Karl Snowdon v. Preferred Rv Resort Owners Association ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                                FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                MAY 18 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    KARL SNOWDON; et al.,                              No. 09-15877
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,            D.C. No. 2:08-cv-01094-RCJ-PAL
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    PREFERRED RV RESORT OWNERS
    ASSOCIATION, a Nevada corporation,
    DBA Preferred RV Resort; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted May 12, 2010
    San Francisco, California
    Before: SILVERMAN, FISHER and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their civil rights action for lack of subject
    matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The district
    court found that Defendants, a private corporation and some its employees and
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    -2-
    board members, were not state actors for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
    district court also denied Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm on alternative grounds
    supported by the record: summary judgment. See Ventura Mobilehome
    Communities Owners Ass’n v. City of San Buenaventura, 
    371 F.3d 1046
    , 1051 n.4
    (9th Cir. 2004).
    The color of law requirement is an element of a § 1983 claim. See, e.g.,
    Johnson v. Knowles, 
    113 F.3d 1114
    , 1117 (9th Cir. 1997). Failure to establish a
    threshold fact does not deprive federal courts of “authority to adjudicate the claim
    in suit.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 
    546 U.S. 500
    , 511 (2006); see also York v.
    Story, 
    324 F.2d 450
    , 453 (9th Cir. 1963) (holding that allegations of a civil rights
    violation are “enough to establish district court jurisdiction, whether or not
    appellant succeeded in stating such a claim”). Defendants moved for both
    dismissal and summary judgment in the district court, and the court went beyond
    the complaint to find a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We therefore address
    this appeal under the framework of summary judgment.
    First, the district court properly rejected both of Plaintiffs’ theories of state
    action. Defendant Preferred RV Resort did not perform the traditional and
    exclusive public function of municipal governance. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326
    -3-
    U.S. 501 (1946). Rather, Preferred RV Resort provided an assortment of basic
    amenities and simple services to its paying members, all within the fenced-in
    confines of its private property. Plaintiffs failed to show that Preferred RV Resort
    had “assum[ed] . . . all of the attributes of a state-created municipality” and
    “exercise[d] . . . semi-official municipal functions as a delegate of the State.”
    Hudgens v. NLRB, 
    424 U.S. 507
    , 519 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Moreover, Defendants are not state actors on the basis of exercising eminent
    domain power delegated to them by the state, see Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co.,
    
    419 U.S. 345
    , 353 (1974), because they had no such power, see Nev. Rev. Stat.
    §§ 37.0097, 116.1108. To the extent that Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of a
    property interest, Plaintiffs may have a state law claim for ejectment. See, e.g.,
    LeMon v. Landers, 
    402 P.2d 648
    (Nev. 1965).
    Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion by tacitly rejecting
    Plaintiffs’ request under Rule 56(f) for further discovery prior to resolution of
    Defendants’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. Plaintiffs identified
    mechanisms through which they wished to obtain further discovery but did not
    specify the subjects of proposed depositions and document requests. They
    therefore failed to show “‘what facts additional discovery could produce that
    would affect’” the summary judgment analysis. Cheyenne Arapaho Tribes v.
    -4-
    United States, 
    558 F.3d 592
    , 596 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Mwani v. bin Laden, 
    417 F.3d 1
    , 17 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
    Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiffs
    leave to amend their complaint. Amendment would have been futile, as Plaintiffs
    merely proposed to amend their pleadings to incorporate evidence put forward in
    opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. As explained above,
    these facts are insufficient to state a claim. See Gardner v. Martino, 
    563 F.3d 981
    ,
    990 (9th Cir. 2009).
    The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
    AFFIRMED.