Leslie Dutton v. David Wesley ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              JUL 18 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LESLIE DUTTON; AMERICAN                          No. 12-56162
    ASSOCIATION OF WOMEN, INC.,
    D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01888-R-JC
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    DAVID S. WESLEY, in her official
    capacity as Presiding Judge of the Superior
    Court of California, County of Los
    Angeles; ANN I. JONES, in her official
    capacity as a Judge of the Superior Court
    of California, County of Los Angeles; D.
    BRETT BIANCO, in his official capacity
    as Court Counsel to the Superior Court of
    California, County of Los Angeles,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted March 4, 2014
    Pasadena, California
    Before: BYBEE, BEA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    Plaintiffs-Appellants Leslie Dutton and the American Association of
    Women, Inc., appeal the district court’s order dismissing their complaint in this 42
    U.S.C. § 1983 action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
    de novo an order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Stearns
    v. Ticketmaster Corp., 
    655 F.3d 1013
    , 1018 (9th Cir. 2011). We reverse the
    district court’s order dismissing the complaint and remand for further proceedings.
    The empty courtroom that the plaintiffs sought to access to film their
    documentary is either a nonpublic forum or a limited public forum. See
    Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 
    303 F.3d 959
    , 966 (9th Cir. 2002),
    abrogated in part on other grounds by Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
    
    555 U.S. 7
    (2008). Either way, speech restrictions are impermissible unless they
    are reasonable in light of the purposes served by the forum and viewpoint neutral.
    Wright v. Incline Vill. Gen. Improvement Dist., 
    665 F.3d 1128
    , 1138 n.5 (9th Cir.
    2011); see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 
    533 U.S. 98
    , 106–07
    (2001); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 
    473 U.S. 788
    , 806
    (1985).
    The plaintiffs’ complaint includes enough factual content to permit the
    reasonable inference that the defendants denied the plaintiffs’ request to access the
    courtroom because of the plaintiffs’ viewpoint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 2
    662, 676–78 (2009). The complaint alleges that another news outlet was permitted
    to access the same courtroom to report on the same subject, that the plaintiffs had a
    history of being critical of the defendants, and that the defendants were aware of
    this criticism. We can reasonably infer from the facts asserted that the plaintiffs
    were treated differently because of their viewpoint. Cf. Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv.,
    
    572 F.3d 962
    , 970–71 (9th Cir. 2009). We acknowledge that the defendants might
    have viewpoint-neutral reasons for excluding the plaintiffs while permitting others
    to engage in similar expressive activity on the same property. But “[t]he standard
    at this stage of the litigation is not that [the] plaintiff[s’] explanation must be true
    or even probable. The factual allegations of the complaint need only ‘plausibly
    suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Starr v. Baca, 
    652 F.3d 1202
    , 1216–17 (9th Cir.
    2011) (quoting 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681
    ).
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    3