Rau v. United Parcel Service, Inc. ( 2015 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAY 27 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
SHEILA RAU, No. 13-35809
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:12-cv-00194-BLW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., a
Delaware and Ohio corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 6, 2015**
Seattle, Washington
Before: WALLACE, KLEINFELD, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Sheila Rau appeals from the district court judgment
dismissing her action against her former employer United Parcel Service (UPS).
Rau argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for UPS
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
because there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to her Title VII claim
and her state law claims. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and,
reviewing de novo, Hawn v. Executive Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th
Cir. 2010), we affirm.
We analyze Title VII claims through the burden-shifting framework of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), under which a plaintiff
must first establish a prima facie case by showing (1) that she is a member of a
protected class; (2) that she was qualified for her position and performing her job
satisfactorily; (3) that she experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) that
similarly situated individuals outside her protected class were treated more
favorably than she was treated. Hawn, 615 F.3d at 1156.
The district court was correct to conclude that even when the facts are taken
in the light most favorable to Rau, she has not met her burden of establishing that
similarly situated men were treated more favorably. To the extent that Robert
Orloff was similarly situated to Rau, Orloff was not treated more favorably than
Rau. Any differences in treatment were appropriate given the differences in
situation between Rau and Orloff, including the complaints received by UPS
regarding Rau’s conduct with her subordinates and the fact that Orloff chose to
reject the separation agreement offered to him while Rau chose to negotiate the
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terms of the agreement offered to her. Id. at 1159–60. Since we conclude that the
district court was correct regarding Rau’s failure to meet her minimal burden under
the fourth prima facie factor of the McDonnell Douglas framework, we need not
reach the other factors.
Our analysis of Rau’s gender discrimination claims under the Idaho Human
Rights Act is the same as our analysis of her Title VII claim. See Peterson v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004).
Rau’s claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is based
on her Title VII claim, so the district court was also correct to grant summary
judgment as to the wrongful termination claim in light of the grant of summary
judgment as to her Title VII claim.
Rau’s claim regarding breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is based on the theory that UPS breached the covenant implied in her
employment agreement when UPS treated her differently from similarly situated
employees based on her gender. However, as discussed above, the district court
was correct to conclude that Rau failed to make a prima facie case that UPS had
treated similarly situated men more favorably than UPS treated Rau, so the district
court was also correct to grant summary judgment as to her breach claim.
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Rau’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is based on the
validity of her allegations of gender discrimination. Since Rau failed to make a
prima facie case in support of her allegations of gender discrimination, as
discussed above, the district court was also correct to grant summary judgment as
to her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Rau does not dispute the district court’s conclusion that she failed to show
that UPS had an established duty to her that could serve as the foundation for her
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. The district court was therefore
correct to grant summary judgment as to her claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
AFFIRMED.
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