Carlis Gragg v. K. Prosper ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                              FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                               DEC 09 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CARLIS A. GRAGG,                                  No. 09-17268
    Petitioner - Appellant,             D.C. No. 2:08-cv-02162-GGH
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    K. PROSPER,
    Respondent - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Gregory G. Hollows, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Submitted December 7, 2010 **
    San Francisco, California
    Before: D.W. NELSON, THOMPSON, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
    Carlis A. Gragg appeals from the district court’s denial of his petition for
    habeas corpus filed pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    . We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Gragg was found guilty of making a criminal threat in violation of California
    Penal Code § 422. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction in a
    reasoned decision. People v. Gragg, No. C053681, 
    2008 WL 933554
     (Cal. Ct.
    App. Apr. 8, 2008). The California Supreme Court denied review without
    comment. The district court denied prisoner’s federal habeas corpus petition, and
    issued a certificate of appealability under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    (c).
    The certified issue is whether admission of Jade Sprickman’s statements in
    the 911 recordings violated Gragg’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the
    Sixth Amendment. To obtain relief under § 2254, Gragg must show that the state
    court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
    established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
    or . . . resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
    the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d); see Williams v. Taylor, 
    529 U.S. 362
    , 412-13 (2000). We
    review the decision of the California Court of Appeal, as the “last reasoned
    decision” of the state court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 
    501 U.S. 797
    , 804-06 (1991).
    We hold that the California Court of Appeal’s characterization of the
    statements in both 911 calls as non-testimonial under Davis v. Washington, 
    547 U.S. 813
     (2006), and thus not subject to the Confrontation Clause, was not an
    2
    unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law nor an unreasonable
    determination of the facts presented. Davis establishes that a statement is non-
    testimonial when made “under circumstances objectively indicating that the
    primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police . . . to meet an ongoing
    emergency.” 
    Id. at 822
    .
    Gragg argues that the state court unreasonably applied Davis when it failed
    to consider the evidence of Sprickman’s alleged revengeful intent. However,
    Sprickman’s alleged subjective intentions at the time she made the calls are
    irrelevant because the circumstances surrounding the calls objectively indicated an
    ongoing emergency situation. See 
    id.
     Next, Gragg argues the state court failed to
    recognize the point at which the second call produced testimonial statements.
    Although we recognize that the district court drew a line distinguishing the point at
    which it believed the second call began to produce testimonial statements, we
    decline to do so. Instead, we hold that it was not unreasonable for the state court to
    characterize the entirety of Sprickman’s statements in both calls as non-testimonial
    because the police did not yet have Gragg in custody and Sprickman was still
    facing an ongoing emergency. In light of this determination, we need not consider
    Gragg’s final argument regarding his counsel’s ability to cross-examine
    Sprickman. See Crawford v. Washington, 
    541 U.S. 36
    , 51 (2004) (noting the
    3
    Confrontation Clause applies to “‘witnesses’ . . . who ‘bear testimony’”); Whorton
    v. Bockting, 
    549 U.S. 406
    , 420 (2007) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause has no
    application to [non-testimonial] statements . . . . ”).
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-17268

Filed Date: 12/9/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021