United States v. Raul Delacruz-Ulin ( 2011 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                                DEC 06 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No. 10-50551
    Plaintiff - Appellee,             D.C. No. 3:09-cr-04014-MMA
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    RAUL DE LA CRUZ-ULIN,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Michael M. Anello, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted November 9, 2011**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: FERNANDEZ and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL,
    District Judge.***
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
    oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, United States District Judge for the
    Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
    Raul De La Cruz-Ulin (“De La Cruz”) appeals his conviction following a
    conditional guilty plea for attempted reentry after deportation, in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    . De La Cruz argues that due process violations invalidated the
    removal order that was the basis of the § 1326 conviction. The district court
    denied the motion to dismiss the § 1326 charge on the basis that, even though there
    was a due process violation, De La Cruz suffered no prejudice. Reviewing the
    claim de novo, we affirm.
    In the deportation proceeding that led to the underlying removal order, De
    La Cruz waived his right to counsel and to appeal. Those waivers did not comply
    with due process requirements. But the due process violations do not warrant
    dismissal of the § 1326 charge because De La Cruz cannot show that he was
    prejudiced as a result.
    To show prejudice, De La Cruz must show that he had a plausible ground for
    relief from the removal order. De La Cruz asserts that he had a plausible ground
    for relief in the form of fast-track voluntary departure. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a); see
    United States v. Arias-Ordonez, 
    597 F.3d 972
    , 978 (9th Cir. 2010). The record
    shows, however, that De La Cruz was ineligible for such relief because his
    conviction for receipt of stolen property under California Penal Code § 496(a)
    made him an aggravated felon under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(43)(G) unless he received
    a sentence of less than one year. See Verdugo-Gonzalez v. Holder, 
    581 F.3d 1059
    ,
    1061 (9th Cir. 2009). The state-court record does not support a finding that the
    California state court imposed a sentence of less than one year.
    Under California Penal Code § 654(a), the state court was required to
    impose a custodial sentence on both the burglary and the receipt of stolen property
    counts of conviction and stay execution of the sentence on the count that provides
    for the shorter potential term of imprisonment. See People v. Alford, 
    103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 898
    , 900, 905 (Ct. App. 2010). The record shows that when the state
    court revoked De La Cruz’s probation, the court imposed a custodial sentence of
    sixteen months for the burglary conviction and stayed the sentence for the receipt
    of stolen property conviction in accordance with § 654(a). Because the state court
    was required to impose a custodial sentence on both counts, De La Cruz cannot
    show that the state court did not sentence him to less than one year for his receipt
    of stolen property conviction. See United States v. Gonzalez-Valerio, 
    342 F.3d 1051
    , 1056 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that “[i]n order to demonstrate prejudice,
    Gonzalez would also have to show that he is not barred from receiving relief”
    (emphasis added), and noting that a defendant does not meet this burden by
    pointing to an ambiguity in the underlying criminal sentence). Based on the
    record, De La Cruz cannot show prejudice from the due process violations in the
    removal hearing because he cannot show eligibility for voluntary deportation.
    Because De La Cruz suffered no prejudice as a result of the due process
    violations, his removal order was valid. The district court properly denied the
    motion to dismiss the § 1326 count of the indictment.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-50551

Judges: Fernandez, Tallman, Rosenthal

Filed Date: 12/6/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024