Lovell Brown v. B. Curry , 451 F. App'x 693 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             OCT 05 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LOVELL S. BROWN,                                 No. 09-16162
    Petitioner - Appellant,           D.C. No. 2:07-cv-01474-MCE
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    B. CURRY, Warden and ATTORNEY
    GENERAL,
    Respondents - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted September 27, 2011 **
    Before:        HAWKINS, SILVERMAN, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
    California state prisoner Lovell S. Brown appeals from the district court’s
    dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition as untimely. We have
    jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    As the district court determined, the statute of limitations was triggered on
    the date Brown’s conviction became final because Brown knew or could have
    known the factual predicate of his claims by that time. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
    Because Brown waited over three years from that date to file his federal petition,
    his claims are time-barred. See 
    id. His state
    habeas petitions, which were filed
    after the expiration of the statute of limitations and denied as untimely, did not toll
    the statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Jiminez v. Rice, 
    276 F.3d 478
    , 482 (9th
    Cir. 2001) (federal petition is time-barred where state habeas petition is first filed
    after expiration of the statute); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 
    544 U.S. 408
    , 417 (2005) (a
    petition deemed untimely by the state court is not “properly filed” so as to entitle a
    petitioner to statutory tolling). Moreover, Brown has not made a credible showing
    of actual innocence sufficient to allow review of his time-barred claims. See Lee v.
    Lampert, No. 09-35276, 
    2011 WL 3275947
    , at *2, *13 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2011).
    We are in receipt of Brown’s letter, dated September 21, 2011. Nothing in
    the letter affects the timeliness of Brown’s petition. Furthermore, state law
    sentencing errors, if any, are not cognizable on habeas review. See Miller v.
    Vasquez, 
    868 F.2d 1116
    , 1118-19 (9th Cir. 1989).
    Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.
    AFFIRMED.
    2                                    09-16162
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-16162

Citation Numbers: 451 F. App'x 693

Judges: Hawkins, Silverman, Fletcher

Filed Date: 10/5/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024