Nancy Coomer v. Michael Astrue ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             AUG 11 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    NANCY COOMER, as personal                        No. 09-15061
    representative of the estate and on behalf
    of Danny Coomer, deceased,                       D.C. No. 4:06-cv-00629-CKJ
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    MEMORANDUM *
    v.
    MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
    Social Security,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted January 4, 2011 **
    Before: HUG, SKOPIL, and BEEZER, Circuit Judges.
    Nancy Coomer appeals pro se the district court’s decision affirming the
    Commissioner’s determination that her late ex-husband Danny Coomer
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    (“Coomer”) was ineligible for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the
    Social Security Act for the period from January 1994 through December 1995.
    Although Coomer was determined to be disabled due to Crohn’s disease and
    related secondary impairments as of September 3, 1985, an Administrative Law
    Judge (ALJ) in 2006 found that Coomer’s entitlement to benefits ended on March
    31, 1994, because he was at that time engaged in substantial gainful activity
    (SGA). The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g), and we
    have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We affirm.
    Appellant first contends the ALJ erred in ruling that Coomer’s medical
    condition was irrelevant to the determination whether he was engaged in SGA in
    1994 and 1995. We disagree. Where a claimant has previously been found to be
    disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act, his eligibility for disability
    benefits may cease, regardless of his medical condition, if he is found upon any
    statutorily mandated review to have engaged in SGA. See 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 421
    (I),
    423(f); 
    20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594
    (d)(5), 404.1595(f)(1); Katz v. Sec’y of Health &
    Human Servs., 
    972 F.2d 290
    , 293 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that it is not necessary to
    show medical improvement where SGA is the issue in a disability benefits
    termination case).
    -2-
    Appellant further contends the ALJ erred in finding, based on conflicting
    testimony from Coomer and other witnesses, that Coomer contributed over half the
    time required for management of his feed business in 1994 and 1995, and that
    those services amounted to SGA. We reject this argument.
    In finding that Coomer contributed “more than half the total time required
    for the management” of his feed business, and that he was thus engaged in SGA,
    
    20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1575
    (a)(2) & (b)(1), the ALJ relied primarily on admissions
    Coomer made during his testimony at an April 2000 hearing about the operation of
    his business. The ALJ rejected later inconsistent testimony about the allocation of
    responsibilities between Coomer and one of his employees, Christopher Stump,
    and the report of a certified rehabilitation counselor, David Goguen, who relied on
    Stump’s testimony and the United States Department of Labor’s Dictionary of
    Occupational Titles, to opine that Coomer did not perform more than half of the
    required management duties. While the Secretary may rely on that dictionary to
    characterize a claimant’s “past relevant work” for purposes of a Step Four
    “residual functional capacity” determination, Villa v. Heckler, 
    797 F.2d 794
    , 798-
    99 (9th Cir. 1986), nothing in the regulations or case law requires him to do so
    with respect to an SGA determination.
    -3-
    In any event, the ALJ clearly considered Goguen’s testimony, but properly
    rejected it because it was based on the later testimony of Stump, in 2005, who
    contradicted Coomer’s earlier testimony, in 2000, about the allocation of
    responsibilities between him and his employees. The ALJ also considered and
    properly evaluated all of the evidence in the record. She applied the proper legal
    standards, and her finding of SGA in 1994 and 1995 is supported by substantial
    evidence.
    AFFIRMED.
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-15061

Judges: Hug, Skopil, Beezer

Filed Date: 8/11/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024