Steven Burr v. Frank Chavez ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                         MAY 30 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    DONGSHENG HUANG,                                 No. 12-17605
    Plaintiff - Appellant,            D.C. No. 5:12-cv-00785-PSG
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ULTIMO SOFTWARE SOLUTIONS,
    INC.,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Paul S. Grewal, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Submitted May 13, 2014**
    Before:        CLIFTON, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
    Dongsheng Huang appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing
    his action seeking enforcement of an order of the United States Department of
    Labor. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo,
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Robinson v. United States, 
    586 F.3d 683
    , 685 (9th Cir. 2009), and we affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Huang’s action because Huang failed
    to allege facts showing that Ultimo Software Solutions, Inc. is a federal agency
    subject to review under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). See 5 U.S.C.
    § 551(1) (defining an “agency” as “each authority of the Government of the United
    States”). Moreover, Huang failed to show that he had exhausted administrative
    remedies before bringing his action. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (under the APA, agency
    action is subject to judicial review only when it is made reviewable by statute or a
    final agency order has issued); Buckingham v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
    603 F.3d 1073
    , 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The APA requires plaintiffs to exhaust their
    administrative remedies before bringing suit in federal court.”).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing without leave to
    amend because amendment would have been futile. See Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of
    Corr. & Rehab., 
    707 F.3d 1114
    , 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2013) (setting forth standard of
    review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied if amendment would be
    futile).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Huang’s motion
    for reconsideration because Huang failed to establish grounds for such relief. See
    Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 
    5 F.3d 1255
    , 1262-63
    2                                   12-17605
    (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration).
    Contrary to Ultimo Software Solutions, Inc.’s contention, Huang’s appeal of
    the district court’s dismissal order was timely. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii);
    Stephanie-Cardona LLC v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 
    476 F.3d 701
    , 703
    (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f the district court does not set forth the judgment on a separate
    document, an appealable final order is considered entered when 150 days have run
    from the time the final order is docketed.”).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                    12-17605