United States v. State of Washington , 864 F.3d 1017 ( 2017 )


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  •                 FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;            No. 13-35474
    SUQUAMISH INDIAN TRIBE;
    SAUK-SUIATTLE TRIBE;                    D.C. Nos.
    STILLAGUAMISH TRIBE; HOH           2:01-sp-00001-RSM
    TRIBE; JAMESTOWN S’KLALLAM         2:70-cv-09213-RSM
    TRIBE; LOWER ELWHA BANK OF
    KLALLAMS; PORT GAMBLE
    BAND CLALLAM; NISQUALLY                 ORDER
    INDIAN TRIBE; NOOKSACK
    INDIAN TRIBE; SKOKOMISH
    INDIAN TRIBE; SQUAXIN ISLAND
    TRIBE; UPPER SKAGIT INDIAN
    TRIBE; TULALIP TRIBES; LUMMI
    INDIAN NATION; QUINAULT
    INDIAN NATION; SUQUAMISH
    INDIAN TRIBE; PUYALLUP
    TRIBE; CONFEDERATED TRIBES
    AND BANDS OF THE YAKAMA
    INDIAN NATION; QUILEUTE
    INDIAN TRIBE; MAKAH INDIAN
    TRIBE; SWINOMISH INDIAN
    TRIBAL COMMUNITY;
    MUCKLESHOOT INDIAN TRIBE,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    v.
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    2               UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON
    Filed May 19, 2017
    Before: William A. Fletcher and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit
    Judges, and David A. Ezra,* District Judge.
    Order;
    Concurrence by Judge W. Fletcher;
    Opinion Respecting Denial by Judge O’Scannlain;
    Statement by Judge Hurwitz
    SUMMARY **
    Tribal Fishing Rights
    The panel denied a petition for a panel rehearing and
    denied a petition for rehearing en banc on behalf of the court
    in an action in which the panel affirmed the district court’s
    injunction directing the State of Washington to correct
    culverts, which allow streams to flow underneath roads,
    because they violated, and continued to violate, the Stevens
    Treaties, which were entered in 1854–55 between Indian
    tribes in the Pacific Northwest and the Governor of
    Washington Territory.
    Concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc, Judges W.
    Fletcher and Gould stated that the district court properly
    found that Washington State violated the Treaties by acting
    *
    The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the
    District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
    has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON                    3
    affirmatively to build state-owned roads, and to build and
    maintain salmon-blocking culverts under those roads. The
    Judges stated that there is ample evidence in the record that
    remediation of the State’s barrier culverts will have a
    substantial beneficial effect on salmon populations, resulting
    in more harvestable salmon for the Tribes. As an incidental
    result, there will also be more harvestable salmon for non-
    Indians. The Judges noted that the United States requested
    an injunction requiring remediation of all of the State’s
    barrier culverts within five years. The district court crafted
    a careful, nuanced injunction, giving the United States much
    less than it requested. The Judges stated that the district
    court properly found a violation of the Treaties by the State,
    and that it acted within its discretion in formulating its
    remedial injunction.
    In an opinion respecting the denial of rehearing en banc,
    Judge O’Scannlain, joined by Judges Kozinski, Tallman,
    Callahan, Bea, Ikuta and N.R. Smith, and joined by Judges
    Bybee and M. Smith as to all but Part IV, stated that the panel
    opinion’s reasoning ignored the Supreme Court’s holding in
    Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger
    Fishing Vessel Association, 
    443 U.S. 658
     (1979), and this
    Circuit’s cases, was incredibly broad, and if left unchecked,
    could significantly affect natural resource management
    throughout the Pacific Northwest, inviting judges to become
    environmental regulators. Judge O’Scannlain stated that by
    refusing to consider the doctrine of laches, the panel opinion
    further disregarded the Supreme Court’s decision in City of
    Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 
    544 U.S. 197
    (2005), relying instead on outdated and impliedly overruled
    precedent. Finally, Judge O’Scannlain stated that the panel
    opinion imposed a poorly-tailored injunction which will
    needlessly cost the State of Washington hundreds of millions
    of dollars.
    4             UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON
    In a separate statement, Judge Hurwitz stated the dissent
    from the denial of rehearing en banc unfortunately
    perpetuated the false notion that the full court’s refusal to
    exercise its discretion under Federal Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 35(a) is tantamount to the court “tacitly affirming
    the panel opinion’s erroneous reasoning.” Judge Hurwitz
    stated that, like the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court,
    the denial of rehearing en banc simply leaves a panel
    decision undisturbed.
    COUNSEL
    Noah G. Purcell (argued), Solicitor General; Laura J.
    Watson, Deputy Solicitor General; Robert W. Ferguson,
    Attorney General; Jessica E. Fogel, Assistant Attorney
    General; Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General; Office of
    the Attorney General, Olympia, Washington; for Defendant-
    Appellant State of Washington.
    John C. Sledd (argued), Jane G. Steadman, Cory J. Albright,
    Philip E. Katzen, and Riyaz A. Kanji; Kanji & Katzen,
    PLLC, Seattle, Washington; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
    David C. Shilton (argued), Vanessa Boyd Willard, and
    Evelyn S. Ying, Attorneys; United States Department of
    Justice, Environment & Natural Resources Division;
    Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellee United States.
    Pamela B. Loginsky, Washington Association of
    Prosecuting Attorneys, Olympia, Washington; Douglas D.
    Shaftel, Pierce County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney; for
    Amicus Curiae Washington State Association of Counties.
    UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON                 5
    Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General; Anna M. Joyce,
    Solicitor General; Michael A. Casper, Deputy Solicitor
    General; Stephanie L. Striffler, Senior Assistant Attorney
    General; Oregon Department of Justice, Salem, Oregon; for
    Amicus Curiae State of Oregon.
    Colette Routel, Associate Professor and Co-Director, Indian
    Law Clinic, William Mitchell College of Law, Saint Paul,
    Minnesota, for Amicus Curiae Indian Law Professors.
    Amanda W. Goodin and Janette K. Brimmer, Earthjustice,
    Seattle, Washington, for Amicus Curiae Pacific Coast
    Federation of Fishermen’s Associations and Institute for
    Fisheries Resources.
    Dale Schowengerdt, Solicitor; Timothy C. Fox, Attorney
    General; United States Attorney's Office, Helena, Montana;
    for Amicus Curiae State of Montana.
    Clay R. Smith, Deputy Attorney General; Clive J. Strong,
    Chief of Natural Resources; Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney
    General; Office of the Attorney General, Boise, Idaho; for
    Amicus Curiae State of Idaho.
    Dominic M. Carollo, Yockim Carollo LLP, Roseburg,
    Oregon, for Amici Curiae Klamath Critical Habitat
    Landowners, Modoc Point Irrigation District, Mosby Family
    Trust, Sprague River Water Resource Foundation Inc., and
    TPC LLC.
    6                UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON
    ORDER
    The panel, as constituted above, has voted unanimously
    to deny the petition for panel rehearing. Judges Fletcher and
    Gould have voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc,
    and Judge Ezra so recommends.
    A judge of the court called for a vote on the petition for
    rehearing en banc. A vote was taken, and a majority of the
    non recused active judges of the court failed to vote for en
    banc rehearing. Fed. R. App. P. 35(f).
    The petition for rehearing and the petition for rehearing
    en banc, filed August 11, 2016, are DENIED.
    W. FLETCHER and GOULD, Circuit Judges, concurring in
    the denial of rehearing en banc: *
    The opinion in this case speaks for itself. See United
    States v. Washington, 
    853 F.3d 946
     (9th Cir. 2017). We
    write to respond to the views of our colleagues who dissent
    from the decision of our court not to rehear the case en banc.
    In 1854 and 1855, U.S. Superintendent of Indian Affairs
    and Governor of Washington Territory, Isaac I. Stevens,
    negotiated a series of virtually identical Treaties with the
    Indian Tribes that lived around Puget Sound. In return for
    their agreement to live on reservations, the Tribes were
    promised equal access to off-reservation fishing “at all usual
    *
    District Judge Ezra was a member of the three-judge panel that
    decided this case. Because Judge Ezra is not a member of the Ninth
    Circuit, he does not have the authority to vote on a petition for rehearing
    en banc.
    UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON                      7
    and accustomed grounds and stations.” The Supreme Court
    described the importance of the promise:
    During the negotiations, the vital importance
    of the fish to the Indians was repeatedly
    emphasized by both sides, and the
    Governor’s promises that the treaties would
    protect that source of food and commerce
    were crucial in obtaining the Indians’ assent.
    Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger
    Fishing Vessel Ass’n (“Fishing Vessel”), 
    443 U.S. 658
    , 676
    (1979).
    For more than 100 years, the State of Washington
    deliberately and systematically prevented the Tribes from
    engaging in the off-reservation fishing promised under the
    Treaties. The State eventually came to employ surveillance
    planes, high powered boats, tear gas, billy clubs and guns
    against tribal members engaged in off-reservation fishing.
    In 1970, the United States brought suit against Washington
    State to enforce the Treaties.
    The district court held that the Treaties promised the
    Tribes fifty percent of the harvestable salmon in any given
    year. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Tribes
    had been promised a “moderate living” from fishing, and
    that they were entitled to fifty percent of the harvest, up to
    the point where they were able to catch enough salmon to
    provide a moderate living. 
    Id. at 686
    . The district court
    entered a detailed injunction which the State strenuously
    resisted. The Supreme Court affirmed the injunction:
    It is . . . absurd to argue . . . both that the state
    agencies may not be ordered to implement
    the decree and also that the District Court
    8             UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON
    may not itself issue detailed remedial orders
    as a substitute for state supervision.
    
    Id. at 695
    .
    The current proceeding is a continuation of the suit
    brought by the United States in 1970.
    Salmon are anadromous fish—hatching in fresh water,
    migrating to the ocean to mature, and returning to fresh
    water to spawn—so access to spawning grounds is essential
    to their reproduction and survival. For many years, the
    Tribes had complained that the State had built roads across
    salmon-bearing streams, and that it had built culverts under
    the roads that allowed passage of water but not passage of
    salmon. The United States instituted the current proceeding
    in 2001 to require the State to modify its culverts to allow
    passage of salmon.
    The State has fought the proceeding tooth and nail. The
    State contended, and continues to contend, that it can block
    every salmon-bearing stream into Puget Sound without
    violating the Treaties. The district court disagreed and held
    that the State’s affirmative act of building roads with
    salmon-blocking, or “barrier,” culverts violated the Treaties.
    The district court sought the State’s participation and
    assistance in drafting a remedial injunction, but the State
    refused to participate. Despite the State’s refusal, the district
    court entered an injunction that was substantially more
    favorable to the State than the injunction sought by the
    United States.
    The State appealed, objecting to the district court’s
    holding that its affirmative acts in building roads with barrier
    culverts violated the Treaties. Without conceding that it
    violated the Treaties, the State also objected to the scope of
    UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON                     9
    the injunction in whose formulation it had declined to
    participate. We affirmed.
    Our dissenting colleagues object to our decision on four
    grounds. We respond to the objections in turn.
    I. Violation of the Treaties
    First, our colleagues contend that we have misread the
    Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in Fishing Vesssel. They
    contend that fifty percent of the harvestable salmon is an
    absolute “ceiling” on the amount of fish the Tribes have been
    promised. They contend that the Treaties promised only that
    the Tribes will get fifty percent of the harvestable salmon,
    and that Treaties permit the State to take affirmative acts that
    have the effect of diminishing the supply of salmon below
    the amount necessary to provide a moderate living.
    According to our colleagues, if the State acts affirmatively
    to entirely eliminate the supply of harvestable salmon, the
    Tribes get fifty percent of nothing.
    Our colleagues misread Fishing Vessel. The Court
    recognized that the Treaties promised that the Tribes would
    have enough salmon to feed themselves. In the words of the
    Court, the Treaties promised that the Tribes would have
    enough harvestable salmon to provide a “moderate living.”
    Fishing Vessel, 433 U.S. at 686. The Tribes get only fifty
    percent of the catch even if the supply of salmon is
    insufficient to provide a moderate living. However, there is
    nothing in the Court’s opinion that authorizes the State to
    diminish or eliminate the supply of salmon available for
    harvest.
    It is undisputed that at the present time fifty percent of
    the harvestable salmon in Puget Sound does not provide a
    moderate living to the Tribes. It is also undisputed that the
    10           UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON
    State has acted affirmatively to build roads with barrier
    culverts that block the passage of salmon, with the
    consequence of substantially diminishing the supply of
    harvestable salmon.       Evidence at trial showed that
    remediation of the State’s barrier culverts will increase the
    yearly supply of salmon by several hundred thousand adult
    salmon. Half of the newly produced harvestable salmon will
    be available to the Tribes. The other half will be available
    to non-Indians.
    Our opinion does not hold that the Tribes are entitled to
    enough salmon to provide a moderate living, irrespective of
    the circumstances. We do not hold that the Treaties’ promise
    of a moderate living is valid against acts of God (such as an
    eruption of Mount Rainier) that would diminish the supply
    of salmon. Nor do we hold that the promise is valid against
    all human-caused diminutions, or even against all State-
    caused diminutions. We hold only that the State violated the
    Treaties when it acted affirmatively to build roads across
    salmon bearing streams, with culverts that allowed passage
    of water but not passage of salmon.
    II. Effect and Scope of the Holding
    Second, our colleagues contend that our decision may
    open the door to “a whole host of future suits,” and that we
    do “nothing to cabin [our] opinion.” We are not sure what
    the hypothesized future suits would be. But we are sure that
    we have not opened the floodgates to a host of future suits.
    Because of the Eleventh Amendment, a further suit
    against Washington State seeking enforcement of the
    Treaties cannot be brought by the Tribes. Nor can it be
    brought by non-Indians who would benefit from an increase
    in harvestable salmon (recall that 50% of any increased
    salmon harvest will go to non-Indians). Nor can it be
    UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON                    11
    brought by environmental groups. The only possible
    plaintiff is the United States. The United States is a
    responsible litigant and is not likely to burden the States
    without justification.    The history of this litigation
    demonstrates that it was no easy thing for the Tribes to
    persuade the United States to institute proceedings against
    the state of Washington to seek remediation of the State’s
    barrier culverts, and will be no easy thing for other
    Northwest tribes to persuade the United States to bring
    comparable suits against other States.
    Our opinion describes the facts of this litigation carefully
    and in detail, as required by our decision in United States v.
    State of Washington, 
    759 F.2d 1353
    , 1357 (9th Cir. 1985)
    (en banc) (“[T]he measure of the State’s [Treaty] obligation
    will depend for its precise legal formulation on all of the
    facts presented by a particular dispute.”). Cabining our
    opinion by means other than a careful, detailed description
    of the facts presented would have entailed positing
    hypothetical facts in cases not before us and giving an
    improper advisory opinion. On the facts presented to us, we
    held that the State violated the Treaties when it acted
    affirmatively to block salmon-bearing streams by building
    roads with culverts that protected the State’s roads but killed
    the Tribes’ salmon. Other cases with different facts might
    come out differently, but we did not decide—and should not
    have decided—such cases.
    III. Laches
    Third, our colleagues contend that the United States’ suit
    on behalf of the Tribes is barred by laches. There is an
    established line of cases holding that the United States
    cannot, based on laches or estoppel, render unenforceable
    otherwise valid Indian treaty rights. Our colleagues contend
    that these cases have been overruled by City of Sherrill v.
    12            UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON
    Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 
    544 U.S. 197
     (2005), and that
    laches applies here.
    This contention is belied by Sherrill itself. In 1788, the
    Oneida Indian Nation (“OIN”), located in New York State,
    had a reservation of 300,000 acres. By 1920, the OIN had
    sold off all but 32 acres. In 1985, the Supreme Court held
    that the sale of OIN lands had been illegal, and that the OIN
    was entitled to monetary compensation for the sales. County
    of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 
    470 U.S. 226
    (1985). The OIN subsequently bought two parcels of land
    within the boundaries of its ancestral reservation. The
    parcels had been sold to a non-Indian in 1807. The OIN
    asserted that the repurchased parcels were sovereign tribal
    property and therefore free from local taxation. The
    Supreme Court disagreed. It wrote, “[T]he Tribe cannot
    unilaterally revive its ancient sovereignty . . . over the
    parcels at issue. The Oneidas long ago relinquished the reins
    of government and cannot regain them through open market
    purchases from current titleholders.” Sherrill, 
    544 U.S. at 203
    .
    The case before us is different from Sherrill. The
    question in our case is not whether, as in Sherrill, a tribe can
    reassert sovereignty over land within the boundaries of an
    abandoned reservation. The Tribes have not abandoned their
    reservations. Nor is the question whether, as in Sherrill, the
    Tribes have acted to relinquish their rights under the
    Treaties. The Tribes have done nothing to authorize the
    State to construct and maintain barrier culverts. Nor, finally,
    is the question whether, as in Sherrill, to allow the revival of
    disputes or claims that have long been dormant. Washington
    and the Tribes have been in a continuous state of conflict
    over treaty-based fishing rights for well over one hundred
    years.
    UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON                   13
    IV. Breadth of the Injunction
    Fourth, our colleagues contend that the injunction is
    overbroad. The United States requested an injunction that
    would have required the remediation of all of the State’s
    barrier culverts within five years. The district court declined
    that request. Instead, it issued a nuanced injunction
    requiring the remediation of some, but not all, of the barrier
    culverts within seventeen years.
    Briefly stated, the injunction provides as follows. The
    only seriously debated culverts are those under the control
    of the Washington State Department of Transportation
    (“WSDOT”). The court ordered the State to prepare a list of
    all of WSDOT barrier culverts within the area covered by
    the Treaties. In Paragraph 6 of the injunction, the court
    ordered WSDOT to provide, within seventeen years, fish
    passage for each barrier culvert with more than 200 linear
    meters of accessible salmon habitat upstream to the first
    natural passage barrier. In Paragraph 7, the court ordered
    WSDOT to replace existing barrier culverts above which
    there was less than 200 linear meters of upstream accessible
    salmon habitat only at the “end of the useful life” of the
    culverts, or sooner “as part of a highway project.” In
    Paragraph 8, the court allowed WSDOT to defer correction
    of some of the culverts described in Paragraph 6. Deferred
    culverts can account for up to ten percent of the total
    accessible upstream habitat from the culverts described in
    Paragraph 6. WSDOT can choose which culverts to defer,
    after consulting with the United States and the Tribes.
    Culverts deferred under Paragraph 8 need only be replaced
    on the more lenient schedule specified in Paragraph 7.
    The injunction thus divided WSDOT barrier culverts
    into two categories. High priority category culverts must be
    remediated within seventeen years. Low priority category
    14            UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON
    culverts must be remediated only at the end of the natural
    life of the existing culvert, or in connection with a highway
    project that would otherwise require replacement of the
    culvert. Deferred culverts in the high priority category
    (culverts blocking a total of ten percent of the accessible
    upstream habitat above all the high priority culverts) can be
    remediated on the schedule of low priority culverts.
    In identifying the State’s barrier culverts and sorting
    them into the two categories, the district court focused on the
    amount of available upstream spawning habitat before
    encountering a natural barrier. Culverts with more than
    200 linear meters of accessible upstream habitat are in the
    high category; culverts with less than 200 meters are in the
    low category. The court ignored the existence of man-made
    barriers, including those downstream of the State’s barrier
    culverts. In so doing, the court followed the methodology of
    the State in identifying and prioritizing culverts that should
    be remediated. The State could have objected to the court’s
    reliance on its own methodology, but it did not do so.
    There were good reasons for the district court to ignore,
    for purposes of its injunction, the existence of downstream
    barriers. The most obvious reason is the following: The
    State identified a total of 817 state-owned barrier culverts,
    including both high and low priority culverts. On streams
    where there are both state and non-state barrier culverts,
    there are 1,590 non-state culverts. Of those, 1,370 are
    upstream of the state culverts; only 220 are downstream. Of
    those 220 downstream culverts, 152 allow partial passage of
    salmon; only 68 entirely block passage.
    Even if we were to make the assumption that all 817 of
    the identified barrier culverts are high priority culverts
    (which they clearly are not), state-provided documents
    introduced at trial showed that roughly 230 of them—more
    UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON                   15
    than all of the 220 non-state downstream culverts
    combined—need not be remediated within seventeen years.
    They may be deferred and need be remediated only at the
    end of their natural life or in connection with an
    independently undertaken highway project.           Further,
    Washington law already imposes some obligation on the part
    of owners of non-state barrier culverts to repair or replace
    them, at their own expense, to allow fish passage.
    Our dissenting colleagues emphasize the high cost of
    complying with the injunction. Our colleagues, like the
    State, exaggerate the cost. The State claimed in its brief to
    us that compliance with the injunction will cost a total of
    $1.88 billion. Our colleagues highlight that figure at the
    beginning of their dissent. There is no plausible basis for the
    State’s claim of $1.88 billion. We analyze the evidence in
    detail in our opinion, to which we refer the reader. For
    present purposes, it is sufficient to note, as we point out in
    our opinion, that “Washington’s cost estimates are not
    supported by the evidence.” United States v. Washington,
    853 F.3d at 976.
    ***
    In sum, the district court properly found that Washington
    State violated the Treaties by acting affirmatively to build
    state-owned roads, and to build and maintain salmon-
    blocking culverts under those roads. By allowing passage of
    water, the culverts protect the State’s roads. But by not
    allowing passage of fish, the culverts kill the Tribes’ salmon.
    There is ample evidence in the record that remediation of the
    State’s barrier culverts will have a substantial beneficial
    effect on salmon populations, resulting in more harvestable
    salmon for the Tribes. As an incidental result, there will also
    be more harvestable salmon for non-Indians. The United
    States requested an injunction requiring remediation of all of
    16               UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON
    the State’s barrier culverts within five years. The district
    court crafted a careful, nuanced injunction, giving the United
    States much less than it requested. We unanimously
    concluded that the district court properly found a violation
    of the Treaties by the State, and that it acted within its
    discretion in formulating its remedial injunction.
    O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge, * with whom KOZINSKI,
    TALLMAN, CALLAHAN, BEA, IKUTA, and N.R.
    SMITH, Circuit Judges, join, and with whom BYBEE and
    M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, join as to all but Part IV,
    respecting the denial of rehearing en banc:
    Fashioning itself as a twenty-first century environmental
    regulator, our court has discovered a heretofore unknown
    duty in the Stevens Indian Treaties of 1854 and 1855. The
    panel opinion in this case enables the United States, as a
    Treaty signatory, to compel a State government to spend
    $1.88 billion 1 to create additional salmon habitat by
    *
    As a judge of this court in senior status, I no longer have the power
    to vote on calls for rehearing cases en banc or formally to join a dissent
    from failure to rehear en banc. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 46
    (c); Fed. R. App. P.
    35(a). Following our court’s general orders, however, I may participate
    in discussions of en banc proceedings. See Ninth Circuit General Order
    5.5(a).
    1
    According to the State’s estimate. There is a dispute about the
    actual cost of the injunction, but even using the more conservative
    estimates on which the district court relied, the cost of replacing all
    817 culverts ranges from $538 million to $1.5 billion (the average cost
    of replacing a culvert was $658,639 to $1,827,168). See United States v.
    Washington, 
    853 F.3d 946
    , 976 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Washington V”).
    UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON                          17
    removing or replacing culverts 2 under state-maintained
    highways and roads, wherever found. Pacific Northwest
    salmon litigation has been ongoing for almost fifty years, 3
    has been before our court multiple times, and has been up to
    and down from the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, it
    apparently just occurred to the Tribes, the United States, and
    our court that in order to fulfill nineteenth century federal
    treaty obligations, the State of Washington must now be
    required to remove physical barriers which might impede the
    passage of salmon. See Washington V, 853 F.3d at 966.
    Given the significance of this case—both in terms of
    dollars and potential precedential effect—it seemed the ideal
    candidate for en banc review and, hopefully, correction on
    the merits. But rather than reining in a runaway decision, our
    court has chosen to do nothing—tacitly affirming the panel
    opinion’s erroneous reasoning.
    With utmost respect, I believe our court has made a
    regrettable choice.
    I
    In reaching its conclusion, the panel opinion makes four
    critical errors.
    2
    A culvert is “[a] tunnel carrying a stream or open drain
    under a road or railway.” Culvert, OxfordDictionaries.com,
    https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/culvert (last visited April
    29, 2017).
    3
    Five iterations of the United States v. Washington litigation,
    including this case, which is referred to as Washington V, are mentioned
    herein and are referred to as Washington I, Washington II, etc.
    18              UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON
    First, it misreads Washington v. Washington State
    Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association
    (“Fishing Vessel”), 
    443 U.S. 658
     (1979), as requiring
    Washington to ensure that there are a certain “number of
    fish” available for the Tribes, “sufficient to provide a
    ‘moderate living.’” Washington V, 853 F.3d at 965 (quoting
    Fishing Vessel, 
    443 U.S. at 686
    ).
    Second, by holding that culverts need to be removed
    because they negatively impact the fish population, the panel
    opinion sets up precedent that could be used to challenge
    activities that affect wildlife habitat in other western states,
    which led Idaho and Montana to join Washington in
    requesting rehearing. The panel opinion fails to articulate a
    limiting legal principle that will prevent its holding from
    being used to attack a variety of development, construction,
    and farming practices, not just in Washington but throughout
    the Pacific Northwest.
    Third, the panel opinion contravenes City of Sherrill v.
    Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 
    544 U.S. 197
     (2005), by
    refusing to apply the doctrine of laches to the United States.
    Fourth, the panel opinion upholds an injunction that is
    overbroad—requiring the State to spend millions of dollars
    on repairs that will have no immediate effect on salmon
    habitat.
    II
    The Stevens Treaties 4 provide that “[t]he right of taking
    fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is
    The Treaties are a series of Senate-ratified agreements between the
    4
    United States and various Indian tribes that were negotiated in the 1850s
    UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON                           19
    further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens
    of the Territory.” Fishing Vessel, 
    443 U.S. at 674
    . The
    precise contours of this guarantee remain hotly contested but
    were most fully addressed by the Supreme Court’s opinion
    in Fishing Vessel.
    A
    The panel opinion reads language in Fishing Vessel as
    requiring that there be enough fish to provide a “moderate
    living” for the Tribes. See Washington V, 853 F.3d at 965–
    66. It is true that the Court stated that “Indian treaty rights to
    a natural resource [i.e. fish]. . . secures so much as, but no
    more than, is necessary to provide the Indians with a
    livelihood—that is to say, a moderate living.” Fishing
    Vessel, 
    443 U.S. at 686
    . In isolation, this statement might be
    read as guaranteeing the Tribes a certain number of fish, but
    only if one ignores the rest of the opinion. In Fishing Vessel,
    the Supreme Court adopted the United States’ position that
    the Treaties entitled the Tribes “either to a 50% share of the
    ‘harvestable’ fish” passing through their fishing grounds “or
    to their needs, whichever was less.” 
    Id. at 670
     (emphasis
    added); see also 
    id.
     at 685–86.
    by Isaac Stevens, then-federal Governor and Superintendent of Indian
    Affairs of the Washington Territory (pre-statehood), under which the
    Tribes agreed to give up land in exchange for monetary payments.
    Fishing Vessel, 
    443 U.S. at
    661–62, 666. The Treaties contained clauses
    reserving the Tribes’ right to fish on ceded land. See, e.g., Treaty of
    Medicine Creek, 
    10 Stat. 1132
     (1854). Beginning with U.S. District
    Court Judge George Boldt’s decision in 1974, United States v. State of
    Washington, 
    384 F. Supp. 312
     (W.D. Wash. 1974) (“Washington I”), the
    contours of these fishing rights have been the subject of extensive
    litigation before the district court, our court, and the Supreme Court and
    tumultuous protests by the people impacted by these decisions.
    20            UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON
    Thus, notwithstanding the significance of fish to the
    Tribes, the Court recognized that “some ceiling should be
    placed on the Indians’ apportionment to prevent their needs
    from exhausting the entire resource and thereby frustrating
    the treaty right of ‘all [other] citizens of the Territory.’” Id.
    at 686. The Court ruled that 50% of the available fish was
    the appropriate limit. See id. (“[T]he 50% figure imposes a
    maximum . . . allocation.”) (“[T]he maximum possible
    allocation to the Indians is fixed at 50%.”); id. at 686 n.27
    (“Because the 50% figure is only a ceiling, it is not correct
    to characterize our holding as ‘guaranteeing the Indians a
    specified percentage’ of the fish.”).
    Such ceiling makes intuitive sense. With or without pre-
    existing barriers, the population of fish varies dramatically
    from year to year and season to season. In a year with a low
    run of fish, absent a ceiling, the Tribes’ needs could easily
    predominate, leaving few fish for other citizens. Thus, to
    protect the rights of all parties to the Treaties, the Court
    imposed a 50% ceiling.
    Since the fish population varies, however, the presence
    of the ceiling necessarily entails that the Tribes may not
    always receive enough fish to provide a “moderate living.”
    Indeed, the Court emphasized that the Treaties secured to the
    Tribes “a fair share of the available fish,” rather than a
    certain number of fish. Id. at 685 (emphasis added). The total
    number of fish that the Tribes receive indubitably will vary
    with the run of fish. See id. at 679 (observing that the
    Treaties “secure the Indians’ right to take a share of each run
    of fish that passes through tribal fishing areas” (emphasis
    added)); id. at 687 (discussing the “50% allocation of an
    entire run that passes through . . . customary fishing
    grounds”).
    UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON                         21
    Thus, by imposing a percentage ceiling tied to the
    relevant run rather than a fixed numerical floor, the Court
    rejected the proposition that the Tribes were entitled to a
    certain number of fish. Indeed, “while the maximum
    possible allocation to the Indians is fixed at 50%, the
    minimum is not; the latter will, upon proper submissions to
    the District Court, be modified in response to changing
    circumstances.” 5 Id. at 686–87. Our court has confirmed this
    holding multiple times.
    In United States v. Washington, 
    759 F.2d 1353
    , 1359
    (9th Cir. 1985) (“Washington III”), our en banc court
    explained:
    [T]he Supreme Court in Fishing Vessel did
    not hold that the Tribes were entitled to any
    particular minimum allocation of fish.
    Instead, Fishing Vessel mandates an
    allocation of 50 percent of the fish to the
    Indians, subject to downward revision if
    moderate living needs can be met with less.
    The Tribes have a right to at most one-half of
    the harvestable fish in the case area.
    
    Id.
     (emphasis added). Likewise in Midwater Trawlers Co-
    operative v. Department of Commerce, 
    282 F.3d 710
    , 719
    (9th Cir. 2002), we observed that under Fishing Vessel, the
    Makah Tribe was entitled “to one-half the harvestable
    surplus of Pacific whiting that passes through its usual and
    5
    Such changing circumstances include the Tribes finding “other
    sources of support that lead it to abandon its fisheries.” Id. at 687.
    Washington does not present this contention, but arguably the tribal
    economy has changed dramatically since the enactment of the Stevens
    Treaties, leading the Tribes to rely less on fish for their subsistence.
    22            UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON
    accustomed fishing grounds, or that much of the harvestable
    surplus as is necessary for tribal subsistence, whichever is
    less.” Id. (emphasis added). Most recently in Skokomish
    Indian Tribe v. United States, 
    410 F.3d 506
    , 513 (9th Cir.
    2005), our en banc court again described Fishing Vessel as
    holding that the Tribes were “entitled to an equal measure of
    the harvestable portion of each run that passed through a
    ‘usual and accustomed’ tribal fishing ground, adjusted
    downward if tribal needs could be satisfied by a lesser
    amount.” 
    Id.
     (emphasis added) (quoting Fishing Vessel,
    
    443 U.S. at
    685–89).
    By holding that the Treaties guarantee “that the number
    of fish would always be sufficient to provide a ‘moderate
    living’ to the Tribes,” Washington V, 853 F.3d at 965
    (emphasis added), the panel opinion turns Fishing Vessel on
    its head. It imposes an affirmative duty upon the State to
    provide a certain quantity of fish, which reads out the 50%
    ceiling entirely.
    Instead, the panel opinion ignores the 50% ceiling,
    effectively adopting the position urged by the Tribes in
    Fishing Vessel that “the treaties had reserved a pre-existing
    right to as many fish as their commercial and subsistence
    needs dictated.” 
    443 U.S. at 670
    . Yet, as explained, the
    Supreme Court has already rejected this approach, following
    instead the United States’ position that the Tribes were
    guaranteed the lesser of their needs or 50% of the available
    run. See 
    id. at 670, 685
    . Likewise, our court has rejected
    interpretations of Fishing Vessel that would entitle the Tribes
    to a “particular minimum allocation of fish.” Washington III,
    
    759 F.2d at 1359
    . The panel opinion’s holding misconstrues
    not only the Supreme Court’s decision in Fishing Vessel but
    also our decisions in Washington III, Midwater Trawlers,
    and Skokomish Indian Tribe.
    UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON                          23
    B
    To reach its conclusion, the panel points to various
    statements allegedly made by Governor Stevens to the
    Tribes at the time the Treaties were negotiated in the 1850s.
    Washington V, 853 F.3d at 964–65. As the Supreme Court
    observed in Fishing Vessel, however, “[b]ecause of the great
    abundance of fish and the limited population of the area, it
    simply was not contemplated that either party would
    interfere with the other’s fishing rights.” 
    443 U.S. at 668
    .
    Indeed, the Supreme Court considered the very same
    statements in Fishing Vessel yet still chose to impose a 50%
    cap on the Tribes’ share of available fish. See 
    id.
     at 666–68
    & nn. 9 & 11. 6 Such cap necessarily means that the Tribes
    are not always guaranteed enough fish to meet their needs.
    If the Supreme Court considered Stevens’ statements and
    declined to find that the Tribes were entitled to a certain
    minimum quantity of fish, it eludes me how a panel of our
    court can reach the opposite conclusion by relying on these
    statements now. The panel opinion utterly fails to grapple
    with the 50% cap imposed by Fishing Vessel.
    The panel opinion further cites to the Supreme Court’s
    opinion in Winters v. United States, 
    207 U.S. 564
    , 576–77
    (1908), and our opinion in United States v. Adair, 
    723 F.2d 1394
    , 1409, 1411 (9th Cir. 1983), as supporting its
    conclusion that the Stevens Treaties guarantee the Tribes a
    specific quantity of fish. Yet, neither Winters nor Adair is
    factually relevant. Each involved the question of whether
    certain tribes were entitled to various water rights on their
    reservations under the treaties creating the reservations.
    6
    In fact, the panel opinion quotes Fishing Vessel for some of these
    statements. See Washington V, 853 F.3d at 964–65.
    24            UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON
    In Winters, the Supreme Court held that the lands ceded
    to create the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation necessarily
    included the water rights accompanying such lands. See
    
    207 U.S. at 565
    , 576–77. Likewise in Adair, we held “that at
    the time the Klamath Reservation was established, the
    [United States] and the Tribe intended to reserve a quantity
    of the water flowing through the reservation.” 723 F.2d at
    1410. Thus, both cases stand for the somewhat unremarkable
    proposition that in the context of Native American
    reservations, water rights accompany land rights.
    It is true that both cases found water rights that were not
    explicitly detailed in the text of the treaties. Nonetheless, if
    we read these cases broadly to mean that we can and should
    infer a whole host of rights not contained in the four corners
    of tribal treaties, the possibilities are endless. Since the
    Supreme Court made it plain in Fishing Vessel that the
    Tribes are not entitled to a certain numerical amount of fish,
    we certainly should not rely on Winters and Adair to hold
    otherwise.
    III
    Even if one agrees with the panel opinion that the Tribes
    are entitled to a specific quantity of fish, however, it does not
    necessarily mean that the installation and maintenance of
    culverts run afoul of the Treaties. But assuming that they do,
    it is far from clear that the drastic remedy of removal or
    repair should be required.
    A
    Before reaching its conclusion that the State violated the
    Treaties, the panel opinion devotes minimal treatment to
    showing (1) that tribal members would engage in more
    fishing if there were more salmon and (2) that removing
    UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON                             25
    culverts would increase this salmon population. See
    Washington V, 853 F.3d at 966 (devoting three paragraphs
    to these issues). 7 The panel opinion acknowledges that the
    State of Washington was not intentionally trying to impact
    the fish population when it installed culverts under state
    highways and other roads. 8 Id. Nonetheless, the panel
    opinion concludes that because there was evidence that
    culverts affect fish population, and because the fish
    population is low, the State violated the Treaties by building
    and maintaining its culverts. See id.
    This overly broad reasoning lacks legal foundation.
    There are many factors that affect fish population and
    multiple fish populations that are low. 9 Is any surface
    physical activity, wherever found, that negatively affects
    7
    The panel opinion provides more factual support for the
    proposition that culverts adversely affect the population of salmon in
    considering the injunction, see Washington V, 853 F.3d at 972–75, but at
    that point it had already found that the Treaties were violated.
    8
    The concurrence makes the extravagant assertion that I maintain
    that the Treaties allow the State to act “affirmatively to entirely eliminate
    the supply of harvestable salmon.” What utter nonsense! I said no such
    thing! In building and maintaining the culverts, the State was not acting
    affirmatively to destroy the salmon population—any negative effects
    were incidental—as the panel opinion acknowledged. See Washington
    V, 853 F.3d at 966. Far from seeking to eliminate the salmon population,
    the State recognizes that it is a treasured resource and has spent millions
    of dollars on programs specifically designed to preserve, to protect, and
    to enhance the salmon population.
    9
    See, e.g., Washington Department of Fish & Wildlife,
    Washington’s Native Char, http://wdfw.wa.gov/fishing/char/ (noting
    that the bull trout population is “low and in some cases declining”).
    26             UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON
    fish habitat an automatic Treaty violation? If so, the panel’s
    opinion could open the door to a whole host of future suits.
    While such speculation may sound far-fetched, in
    actuality, it is already occurring. Legal commentators have
    noted that plaintiffs could use the panel’s decision to demand
    the removal of dams and attack a host of other practices that
    can degrade fish habitat (such as logging, grazing, and
    construction). 10 The panel does nothing to cabin its opinion.
    Nor does it provide any detail for how to determine if a fish
    population has reached an appropriate size, making further
    remedial efforts unnecessary.
    B
    Furthermore, the future reach of this decision extends far
    beyond the State of Washington. As the amici observe, the
    same fishing rights are reserved to tribes in Idaho, Montana,
    and Oregon. Further, the Stevens Treaties also guarantee the
    Tribes the privilege of hunting. See Fishing Vessel, 
    443 U.S. at 674
    . There seems little doubt that future litigants will
    argue that the population of various birds, deer, elk, bears,
    and similar animals, which were traditionally hunted by the
    Tribes, have been impacted by Western development. If a
    court subsequently concludes that hunting populations are
    covered by the reasoning of this decision, the potential
    impact of this case is virtually limitless.
    C
    Yet, our court has already held that the Stevens Treaties
    cannot be used to attach broad “environmental servitudes”
    See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Indian Treaty Fishing Rights and
    10
    the Environment: Affirming the Right to Habitat Protection and
    Restoration, 
    92 Wash. L. Rev. 1
    , 29–31 (2017).
    UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON                           27
    to the land. See United States v. Washington, 
    694 F.2d 1374
    ,
    1381 (9th Cir. 1982) (coining the term “environmental
    servitude”), vacated on reh’g, Washington III, 
    759 F.2d at
    1354–55 (but reaching similar result). Thus, in Washington
    III, our en banc court vacated a declaratory judgment from
    the district court which held “that the treaties impose upon
    the State a corresponding duty to refrain from degrading or
    authorizing the degradation of the fish habitat to an extent
    that would deprive the treaty Indians of their moderate living
    needs.” 
    759 F.2d at 1355
    , vacating United States v.
    Washington, 
    506 F. Supp. 187
    , 208 (W.D. Wash. 1980)
    (“Washington II”). While the panel’s opinion here deals with
    the specific issue of culverts, its reasoning is not so confined;
    it effectively imposes the same boundless standard upon the
    State—preventing habitat degradation—that we rejected in
    Washington III.
    D
    Once a court has decided that there has been a violation,
    it must address the remedy. The panel opinion acknowledges
    “that correction of barrier culverts is only one of a number
    of measures that can usefully be taken to increase salmon
    production.” 11 Washington V, 853 F.3d at 974. And, the
    panel opinion further concedes “that the benefits of culvert
    correction differ depending on the culvert in question.” Id.
    Yet, if culverts are only one “measure” that could affect the
    salmon population, what about the other measures? Why is
    it appropriate to require the State to correct culverts rather
    11
    Indeed, the State argues that while the culverts have been in place,
    the fish harvest has fluctuated dramatically from “nearly 11 million fish
    in 1985” to “900,000 fish” in 1999, and then back to “over 4 million fish
    by 2003.” Such evidence tends to suggest that culverts are not a primary
    driver of fish population.
    28               UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON
    than something else? Since, at some level, almost all urban
    growth can impact fish populations, should the State be
    required to reverse decades of development in an effort to
    increase the number of fish? Is the answer that any activity
    that amounts to a Treaty violation must be halted or
    removed? The panel opinion offers no cost-benefit analysis,
    or any other framework, to guide future courts on what is an
    appropriate remedial measure (and what is not). 12
    In effect, the panel’s decision opens a backdoor to a
    whole host of potential federal environmental regulation-
    making. And, it invites courts, who have limited expertise in
    this area, to serve as policymakers.
    But the issues at the heart of this suit—development
    versus wildlife habitat, removal versus accommodation—
    are properly left to the political process. Judges are ill-
    equipped to evaluate these questions. We deal in closed
    records and have difficulty obtaining and evaluating on-the-
    ground information—for example, which culverts it would
    be most cost-effective to remove over the next seventeen
    years.
    Here, the State recognizes that “[s]almon are vital to
    Washington’s economy, culture, and diet.” Prior to the
    injunction, the State was already working to address
    problematic culverts, and the State has spent “hundreds of
    12
    It seems highly likely that if the panel opinion had engaged in such
    cost-benefit analysis, there would be more cost-effective ways to remedy
    the alleged Treaties violation. For example, a 1997 state report estimated
    that if the State replaced the culverts maintained by the Washington State
    Department of Transportation (which controls a majority of culverts), it
    would result in an annual increase of 200,000 salmon. Washington V,
    853 F.3d at 970. It might be cheaper to stock an additional 200,000
    salmon into Washington’s streams each year.
    UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON                    29
    millions of dollars” on programs designed “to preserve and
    restore salmon runs.” There is no justification for interfering
    with the State’s existing programs.
    IV
    Notably, the panel opinion does not prohibit the State
    from installing future culverts. Instead, it orders the State to
    correct existing culverts. See Washington V, 853 F.3d at
    979–80. Yet, according to the State, it was the federal
    government, now bringing suit in its capacity as trustee for
    the Tribes, which “specified the design for virtually all of the
    culverts at issue.” Further, these culverts have been in place
    for many decades. According to the State, “Washington’s
    state highway system has been essentially the same size
    since the 1960’s,” and thus presumably many culverts
    predated this litigation, which has been ongoing for almost
    fifty years. Apparently, however, no one thought that the
    culverts might be a problem until 2001 when the Tribes filed
    a request for determination that such pre-existing barriers
    were infringing the Treaties. See Washington V, 853 F.3d at
    954.
    Given the United States’ involvement in designing the
    culverts and its long acquiescence in their existence, one
    might suppose that an equitable doctrine such as laches
    would bar suit by the United States. Indeed, “[i]t is well
    established that laches, a doctrine focused on one side’s
    inaction and the other’s legitimate reliance, may bar long-
    dormant claims for equitable relief.” City of Sherrill,
    
    544 U.S. at 217
    .
    According to the panel opinion, however, “[t]he United
    States cannot, based on laches or estoppel, diminish or
    render unenforceable otherwise valid Indian treaty rights.”
    Washington V, 853 F.3d at 967. The panel opinion cites
    30            UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON
    several cases for this proposition, including the 1923 opinion
    of Cramer v. United States, 
    261 U.S. 219
    , 234 (1923)
    (holding that a government agent’s unauthorized acceptance
    of leases of tribal land could not bind the government or
    tribe), and United States v. Washington, 
    157 F.3d 630
    , 649
    (9th Cir. 1998) (“Washington IV”) (“[L]aches or estoppel is
    not available to defeat Indian treaty rights.”). See
    Washington V, 853 F.3d at 967.
    Yet, the panel opinion’s rejection of laches contravenes
    the Supreme Court’s subsequent 2005 decision in City of
    Sherrill, 
    544 U.S. at 221
    . That case involved an attempt by
    the Oneida Indian Nation to reassert sovereignty over newly-
    purchased land that had once belonged to the Nation but had
    been sold in contravention of federal law (although with the
    apparent acquiescence of federal agents) approximately two
    hundred years before. 
    Id.
     at 203–05, 211. In particular, the
    Nation sought to avoid local regulatory control and taxation
    of its newly-purchased parcels. 
    Id. at 211
    .
    The Supreme Court analogized the situation to a dispute
    between states, explaining that “long acquiescence may have
    controlling effect on the exercise of dominion and
    sovereignty over territory.” 
    Id. at 218
    . The Court further
    “recognized the impracticability of returning to Indian
    control land that generations earlier passed into numerous
    private hands.” 
    Id. at 219
    . Therefore, the Court concluded,
    “the Oneidas’ long delay in seeking equitable relief against
    New York or its local units, and developments in the city of
    Sherrill spanning several generations, evoke the doctrines of
    laches, acquiescence, and impossibility, and render
    inequitable the piecemeal shift in governance this suit seeks
    unilaterally to initiate.” 
    Id. at 221
    .
    Thus, Sherrill indicates that our court’s previous holding
    in Washington IV, 
    157 F.3d at 649
    , that laches cannot be
    UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON                  31
    used “to defeat Indian treaty rights” is wrong and impliedly
    overruled. Cf. Miller v. Gammie, 
    335 F.3d 889
    , 900 (9th Cir.
    2003). The Second Circuit has recognized as much,
    observing that Sherrill “dramatically altered the legal
    landscape” by permitting “equitable doctrines, such as
    laches, acquiescence, and impossibility” to “be applied to
    Indian land claims.” Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki,
    
    413 F.3d 266
    , 273 (2d Cir. 2005).
    Yet, the panel opinion blindly cites Washington IV and
    sidesteps the central tenet of Sherrill by attempting to
    distinguish it on its facts. See Washington V, 853 F.3d at
    967–68. The panel opinion tries to draw three distinctions:
    (1) this case does not involve the question of whether the
    Tribes can regain sovereignty over abandoned land; (2) the
    Tribes never authorized the design or construction of the
    culverts; and (3) the Tribes are not trying to revive claims
    that have lain dormant. Id. at 968.
    The first distinction is irrelevant; since Sherrill made
    clear that laches can apply to Indian treaty rights, it should
    not matter whether a party is seeking to apply laches in the
    context of sovereignty over land or the enforcement of rights
    appurtenant to land (the ability to fish).
    Second, as Montana and Idaho observe, it does not
    matter that the Tribes never authorized the design or
    construction of the culverts because Washington is seeking
    to impose the doctrine of laches against the United States,
    not the Tribes. And, as the Second Circuit has made plain,
    the logic of Sherrill applies to the United States when it is
    acting as trustee for the Tribes. See Oneida Indian Nation v.
    Cty. of Oneida, 
    617 F.3d 114
    , 129 (2d Cir. 2010).
    Notably, only the United States could bring suit against
    Washington for alleged culvert violations because
    32            UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON
    Washington is protected by sovereign immunity against suit
    from the Tribes. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho,
    
    521 U.S. 261
    , 268 (1997). The panel opinion asserts that the
    United States cannot waive treaty rights, and this may be true
    as a general matter. Washington V, 853 F.3d at 967.
    Nonetheless, in the context of specific litigation, since the
    United States acts as the Tribes’ trustee, such representation
    necessarily entails the ability to waive certain litigation
    rights (failing to bring a claim within the statute of
    limitations for example). Thus, the fact that the Tribes did
    not authorize the culverts is irrelevant; the United States did,
    and it further failed to object to the culverts for many years.
    Finally, I disagree with the panel opinion’s assertion that
    the United States is not trying to revive claims that have lain
    dormant. Presumably, the State’s alleged violation of the
    Treaties was complete when it constructed the culverts (and
    relevant highways) in the 1960s. The United States first
    brought suit to enforce the Tribes’ fishing rights in 1970.
    Washington V, 853 F.3d at 958. Yet, the United States found
    no problem with the culverts until 2001. While the claims
    did not lie dormant for 200 years as in Sherrill, they were
    dormant for over 30 years. And as in Sherrill, there are
    significant practical issues involved with asserting the
    claims now such as the time, expense, and efficacy of
    removing the culverts. See 
    544 U.S. at 219
    .
    Thus, while Sherrill may be factually distinct, it is also
    directly on point. The panel opinion errs by ignoring its
    central teaching. There is good reason to contend that the
    United States is barred from bringing this suit by the doctrine
    of laches. And, if the United States is barred from suit, the
    entire suit is prohibited, since the Tribes cannot puncture the
    State’s defense of sovereign immunity on their own. See
    Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 
    521 U.S. at 268
    .
    UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON                  33
    Rather than taking the opportunity to harmonize our
    precedent, the panel opinion ignores the changes wrought by
    Sherrill, defying the Supreme Court’s direction.
    V
    Even if one concludes (1) that the Treaties guarantee the
    Tribes enough fish to sustain a “moderate living,” (2) that
    violation of such guarantee can and should be remedied by
    removing culverts, and (3) that the suit is not barred by the
    doctrine of laches, there is still good reason to reject the
    injunction itself as overbroad. As the State explains, the
    injunction requires it to replace or repair all 817 culverts
    located in the area covered by the Treaties without regard to
    whether replacement of a particular culvert actually will
    increase the available salmon habitat.
    In addition to state-owned culverts, there are a number
    of other privately-owned culverts and barriers on the streams
    in question which are not covered by the injunction. Where
    there are non-state-owned culverts blocking fish passage
    downstream or immediately upstream from state-owned
    culverts, replacement of the State’s culverts will make little
    or no difference on available salmon habitat. Indeed, the
    State observes that
    (1) roughly 90% of state barrier culverts are
    upstream or downstream of other barriers . . .
    (2) state-owned culverts are less than 25% of
    known barrier culverts . . . and (3) in many
    watersheds, non-state barrier culverts
    drastically exceed state-owned culverts, by
    up to a factor of 36 to 1[.]
    The panel attempted to address this issue in its revised
    opinion. First, the opinion quotes testimony from a former
    34             UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON
    State employee stating that Washington itself does not take
    into account the presence of non-state-owned barriers when
    calculating the priority index for which culverts to address.
    Washington V, 853 F.3d at 973. What the opinion does not
    reveal, however, is that this same expert also testified that
    correcting state-owned culverts that are downstream from
    non-state barriers “generally” will not have an immediate
    impact or benefit on salmon habitat. And, according to the
    State of Washington, the priority index, notwithstanding its
    name, typically does not dictate which barriers the State
    addresses first; instead the State focuses on culverts in
    streams without barriers.
    Next, the panel opinion points out that Washington law
    requires dams or other stream obstructions to include a
    fishway and observes that the State may take corrective
    action against private owners who fail to comply with this
    obligation. Washington V, 853 F.3d at 973 (quoting 
    Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 77.57.030
    (1)–(2)). Yet, what the panel
    opinion fails to disclose is that this law only went into effect
    in 2003 and specifically “grandfathered in” various
    obstructions that were installed before May 20, 2003. 
    Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 77.57.030
    (3). Presumably, some of the
    non-state barriers would fall under this exception.
    Finally, the panel opinion observes that
    [I]n 2009, on streams where there were both
    state and non-state barriers, 1,370 of the
    1,590 non-state barriers, or almost ninety
    percent, were upstream of the state barrier
    culverts. Sixty nine percent of the
    220 downstream non-state barriers allowed
    partial passage of fish. Of the 152 that
    allowed partial passage, “passability” was
    UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON                          35
    67% for 80 of the barriers and 33% for 72 of
    them.
    Washington V, 853 F.3d at 973.
    Given the significant cost of replacing barriers, however,
    being forced to replace even a single barrier that will have
    no tangible impact on the salmon population is an unjustified
    burden. Even using the most conservative estimates found
    by the district court, the average cost of replacing a single
    culvert is between $658,639 and $1,827,168. Washington V,
    853 F.3d at 976. 13 We do not know the precise number of
    state-owned culverts that are located above non-state-owned
    culverts which prevent all fish passage. Yet, considering that
    there are at least sixty-eight non-state-owned barriers
    blocking all passage downstream from state-owned
    culverts, 14 there are almost certainly more than one or two
    culverts whose replacement would have no impact
    whatsoever on salmon habitat. The panel’s opinion utterly
    fails to explain why the State should waste millions of
    dollars on such culverts in particular.
    Further, even if the majority of non-state barriers are
    upstream, the court should still take into account the location
    of these barriers. As noted, if a non-state upstream barrier is
    close to or immediately above a state barrier, replacing the
    13
    Contrary to the curious claim in the concurrence that the costs are
    exaggerated, these figures were relied upon in the panel’s own opinion!
    14
    Sixty-eight equals thirty-one percent of 220. See Washington V,
    853 F.3d at 973 (explaining that “[s]ixty nine percent of the
    220 downstream non-state barriers [i.e. 152 culverts] allowed partial
    passage of fish,” and thus by implication, thirty-one percent (i.e.
    68 culverts) blocked all passage).
    36               UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON
    state barrier will have little effect on the size of salmon
    habitat, but it will come at a significant cost to the State.
    The panel opinion observes that the injunction offers the
    State a longer schedule for replacing barriers that will open
    up less habitat. See Washington V, 853 F.3d at 974–75. It
    may be advantageous to the State to have the cost spread out
    over a longer time period, but whether it occurs five years or
    twenty-five years from now, the panel opinion fails to
    explain why taxpayers should be required to replace barriers
    that will not change the available salmon habitat. 15
    Thus, significant overbreadth problems remain. There is
    no doubt that the record in this case is voluminous and
    pinpointing the specific culverts whose removal might
    actually impact the available salmon habitat is an arduous
    task. Both the panel and district court made a valiant effort
    to wade through the many pages of maps and statistics. 16 As
    it currently stands, however, the injunction is unsupportable.
    VI
    In sum, there were many reasons to rehear this case en
    banc. The panel opinion’s reasoning ignores the Court’s
    holding in Fishing Vessel and our own cases, is incredibly
    broad, and if left unchecked, could significantly affect
    15
    In addition to the obvious financial cost to the State, there is also
    a broader cost to residents. Shortly after the panel’s opinion was issued,
    various news stories informed residents of highway closings resulting
    from the repair of culverts associated with the injunction. See, e.g.,
    KIRO7, S[R] 167 to be closed all weekend from Sumner to Auburn (Aug.
    19, 2016), http://www.kiro7.com/news/local/sb-167-to-be-closed-all-
    weekend-from-sumner-to-auburn/426411799.
    16
    Indeed, the difficulties of crafting an appropriate injunction
    illustrate why it is an undertaking best left to the State.
    UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON                    37
    natural resource management throughout the Pacific
    Northwest, inviting judges to become environmental
    regulators. By refusing to consider the doctrine of laches, the
    panel opinion further disregards the Supreme Court’s
    decision in Sherrill, relying instead on outdated and
    impliedly overruled precedent from our court. Finally, the
    panel opinion imposes a poorly-tailored injunction which
    will needlessly cost the State hundreds of millions of dollars.
    Rather than correcting these errors, our court has chosen
    the path of least resistance. We should have reheard this case
    en banc.
    Separate Statement of HURWITZ, Circuit Judge:
    The dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc
    unfortunately perpetuates the false notion that the full court’s
    refusal to exercise its discretion under Federal Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 35(a) is tantamount to the court “tacitly
    affirming the panel opinion’s erroneous reasoning.” This
    effectively rewrites Rule 35(a). The Rule is entirely
    discretionary, providing that the court “may order” rehearing
    en banc, and cautioning that such an order “is not favored”
    and is reserved for “a question of exceptional importance”
    or “to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s
    decisions.”
    Like the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court, the
    denial of rehearing en banc simply leaves a panel decision
    undisturbed. There are at least as many valid reasons for a
    circuit judge to decide not to vote to rehear a case en banc as
    there are for a Supreme Court justice to decide not to vote to
    grant certiorari. Indeed, there is at least one additional
    reason—Supreme Court review remains available to the
    38            UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON
    losing litigant in our court, so it is not necessary that each of
    us have the last word on every case. No one would suggest
    that when the Supreme Court exercises its discretion not to
    grant certiorari, it is “tacitly affirming” the decision below.
    No different legal or factual conclusion can be made here.
    Judges on our court—even those who cannot participate
    in the voting—are entirely free to criticize the court’s failure
    to grant rehearing en banc and express their own views as to
    why a panel decision is incorrect. But it is not correct to
    impute hidden meanings to the discretionary decisions of
    others. When a judge chooses not to indicate views on the
    merits of a controversy, colleagues should not invent them.