Independent Electric Supply, Inc. v. Stronghold Engineering, Inc. , 610 F. App'x 673 ( 2015 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 28 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
INDEPENDENT ELECTRIC SUPPLY, No. 13-56062
INC.,
D.C. No. 2:12-cv-06532-PA-RZ
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. MEMORANDUM*
STRONGHOLD ENGINEERING, INC., a
California corporation,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 3, 2015**
Pasadena, California
Before: FISHER and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and FOOTE, District Judge.***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Elizabeth E. Foote, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
Defendant-appellant Stronghold Engineering, Inc. appeals the district court’s
award of attorney’s fees to plaintiff-appellee Independent Electric Supply, Inc.
(“IES”), following IES’s acceptance of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 offer
of judgment. The offer allowed entry of judgment against Stronghold in the
amount of “$50,000 plus all court costs and reasonable attorney fees (as
determined by the Court) . . . .” Upon IES’s acceptance, the district court entered
judgment in accordance with Stronghold’s offer of judgment. IES then moved the
district court to set reasonable attorney’s fees. Stronghold thereafter objected to
IES’s motion for attorney’s fees, contending that IES was not entitled to attorney’s
fees for six of its seven claims as a matter of law. The district court ultimately
awarded IES the entire amount it sought in fees. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review de novo issues involving the interpretation of
Rule 68 offers of judgment. See Erdman v. Cochise Cnty., Ariz., 926 F.2d 877,
879 (9th Cir. 1991). We affirm the district court’s award.
We conclude that Stronghold’s offer of judgment was unambiguous and
plainly allowed for the entry of reasonable attorney’s fees. Indeed, the offer’s
language specified that the only question left to be resolved was the reasonableness
of a fee award, not the existence of such an award. Stronghold contends that the
language of the offer did not compel a fee award, but rather reserved to it the right
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to oppose IES’s claim for any award. We disagree, concluding that the language
was clear on its face and entitled IES to attorney’s fees. In any event, had the
language been ambiguous, that ambiguity would be construed against Stronghold,
as “defendants are the master of what their Rule 68 offers offer.” Nusom v. Comh
Woodburn, Inc., 122 F.3d 830, 833 (9th Cir. 1997). The language drafted by
Stronghold permitted it to challenge only the reasonableness of the fees sought by
IES -- a challenge Stronghold chose not to pursue.
AFFIRMED.
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