Michael Blomquist v. Washington Mutual , 384 F. App'x 665 ( 2010 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 21 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL BLOMQUIST, d.b.a. Michael No. 08-16910
Scott Properties, Inc.,
D.C. No. 5:07-cv-04108-JF
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM *
WASHINGTON MUTUAL, a Washington
corporation; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jeremy D. Fogel, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 25, 2010 **
Before: CANBY, THOMAS, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Blomquist’s
request for oral argument is denied.
08-16910
Michael Blomquist appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing for lack of standing and without leave to amend his claims against non-
lender defendants alleging violations of antitrust, consumer protection, and
securities laws in connection with mortgage lending practices. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Loritz v. U.S. Ct.
App. for the Ninth Cir., 382 F.3d 990, 991 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed the claims for lack of standing because
Blomquist failed to allege a personal injury fairly traceable to the actions of non-
lender defendants. See id. at 992 (concluding that plaintiff lacked standing where
allegations concerning injury were speculative and unfounded).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the claims
without leave to amend because Blomquist failed to explain how he could cure the
pleading deficiencies. See Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, 300 F.3d 1083, 1087-88
(9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion by
dismissing without leave to amend where amendment would be futile); see also
Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding
that amendment would be futile where plaintiffs already filed an amended
complaint containing the same defects as their original complaint and failed to state
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what additional facts they would plead if given leave to amend, or what additional
discovery they would conduct to discover such facts).
Blomquist’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
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