James Selvitella v. City of South San Francisco, C , 425 F. App'x 544 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                              FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                               MAR 28 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JAMES SELVITELLA,                                 No. 10-15151
    Plaintiff - Appellant,              D.C. No. 4:08-cv-04388-CW
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    CITY OF SOUTH SAN FRANCISCO,
    CALIFORNIA, a Municipal Corporation;
    et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Claudia A. Wilken, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 16, 2011 **
    San Francisco, California
    Before: NOONAN, FERNANDEZ, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
    James Selvitella appeals the district court’s order denying his petition for a
    writ of mandamus under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5. We affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    The district court correctly concluded that the city of South San Francisco
    complied with its Personnel Rule § 13.02(B), which requires that the subject of
    disciplinary action be allowed “to inspect copies of all materials upon which the
    disciplinary action is based.” In Selvitella’s hearing before the Personnel Board,
    the Board accepted testimony that the city produced all of the materials it relied on
    in deciding to terminate Selvitella. The materials provided Selvitella with his
    notice of termination were more than sufficient to prove the factual allegations
    underlying his dismissal–indeed, Selvitella’s termination could have been
    supported by his admissions alone–which constitutes substantial evidence
    supporting the Board’s conclusion that Selvitella was allowed to inspect all
    materials on which the decision to terminate him was based. See Rosenblit v.
    Superior Court, 
    282 Cal. Rptr. 819
    , 824 (1991) (holding that foundational factual
    findings material to whether an agency proceeded in the manner required by law
    are reviewed for substantial evidence).
    The Personnel Board did not abuse its discretion by denying Selvitella’s
    discovery requests. See Cimarusti v. Superior Ct., 
    94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336
    , 342-43
    (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that agency evidentiary and discovery decisions are
    reviewed for abuse of discretion). Selvitella’s reliance on Shiveley v. Stewart, 
    55 Cal. Rptr. 217
    (Cal. 1966) is misplaced for two reasons. First, Shiveley dealt with
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    the right to practice one’s profession, not to retain a particular job. Second, even in
    Shively, the doctors challenging the agency decision were denied discovery with
    respect to “reports and documents gathered by investigators and employees of the
    board.” 
    Shiveley, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 69
    . The court held that “to secure discovery, there
    must be a showing of more than a wish for the benefit of all the information in the
    adversary’s files,” and that “some additional showing of need and specificity” was
    required. 
    Id. Selvitella has
    been incapable of even theorizing as to what types of
    documents or other materials the criminal investigation may have produced that
    could overcome the clearly established facts of his misconduct. Because the Board
    properly found that Selvitella had been provided all the materials to which he was
    entitled under local rules, the district court was correct to conclude that it did not
    abuse its discretion in refusing to order additional discovery.
    Selvitella’s complaint that the Board’s decision was not supported by
    findings related to the charges against him is without merit. In its decision, the
    Board noted that it “voted, unanimously, to uphold the City’s decision.” The Board
    also referenced the factual conclusions that underlay the City’s decision:
    The City terminated Mr. Selvitella’s employment after
    determining that Mr. Selvitella had engaged in repeated
    instances of illegal gambling while on duty, used City
    facilities to conduct illegal gambling activities and
    facilitated on-duty illegal gambling by a subordinate.
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    Far from leaving any “analytic gap,” as Selvitella suggests, the links between the
    factual allegations against Selvitella and the rule violations that resulted in his
    termination were made abundantly clear in the several notices he received
    regarding the disciplinary action against him, and did not require much explanation
    in the first place. Cf. Topanga Ass’n for A Scenic Community v. County of Los
    Angeles, 
    113 Cal. Rptr. 836
    , 841 (1974) (“[I]mplicit in section 1094.5 is a
    requirement that the agency which renders the challenged decision must set forth
    findings to bridge the analytic gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision
    or order.”) That the Personnel Board decision was brief and incorporated the City’s
    decision by reference is inconsequential, for the communication of the charges to
    Selvitella certainly satisfied “the liberal rules of administrative pleading,” which
    “require only that the respondent . . . be informed of the substance of the charge
    and afforded the basic, appropriate elements of procedural due process.” Cooper v.
    Bd. of Med Examiners, 
    123 Cal. Rptr. 563
    , 570 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); see also
    Burako v. Munro, 
    345 P.2d 124
    , 126 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (“[C]ourts are more
    interested in fair notice to the accused than in adherence to technical rules of
    pleading.”).
    Selvitella’s emphasis on the Board’s statement that it “also note[d] that the
    termination is warranted based on Mr. Selvitella’s acknowledged repeated
    4
    instances of illegal conduct while on duty” is a red herring. That statement merely
    indicates that, in addition to the several rule violations cited by the City, Selvitella
    also deserved to be terminated based on the simple fact that his actions were
    illegal. See South San Francisco Personnel Rule 13 (“The City may take
    disciplinary action against any employee for misconduct of any violation of
    . . . any laws.”).
    The Board did not abuse its discretion by terminating Selvitella for his
    misconduct. Courts review agency penalties “with great deference to the
    administrative agency.” Deegan v. Mountain View, 
    84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690
    , 695 (Cal
    Ct. App. 1999). “The appellate court reviews the agency’s selection of penalty and,
    if reasonable minds can differ with regard to the propriety of the disciplinary
    action, it finds no abuse of discretion.” 
    Id. Every City
    official that reviewed
    Selvitella’s case, including the Fire Chief, the City Manager, the Assistant City
    Manager, and each member of the unanimous Board, determined that Selvitella
    should be terminated. Their determination was based on the fact that Selvitella
    violated City rules by engaging in conduct that he knew was illegal, by
    encouraging at least one subordinate employee to do the same, and by using City
    property and equipment to engage in that illegal activity. That is not an
    5
    unreasonable basis. See 
    Deegan, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 695
    . The Board therefore did
    not abuse its discretion in upholding Selvitella’s termination.
    AFFIRMED.
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