Huson Ex Rel. Huson v. Simi Valley Unified School District ( 2010 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION SEP 08 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAMES HUSON, by and through his No. 07-55785
guardian ad litem MICHAEL HUSON;
MICHAEL D. HUSON; TENA HUSON, D.C. No. CV-06-07488-PSG
Plaintiffs - Appellants, AMENDED
MEMORANDUM *
v.
SIMI VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT; BARBARA PATTEN,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 21, 2008
Pasadena, California
Before: PREGERSON and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and COLLINS **,
District Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Raner C. Collins, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
James Huson and his parents, Michael and Tena Huson (the “Husons”)
appeal the district court’s dismissal of their claims under the Rehabilitation Act,
Americans with Disabilities Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because the parties are
familiar with the facts of the case, we repeat them here only to the extent necessary
to explain our decision. We have jurisdiction over the district court’s order under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review questions of law, such as whether administrative
exhaustion is required under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
(“IDEA”) de novo. Witte v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1274 (9th Cir.
1999). We affirm.
“[P]laintiffs must exhaust administrative remedies before filing a civil
lawsuit if they seek relief for injuries that could be redressed to any degree by the
IDEA’s administrative procedures.” Kutasi v. Las Virgenes Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d
1162, 1163 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added); see also Robb v. Bethel Sch. Dist. #
403, 308 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002). Exhaustion is not required where the
IDEA administrative process would be “futile or inadequate.” Honig v. Doe, 484
U.S. 305, 327 (1988).
Here, Appellants’ attempt to invoke the futility exception is not persuasive.
Appellants initially sought IDEA services and were denied. Appellants seek to
avoid the exhaustion requirement by adopting Appellees’ position that James
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Huson is ineligible for IDEA services. The IDEA provides the “opportunity for
any party to present a complaint . . . with respect to any matter relating to the
identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of
a free appropriate public education to such a child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A);
see also Cal. Educ. Code § 56501(a) (providing a due process hearing when there
is a “refusal to initiate or change the identification, assessment, or educational
placement of the child or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the
child”). The disagreement over James Huson’s education falls within these
bounds, and must be administratively exhausted before Plaintiffs may bring other
claims.1
Accordingly, the district court’s order is AFFIRMED.2
1
Because James Huson’s eligibility for IDEA services has not yet been
finally determined and because Appellants must exhaust IDEA remedies, we do
not reach the other issues presented on appeal. We note, however, that
comprehensive enforcement schemes, such as the IDEA, preclude claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 120
(2005); Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 509 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2007).
2
Because Huson is required to exhaust his administrative remedies, the
district court lacked jurisdiction to hear his other claims. Witte v. Clark County
Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1274 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, we vacate the
district court’s order with respect to Huson’s claims against Principal Patten.
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