United States v. Anthony Rankin ( 2010 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 17 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 09-30224
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 4:08-CR-00031-RRB-1
v.
MEMORANDUM *
ANTHONY RANKIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Ralph R. Beistline, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 29, 2010
Anchorage, Alaska
Before: SCHROEDER, O’SCANNLAIN and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Anthony Rankin was convicted, after a bench trial, of being a felon in
possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and
924(a)(2). He challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, and
also challenges his sentence.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The initial contact between Rankin and Alaska State Trooper Tuckwood in
the St. Mary’s airport was not an illegal seizure. The parties agree that the
appropriate analysis is supplied by United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
554-55 (1980), which identified relevant factors to consider. None of those factors
was present in this encounter. For example, as the district court found, the
officer’s tone was not aggressive, and although the cargo area to which the trooper
asked Rankin to go was not readily accessible to the general public, airline
employees used it and it was not confined. The magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation was thorough and well-reasoned, and its findings not clearly
erroneous.
The district court did not err when it ruled that Rankin voluntarily consented
to the search of his backpack. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-
49 (1973); United States v. Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d 1324, 1327 (9th Cir. 1997).
Nor did it err when it concluded that the statements made during the initial contact
and search of his backpack were not the product of custodial interrogation. See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
With respect to sentencing, the district court applied a two-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) for possession of a stolen firearm.
The finding that the gun had been stolen was not clearly erroneous. The sentence
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was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable, see United States v.
Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), particularly given the
dangerous nature of the defendant’s conduct in carrying a loaded firearm on an
airplane.
AFFIRMED.
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