclosed arbitrarily.” 
    Id. at 577
    . The
    Court later clarified that the First Amendment protects the
    right of public access, even though it is not explicitly
    enumerated therein, because “a major purpose of that
    Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
    governmental affairs.” Globe Newspaper Co., 
    457 U.S. at 604
     (internal quotation marks omitted). The right of access
    is thus an essential part of the First Amendment’s purpose to
    “ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate
    in and contribute to our republican system of self-
    government.” 
    Id.
    We have similarly explained that the First Amendment
    right of access exists to enable free expression about
    important issues. “By guaranteeing that the individual citizen
    can effectively participate in and contribute to our republican
    system of self-government, the First Amendment right of
    access ensures that th[e] constitutionally protected discussion
    of governmental affairs is an informed one.” Cal. First
    COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET                 17
    Amendment Coal. v. Woodford, 
    299 F.3d 868
    , 874 (9th Cir.
    2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Open government
    has been a hallmark of our democracy since our nation’s
    founding. . . . Indeed, this transparency has made possible the
    vital work of . . . journalists who have strengthened our
    government by exposing its flaws.” Leigh v. Salazar,
    
    677 F.3d 892
    , 897 (9th Cir. 2012). By enabling the free
    discussion of governmental affairs, the right of access
    strengthens the core ‘marketplace’ of political ideas that the
    Founders sought to protect. See Roth v. United States,
    
    354 U.S. 476
    , 483–84 (1957) (“[T]he unconditional phrasing
    of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every
    utterance. . . . The protection given speech and press was
    fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
    bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
    people.”); see also Alexander Meiklejohn, The First
    Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255
    (“The First Amendment . . . protects the freedom of those
    activities of thought and communication by which we
    ‘govern.’”).
    Though the Supreme Court originally recognized the First
    Amendment right of access in the context of criminal trials,
    see Richmond Newspapers, 
    448 U.S. 555
    , the federal courts
    of appeals have widely agreed that it extends to civil
    proceedings and associated records and documents. See, e.g.,
    N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 
    684 F.3d 286
    , 305 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding a right of access to
    administrative civil infraction hearings); Publicker Indus.,
    Inc. v. Cohen, 
    733 F.2d 1059
    , 1061 (3d Cir. 1984) (“We hold
    that the First Amendment does secure a right of access to
    civil proceedings.”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 
    732 F.2d 1302
    , 1308 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding a right of access to
    litigation committee reports in shareholder derivative suits);
    18        COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET
    Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n,
    
    710 F.2d 1165
    , 1177 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that the First
    Amendment limits judicial discretion to seal documents in a
    civil case). The California Supreme Court has also so held.
    See NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court,
    
    980 P.2d 337
    , 361 (Cal. 1999). Though we have not
    expressly held that the First Amendment right of access
    encompasses civil cases, we have recognized a right of access
    to executions, documents related to a criminal defendant’s
    pretrial release, and criminal jury voir dire, among other
    proceedings. Cal. First Amendment Coal., 299 F.3d at 877
    (executions); Seattle Times Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 
    845 F.2d 1513
    , 1519 (9th Cir. 1988) (pretrial release documents);
    United States v. Brooklier, 
    685 F.2d 1162
    , 1168–69 (9th Cir.
    1982) (voir dire). We have also applied the Press-Enterprise
    II framework to evaluate right of access claims in a variety of
    nonjudicial contexts. See, e.g., Cal-Almond, Inc. v. U.S.
    Dep’t of Agric., 
    960 F.2d 105
    , 109 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding a
    “serious constitutional question” as to whether the plaintiff
    was entitled to access a list of almond growers eligible to vote
    in a referendum on a federal regulatory order).
    The news media’s right of access to judicial proceedings
    is essential not only to its own free expression, but also to the
    public’s. The Supreme Court has explained: “[I]n a society
    in which each individual has but limited time and resources
    with which to observe at first hand the operations of his
    government, he relies necessarily upon the press . . . . With
    respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the function of
    the press serves to . . . bring to bear the beneficial effects of
    public scrutiny upon the administration of justice.” Cox
    Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 
    420 U.S. 469
    , 491–92 (1975). We
    have observed that the news media, when asserting the right
    of access, “are surrogates for the public. . . . The free press is
    COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET                    19
    the guardian of the public interest, and the independent
    judiciary is the guardian of the free press.” Leigh, 
    677 F.3d at 900
     (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ERWIN
    CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
    POLICIES § 11.6.3 (4th ed. 2011) (“[W]ithout a right of access
    to government papers and places the people will be denied
    information that is crucial in monitoring government and
    holding it accountable. The press obviously plays a crucial
    role in this regard.”).
    It is thus well-established that the right of access to public
    records and proceedings is “necessary to the enjoyment” of
    the right to free speech. Globe Newspaper Co., 
    457 U.S. at 604
    ; Cal. First Amendment Coal., 299 F.3d at 874.
    C.
    CNS’s First Amendment right of access claim falls within
    the general rule against abstaining under Pullman in First
    Amendment cases. CNS’s right of access claim implicates
    the same fundamental First Amendment interests as a free
    expression claim, and it equally commands the respect and
    attention of the federal courts.
    We join the Second Circuit in reaching this conclusion.
    In Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 
    380 F.3d 83
    , 100 (2d
    Cir. 2004), Connecticut newspapers challenged the state court
    system’s longstanding practice of sealing docket sheets in
    certain civil cases, sometimes in the absence of any court
    order so requiring. 
    Id.
     at 86–89. The Second Circuit held
    that the press and the public had a qualified First Amendment
    right of access to the docket sheets, reasoning that “docket
    sheets provide a kind of index to judicial proceedings and
    documents, and endow the public and press with the capacity
    20        COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET
    to exercise their rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.”
    
    Id. at 93
    . The Second Circuit further held that the district
    court properly declined to abstain under the Pullman doctrine
    for two reasons: first, because there was “no applicable state
    statute” construction of which would avoid the constitutional
    issues, and second, because “the weight of the First
    Amendment issues involved counsels against abstaining.” 
    Id. at 100
    .
    We disfavor abstention in First Amendment cases because
    of the “risk . . . that the delay that results from abstention will
    itself chill the exercise of the rights that the plaintiffs seek to
    protect by suit.” Porter, 
    319 F.3d at 487
    ; see also Zwickler
    v. Koota, 
    389 U.S. 241
    , 252 (1967) (explaining that, in a First
    Amendment facial challenge, “to force the plaintiff who has
    commenced a federal action to suffer the delay of state court
    proceedings might itself effect the impermissible chilling of
    the very constitutional right he seeks to protect”).
    The concern that a delay in litigation will itself chill
    speech is also implicated here. As an initial matter, we do not
    believe that the norm against Pullman abstention in First
    Amendment cases must be limited to instances in which the
    plaintiff challenges a statute that directly regulates
    expression. Government action that does not directly prohibit
    expressive activity may nonetheless raise profound First
    Amendment concerns. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 
    408 U.S. 1
    ,
    12–13 (1972) (“[G]overnmental action may be subject to
    constitutional challenge even though it has only an indirect
    effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights.”); NAACP
    v. Alabama, 
    357 U.S. 449
    , 462 (1958) (explaining that
    “compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in
    advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom
    COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET                  21
    of association” as overly broad statutes are restraints on
    speech).
    Moreover, this case does involve expressive activity. As
    in virtually every other First Amendment case, abstention
    here risks stifling the expression of both the plaintiff and the
    public. Abstaining in this case portends particularly
    egregious damage to First Amendment rights because it
    stifles the “free discussion of governmental affairs” that the
    First Amendment exists to protect. Globe Newspaper Co.,
    
    457 U.S. at 604
     (internal quotation marks omitted). In this
    instance, the deterred expression is not an adult film,
    Playtime Theaters, Inc., 
    748 F.2d at 532
    , or a sexually
    explicit phone message, Sable Commc’ns of Cal. Inc.,
    
    890 F.2d at 186
    , but informed public discussion of ongoing
    judicial proceedings. The purpose of CNS’s effort to timely
    access filed unlimited civil complaints is to report on
    whatever newsworthy content they contain, and CNS cannot
    report on complaints the Ventura County Superior Court
    withholds.
    Planet incorrectly contends that CNS may not claim its
    expression is chilled by the delay in access to complaints
    because it is not subject to prosecution or punishment. This
    assertion relies on case law holding that a plaintiff must be
    prospectively subject to “regulatory, proscriptive, or
    compulsory” government action to have standing to bring a
    facial First Amendment challenge against a statute that has
    not been directly enforced against him. Laird v. Tatum,
    
    408 U.S. 1
    , 11 (1972); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
    Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 
    593 F.2d 1030
    , 1052 (D.C. Cir.
    1978); see also L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g
    Corp., 
    528 U.S. 32
    , 41 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding
    no “‘chill’ upon speech that would allow a plaintiff to
    22        COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET
    complain about the application of the statute to someone
    other than himself”). Here, however, there is no question that
    CNS itself has alleged a cognizable injury caused by the
    Ventura County Superior Court’s denial of timely access to
    newly filed complaints. We are simply considering, for
    purposes of reviewing the district court’s decision to abstain,
    whether this alleged violation of CNS’s First Amendment
    right of access also harms its free speech interests.
    We believe it clearly does, and we do not find it
    meaningful to our analysis that the allegedly unlawful
    withholding of public judicial records, rather than the
    allegedly unlawful threat of prosecution, is the cause of this
    harm.      Our precedent is ultimately concerned with
    abstention’s effect on the plaintiff’s ability to exercise “‘the
    very constitutional right he seeks to protect.’” Porter,
    
    319 F.3d at 493
     (quoting Zwickler, 
    389 U.S. at 252
    ); J-R
    Distribs., Inc. v. Eikenberry, 
    725 F.2d 482
    , 488 (9th Cir.
    1984), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Brockett v. Spokane
    Arcades, Inc., 
    472 U.S. 491
     (1985). Even though it is not
    subject to prosecution, CNS will be unable to access judicial
    records and report on newsworthy proceedings during “the
    delay that comes from abstention . . . itself.” Porter, 
    319 F.3d at 492
    . Like other First Amendment plaintiffs, CNS thus
    faces the possibility that the official conduct it challenges will
    prevent it from engaging in protected activity during the
    pendency of the state court litigation.
    Abstention also risks harming the public’s First
    Amendment interests. The general public has the same right
    of access as does the media. See Cal. First Amendment
    Coal., 299 F.3d at 873 n.2. Therefore, if the Ventura County
    Superior Court’s policy of withholding filings violates CNS’s
    First Amendment rights, it also violates the rights of anyone
    COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET                          23
    else who has tried to access a complaint—or was deterred
    from trying because he did not think it was possible. More
    important, if CNS’s protected expression is delayed while the
    litigation proceeds in state court, then the expression of the
    newspapers, lawyers, libraries, and others who rely on CNS
    for information will also be stifled.7 CNS is a “surrogate[] for
    the public,” Leigh, 
    677 F.3d at 900
     (internal quotation marks
    omitted), and the public cannot discuss the content of
    unlimited civil complaints about which it has no information.
    CNS’s right of access claim presents the same essential
    concerns that have compelled us to reject Pullman abstention
    in every First Amendment case except one that was uniquely
    postured. To hold otherwise would disregard the principle
    that the right of access is “necessary to the enjoyment” of the
    right to free speech. Globe Newspaper Co., 
    457 U.S. at 604
    .
    The scope of CNS’s right is an important question of first
    impression and a matter of “particular federal concern” that
    removes this case from the realm of “sensitive” state issues
    that federal courts should hesitate to address. Ripplinger,
    
    868 F.2d at 1048
    . Because of “the weight of the First
    Amendment issues involved,” Hartford Courant Co.,
    
    380 F.3d at 100
    , the district court lacked the discretion to
    abstain under the Pullman doctrine.
    V.
    Our analysis of Pullman abstention does not fully resolve
    the matter, however. The district court also abstained from
    deciding CNS’s claims under O’Shea v. Littleton, 
    414 U.S. 7
    Indeed, our court’s own library ably publishes, for internal use only, a
    daily news digest entitled “New and Noteworthy.” The CNS website is
    the source for many of the included articles.
    24       COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET
    488 (1974). We must decide whether O’Shea provides an
    independent basis for abstention. Under either de novo
    review or the de novo component of the modified abuse of
    discretion standard applicable in most abstention cases, see
    Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 
    302 F.3d 928
    , 939
    (9th Cir. 2002), we conclude that O’Shea abstention was also
    improper.
    A.
    In O’Shea, nineteen plaintiffs challenged comprehensive
    racial discrimination in the administration of justice in
    Alexander County, Illinois. They alleged, among other
    things, that the county magistrate and judge had set higher
    bail for and imposed harsher sentences on black defendants
    than white defendants. Id. at 492. Relying on its then-recent
    decision in Younger v. Harris, 
    401 U.S. 37
     (1971), the
    Supreme Court explained that principles of comity and
    federalism “preclude[d] equitable intervention” because the
    plaintiffs sought “an injunction aimed at controlling or
    preventing the occurrence of specific events that might take
    place in the course of future state criminal trials.” O’Shea,
    
    414 U.S. at
    499–500. Younger had established a firm rule
    against enjoining ongoing state criminal proceedings, absent
    exceptional circumstances, and the plaintiffs in O’Shea
    simply sought to “indirectly accomplish the [same] kind of
    interference” through an “ongoing federal audit” of state
    proceedings. 
    Id. at 500
    .
    The Supreme Court later relied on the principles of
    O’Shea to hold that an injunction requiring the Philadelphia
    police department to draft comprehensive internal procedures
    to address civilian complaints was beyond the “scope of
    federal equity power.” See Rizzo v. Goode, 
    423 U.S. 362
    ,
    COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET                   25
    378–80 (1976). Younger has also been extended well beyond
    criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Gilbertson v. Albright,
    
    381 F.3d 965
    , 968–69 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (holding that
    Younger principles apply to an action for damages that relates
    to a pending state proceeding); Wiener v. Cnty. of San Diego,
    
    23 F.3d 263
    , 266 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that Younger
    abstention is required when the federal plaintiff has an
    adequate opportunity to litigate federal constitutional claims
    in a pending state proceeding involving important state
    interests); see also 17A MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
    § 122.05[2][d] (3d ed. 2012) (describing the extension of
    Younger).
    We have come to view O’Shea as standing for the more
    general proposition that “[w]e should be very reluctant to
    grant relief that would entail heavy federal interference in
    such sensitive state activities as administration of the judicial
    system.” L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 
    979 F.2d 697
    , 703 (9th
    Cir. 1992). O’Shea compels abstention where the plaintiff
    seeks an “ongoing federal audit” of the state judiciary,
    whether in criminal proceedings or in other respects. E.T. v.
    Cantil-Sakauye, 
    682 F.3d 1121
    , 1124 (9th Cir. 2011) (per
    curiam), cert. denied, 
    133 S. Ct. 476
     (2012); see also
    Kaufman v. Kaye, 
    466 F.3d 83
    , 86 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding
    that abstention was required where the relief sought would be
    overly “intrusive in the administration of the New York court
    system”).
    In Los Angeles County Bar Ass’n, the plaintiff sought a
    declaratory judgment that the California statute providing for
    238 superior court judgeships for Los Angeles County
    violated the state and federal constitutions by causing major
    delays in the resolution of civil cases. L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n,
    
    979 F.2d at 700
    . We acknowledged that a declaration that
    26        COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET
    there were too few judicial positions on the court to meet
    minimum constitutional requirements would prompt the
    California legislature to authorize new judgeships, which the
    governor would then have a legal duty to fill. See 
    id. at 701
    .
    We declined to abstain under O’Shea. We reasoned that a
    simple declaration of the minimum number of judgeships
    needed to satisfy the requirements of due process would
    provide a clear, “useful” answer and would conclusively
    resolve the discrete legal dispute between the parties, even
    though it would “inevitably require restructuring” of the
    superior court. 
    Id.
     at 703–04.
    In E.T., by contrast, the plaintiffs alleged that the
    caseloads of court-appointed attorneys representing a putative
    class of roughly 5,100 foster children in dependency court
    prevented them from providing constitutionally adequate
    representation. E.T., 682 F.3d at 1122–23. They sought,
    among other forms of relief, an injunction requiring the
    defendants to “provide the additional resources required to
    comply with the Judicial Council of California and the
    National Association of Counsel for Children’s recommended
    caseloads for each court-appointed attorney.” Id. at 1123.
    We affirmed the district court’s decision to abstain under
    O’Shea, finding that the plaintiffs were seeking an “ongoing
    federal audit” of the dependency court for Sacramento
    County. Id. at 1124. We reasoned that, because the
    plaintiffs’ requested relief concerned the adequacy of
    representation, “potential remediation might involve
    examination of the administration of a substantial number of
    individual cases.” Id. We distinguished Los Angeles County
    Bar Ass’n on the ground that it involved “average court
    delays” and violations of the right to a speedy trial that the
    plaintiffs alleged would be “solved by a simple increase in the
    number of judges.” Id.
    COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET                  27
    Read in tandem, these cases suggest that O’Shea
    abstention is inappropriate where the requested relief may be
    achieved without an ongoing intrusion into the state’s
    administration of justice, but is appropriate where the relief
    sought would require the federal court to monitor the
    substance of individual cases on an ongoing basis to
    administer its judgment.
    B.
    CNS seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief
    “prohibiting” Planet from “continuing his policies resulting
    in delayed access to new unlimited jurisdiction civil
    complaints and denying Courthouse News timely access to
    new civil unlimited jurisdiction complaints on the same day
    they are filed.” It also seeks a declaratory judgment that
    Planet’s “policies that knowingly affect delays in access and
    a denial of timely, same-day access to new civil unlimited
    complaints” violate the U.S. Constitution, the federal
    common law, and the California Rules of Court.
    The district court erred by finding that this requested
    relief would “impose an ongoing federal audit” of the
    Ventura County Superior Court. E.T., 682 F.3d at 1124
    (internal quotation marks omitted). The remedy that CNS
    seeks is more akin to the bright-line finding that we approved
    in Los Angeles County Bar Ass’n than the ongoing
    monitoring of the substance of state proceedings that we
    rejected in E.T. To determine whether the Ventura County
    Superior Court is making complaints available on the day
    they are filed, a federal court would not need to engage in the
    sort of intensive, context-specific legal inquiry that would be
    necessary to determine whether counsel’s performance was
    constitutionally adequate. See id. There is little risk that the
    28        COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET
    federal courts would need to “examin[e] the administration of
    a substantial number of individual cases” to provide the
    requested relief. Id. at 1124; see also Tarter v. Hury,
    
    646 F.2d 1010
    , 1013 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that an
    injunction against excessive bail was barred by O’Shea, but
    that an injunction requiring clerks to file and docket all pro se
    motions was a “simple, nondiscretionary procedural
    safeguard” that would not be excessively intrusive).
    The Ventura County Superior Court has available a
    variety of simple measures to comply with an injunction
    granting CNS all or part of the relief requested, should CNS
    prevail on the merits of its claims. For instance, the court
    could give reporters a key to a room where new complaints
    are placed in boxes for review before being processed, as
    does the Los Angeles Division of the U.S. District Court for
    the Central District of California. It could adopt the practice
    of the New York County Supreme Court in Manhattan and
    place paper versions of new complaints in a secure area
    behind the counter where reporters are free to review them on
    the day of filing. Or it could follow the Santa Monica branch
    of the Superior Court for Los Angeles County and permit
    reporters to view the cover page of all newly filed complaints
    each afternoon and request the full text of any that seem
    newsworthy. To permit same-day access, the Ventura County
    Superior Court may not need to do anything more than allow
    a credentialed reporter—the same reporter who has been
    regularly visiting the courthouse for the past twelve years—to
    go behind the counter and pick up a stack of papers that
    already exists. The federal courts would not need to
    “examin[e] the administration of a substantial number of
    individual cases” to assess whether the Ventura County
    Superior Court is adopting any of these methods. E.T.,
    682 F.3d at 1124. It is therefore within the district court’s
    COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET                           29
    sound discretion to fashion relief that would protect First
    Amendment rights but would not require an “ongoing federal
    audit” of the Ventura County Superior Court. Id. The district
    court may also engage in fact-finding to understand the
    Ventura County Superior Court’s resource limitations and
    take them into account in crafting appropriate relief.
    Planet’s focus on CNS’s mention of “appropriate case-
    by-case adjudication” in its prayer for relief is misplaced.
    This is not CNS’s requested relief, but rather is a reference to
    the judicial findings of fact already required by the California
    Rules of Court to permit a party to file a complaint under
    seal. Cal. R. Ct. 2.550(d), 2.551. This construction of the
    prayer for relief is consistent with CNS’s motion for a
    preliminary injunction that would direct Planet “to provide
    [CNS] with access to new complaints no later than the end of
    the day on which they are filed, except in those instances
    where the filing party is seeking a TRO or other immediate
    relief or has properly filed the pleading under seal.” In other
    words, CNS seeks relief requiring the Ventura County
    Superior Court to make unlimited civil complaints available
    the day they are filed, except where a process already exists
    to consider case-specific factors that may justify withholding
    a complaint.8
    8
    Planet’s assertion that CNS seeks to create a “new hearing system” is
    therefore incorrect. CNS does argue that judges of the Ventura County
    Superior Court must conduct case-by-case adjudication whenever the
    court seeks to seal records, and that this adjudication must be consistent
    with First Amendment standards. But California law already so provides,
    see Cal. R. Ct. 2.551(a) (“A record must not be filed under seal without a
    court order.”); Cal. R. Ct. 2.550(d) (setting forth express factual findings
    required to seal court records), and these California rules must, of course,
    be applied in a manner consistent with the federal Constitution, cf. NBC
    Subsidiary (KNBC-TV) Inc. v. Superior Court, 
    980 P.2d 337
    , 361 (Cal.
    30          COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET
    Moreover, that some additional litigation may later arise
    to enforce an injunction does not itself justify abstaining from
    deciding a constitutional claim. Any plaintiff who obtains
    equitable relief under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     enforcing his
    constitutional rights against a state official may need to return
    to court to ensure compliance with the judgment. See, e.g.,
    Gluth v. Kangas, 
    951 F.2d 1504
     (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding
    procedures established by the district court to ensure
    compliance with an injunction); cf. Brown v. Plata, 
    131 S. Ct. 1910
    , 1946 (2011) (“A court that invokes equity’s power to
    remedy a constitutional violation by an injunction mandating
    systemic changes to an institution has the continuing duty and
    responsibility to assess the efficacy and consequences of its
    order.”). Accepting Planet’s view that O’Shea applies “when
    litigants seek federal court injunctions to reform the
    institutions of state government” would justify abstention as
    a matter of course in almost any civil rights action under
    § 1983. Mindful that the federal courts have a “virtually
    unflagging obligation” to exercise our jurisdiction, we decline
    to adopt this position. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist.
    v. United States, 
    424 U.S. 800
    , 817 (1976); see also
    Gilbertson, 
    381 F.3d at
    969 n.2 (“[A]lthough there are limited
    circumstances in which . . . abstention by federal courts is
    appropriate, those circumstances are carefully defined and
    remain the exception, not the rule.” (internal quotation marks
    omitted)). We also trust that the Ventura County Superior
    Court would comply with any federal injunction requiring it
    to make unlimited civil complaints available within a
    specified time period, so further proceedings to enforce an
    injunction would be unlikely.
    1999) (holding that a provision of state law governing the closure of court
    proceedings must be “interpreted in a manner compatible” with the First
    Amendment right of access).
    COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET                          31
    We conclude that the requirements of the O’Shea doctrine
    are not satisfied. An injunction requiring the Ventura County
    Superior Court to provide same-day access to filed unlimited
    civil complaints poses little risk of an “ongoing federal audit”
    or “a major continuing intrusion of the equitable power of the
    federal courts into the daily conduct of state . . . proceedings.”
    O’Shea, 
    414 U.S. at 500, 502
    . Under either de novo review
    or the de novo component of the modified abuse of discretion
    standard applicable in abstention cases, the district court erred
    by abstaining under O’Shea.
    VI.
    There may be limitations on the public’s right of access
    to judicial proceedings, and mandating same-day viewing of
    unlimited civil complaints may be one of them.9 We take no
    position on the ultimate merits of CNS’s claims, which the
    district court has yet to address in the first instance. But those
    claims raise novel and important First Amendment questions
    that the federal courts ought to decide. We decline to leave
    CNS and those who rely on its reporting twisting in the wind
    while the state courts address a different question
    entirely—the interpretation of a state law that itself
    recognizes the importance of public access to judicial
    proceedings. We reverse the judgment below and remand so
    that the First Amendment issues presented by this case may
    9
    For instance, the right of access may be overcome by an “overriding
    [governmental] interest based on findings that closure is essential to
    preserve higher values.” Leigh, 
    677 F.3d at 898
     (quoting Press-Enterprise
    II, 
    478 U.S. at 9
    ). The delay in making the complaints available may also
    be analogous to a permissible “reasonable restriction[] on the time, place,
    or manner of protected speech.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 
    491 U.S. 781
    , 791 (1989).
    32       COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. PLANET
    be adjudicated on the merits in federal court, where they
    belong.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.