Galvan Ramos v. Holder , 385 F. App'x 695 ( 2010 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 28 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAYMUNDO NOEL GALVAN RAMOS, No. 04-75956
Jr.; MONETTE DOMAGAS RAMOS;
NATALIE LOUISE DOMAGAS Agency Nos.A096-167-183
RAMOS, A096-167-184
A096-167-185
Petitioners,
v. MEMORANDUM *
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 14, 2010 **
San Francisco, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, TASHIMA, BEA, Circuit Judges.
Raymundo Noel Galvan Ramos, Jr. (“Ramos”), his wife Monette Domagas
Ramos, and their daughter Natalie Louise Domagas Ramos, natives and citizens of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
the Philippines, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)
affirmance of the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying their
application for asylum, and Ramos’ application for withholding of removal and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1
B ACKGROUND
The IJ found Ramos not credible and denied his petitions for asylum and
withholding of removal. The IJ also determined that Ramos could safely relocate
within the Philippines. Finally, the IJ held that Ramos had not demonstrated
eligibility for CAT relief. The BIA upheld the IJ’s denial of relief on the bases of
the adverse credibility and relocation findings.
D ISCUSSION
We have jurisdiction to consider Ramos’ petition for review of the BIA’s
decision pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We review the decision of the BIA for
substantial evidence and “‘must uphold the BIA’s finding[s] unless the evidence
compels a contrary result.’” Tekle v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir.
2008) (quoting Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 920 (9th Cir. 2006)).
Because the BIA did not specify what standard of review it applied in affirming the
1
Ramos’ wife and daughter are derivative applicants to his petition for
asylum.
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IJ’s decision, we “look to the IJ’s oral decision as a guide to what lay behind the
BIA’s conclusion.” Avetova-Elisseva v. INS, 213 F.3d 1192, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000).
Because at least one of the grounds identified by the IJ as a basis for the
adverse credibility determination that the BIA upheld is material and goes to the
heart of Ramos’ claim, we hold that the adverse credibility finding is supported by
substantial evidence. See Li v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2004). Ramos
testified that in January 2001, he was threatened and harassed because he and his
uncle were publicly announcing through his uncle’s political campaign that the
mayor and a former councilor were involved in the drug trade. The IJ noted that a
February 25, 2001, article in the local paper undermined this testimony. The
paper’s interview with Ramos’ uncle indicates that Ramos’ uncle had nothing
against the mayor. Further, Ramos testified that it was not until March 2001 that
he and his uncle campaigned door-to-door and told voters about the mayor’s
involvement in the drug trade. These inconsistencies call into question whether the
harassment Ramos experienced was politically motivated, and whether Ramos and
his uncle were engaged in political speech against the mayor. When given an
opportunity to explain the discrepancy between his testimony and the newspaper
article, Ramos was unable to do so.
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In the absence of credible testimony, Ramos has not met his burden of proof
of establishing that he is eligible for asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2009). The
additional documentary evidence that Ramos proffered in support of his
application frequently contradicted, rather than corroborated, his testimony such
that the IJ did not know what to believe. Having failed to establish his eligibility
for asylum, Ramos necessarily fails to meet the more demanding burden of proof
for demonstrating eligibility for withholding of removal.
Ramos’ failure to establish eligibility for asylum does not necessarily doom
his application for relief under the CAT. See Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279,
1283 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the IJ, after reviewing the country conditions
evidence, found that Ramos does not have a “chance greater than fifty percent that
he will be tortured” upon return to the Philippines. Hamoui v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d
821, 827 (9th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, the IJ found that Ramos could safely
relocate within the Philippines because his alleged persecutors are located in a very
small geographic area and Ramos introduced no credible evidence that they would
be able to find him elsewhere in the country. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)(ii)
(2009). We agree. In the absence of credible testimony that Ramos suffered past
torture, or country conditions of widespread torture, and in light of the finding that
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relocation would be possible, Ramos has not met his burden of establishing
eligibility for relief under the CAT.
The petition for review is DENIED.
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