Robert Paige v. Terry Goddard ( 2010 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 06 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT STANLEY PAIGE, No. 09-16789
Petitioner - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:07-cv-08089-EHC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
TERRY GODDARD, Attorney General of
the State of Arizona; CHARLES L.
RYAN,
Respondents - Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Earl H. Carroll, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 4, 2010
San Francisco, California
Before: FERNANDEZ and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges, and DUFFY, District
Judge.**
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
The State of Arizona appeals from the district court’s grant of Robert
Paige’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2253, and we reverse.
Because Paige filed his habeas petition after April 24, 1996, the Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies to his case.
Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001). We review de novo a
district court’s decision to grant or deny habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254, Rodriguez Benitez v. Garcia, 495 F.3d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 2007), and we look
to the last reasoned state court decision to determine whether it was contrary to, or
unreasonably applied federal law, Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1015 (9th Cir.
2008).
Paige argues that his guilty plea was involuntary because it was induced by
his counsel’s deficient performance. Specifically, Paige alleges that his counsel
misrepresented to him that the trial judge promised to sentence him to five years
imprisonment followed by lifetime probation; instead he received a sentence of
twenty-two years. Paige’s counsel testified that he told Paige that the judge gave
“every indication” that he would sentence Paige from five to seven-and-a-half
years imprisonment followed by a term of lifetime probation. And Paige’s
attorney stated that he explained to Paige that in his experience, the judge would
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not “change course without fair warning.” However, Paige’s attorney also testified
that he “fully and completely explained the written plea agreement . . . in a manner
[Paige] understood,” and expressly told Paige that as to his sentence “point blank
there was never a guarantee.”
Based on this testimony the state court found that Griffen did not make any
promises or misrepresentations to Paige regarding the judge’s sentencing
intentions; instead, he merely predicted, at best inaccurately, the sentence Paige
would receive. Paige knew he could get up to twenty-two years in prison. His
lawyer thought it would be less, but told Paige there was no guarantee. These
factual findings are not unreasonable. See Wood v. Allen, 130 S.Ct. 841, 849
(2010) (“a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because a
federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first
instance.”). Because the state court did not unreasonably find the facts, nor was its
decision contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court law, the
petition for habeas corpus should have been denied. See Womack v. Del Papa, 497
F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2007) (“a mere inaccurate prediction, standing alone,
would not constitute ineffective assistance” (internal quotation omitted)).
REVERSED.
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