Morgan Chikosi v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage , 611 F. App'x 429 ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              JUL 30 2015
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MORGAN CHIKOSI,                                  No. 13-56031
    Plaintiff - Appellant,            D.C. No. 5:11-cv-00964-JGB-
    DTB
    v.
    MICHAEL T. GALLAGHER; et al.,                    MEMORANDUM*
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted July 21, 2015**
    Before:        CANBY, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    Morgan Chikosi appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his
    action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of Chikosi’s purchase of
    property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
    Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 
    637 F.3d 1047
    , 1060 (9th Cir.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    2011) (summary judgment); Cholla v. Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 
    382 F.3d 969
    , 973
    (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal on basis of statute of limitations). We affirm.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment for Gallagher on
    Chikosi’s claim relating to the “incomplete purchase agreement” because Chikosi
    failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Gallagher was a
    party to the purchase agreement between the Chikosis and Gallagher Management
    Company (“GMC”), as Gallagher signed the agreement as president of GMC. See
    Firestone v. Wahl, 
    284 P.2d 499
    , 501 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (explaining when agent
    will be held liable for signing an agreement).
    The district court properly granted summary judgment for Gallagher on
    Chikosi’s breach of oral contract claim because Chikosi failed to raise a genuine
    dispute of material fact as to whether Gallagher agreed to give Chikosi a car in
    connection with closing escrow. See Stockton Mortg. Inc. v. Tope, 
    183 Cal. Rptr. 3d
    186, 200 (Ct. App. 2014) (setting forth elements of claim for breach of an oral
    contract); see also Cafasso, U.S. ex 
    rel., 637 F.3d at 1061
    (“To survive summary
    judgment, a plaintiff must set forth non-speculative evidence of specific facts . . .”).
    The district court properly dismissed Chikosi’s claims based on fraud,
    forgery, and statutory violations against Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Crooks, and
    Wansten (collectively, “Lenders”) as barred by the statute of limitations because
    2                                     13-56031
    Chikosi filed his action more than three years after the events giving rise to it. See
    Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(a), (d) (prescribing a three year statute of limitations for
    actions asserting liability created by statute and for relief on the ground of fraud);
    Hatch v. Collins, 
    275 Cal. Rptr. 476
    , 479 (Ct. App. 1990) (explaining that “[t]he
    applicable statute of limitations is determined by the substance or gravamen of the
    action” and that § 338(d) applies “if fraud or mistake is the basis of the legal injury
    . . . regardless of whether the complaint . . . pleads a cause of action in tort or
    contract” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Chikosi’s action
    against the Lenders after Chikosi failed to file a timely Second Amended
    Complaint regarding his claims that had been dismissed with leave to amend. See
    Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 
    191 F.3d 983
    , 989-90 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing factors
    for determining whether a district court abused its discretion in dismissing an
    action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order requiring
    submission of an amended pleading).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Chikosi’s motion
    for reconsideration regarding the Lenders’ motion to dismiss because Chikosi
    failed to establish grounds for such relief. See C.D. Cal. R. 7-18 (setting forth
    grounds for reconsideration under local rules); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 
    5 F.3d 391
    ,
    3                                         13-56031
    395 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review for compliance with local
    rules).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Chikosi’s request to
    add GMC as a defendant after the scheduling order deadline. See Johnson v.
    Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 
    975 F.2d 604
    , 607-09 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth
    standard of review and explaining circumstances where a party may join additional
    defendants following a cut-off date).
    We reject Chikosi’s contentions concerning mediation and that the district
    court failed to address his a claim under California Civil Code § 1102.3, which
    Chikosi never brought against Gallagher.
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
    The Lenders’ request for judicial notice, filed on April 17, 2014, and
    Chikosi’s request for judicial notice, filed on May 5, 2014, are denied as
    unnecessary.
    AFFIRMED.
    4                                    13-56031