Carlos Villalta v. City and County of San Francisco , 448 F. App'x 697 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             AUG 23 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CARLOS VILLALTA; ANTHONY                         No. 10-16006
    PADILLA; GILBERT GUERRA;
    DANIEL PEREZ,                                    D.C. No. 3:08-cv-04958-CRB
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    MEMORANDUM *
    v.
    CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
    FRANCISCO,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted August 9, 2011
    San Francisco, California
    Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, O’SCANNLAIN and BEA, Circuit Judges.
    Gilberto Guerra, Daniel Perez, Anthony Padilla, and Carlos Villalta appeal
    from a grant of summary judgment to the City and County of San Francisco
    Municipal Transportation Agency (“MTA”) on their Title VII disparate treatment
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    claims. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    12 U.S.C. § 1291
    . Reviewing de novo,
    Anthoine v. N. Cent. Counties Consortium, 
    605 F.3d 740
    , 747 (9th Cir. 2010), we
    affirm.
    Guerra failed to establish a prima facie case of workplace discrimination or
    retaliation because restricting his access to a computer database and to a
    photocopier did not “materially affect the compensation, terms, conditions, or
    privileges of employment.” Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 
    520 F.3d 1080
    , 1089 (9th
    Cir. 2008) (discussing the third element of disparate impact claims) (internal
    alterations omitted); see Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 
    229 F.3d 917
    , 928 (9th Cir.
    2000) (applying similar standard to retaliation).
    Even assuming Perez made out a prima facie case of discrimination, his
    work-related misconduct constituted a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for
    his dismissal. Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 
    439 F.3d 1018
    , 1028 (9th
    Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Perez adduced no evidence that the
    employer’s reason was pretextual.
    Padilla and Villalta each made out prima facie cases of disparate treatment
    by showing that each was passed over for a promotion for which he was qualified
    in favor of a Caucasian employee. See Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 
    26 F.3d 885
    , 889
    (9th Cir. 1994). But MTA brought forward admissible evidence that it promoted
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    individuals who were rated as more highly qualified than either Padilla or Villalta
    during the interview process. And unlike the plaintiffs, neither had disciplinary
    records. Neither Padilla nor Villalta has brought forth evidence creating a triable
    issue of fact as to whether MTA’s explanation was “unworthy of credence.”
    Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 
    424 F.3d 1027
    , 1037, 1040–41 (9th Cir.
    2005) (applying the standard enunciated by Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 
    539 U.S. 90
     (2003)).
    For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s summary judgment in favor of
    MTA is AFFIRMED.
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